

BIRLA CENTRAL LIBRARY

PILANI (RAJASTHAN)

Call No.	062
	B862
	v. 33
Accession No.	36115

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRITISH ACADEMY

1947

LONDON: *Published for* THE BRITISH ACADEMY
by GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4

The papers contained in this volume are issued
in separate form, and can be had from the
Publisher, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Amen House,
London, E.C. 4

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD
BY CHARLES BATEY, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

CONTENTS

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1947	v
RETIRED FELLOWS, 1947	vi
CORRESPONDING FELLOWS, 1947	vi
DECEASED FELLOWS, 1947	vii
OFFICERS AND COUNCIL, 1947-8	xi
ANNUAL REPORT, 1946-7	3
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. By Sir H. I. Bell	19
NATURALISTIC ETHICS (<i>Philosophical Lecture</i>). By W. F. R. Hardie. Read 5 March 1947	29
MILTON (<i>Lecture on a Master Mind</i>). By T. S. Eliot. Read 26 March 1947	61
SHAKESPEARE AND THE TERMERS (<i>Shakespeare Lecture</i>). By G. M. Young. Read 23 April 1947	81
THE RISE OF NORMANDY (<i>Raleigh Lecture on History</i>). By David Douglas. Read 28 May 1947	101
BAROQUE ART (<i>Aspects of Art Lecture</i>). By G. Webb. Read 18 June 1947	131
'THE FAERIE QUEENE' (<i>Warton Lecture on English Poetry</i>). By W. L. Renwick. Read 16 July 1947	149
THE ITALIAN ELEMENT IN LATE ROMAN AND EARLY MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTURE (<i>Italian Lecture</i>). By J. B. Ward-Perkins. Read 26 November 1947	163
SOME ATTIC VASES IN THE CYPRUS MUSEUM. By J. D. Beazley. <i>Communicated</i> 5 December 1947	195
THE ARCHAISM OF IRISH TRADITION (<i>Rhys Memorial Lecture</i>). By Myles Dillon. Read 11 February 1948	245

OBITUARY NOTICES

GEORGE GORDON COULTON, 1858-1947. By H. S. Bennett	267
WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, 1859-1946. By Arnold D. McNair and P. W. Duff	283
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, 1861-1947. By Dorothy Emmet	293
HECTOR MUNRO CHADWICK, 1870-1947. By J. M. de Navarro	307
HAROLD ARTHUR PRICHARD, 1871-1947. By H. H. Price	331
C. W. PREVITÉ-ORTON, 1877-1947. By M. D. Knowles	351

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

BAROQUE ART:

Plates I-VIII	<i>following p.</i> 148
-------------------------	-------------------------

ITALIAN ELEMENT IN LATE ROMAN ARCHITECTURE:

Plates I-VIII	„ 194
-------------------------	-------

SOME ATTIC VASES IN THE CYPRUS MUSEUM:

Plates 1-8	„ 244
----------------------	-------

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1947

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>†⁸⁶ Professor F. E. ADCOCK, O.B.E.
 ⁴¹ Mr. J. ALLAN.
 ⁴⁴ Dr. C. K. ALLEN.
 ²³ Mr. T. W. ALLEN.
 ²⁸ Professor B. ASHMOLE.
 ³³ Dr. C. BAILEY, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Professor H. W. BAILEY.
 ²⁶ Mr. E. A. BARBER.
 ⁴⁷ Sir ERNEST BARKER.
 ²⁶ Dr. L. D. BARNETT, C.B.
 ²⁰ Professor NORMAN H. BAYNES.
 ³⁷ Professor J. D. BEAZLEY.
 ²³ Sir H. I. BELL, C.B., O.B.E.
 ²⁴ The Rev. Professor J. F. BETHUNE-BAKER.
 ³⁷ The Rt. Hon. Lord BEVERIDGE, K.C.B.
 ²³ Dr. C. M. BOWRA.
 ²⁶ Professor C. D. BROAD.
 ³⁷ Dr. W. H. BUCKLER.
 ²¹ Professor W. M. CALDER.
 ⁴⁵ Miss Helen CAM.
 ⁴⁵ Mr. E. F. CARRITT.
 ⁴⁶ Sir A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS.
 ⁴⁴ Miss G. CATON THOMPSON.
 ²⁴ Sir E. K. CHAMBERS, K.B.E., C.B.
 ⁴⁰ The Rev. M. P. CHARLESWORTH.
 ⁴⁵ Professor G. C. CHESHIRE.
 ⁴⁰ Professor V. GORDON CHILDE.
 ²⁵ Sir A. W. CLAPHAM, C.B.E.
 ²⁶ Dr. G. N. CLARK.
 ⁴¹ Dr. A. B. COOK.
 ²³ Professor S. A. COOK.
 ²¹ Sir WILLIAM A. CRAIGIE.
 ⁴⁷ Mr. O. G. S. CRAWFORD.
 ⁴⁷ Professor K. A. C. CRESWELL.
 ⁴⁷ Miss HELEN DARBISHIRE.
 ²³ Professor R. M. DAWKINS.
 ⁴³ Mr. CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.
 ²⁷ Mr. J. D. DENNISTON, O.B.E.
 ⁴⁶ The Rev. Professor C. H. DODD.
 ⁴² Professor E. R. DODDS.
 ²⁰ Dr. CAMPBELL DODGSON, C.B.E.
 ²⁰ Professor G. R. DRIVER.
 ⁴³ Mr. J. GORONWY EDWARDS.
 ⁴¹ Dr. A. C. EWING.
 ⁴⁷ Sir CYRIL FLOWER, C.B.
 ⁴⁰ Sir CYRIL FOX.
 ⁴¹ Professor E. FRAENKEL.
 ⁴⁰ Mr. C. J. GADD.
 ²⁰ Professor V. H. GALBRAITH.
 ²⁰ Dr. ALAN H. GARDINER.
 ²¹ Dr. H. W. GARROD, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Professor H. A. R. GIBB.
 ⁴⁶ Professor S. R. K. GLANVILLE.</p> | <p>⁴⁷ Professor A. W. GOMME.
 ²⁶ Dr. G. P. GOOCH, C.H.
 ⁴³ Mr. A. S. F. GOW.
 ²⁸ Dr. W. W. GREG.
 ²³ Sir H. J. C. GRIERSON.
 ⁴³ Professor BATTISCOMBE GUNN.
 ⁴⁶ Professor R. HACKFORTH.
 ⁴³ Dr. J. L. HAMMOND.
 ⁴⁷ Mr. R. F. HARROD.
 ²³ Mr. R. G. HAWTREY, C.B.
 ⁴⁴ Professor F. A. VON HAYEK.
 ²⁴ Professor H. D. HAZELTINE.
 ⁴¹ Professor J. R. HICKS.
 ¹⁷ Sir G. F. HILL, K.C.B.
 ²¹ The Very Rev. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O.
 ⁴⁶ Dr. E. F. JACOB.
 ²⁴ Mr. CHARLES JOHNSON.
 ⁴⁷ Professor A. H. M. JONES.
 ⁴⁴ Dr. W. H. S. JONES.
 ⁴¹ Mr. T. D. KENDRICK.
 ² Sir F. G. KENYON, G.B.E., K.C.B.
 ⁴⁷ The Rev. Professor M. D. KNOWLES.
 ²³ Professor R. W. LEE.
 ²⁹ Sir A. D. McNAIR, C.B.E., K.C.
 ⁴⁶ The Rev. Professor T. W. MANSON.
 ²⁶ Sir JOHN MARSHALL, C.I.E.
 ⁴⁶ Mr. H. MATTINGLY.
 ²⁵ Sir ELLIS H. MINNS.
 ¹⁸ Professor G. E. MOORE.
 ¹⁰ Professor GILBERT MURRAY, O.M.
 ⁴⁴ Professor R. A. B. MYNORS.
 ²³ Sir J. L. MYRES, O.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Professor L. B. NAMIER.
 ²⁸ Dr. C. T. ONIONS, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁶ Professor H. J. PATON.
 ²⁶ Sir C. R. PEERS, C.B.E.
 ²⁴ Dr. A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE.
 ⁴⁶ Professor T. F. T. PLUCKNETT.
 ²⁹ Dr. A. F. POLLARD.
 ²⁷ Sir F. M. POWICKE.
 ⁴⁰ Professor EDGAR PRESTAGE.
 ⁴³ Professor H. H. PRICE.
 ⁴¹ Dr. F. J. E. RABY, C.B.
 ²⁰ Sir SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN.
 ⁴⁶ Professor W. L. RENWICK.
 ⁴⁷ Mr. I. A. RICHMOND.
 ⁴³ Professor L. C. ROBBINS, C.B.
 ⁴⁷ Mr. C. H. ROBERTS.
 ²⁰ Professor D. H. ROBERTSON, C.M.G.
 ⁴⁰ Professor D. S. ROBERTSON.
 ⁴² Mr. E. S. G. ROBINSON.
 ²⁴ Professor H. J. ROSE.
 ²⁷ Sir W. D. ROSS, K.B.E.
 ⁴⁷ The Rev. Professor H. H. ROWLEY.</p> |
|---|---|

† The year of election is indicated by the number: e.g. 4 = 1904; 13 = 1913.

LIST OF FELLOWS, 1947 (*continued*)

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p> ³⁰ The Rev. H. E. SALTER.
 ⁴⁴ Professor F. SAXL.
 ³² Professor R. W. SETON-WATSON.
 ⁴¹ Mr. K. SISAM.
 ³³ Professor D. NICHOL SMITH.
 ³⁴ Professor N. KEMP SMITH.
 ⁴¹ Professor SIDNEY SMITH.
 ³⁶ Professor ALEXANDER SOUTER.
 ³⁶ Professor F. M. STENTON.
 ⁴⁵ Mr. B. H. SUMNER.
 ⁴⁴ Mr. RONALD SYME.
 ³⁸ Dr. W. W. TARN.
 ³⁴ Professor R. H. TAWNEY.
 ³⁶ The Rev. Dr. F. R. TENNANT.
 ³⁷ Professor F. W. THOMAS, C.I.E.
 ³⁶ Sir H. THOMAS.
 ³⁸ Professor A. HAMILTON THOMPSON, C.B.E.
 ⁴⁷ The Rev. J. M. THOMPSON.
 ³⁹ Dr. MARCUS N. TOD, O.B.E.
 ³⁷ Professor ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.
 ³⁵ Dr. GEORGE M. TREVELYAN, O.M., C.B.E. </p> | <p> ⁴³ Professor R. L. TURNER.
 ⁴⁵ Professor A. J. B. WACE.
 ⁴¹ Professor H. T. WADE-GERY.
 ⁴⁵ Dr. A. D. WALEY.
 ³⁷ Dr. C. C. J. WEBB.
 ³⁷ Sir C. K. WEBSTER, K.C.M.G.
 ⁴¹ Dr. R. E. MORTIMER WHEELER, C.I.E.
 ⁴⁷ Professor BASIL WILLEY.
 ³⁶ Professor BASIL WILLIAMS, O.B.E.
 ⁴⁴ Mr. HAROLD WILLIAMS.
 ³⁸ Sir IFOR WILLIAMS.
 ⁴³ Professor F. P. WILSON.
 ³¹ Professor J. DOVER WILSON, C.H.
 ³⁶ Professor P. H. WINFIELD.
 ⁴⁶ Sir R. O. WINSTEDT, K.B.E., C.M.G.
 ⁴⁶ Professor E. L. WOODWARD.
 ⁴⁰ The Rt. Hon. Lord WRIGHT.
 ³⁹ The Most Hon. the Marquess of ZETLAND, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
 ³⁹ Professor F. de ZULUETA. </p> |
|---|--|

RETIRED FELLOWS, 1947

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p> ²² Professor A. L. BOWLEY, C.B.E. </p> | <p> ³⁵ Mr. E. W. BROOKS.
 ²⁷ Professor A. C. PIGOU. </p> |
|---|--|

CORRESPONDING FELLOWS, 1947

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p> ⁴⁷ Dr. A. ALFÖLDI (Hungary).
 ³³ The Duke of BERWICK AND ALBA (Spain).
 ³⁹ Professor ETTORE BIGNONE (Italy).
 ⁴³ Professor CAMPBELL BONNER (U.S.A.).
 ³⁵ Senatore BENEDETTO GROCE (Italy).
 ¹⁸ M. F. CUMONT (Belgium).
 ³⁷ M. RENÉ DUSSAUD (France).
 ⁴⁷ The Rev. Professor F. DVORNIK (Czechoslovakia).
 ³⁷ Professor EILERT EKWALL (Sweden).
 ⁴³ Professor W. S. FERGUSON (U.S.A.).
 ³⁴ Professor MAX FÖRSTER (Germany).
 ³⁹ M. ALFRED FOUCHER (France).
 ³⁷ Professor ÉTIENNE GILSON (France).
 ⁴⁷ Professor ERNST E. HERZFELD (Germany).
 ³⁶ Dr. PAUL JACOBSTHAL (Germany).
 ⁴⁵ Dr. FELIX JACOBY (Germany).
 ³⁷ Professor WERNER JAEGER (Germany).
 ³⁹ M. PIERRE JOUGUET (France).
 ⁴⁶ Professor WILHELM KOEHLER (Germany).
 ³¹ Professor HALVDAN KOHT (Norway).
 ³³ Professor PAUL LEHMANN (Germany).
 ³¹ Professor EINAR LÖFSTEDT (Sweden).
 ³⁵ Professor FERDINAND LOT (France). </p> | <p> ³⁹ Professor E. A. LOWE (U.S.A.).
 ⁴¹ Dr. PAUL MAAS (Germany).
 ⁴¹ Professor C. H. McILWAIN (U.S.A.).
 ³⁹ M. ÉMILE MÂLE (France).
 ³⁹ Professor RAMÓN MENÉNDEZ PIDAL (Spain).
 ⁴⁰ Professor B. D. MERITT (U.S.A.).
 ⁴³ Professor VLADIMIR MINORSKY (Russia).
 ³⁹ Professor MARTIN P. NILSSON (Sweden).
 ⁴³ Professor A. D. NOCK (U.S.A.).
 ⁴⁰ Professor ROSCOE POUND (U.S.A.).
 ³⁹ Professor LUDWIG RADERMACHER (Germany).
 ⁴⁶ Miss GISELA M. A. RICHTER (U.S.A.).
 ⁴⁶ Professor LOUIS ROBERT (France).
 ¹⁷ Professor MIKHAIL ROSTOVTZEFF (U.S.A.).
 ⁴⁶ M. CLAUDE F. A. SCHAEFFER (France).
 ³³ Dr. HAAKON SHETELIG (Norway).
 ⁴⁴ Professor E. V. TARLÉ (Russia).
 ⁴⁴ Professor TSCHEN YINKOH (China).
 ³⁹ Père L. HUGUES VINCENT (France).
 ³¹ Professor ADOLF WILHELM (Germany). </p> |
|---|---|

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1947

ORDINARY

- ¹⁸ The Rev. Dr. E. A. ABBOTT.
¹⁷ Dr. LASCELLES ABERCROMBIE.
¹⁸ Professor SAMUEL ALEXANDER, O.M.
²⁰ Dr. P. S. ALLEN.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Sir W. R. ANSON, Bart.
^{*} Mr. EDWARD ARMSTRONG.
²⁰ Sir T. W. ARNOLD, C.I.E.
²⁷ Dr. THOMAS ASHBY.
²⁸ The Rt. Hon. Lord ATKIN.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. the Earl of BALFOUR, K.G., O.M.
²¹ Professor C. F. BASTABLE.
⁴³ Dr. E. R. BEVAN, O.B.E.
²⁰ Dr. J. BONAR.
^{*} Professor B. BOSANQUET.
¹⁰ Dr. A. C. BRADLEY.
⁷ Dr. HENRY BRADLEY.
²⁰ The Rev. F. E. BRIGHTMAN.
²⁴ The Rev. Dr. A. E. BROOKE.
⁴⁰ Professor Z. N. BROOKE.
²⁰ Professor G. BALDWIN BROWN.
^{*} Professor HUME BROWN.
^{*} Professor E. G. BROWNE.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Viscount BRYCE, O.M.
²⁰ Professor W. W. BUCKLAND.
¹⁵ Professor F. C. BURKITT.
¹⁸ Professor JOHN BURNETT.
^{*} Professor J. B. BURY.
^{*} Mr. S. H. BUTCHER.
^{*} Mr. INGRAM BYWATER.
^{*} Dr. EDWARD CAIRD.
²⁰ The Rev. Dr. A. J. CARLYLE.
²⁵ Professor H. M. CHADWICK.
²⁷ The Rt. Hon. Lord CHALMERS, G.C.B.
²⁷ Professor R. W. CHAMBERS.
⁶ The Ven. Archdeacon CHARLES.
⁴ The Rev. Professor T. K. CHEYNE.
²⁰ Sir J. H. CLAPHAM, C.B.E.
¹⁸ Dr. A. C. CLARK.
³ The Rt. Hon. ARTHUR COHEN, K.C.
³⁴ Professor R. G. COLLINGWOOD.
¹⁸ Professor R. S. CONWAY.
³ Dr. F. C. CONYBEARE.
²⁷ Professor F. M. CORNFORD.
²⁰ Dr. G. G. COULTON.
⁶ Dr. W. J. COURTHOPE, C.B.
^{*} Professor E. B. COWELL.
¹⁹ Sir ARTHUR E. COWLEY.
²⁸ The Rev. Professor J. M. CREED.
²³ Dr. WILLIAM CROOKE, C.I.E.
³¹ Dr. W. E. CRUM.
^{*} The Ven. Archdeacon CUNNINGHAM.
^{*} The Most Hon. the Marquess CURZON OF KEDLESTON, K.G.
²² Mr. O. M. DALTON
- ²⁷ The Most Rev. C. F. D'ARCY.
⁵ The Rt. Hon. Lord DAVEY.
^{*} Professor T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.
²⁶ Professor H. W. C. DAVIS, C.B.E.
²⁸ Professor W. G. DE BURGH.
^{*} Professor A. V. DICEY, K.C.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Viscount DILLON, C.H.
^{*} The Rev. Professor S. R. DRIVER.
³⁰ Professor J. WIGHT DUFF.
^{*} Professor F. Y. EDGEWORTH.
^{*} Professor ROBINSON ELLIS.
²⁴ Professor O. ELTON.
^{*} Sir A. J. EVANS.
^{*} The Rev. A. M. FAIRBAIRN.
¹⁴ Dr. L. R. FARNELL.
³ Sir C. H. FIRTH.
⁷ The Rt. Hon. H. A. L. FISHER, O.M.
¹⁴ The Rt. Hon. Lord FITZMAURICE.
^{*} Professor J. FITZMAURICE-KELLY.
^{*} The Rev. Professor R. F. FLINT.
²⁴ Dr. R. E. W. FLOWER, C.B.E.
²³ Dr. J. K. FOTHERINGHAM.
^{*} Professor H. S. FOXWELL.
^{*} Professor A. CAMPBELL FRASER.
^{*} Sir J. G. FRAZER, O.M.
³ The Rt. Hon. Sir EDWARD FRY, G.C.B.
³ Dr. F. J. FURNIVALL.
²⁵ Professor E. G. GARDNER.
² Professor P. GARDNER.
²⁰ Sir STEPHEN GASELEE, K.C.M.G., C.B.E.
²⁷ Dr. PETER GILES.
^{*} Sir ISRAEL GOLLANZ.
⁵ The Rt. Hon. Lord GOSCHEN.
⁵ Professor B. P. GRENFELL.
²⁴ Professor F. LLEWELLYN GRIFFITH.
¹⁴ The Rt. Hon. Viscount HALDANE, K.T., O.M.
²⁰ Dr. H. R. H. HALL.
⁴ Professor F. J. HAVERFIELD.
²³ Sir T. L. HEATH, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
²⁸ Professor C. H. HERFORD.
²⁷ Professor G. DAWES HICKS.
²³ Professor A. PEARCE HIGGINS, C.B.E., K.C.
²³ Professor L. T. HOBHOUSE.
^{*} Dr. THOMAS HODGKIN.
^{*} Dr. S. H. HODGSON.
⁵ Dr. D. G. HOGARTH, C.M.G.
²² Sir W. S. HOLDSWORTH, O.M., K.C.
^{*} Sir T. ERSKINE HOLLAND, K.C.
²⁸ Dr. T. RICE HOLMES.
¹³ Professor A. S. HUNT.
⁴⁴ The Rev. Dr. F. E. HUTCHINSON.
^{*} Sir COURTENAY ILBERT, G.C.B.
³ Dr. HENRY JACKSON, O.M.

* One of the First Fellows.

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1947 (continued)

- ³ Dr. M. R. JAMES, O.M.
^{*} Sir R. C. JEBB, O.M.
³⁰ Dr. EDWARD JENKS.
²⁸ Professor H. H. JOACHIM.
²⁸ Mr. W. E. JOHNSON.
⁴ Sir HENRY JONES, C.H.
¹⁵ Sir H. STUART JONES.
³⁰ Mr. H. W. B. JOSEPH.
⁹ The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice KENNEDY.
⁹ Professor C. S. KENNY.
⁵ Professor W. P. KER.
²⁰ The Rt. Hon. Lord KEYNES, C.B.
²⁴ Mr. C. L. KINGSFORD.
³³ Professor J. LAIRD.
⁶ Mr. ANDREW LANG.
²¹ Professor S. H. LANGDON.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. W. E. H. LECKY, O.M.
¹⁰ Sir SIDNEY LEE.
³ The Rt. Hon. Lord LINDLEY.
⁵ Professor W. M. LINDSAY.
²³ Dr. A. G. LITTLE.
³⁰ Sir J. E. LLOYD.
³ The Rt. Hon. Sir A. LYALL, G.C.I.E.,
 K.C.B.
¹⁵ Sir CHARLES J. LYALL, K.C.S.I.
¹³ Sir GEORGE MACDONALD, K.C.B.
⁶ Professor A. A. MACDONELL.
¹³ Sir JOHN MACDONELL, K.C.B.
¹⁴ Dr. J. W. MACKAIL, O.M.
²⁴ Professor J. S. MACKENZIE.
²² Dr. R. B. MCKERROW.
²⁴ Dr. NORMAN McLEAN.
⁶ Dr. J. ELLIS McTAGGART.
^{*} Professor F. W. MAITLAND.
²¹ Dr. R. R. MARETT.
¹⁵ Professor D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.
^{*} Professor ALFRED MARSHALL.
²⁰ Sir ALLEN MAWER.
^{*} Sir H. C. MAXWELL-LYTE, K.C.B.
^{*} The Rev. Professor J. E. B. MAYOR.
²³ Dr. W. MILLER.
^{*} Mr. D. B. MONRO.
⁶ The Rev. Canon MOORE.
³ Professor W. R. MORFILL.
³ The Rt. Hon. Viscount MORLEY, O.M.
²¹ Professor J. H. MUIRHEAD.
³ Dr. A. S. MURRAY.
^{*} Sir JAMES A. H. MURRAY.
⁶ Professor A. S. NAPIER.
¹⁵ Mr. W. L. NEWMAN.
³ Professor J. S. NICHOLSON.
²³ Professor R. A. NICHOLSON.
⁵ Sir CHARLES W. C. OMAN, K.B.E.
²⁸ The Rev. Dr. J. W. OMAN.
²⁴ Professor A. C. PEARSON.
⁴ Dr. JOHN PEILE.
^{*} Professor H. F. PELHAM.
⁴ Sir W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.
²⁴ The Rev. Dr. C. PLUMMER.
²³ Dr. A. W. POLLARD, C.B.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Sir FREDERICK POL-
 LOCK, Bart., K.C.
- ⁴ Dr. REGINALD L. POOLE.
⁷ Professor J. P. POSTGATE.
²⁹ Professor C. W. PREVITÉ-ORTON.
²² Professor H. A. PRICHARD.
⁴ Professor A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTI-
 SON.
³ Sir GEORGE W. PROTHERO, K.B.E.
²³ Dr. L. C. PURSER.
¹⁵ Sir JAMES H. RAMSAY, Bart.
²⁸ Dr. D. RANDALL-MacIVER.
²¹ Professor E. J. RAPSON.
⁹ The Very Rev. HASTINGS RASH-
 DALL.
¹³ Sir C. HERCULES READ.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Lord REAY, K.T.,
 G.C.S.I.
¹⁷ Professor JAMES SMITH REID.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. Sir JOHN RHYS.
²⁷ Admiral Sir HERBERT W. RICH-
 MOND, K.C.B.
⁴ Sir WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.
²⁰ Professor J. G. ROBERTSON.
³ The Very Rev. J. ARMITAGE
 ROBINSON, K.C.V.O.
^{*} The Rt. Hon. the Earl of ROSEBERY,
 K.G., K.T.
¹⁷ The Rt. Rev. BISHOP RYLE,
 K.C.V.O.
¹¹ Professor GEORGE SAINTSBURY.
^{*} The Rev. Provost GEORGE SALMON.
^{*} The Rev. Professor WILLIAM SANDAY.
⁹ Sir JOHN E. SANDYS.
¹⁵ Professor W. R. SCOTT.
²⁷ Professor E. de SELINCOURT.
²⁹ Mr. A. F. SHAND.
⁴⁰ Dr. W. A. SHAW.
^{*} The Rev. Professor W. W. SKEAT.
²⁹ Professor D. A. SLATER.
²⁴ Mr. A. HAMILTON SMITH, C.B.
¹⁵ The Very Rev. Sir GEORGE ADAM
 SMITH.
²³ Professor G. C. MOORE SMITH.
⁵ Professor W. R. SORLEY.
²⁵ The Rt. Hon. Lord STAMP, G.C.B.,
 G.B.E.
²¹ Sir AUREL STEIN, K.C.I.E.
^{*} Sir LESLIE STEPHEN.
^{*} Dr. WHITLEY STOKES, C.S.I.,
 C.I.E.
³ Professor G. F. STOUT.
²⁵ The Rev. Canon B. H. STREETER.
^{*} The Rev. Professor H. B. SWETE.
¹¹ Professor A. E. TAYLOR.
²⁷ Professor H. W. V. TEMPERLEY,
 O.B.E.
²⁵ Sir RICHARD TEMPLE, Bart., C.B.,
 C.I.E.
^{*} Sir E. MAUNDE THOMPSON, G.C.B.
²⁴ Dr. R. CAMPBELL THOMPSON.
¹¹ Professor T. F. TOUT.
¹⁹ Dr. PAGET TOYNBEE.
^{*} The Rev. H. F. TOZER.

DECEASED FELLOWS, 1947 (*continued*)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⁴ The Rt. Hon. Sir GEORGE O. TREVELYAN, Bart., O.M. ¹¹ Mr. G. J. TURNER. [*] Professor R. Y. TYRRELL. ⁶ Sir PAUL VINOGRADOFF. ⁴ Sir SPENCER WALPOLE, K.C.B. [*] Sir A. W. WARD. [*] Professor JAMES WARD. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⁴ Sir G. F. WARNER. ²¹ Mrs. BEATRICE WEBB. ²¹ The Very Rev. H. J. WHITE. ²¹ Professor A. N. WHITEHEAD, O.M. ⁷ Professor J. COOK WILSON. ⁵ The Rt. Rev. JOHN WORDSWORTH. ⁴ Professor JOSEPH WRIGHT. |
|--|---|

RETIRED

- ¹⁶ Professor A. A. BEVAN.
- ¹⁷ Sir GEORGE A. GRIERSON, O.M., K.C.I.E.
- ²⁷ Dr. J. RENDEL HARRIS.
- ²⁵ Professor A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.
- ^{*} Sir W. M. RAMSAY.
- ²² Dr. J. HOLLAND ROSE.
- ²² Dr. F. C. S. SCHILLER.
- ²¹ Professor JAMES TAIT.
- ²² Sir HERBERT THOMPSON, Bart.
- ⁹ Professor CUTHBERT H. TURNER.

HONORARY

- ²² Dr. FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY, O.M.
- ²¹ The Rt. Rev. Bishop G. FORREST BROWNE.
- ¹⁶ The Rt. Hon. the Earl of CROMER, G.C.B., O.M.
- ²² Dr. CHARLES MONTAGU DOUGHTY.
- ¹⁶ The Rt. Hon. Sir SAMUEL WALKER GRIFFITH, G.C.M.G.
- ²² The Rt. Hon. Lord PHILLIMORE.
- ²² The Rev. Professor A. H. SAYCE.
- ²² The Rt. Hon. Viscount WAKEFIELD, G.C.V.O., C.B.E.

CORRESPONDING

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⁴ Count UGO BALZANI (Italy). ¹⁴ M. CHARLES BÉMONT (France). ¹¹ M. HENRI BERGSON (France). ²⁷ Professor JOSEPH BIDEZ (Belgium). ¹⁷ M. CHARLES BORGEAUD (Switzerland). ⁷ M. ÉMILE BOUTROUX (France). ²⁴ Dr. JAMES H. BREASTED (U.S.A.). ¹³ Professor F. K. BRUGMANN (Germany). ²³ M. JEAN CAPART (Belgium). ²⁷ Professor ÉMILE CARTAILLAC (France). ¹⁶ Senatore DOMENICO COMPARETTI (Italy). ²⁰ M. HENRI CORDIER (France). ¹⁶ Professor A. CROISSET (France). ²⁵ Professor ROBERT DAVIDSOHN (Germany). ²⁰ Père HIPPOLYTE DELEHAYE (Belgium). ⁷ M. LÉOPOLD DELISLE (France). ²⁷ Professor CHARLES DIEHL (France). ⁴ Professor H. DIELS (Germany). ¹⁰ Monseigneur DUCHESNE (France). ¹⁴ Mr. CHARLES W. ELIOT (U.S.A.). ²² Professor ADOLF ERMAN (Germany). ²⁴ Professor TENNEY FRANK (U.S.A.). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⁴ M. le Comte de FRANQUEVILLE (France). ²⁸ Professor WILHELM GEIGER (Germany). ¹³ Professor OTTO von GIERKE (Germany). ⁷ Professor BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE (U.S.A.). ⁴ Professor M. J. de GOEJE (Holland). ⁴ Professor I. GOLDZIEHER (Hungary). ⁴ Professor T. GOMPERZ (Austria). ¹⁷ Senatore IGNAZIO GUIDI (Italy). ¹⁷ President ARTHUR T. HADLEY (U.S.A.). ⁷ Professor ADOLF HARNACK (Germany). ²⁰ Professor CHARLES HOMER HASKINS (U.S.A.). ¹⁷ Professor LOUIS HAVET (France). ⁴ Professor J. L. HEIBERG (Denmark). ⁷ Professor HARALD HØFFDING (Denmark). ⁷ Mr. Justice HOLMES (U.S.A.). ¹³ Professor CHRISTIAN SNOUCK HURGRONJE (Holland). ²² Professor EDMUND HUSSERL (Germany). |
|---|---|

DECEASED FELLOWS 1947 (continued)

CORRESPONDING (continued)

- ⁷ Professor WILLIAM JAMES (U.S.A.).
¹⁸ Dr. J. FRANKLIN JAMESON (U.S.A.).
²⁸ Professor OTTO JESPERSEN (Denmark).
⁴¹ Sir GANGANATH JHA, C.I.E. (India)
⁸⁰ Professor FINNUR JONSSON (Iceland).
¹¹ His Excellency M. J. JUSSERAND (France).
⁸⁸ Professor PAUL KEHR (Germany).
¹⁰ Professor G. L. KITREDGE (U.S.A.).
⁹⁷ Professor WILHELM KROLL (Germany).
⁴ Professor K. KRUMBACHER (Germany).
³⁰ Professor C. R. LANMAN (U.S.A.).
¹⁶ M. ERNEST LAVISSE (France).
⁹ Mr. H. C. LEA (U.S.A.).
⁴⁴ Dom HENRI LECLERCQ, O.S.B. (France).
³⁴ Professor ÉMILE LEGOUIS (France).
²³ Professor O. LENEL (Germany).
⁴ Professor F. LEO (Holland).
⁸⁸ Professor H. L. LÉVY-ULLMANN (France).
⁹ Dr. F. LIEBERMANN (Germany).
¹³ President A. LAWRENCE LOWELL (U.S.A.).
⁶⁶ Professor J. LIVINGSTON LOWES (U.S.A.).
³⁰ Dr. CHARLES LYON-CAEN (France).
⁷ Professor FREDERICK DE MARTEN (Russia).
⁸⁰ Dr. T. G. MASARYK (Czechoslovakia).
⁹ Don MARCELINO MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO (Spain).
¹⁰ Professor EDUARD MEYER (Germany).
⁴ M. PAUL MEYER (France).
¹³ Professor ERNEST NYS (Belgium).
¹⁸ Professor B. M. OLSEN (Iceland).
¹⁴ M. H. OMONT (France).
³⁸ Professor WALTER OTTO (Germany).
³¹ Professor PAUL PELLIOT (France).
⁴ M. GEORGES PERROT (France).
⁴⁰ M. CHARLES PETIT-DUTAILLIS (France).
⁴ M. GEORGES PICOT (France).
²¹ Professor HENRI PIRENNE (Belgium)
⁸⁰ Professor PIO RAJNA (Italy).
²⁷ Professor EDWARD KENNARD RAND (U.S.A.).
¹¹ M. SALOMON REINACH (France).
⁹ His Excellency M. LOUIS RENAULT (France).
¹¹ Mr. J. F. RHODES (U.S.A.).
¹⁸ His Excellency M. RIBOT (France).
¹⁶ The Hon. ELIHU ROOT (U.S.A.).
¹⁸ Professor JOSIAH ROYCE (U.S.A.).
²³ Professor REMIGIO SABBADINI (Italy).
⁷ Professor KARL EDUARD SACHAU (Germany).
⁴ Professor C. H. SALEMANN (Russia).
²³ Père VINCENT SCHEIL (France).
¹⁰ M. SENART (France).
⁹ Professor E. SIEVERS (Germany).
²⁶ Professor JYUN TAKAKUSU (Japan).
⁴⁰ Professor A. M. TALLGREN (Finland).
²⁵ Professor FRANCIS WILLIAM TAUSIG (U.S.A.).
⁹ The Prince of TEANO (Italy).
³⁸ M. F. THUREAU-DANGIN (France).
¹⁴ Signor PASQUALE VILLARI (Italy).
⁷ Professor ULRICH von WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORFF (Germany).
²⁶ Professor ULRICH WILCKEN (Germany).
¹⁰ Professor D. ERNST WINDISCH (Germany).
²³ Professor THADDEUS ZIELINSKI (Poland).

THE BRITISH ACADEMY

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL

JULY 1947

PRESIDENT:

SIR H. I. BELL, C.B., O.B.E.

COUNCIL:

⁴⁵ PROFESSOR F. E. ADCOCK, O.B.E.

⁴⁵ DR. C. BAILEY, C.B.E.

⁴⁶ PROFESSOR H. W. BAILEY.

⁴⁶ SIR A. W. CLAPHAM, C.B.E.

⁴⁷ DR. G. N. CLARK.

⁴⁵ MR. J. GORONWY EDWARDS.

⁴⁵ PROFESSOR V. H. GALBRAITH.

⁴⁶ DR. W. W. GREG.

⁴⁷ MR. R. G. HAWTREY, C.B.

⁴⁷ PROFESSOR R. A. B. MYNORS.

⁴⁵ DR. A. W. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE.

⁴⁷⁽⁴⁶⁾ SIR W. D. ROSS, K.B.E.

⁴⁷ PROFESSOR D. NICHOL SMITH.

⁴⁷ PROFESSOR R. L. TURNER.

⁴⁶ PROFESSOR P. H. WINFIELD.

TREASURER:

SIR F. G. KENYON, G.B.E., K.C.B.
BURLINGTON GARDENS, LONDON, W. 1.

SECRETARY:

SIR F. G. KENYON, G.B.E., K.C.B.
BURLINGTON GARDENS, LONDON, W. 1.

⁴⁵ Elected 1945.

⁴⁶ Elected 1946.

⁴⁷ Elected 1947.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRITISH ACADEMY

1947

BRITISH ACADEMY
ANNUAL REPORT

1946-7

THE Academy has lost during the year eight Ordinary Fellows by death: Prof. Z. N. Brooke, Prof. Chadwick, Dr. Coulton, Prof. Laird, Sir J. E. Lloyd, Sir C. Oman, Prof. Previt -Orton, and Sir H. Richmond; also Prof. W. Geiger and Prof. J. Livingston Lowes, Corresponding Fellows. The death of Prof. W. Otto in 1941 has been reported. In July 1946 Sir A. Carr-Saunders, the Rev. C. H. Dodd, Prof. S. R. K. Glanville, Prof. R. Hackforth, Prof. E. F. Jacob, Mr. H. Mattingly, Prof. H. J. Paton, Prof. T. F. T. Plucknett, Prof. W. L. Renwick, and Prof. E. Ll. Woodward were elected to Ordinary Fellowship and Prof. W. Koehler, Miss G. M. A. Richter, Prof. L. Robert, and M. Claude Schaeffer to Corresponding Fellowship. The total number of Fellows before the elections of July 1947 was 137 Ordinary and 46 Corresponding.

The following Lectures were delivered during the year on the various foundations administered by the Academy:

ITALIAN LECTURE, by Mr. D. M. Bueno de Mesquita, on *Some Condottieri of the Trecento* (6 November).

SCHWEICH LECTURES, by Dr. G. Zuntz, on *The Text of the Pauline Epistles* (9, 11, and 13 December).

SIR JOHN RHYS MEMORIAL LECTURE, by Professor T. H. Parry-Williams, on *Welsh Poetic Diction* (29 January).

SIR ISRAEL GOLLANCZ MEMORIAL LECTURE, by Professor C. L. Wrenn, on *The Poetry of Caedmon* (19 February).

PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURE, by Mr. W. F. R. Hardie, on *Naturalistic Ethics* (5 March).

MASTER-MIND LECTURE, by Mr. T. S. Eliot, on *Milton* (26 March).

SHAKESPEARE LECTURE, by Mr. G. M. Young, on *Shakespeare and the Termers* (23 April).

RALEIGH LECTURE, by Professor David Douglas, on *The Rise of Normandy* (28 May).

ASPECTS OF ART LECTURE, by Mr. Geoffrey Webb, on *Baroque Art* (18 June).

WARTON LECTURE, by Professor W. L. Renwick, on *The Faerie Queene* (16 July).

Vol. xxix of the *Proceedings* (for 1943) has been issued during the year, and the Schweich Lectures for 1943 were published in June. The *Proceedings* for 1944-6 still await publication, and the Schweich Lectures for 1941, 1944, 1945, and 1946 are also

in various stages of progress. Vol. xxii of the Pipe Roll Society, subsidized by the Academy, has been issued.

The following awards of prizes and medals were made:

Burkitt Bronze Medal for Biblical Studies: Dr. W. F. Howard.

Rose Mary Crawshay Prize: Professor Marjorie H. Nicolson, of Columbia University, for her book *Newton Demands the Muse*.

Serena Medal for Italian Studies: no award.

Sir Israel Gollancz Biennial Prize: no award.

Cromer Greek Essay Prize: no award.

In accordance with a resolution of the Annual General Meeting in July 1946, application was made to the Privy Council for an alteration in Bye-law 1, raising the maximum number of Ordinary Fellows to 175. This application was granted by Order in Council dated 4 December 1946. The Annual General Meeting resolved that not more than five elections, in addition to those caused by death or resignation, should be made in any one year.

Prof. Broad having resigned his membership of the Council, Sir D. Ross was co-opted in his place.

The following appointments were made of representatives of the Academy on various bodies: Sir A. Carr-Saunders on the Co-operative Body for Social Sciences established by Unesco; Mr. T. D. Kendrick on the London Excavation Committee; Prof. F. W. Thomas on the Congress of Orientalists; Prof. Calder on the Committee for establishing a British Institute at Ankara; Profs. Clark and Galbraith on the British National Committee of the International Historical Congress; Sir A. Clapham on the Committee for the Leverhulme Research Studentships. Prof. Campbell Bonner was appointed to represent the Academy at the Bicentenary Commemoration of Princeton University, and Sir C. Webster at the Centenary Celebrations of the Academy of Vienna, when an address was presented on behalf of the Academy.

Owing to the difficulty of obtaining gold, and the great increase in its cost, it was decided to ask those to whom awards of the Serena Gold Medal had been made, but delivery had been delayed by the war, whether they would prefer to continue to wait until gold should be obtainable at a reasonable price, or to receive their medals in bronze-gilt or plain bronze. All were in favour of receiving them in plain bronze, which was considered to show the workmanship of the medal to better effect.

Applications for gifts of the Academy's publications were granted in the case of the Jesuit Collège Philosophique of Louvain (which had purchased many of the volumes itself), and the Croatian Academy of Sciences, which was placed on the standing list of recipients of the Academy's publications.

Legal difficulties having arisen with regard to Sir Aurel Stein's bequest (see *Annual Report for 1943-4*), on account of uncertainty as to his legal nationality, the Academy was represented at an inquiry before a Judge of the High Court, whose decision (on 20 March 1947) was that Sir Aurel never lost his Hungarian nationality, and the bequest was therefore valid, and that a scheme for the regulation of the Fund should be brought into Court by the Academy. A scheme was prepared in 1944 and approved by the Trustees, and this will be brought into Court in due course.

In accordance with the wishes of H.M. Treasury, the applications of the several Schools of Archaeology for grants from public funds were presented through the Academy and with the Academy's observations and recommendations. As the result, the following grants were made for the current year:

	£
British School at Rome	3,000
British School at Athens	3,000
Egypt Exploration Society	3,000
British School in Iraq	3,000
Anglo-Turkish Institute of Archaeology in Ankara	5,000

No grant was made to the British School in Jerusalem, since operations in Palestine are not likely to be possible in the near future; and a doubt was expressed whether, in view of the existence of a Department of Antiquities in Palestine, there is any need for a British School of Archaeology.

An application was received from the Swiss Commission for the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* for assistance in reviving work on the *Thesaurus* by sending Dr. H. Haffter to Munich on a two years' mission to study the subject in conjunction with the Bavarian authorities and make arrangements for the recommencement of work. On obtaining assurances that this proposal had the full concurrence of the German Academies, who were previously responsible for the work but are no longer able to carry it on unaided, it was agreed to support Dr. Haffter's mission and to make a contribution for two years.

The Academy, in response to an application from an American Committee, promised its moral support to a scheme for preparing annotated lists and guides for Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries on ancient Greek and Latin authors, but was unable, in view of its commitments in respect of the *Corpus Platonicum* and *Aristoteles Latinus* sponsored by the Union Académique Internationale, to make any financial contribution.

Schemes for visits of foreign scholars to this country and of British scholars to the Continent have moved slowly; Prof. Della

Vida of Rome had accepted an invitation to visit Scotland this summer in connexion with his work on the *Scottish Orientalist*, George Strachan, but has been obliged to cancel it. It is hoped that two or more Fellows of the Academy will visit Germany in the course of the summer or early autumn.

An invitation from the Academy of Vienna to send a representative to the celebration of the centenary of the foundation of the Academy in May was accepted, and the Academy was represented by Sir Charles Webster, who presented on behalf of the Academy an address of congratulation, drafted by Dr. Cyril Bailey. The Academy of Vienna sent in return a commemorative medal.

The Academy likewise accepted an invitation from Princeton University to be represented at their Bicentennial celebrations in June, and nominated their Corresponding Fellow, Prof. Campbell Bonner, to represent them.

An offer was received from Yale University of a gift of 100 volumes, published by the Yale University Press, to be made available and, if possible, exhibited in the library of the Academy. The offer was gratefully acknowledged, but it was explained that the Academy does not maintain a library, and it was suggested that the gift should be diverted elsewhere, where it would be more visible and useful.

Since the Academy at times receives gifts of books which cannot well be refused, the Council has decided that such publications may be deposited on indefinite loan in institutions where they may be of use. Under this ruling several volumes have been deposited in the Institute of Archaeology in the University of London.

The British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem having been compelled to suspend operations owing to the impossibility of carrying out field-work in Palestine in the present state of the country, no application was made for a continuance of the Academy's grant to the School. The Council promised consideration for a proposal which might be made that it should hold and administer the funds of the School, and generally take charge of its interests, during the period of its suspended animation.

FINANCE.—The Government grant has been continued at the previous figure of £2,500. The following grants have been made in the course of the year:

(a) General Fund (renewals):	£
Pipe Roll Society	100
Canterbury and York Society	100
Anglo-Norman Text Society	50
British National Committee of the International Historical Congress	25

	£
Royal Asiatic Society	200
English Place-Names Survey	150
British Institute of Philology	75
Professor Jacobsthal, for work on Celtic Antiquities	50
<i>Corpus Platonicum</i> (U.A.I.)	250
<i>Concordance of Muslim Tradition</i> (U.A.I.), for 1946	50
<i>Concordance of Muslim Tradition</i> (U.A.I.), for 1947	75
Dr. Haffter, <i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> , for 1946	80
Dr. Haffter, <i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i> , for 1947	80
(b) General Fund (new proposals):	
Publication of excavations at Khirokitia (Cyprus)	500
	(maximum)
<i>Bibliography of British Historical Writings, 1940-5</i>	30
(c) Schweich Fund (renewals):	
Critical Edition of the Greek New Testament	100
<i>Lexicon of Patristic Greek</i>	50
(d) Prothero Bequest (new proposal):	
<i>Bibliography of British Historical Writings, 1940-5</i>	170

Support was also promised to a proposed fasciculus of the *Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum* to contain the collections at the University of Sydney, N.S.W., and Otago, N.Z.

The Assistant Secretary's salary was raised to £350.

UNION ACADÉMIQUE INTERNATIONALE.—At the time of the outbreak of war the President of the Union was Dr. Waldo G. Leland, Director of the American Council of Learned Societies; and on the cessation of hostilities he undertook preliminary inquiries with a view to the revival of the Union's activities. While these were in progress, however, he retired from the Directorship of the Council, and thereby ceased to represent them on the U.A.I. This having been explained (after a somewhat unaccountable delay), the responsibility for the administration of the Union reverted to Sir David Ross, surviving Vice-President from 1939, who accordingly put himself into communication with the Secretariat at Brussels, with a view to arranging for an informal meeting of representatives of the Allied countries in 1947, and (it is hoped) a full meeting of the Union in 1948. A meeting has accordingly been convoked for Sept. 29–Oct. 1. Work has been proceeding during the war on some of the projects sponsored by the Union, in some of which the Academy is concerned, on which some information can be given.

MEDIEVAL LATIN DICTIONARY.—A conference of the representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands was held in Brussels in March to consider the affairs of the Dictionary in general, and in particular the resumption

of the *Bulletin Ducange*. Other countries were invited to send communications if they so desired. Professor Baxter attended on behalf of the Academy.

The following report has been received from the Committee for the year ending 31 March 1947:

Four meetings of the Committee have been held during the past year.

The Committee reports with regret the death of Dr. G. G. Coulton, who had been one of its members since its formation in 1924.

Professor F. M. Stenton has been elected Chairman, and Professor J. H. Baxter Vice-Chairman, of the Committee, which has been joined by the Rev. D. Callus, O.P., Professors V. H. Galbraith and R. A. B. Mynors, Drs. R. W. Hunt, R. Klibansky, and E. Ashworth Underwood.

Since there is small prospect of a new international *Du Cange*, the Committee has decided to press on with the preparation of a dictionary of purely British and Irish Medieval Latin. Enough material has been collected to justify the beginning of editorial work and for this a paid editor is necessary. It is estimated that financial provision, amounting to not less than £3,000 a year for from seven to ten years, should be made for an editorial staff and offices. In the raising of this sum the Committee hopes to obtain the support of societies and individuals interested, both in this country and abroad.

It has also been decided that the Word-List should be reprinted without emendation and a supplement issued as soon as possible.

The Council of the Academy has accordingly been asked to approve the reissue of the Word-List in its present form as soon as possible; to provide funds for the employment of an assistant to prepare a supplementary Word-List to be issued as soon as completed; and to authorize the Committee to seek financial support for the Dictionary. To these proposals the Council has given its consent. The Oxford University Press has been asked to undertake the reprinting of the Word-List.

In view of the increase in its requirements for salaries and office purposes due to the prospective publication of the supplementary Word-List, the Committee asks for a grant of £600 for the year 1947-8.

The reading of texts continues and slips have been received during the year for the following:¹

101 *Chronica Monasterii Dunelmensis* (E.H.R., 40).

115 *Adelard of Bath: On the Astrolabe* (extracts, ed. Haskins, *Harvard Historical Studies*, 27).

¹ The numbers preceding the author's name or title of the book refer to the *Index of . . . Writers*.

- 124 St. Anselm: *Epistola ad Monialem*, ed. Wilmart (Rev. Bén., 40).
 263A Sermon on the Holy Rood Tree and the Judas Story, ed. Napier (E.E.T.S., 103).
- 292A Accursius: *Arenga* (E.H.R., 58).
 315 Thomas Docketing: *Commentaries* (excerpts, ed. Little).
 348 Robert Kilwardby: *Injunctions*, as visitor of Merton College, Oxford, ed. Garrod.
 — Sermon in capite jejunii and letters, ed. Somner-Beckendorff in *Studies in the Life of Robert Kilwardby*.
- 354 Alexander Neckham: *Sacerdos ad Altare* (extracts, ed. Haskins, *Harvard Historical Studies*, 27).
- 362 John Peckham: *Quaestio de Pueris Oblatis*.
 362A Peter de Aqua Blanca: *Will*, ed. Woodruff (*Camden Misc.*, 14).
 389 Michael Scot: *Liber Particularis* and *Liber Introductorius* (extracts, ed. Haskins, *Harvard Historical Studies*, 27).
 — (extracts, ed. Haskins, *Isis X*).
- 401 Thomas de Musca: *Chronicle of Dale Abbey*, ed. Hope.
 420A The St. Edmundsbury Chronicle (E.H.R., 58).
 430A Durham Annals (Surtees Society, 155).
 479B Poem, *De Beata Virgine* (= Dreves, *An. Hym.* viii, 55), ed. Napier (E.E.T.S., 103).
- 515A Thomas Favent: *Historia . . . Mirabilis Parliamenti*, ed. McKisack (*Camden Misc.*, 14).
- 634 William of Ockham: *Opera Politica*, vol. i (Manchester University Press, 1940), ed. Sikes, &c. (includes—*Octo Quaestiones de Potestate Papae*, *An princeps . . . possit recipere bona ecclesiarum*, *Consultatio de causa Matrimoniali*, *Opus XC dierum*, c. 1-6).
 — *Epistola ad Fratres Minores*, ed. Brampton.
 — *Political Works in Goldast, Monarchia*.
- 726 Thomas Chaundler: *Libellus de laudibus . . . Wellie . . . et Bathonie*, ed. Williams (*Somerset A. & N.H. Soc.*, Proc. 19).
- 766A William Melton: *Sermon in Parasceves*, ed. Little (*Franciscan Papers*, &c.).
- 827 *Historia Vitae et Regni Ricardi II*, ed. Hearne.
 827B *Kirkstall Chronicle* (1358-1400), ed. M. V. Clarke and N. Denham-Young (*Rylands Bulletin*, 15).
- 854A-E F. J. Furnivall: *Manners and Meals in Olden Time* (E.E.T.S., 32) (contains the following poems—*Ut te geras ad mensam*; *Stans puer ad mensam*: *Modus enandi*; poems on Diet from Sloane MS. 1986).
- 868 John Colet: *Statutes for Chantry Priests*, ed. Sparrow Simpson (*Archaeologia*, 52).
- 883B Peter Levins: *Manipulus Vocabulorum*, ed. Wheatley (E.E.T.S., 27).
- 889A Sir Theodore Turquet de Mayerne: *Notes on the Health of James I and Queen Henrietta Maria*, ed. N. Moore (*The History of the Study of Medicine in the British Isles*).
Goldast: Monarchia S. Romani Imperii, 3 vols. (includes:
 634 Ockham: *Political Works*;
 363A Peter Cassiodorus: *De tyrannide Pontificis Romani*;

- 877A Stephen Gardiner: De vera obediencia;
 861B John Bekinsau: De supremo . . . regis imperio;
 516 Richard FitzRalph: Defensio curatorum;
 595 Roger Chonnoe: Defensio religionis mendicantium;
 779 Paul Anglicus: Aureum Speculum).

Levison: England and the Continent in the Eighth Century.

Obedientiaries' Accounts of Canterbury, 1503-1524. MS.

Obedientiary's Accounts of Winchester, 13th Century (E.H.R., 61).

Sacrist's Roll of Lichfield, 1345, ed. Cox and Hope (Salt Soc., Proc. 6, pt. 2).

The Cartulary of the High Church of Chichester (Sussex Arch. Soc. 1946).

Inventory of the Vestry of Westminster Abbey in 1388 (Archaeologia, 52).

Inventory of the . . . bedchamber of brother Richard Stone (Arch. Can. 43).

Register of Archbishop Chichele, vol. iii.

Architectural terms (MS.).

CORPUS PLATONICUM.—The following report by Dr. Klibansky has appeared in the Report of the Warburg Institute for 1945-6:

After the restricted activities of the war, the past year has been employed in reorganizing the *Corpus Platonicum* on a broader basis. Long-interrupted communications with Continental contributors have been re-established, and valuable new contacts have been made. Thus Dutch and Belgian scholars, competent and willing to co-operate, came, at our invitation, to this country to take part in our work. At the request of Dutch classical scholars the General Editor went to Leiden and The Hague to speak about the *Corpus Platonicum*. In Holland as well as in France he secured the collaboration of a number of distinguished scholars. There is, therefore, reason to hope that the widening of the circle of contributors will ensure that steady progress is made with the various parts of the *Corpus Platonicum*.

Difficulties in procuring photostats which are still very great in Germany and Austria are gradually disappearing in Italy.

PLATO LATINUS

(1) Plato, *Parmenides*.—Proclus, *Commentaria in Parmenidem*. The Latin text and the critical apparatus are ready for print. On account of the dialectical method as developed by Proclus, the work belongs to the most abstruse texts of ancient philosophy. The difficulties of understanding it are considerably increased by the form in which it has been preserved: the thirteenth-century rendering by William of Moerbeke. In order to make the text comprehensible to the reader, it has been decided to supply the edition with an apparatus of sources and of Greek parallel passages, as well as with a paraphrase in English. All these are

nearing completion. Full indices have also been added. These indices (Greek-Latin and Latin-Greek) will make it possible for the first time to study the ways and methods by which Greek philosophical terminology has been rendered in the Latin of Thomas Aquinas's time. Furthermore, a detailed comparison of other parts of Proclus's work has yielded several more instances where the Latin translation has preserved passages lost in the Greek original.

Because of the limited manuscript resources available during the war years, the scope of the edition was confined to the Latin text of the part lost in the Greek original. It has, therefore, so far not been possible to solve the problem of the relation of the Latin text to the Greek manuscript tradition, nor to approach the wider question of the significance of Proclus for the tradition of the Platonic text. Any attempt in that direction has been hampered by the fact that the existing editions of Proclus's work are not only based on too few manuscripts (five out of twenty-nine now identified), but are also untrustworthy with regard to the evidence they present. The actual readings of the Paris MSS. in all those passages where the editions disagree have now been ascertained—a necessary check which had been omitted by those editors of the *Parmenides* who use Proclus as a secondary source for their Plato text. With the help of photostats of the remaining manuscripts—ordered some time ago—it will be possible to edit a specimen part of the Greek text and to establish a *stemma* of all Greek manuscripts, and thus to lay a foundation for any future edition of the work as a whole. At the same time this will help to determine to what extent Proclus can be used as a subsidiary source in constituting the voluminous Platonic text.

(2) Plato, *Phaedo*. The two versions in which this work has been preserved have been recognized as sufficiently different from each other to make it worth while to have them both printed side by side. The text of the first version has been established, except for the necessary checking of MS. Palatinus 639 of the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence. For a long time it has not been possible to obtain photographs from this Library, but we have reason to expect that the microfilms we ordered will be sent to us in the near future. The text of the second version is now being constituted; several manuscripts have been collated in the course of the last few months. It is hoped that the text of both versions will be ready in the course of this year.

(3) *Chalcidius' Translation of, and Commentary on, the Timaeus*. The work on this volume had to be redistributed owing to the death during the war of our Swedish contributor, Dr. Claes Blum. The General Editor has been able to secure the collaboration of Dr. J. H. Waszink, Professor of Latin at the University

of Leiden. Dr. P. J. Jensen, Assistant Professor at the University of Copenhagen and Librarian of the Royal Library, who was working on this volume before the war, has agreed to share the work with Professor Waszink. The papers and materials left by Dr. Blum on his death were deposited in the University Library, Uppsala, and we have now obtained the use of them.

PLATO ARABUS

(1) Galenus, *Compendium Timaei aliorumque dialogorum quae extant fragmenta*. Promises made early this year by the Directors of the Imprimerie Catholique in Beirut led us to expect that printing would be completed by September. The only outstanding part of the book, viz. the Indices (Arabic-Greek and Greek-Arabic), was therefore sent to this firm in the spring. However, in spite of repeated reminders, we have not yet been able to obtain the last sheets. The book will therefore not appear before the coming year.

(2) Averroes, *Paraphrase of Plato's Republic*. So far the text of the second and third books has been established, and the translation of the same books completed in manuscript. They are ready for print, subject to one further revision. As to the first book, it is hoped to complete text and translation in the first half of next year. Progress has been slowed down by the teaching obligations of the two editors in Oxford, who have now given October 1947 as the date for the delivery of the manuscript.

(3) Alfarabi, *Summary of Plato's Laws*. A contract has been made with Dr. F. Gabrieli, Professor of Arabic at the University of Rome, who has undertaken to deliver the manuscript by the end of 1947.

(4) *New collaborators*. Monsieur Henri Corbin, of the French Institute in Teheran, and Monsieur George Vayda, of the Institut des Études Islamiques in Paris, have agreed to take part in the work of the *Corpus*. Negotiations about the texts to be edited by them are in progress. Monsieur Vayda has already accepted the edition of the so-called Platonic Prayers in Arabic.

CANTERBURY AND YORK SOCIETY.—The following is the report for the year ending 30 June 1946:

Part CXV of the Register of Bishop Hamo de Hethe has been issued; Part CXVI, which will complete the Register of Hamo de Hethe, has advanced. These parts are the publications for the year 1942-3.

For the year 1943-4 it is proposed to issue the Acta of Archbishop Stephen Langton, edited by Miss Kathleen Major. For the year 1944-5 it is hoped that Volume IV of Archbishop Chichele's Register may be issued; for 1945-6 the conclusion

of Archbishop Winchelsey's Register; for 1946-7 the Register of Archbishop Langham.

During the war Registers were removed to places of safety, and were inaccessible; the printing of those already transcribed was very much delayed. It is hoped eventually to overtake the arrears. The first of the Ely Registers, that of Bishop Simon Montacute (1337-45), will be edited by the Archdeacon of Wisbech. The publication of another Salisbury Register is under consideration.

The thanks of the Society are due to the British Academy for £100. The previous generous grants of the British Academy have been allocated to the completion of the Registers of Archbishop Winchelsey and Bishop Hamo de Hethe, of which publication is delayed.

Dr. David Knowles, Mr. A. R. B. Fuller, Mr. C. H. Thompson, the Library of the University College, Aberystwyth, and the Library of the Sorbonne have joined the Society. Durham Cathedral Library has taken the place of Durham University Library. Two resignations have been received. There are now 60 individual members and 134 subscribing libraries.

To this the following postscript has been received from the Chairman, Dr. E. F. Jacob, dated 19 February 1947:

This year our programme has been considerably extended. In addition to the Acta of Archbishop Stephen Langton which should be issued in the course of the year (overdue, because of war circumstances, from 1943-4), we are proposing to publish the Ely Register of Bishop Montacute, Archdeacon Evans having already transcribed a considerable part, while Mr. Wood is making good progress with the transcription of Archbishop Langham's Register. We are also arranging for the transcription of a Carlisle register, to produce which may cost us, in all, some £950.

THE PIPE ROLL SOCIETY.—The following report has been received:

In December 1946 an edition of the Pipe Roll for the year 1207 (the ninth year of King John) was issued to members against the subscriptions for the year 1944. The publications of the Society are now two years in arrears. The next volume to be issued by the Society—the Pipe Roll for 1208—is now in page-proof. The date at which it will appear depends on the capacity of the printer employed by the Society. The following volume—a twelfth-century version of the Herefordshire Domesday edited by Professor V. H. Galbraith—is in an advanced state of preparation. The text of a third volume—the Pipe Roll for 1209—is complete in manuscript.

The membership of the Society now stands at 199. It is

tending to increase, partly as a result of new subscribers from the United States, who by now more than replace the loss of the German libraries consequent upon the war. The weakness in the financial position of the Society is the uncertainty which still prevails as to the future cost of printing and binding. Under these conditions, a continuance of the help which the British Academy has given to the Society is urgently needed. We therefore request the British Academy to renew the grant of £100 which it has made to the Society in recent years.

ENGLISH PLACE-NAME SOCIETY.—The following is the Director's report for 1945-6:

The year 1945-6 has seen sweeping changes in the headquarters of the Society, and the change-over has involved a slowing-down in work on the volumes in our immediate programme.

It was not found feasible to summon a General Meeting of members to explain to them the position, but at a meeting of Council held on 22 May 1946 Professor F. M. Stenton resigned from the post of Hon. Director, and shortly after became Vice-Chancellor of the University of Reading. Council appointed in his place Professor B. Dickins, Joint-Editor with him of the Society's publications. The President, Professor Sir William Craigie, resigned from the Presidency, and Professor Stenton agreed to become President of the Society and so preserve his link with its work. Sir William Craigie accepted the invitation of Council to become a Vice-President.

The change in Directorship involves a change in headquarters. Council waited to notify members of the change of Directors until accommodation had been found in Cambridge and the new address could be given to them. In October the headquarters of the Society moved to 7 Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge. In view of the fact that for the first time in its history the Society is not the guest of a University and has therefore to pay rent for its accommodation, and in view also of the greatly increased cost of publication of the volumes, it was decided that the Society must reduce considerably its expenditure on administration, and employ, in place of a permanent paid Secretary, a Research Assistant upon a basis which would involve no cost of superannuation contributions in addition to salary. In order, therefore, to relieve a probable strain upon the finances of the Society, Miss Armstrong resigned from the position of Secretary in June 1946. She was offered, and accepted, a place on the Council, and she is continuing for the present to deal, in a voluntary capacity, with the financial work of the Society. She will also assist the editor in seeing the Cumberland volumes

through the press. The Director has appointed Miss Margaret J. Midgley, B.A., St. Hilda's College, Oxford, as Research Assistant from October 1946.

The financial position of the Society on 30 June 1946 may be summarized as follows: The Society has, from subscriptions, interest on investments, and donations, a reserve of £2,471. os. 5d. for the publication of the four volumes which are now due to members. This average sum of £600 for each volume will not, as was pointed out in the last Report, cover the cost of publication of the volumes, and the probabilities are therefore that we shall have to draw upon our investments for future volumes. Counties upon which we expect to publish volumes within the next few years can, therefore, be provided for, but, as always, the future of the work rests on our ability to maintain a body of subscribers large enough to pay for the cost of production of an annual volume. We have, once again, to apologize to the members who have so loyally supported us in the past for the continuing delays in the publication of the volumes, but we hope that now we are established in our new headquarters the work may go forward and the flow of volumes may be maintained as it was in the years before the war. The volume on the place-names of Oxfordshire is in active preparation.

We have received, and are most grateful for, donations from Mr. C. W. Adams, Professor W. L. Renwick, Mr. P. C. Rushen, and Mr. A. J. Taylor; and from a member who in 1943 gave us a donation towards the publication of the volume on Oxfordshire we have received a further generous gift of £100 towards the work of the Society. The member wishes to remain anonymous, but we should like publicly to record our deep appreciation of the interest in the work which has prompted these gifts. The British Academy has once again given us a grant of £150. A further £400 has been paid from the estate of the late Mr. D. Palmer Pearson towards a volume on Derbyshire place-names, but no final settlement of his estate has yet been made.

In the past year we have lost ten members by death: Sir Percy Bates, Mr. W. P. Bellamy, Sir James Berry, who acted as auditor for us from 1931 to 1938, Mr. G. L. Charlesworth, the Rev. H. Dewhurst, Mrs. Heathcote, Mr. W. Parkin, Miss A. C. Paues, a member of Council from 1922 to 1935, Mr. J. R. F. Robinson, and Colonel C. F. Stevens. Seven members have resigned and four memberships have lapsed. We have gained nine new members (six private and three institutional), and three members who had previously resigned (two private and one institutional) have rejoined the Society. The total membership is now 654 (370 private and 284 institutional) as against 662 (381 private and 281 institutional) last year.¹

¹ These figures show the numbers up to 31 October 1946.

The Society is once again deeply indebted to Mr. E. L. Tanner for auditing its accounts and advising upon financial matters generally.

LEXICON OF PATRISTIC GREEK.—The following report has been received:

As was anticipated in the last report, the past year has been one of great progress in all directions. In addition to the part-time help of the Rev. G. W. H. Lampe, Fellow of St. John's College, three ladies, Miss H. C. Graef, Miss M. D. T. Grosvenor, and Miss E. Bickersteth, all of proved scholarship and ability, are giving whole-time service to the production of the Lexicon, and it may be possible shortly to secure the assistance of a further regular member of the staff. Temporary help has also been given by Mrs. H. G. Schenk.

As regards accommodation, the quarters in the New Bodleian building, which were put at our disposal by the Curators of the Bodleian Library a year ago, soon became inadequate, and the work has now been transferred, very much to our advantage, to a larger and better-placed room on the second floor in the north-west corner of the building.

In respect of books and equipment, the generosity of friends has enabled us to surmount many difficulties, and we now have almost all the principal texts and other printed works which are needed. We are particularly indebted to Mrs. Herbert Moore, who has rescued from Menton most of the books which had belonged to Canon Moore and with great courage and determination overcame the obstacles in the way of conveying a library at the present time from the South of France to Oxford. This library Mrs. Moore has now presented to the Committee. It is an especial pleasure to be able to use Herbert Moore's drafts with the books from which he compiled them. The Principal of Cuddesdon College, the authorities of Mansfield College, and the Rev. B. J. Wigan have made invaluable loans of books. The Benedictine *Chrysostom* from Canon A. W. Goodman, mentioned in the last report, has arrived. We are also grateful to the Archbishop of Armagh for a volume of Cramer's *Catena*, with collations from a Paris manuscript by Dr. H. B. Swete and himself.

Voluntary help has been given by Miss G. I. Johns, who undertook the laborious task of retyping the 'List of Authors'; by Miss Margaret Tennant, who read some out-of-the-way items; by Mrs. E. Zuntz, who sent us further information about *Chrysostomica*; by the Rev. C. A. M. Adams, who helped us in the move from Pusey House to the New Bodleian building; and by a Sister of the C.S.M.V. at Wantage in the sorting of

slips. We are also indebted to Professor G. R. Driver for several communications on LXX and N.T. Words; to Professor Paul Maas for valuable technical advice about abbreviations; to Dr. Claude Jenkins for instructing two of our collaborators in Greek palaeography; and to the Rev. H. Chadwick, Dr. L. W. Grensted, Fr. A. Massart, S.J., and the Rev. J. N. Sanders (who is kindly resuming his reading of the Origen fragments) for communications and assistance.

On the occasion of the first General Meeting of the *Societas Novi Testamenti Studiorum*, held at Oxford last month, some thirty members of the Society honoured us with a visit. A short account of the work and progress of the Lexicon was given, and the party inspected the Lexicon collections. For the present Trinity Term, a seminar on Greek Patristic Vocabulary in the New Bodleian building is announced on the Lecture List of the Faculty of Theology by the Editor and Mr. Lampe.

The Committee and the Editor desire to call attention to the munificent help which has been received during the year from various new sources, chiefly in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, especially the Colleges. This generous support, which in several cases includes a promise of the same annual contribution for the next four years, has given great encouragement to the Committee, which is already responsible for the payment of some £1,300 per annum in salaries alone. The extent of this commitment is not immediately apparent from the accounts, since the staff of workers has only been built up gradually during the last twelve months; and indeed it is possible that during the next four years, by the end of which time it is hoped that the Lexicon may be completed, the annual expenditure will be increased still more, since the Committee in its strong desire to bring the work to a rapid and satisfactory conclusion is unwilling to decline any scholarly help which becomes available and of which use can rightly be made.

GREEK TESTAMENT CRITICAL EDITION.—The Editor, Mr. S. C. E. Legg, reports that the preparation of the copy for the Gospel of St. Luke has reached the end of chapter xxi. He hopes to have the whole Gospel ready for the press by about the middle of 1948. Beyond that it will be impossible for him to continue, and it will be necessary to find another editor. The Committee, which has been enlarged, and now has Professor Lightfoot as Chairman in succession to Bishop Headlam, is taking steps to deal with this situation.

HANDLIST OF ILLUMINATED MANUSCRIPTS OF THE BODLEIAN LIBRARY.—The work on the handlist was

concentrated mainly on the close examination of two groups of manuscripts.

The cataloguing of the Flemish and Dutch schools of illumination was followed up by the compilation of a list of manuscripts illuminated in England in the fifteenth century by foreign artists (Flemish, Dutch, Low German). It appeared justified to treat these manuscripts separately since it would be misleading to include them either under the heading of the 'English' or the 'Continental' schools of illumination, the purely decorative parts being often English, the figure representations of Continental style (altogether thirty-two manuscripts).

Work was also started on the final grouping of the vast material of Anglo-Saxon and of English manuscripts from *c.* 1066 to 1200. The corresponding material of British Museum MSS. being again accessible was studied with a view to collecting more evidence for the date and locality of origin of the Bodleian MSS.

Unfortunately but few of the manuscripts listed for photographing could be photographed and only very little of the sum granted for this purpose by the British Academy could be spent. With the Oxford University Press (Bodleian MSS.) only small orders could be placed and those had to be confined to the Flemish material, which will be published in a monograph on the Master of Mary of Burgundy which is to appear this autumn. Nor could photos be obtained from the material in the British Museum. The photographic studio there being in the process of reorganization would not for many months accept any orders. It is intended to renew the orders for photographs in the coming months.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By SIR H. I. BELL

16 July 1947

IT is, I imagine, usual for a recently elected President of the British Academy to feel some trepidation as he rises to deliver his first Presidential Address, but few, if any, of my predecessors can have had equal cause with myself for apprehension. Indeed, when I consider the illustrious names which grace the Presidential roll I am tempted to ask myself what I am doing in this galley. Λαμπάδια ἔχοντες διαδώσουσιν ἀλλήλοις; but what if one of the torch-bearers should fail in his task and allow the torch which he carries to go out? I can but resolve so to bear myself in the office as not avoidably to betray the confidence you have reposed in me.

When Sir John Clapham gave his last address in 1945 he had just been re-elected to the office of President for the coming year. There seemed then no reason to doubt that he would again appear in this Chair, to deliver the annual address, in 1946; but that was not to be, and by his sudden and premature death on 29 March 1946 the Academy, in common with his College and University, lost a man, distinguished no less for conspicuous practical ability than for scholarship, who had served it faithfully and well. Elected when the war had already begun, he was called upon, owing to the exceptional circumstances, to serve for a longer period, no less than six years, than falls to the lot of most Presidents; but, though a man of many commitments, he cheerfully gave his unstinted service, a service the more valuable because of his experience in administration and practical affairs. His ability in this sphere might well have led him to choose a public career, but he preferred the life of a scholar, and, apart from a comparatively short period as Professor of Economics at Leeds, he maintained a continuous connexion with his own University of Cambridge, in which he was the first occupant of the Chair of Economic History, and for ten years was Vice-Provost of King's College. A good climber and an active member of the Alpine Club, excelling in games, a strong and efficient chairman of any committee, and for years a lay preacher, he was a man of many parts. Fortunately he lived to complete his great history of the Bank of England and his *Economic History of Modern Britain*, and to see the auspicious

beginning of the *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, of which he was joint editor with Eileen Power.

Clapham was not the only eminent Cambridge economist among our Fellows to die since the last Presidential Address was given. In Lord Keynes the University lost a man whose reputation in this sphere was international, and who happily combined a singularly clear and masterly grasp of economic theory with a gift of lucid exposition, administrative talents of a very high order, and an exceptional aesthetic sensibility, which enabled him to render important services to the cause of the arts in Britain.

Another loss is that of Sir Herbert Richmond, who, after a distinguished career in the Navy, turned to the academic world and became Professor of Naval History at Cambridge, and later Master of Downing College. He also was a many-sided man, a talented draughtsman, a witty and brilliant conversationalist, the wielder of a pungent pen, and one who obtained a high rank alike as a practical sailor and administrator and as a writer on strategy and naval history. Endowed with a clear and critical intellect, he hated loose thinking, and could express his dislike with a trenchancy which must have cleared the air in many a controversy.

The losses which Cambridge and with it the British Academy have suffered in the sphere of history are indeed serious. Two occupants of the Chair of Medieval History, Professor Previt -Orton, for many years editor of the *English Historical Review*, and co-editor of the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, who upheld a rigid ideal of exact scholarship, and his successor, Professor Brooke, particularly distinguished by his contributions to ecclesiastical history and with Previt -Orton co-editor of the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, have died during the last year. Better known in the wide world than either was Professor Coulton, that learned medievalist and doughty opponent in any dispute who might perhaps not inaptly be called *malleus clericorum*, so bravely did he assail what he regarded as ecclesiastical perversions of history. The truth which he saw in these controversies was often not the whole truth, but it was rarely anything other than truth so far as it went, and opponents who ventured to dispute his facts were apt to find themselves in trouble, whatever justification they might have for challenging his general conclusions. Lastly, Professor Chadwick may not inappropriately be referred to here, so important and indeed epoch-making were his contributions to the history of literary development. Oxford historical

scholarship has suffered the loss of Sir Charles Oman, who had been a Fellow of the Academy since 1905; and since I began the writing of this Address comes the news that yet another eminent historian has been taken from us. Sir John Lloyd, of whom it would be no exaggeration to say that he had put Welsh historical scholarship on an entirely new footing, had carried far into the eighties of his life the zest and vigour and the intellectual fitness of youth, and had quite recently undertaken to act as consulting editor of the projected Dictionary of Welsh Biography.

In Professor Laird the Academy lost a Fellow who ranked high as a philosopher, a witty and productive writer on philosophic subjects, particularly in the sphere of ethics and the history of philosophy. Another outstanding philosopher whose death we deplore is Professor A. E. Taylor, well known for his valuable contributions to Platonic studies. Had Sir John Clapham lived to address us in 1946 it would have fallen to his lot to speak of him, as of Lord Keynes and others whose deaths were recorded in last year's report. One or two of these I must here mention, G. J. Turner, a learned legal historian, honourably distinguished for his work on the Year Books; Buckland, another eminent lawyer; A. G. Little, erudite and much-loved medievalist, *anima naturaliter Franciscana* as he might be called, whose memory his friends will long cherish with gratitude and affection; and Mackail, a humanist indeed, of a singularly gracious and attractive personality, to the reading, as an undergraduate, of whose *Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology* and *Life of William Morris* I personally owe a great deal of both enjoyment and profit. Of one deceased Fellow, my friend and colleague Robin Flower, I cannot but speak with special feeling. His active mind and boundless energy enabled him to excel in many spheres. Poet, critic, charming prose-writer and lecturer, Celtic scholar, medieval palaeographer, with a wide and discriminating knowledge of English and other literatures, and an inspired translator, he seemed to have been specially chosen by destiny to produce that definitive history of Irish literature to the preparation of which he devoted himself for many years; but it was not given him to accomplish his task, and all that remains is the outline, I had almost said the programme, of his great undertaking.

A word or two should, I feel, be said about two or three Corresponding Fellows whose deaths have occurred recently. Two who were known to me personally were Ulrich Wilcken, the German, and Joseph Bidez, the Belgian. There is, I am sure,

no papyrologist in the world who does not feel a personal gratitude to Wilcken. He was not only himself the most eminent scholar in his own field; he was an ideal leader and director of papyrological studies, generous in help and encouragement to younger men, observing in his own work the most rigid standards of accurate scholarship but always reticent of unfavourable criticism towards anyone whom he saw to be making honest, however fumbling and uncertain, efforts to master the art of decipherment. I have always remembered, as exemplifying the internationalism of true scholarship, the remark made to me by a French friend, who, commenting on the happy mutual amity of papyrologists in general, added: 'I attribute it largely to the influence of Wilcken; he has always been such a perfect gentleman.' Of Bidez, another personal friend, I think with gratitude and admiration for his profound scholarship, his critical discrimination, and his unvaryingly generous kindness. I must mention also that great palaeographer, known to me less intimately, Professor Rand, who did so much to carry on the traditions of his master, Traube. This Address was already finished when the death was announced of yet another Corresponding Fellow, Professor Capart of Brussels, a distinguished Egyptologist to whose vision and enthusiasm was mainly due the establishment of the *Fondation Égyptologique Reine Élisabeth*, an institution which has been and is of immense importance for Egyptological and papyrological studies.

As recorded in the Annual Report, the maximum number of Ordinary Fellows has been raised during the year to 175. As by resolution of the Annual General Meeting not more than five elections over and above those necessitated by death or resignation may be made in any one year, the full complement of Fellows will not be reached for some time. Meantime I must extend a hearty welcome to the fourteen Fellows elected to-day. Several Presidents have commented on the average age of newly elected Fellows; more than one has expressed the hope that the Academy in considering its elections would look for young blood. I cannot doubt that the suggestion is a good one, and rejoice to think that on the whole there has been a tendency in recent years to elect a larger number of comparatively young Fellows; though, of course, it would be regrettable if we were to discontinue the practice of filling some vacancies by the choice of older scholars who for one reason or another have not earlier received the honour of election. I find that, if my arithmetic is to be trusted, the average age of the Fellows elected to-day

amounts to a little under fifty-seven. This is a higher figure than was noted in 1944 by Sir John Clapham, namely 53.6, but I think he would have found it, in his own word, 'encouraging', for the list includes one Fellow of under forty, three more of under fifty, and again three more of under sixty.

When Sir John Clapham gave his last address in 1945 we were living in what he happily called 'a state of three-quarters peace'. The war in Europe was over, but hostilities continued in Asia and seemed likely to go on for months. The general assault on Japan was being prepared, and the atomic bomb had not yet been dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of that small missile did more than destroy a great city; it brought home to men everywhere, as not even the previous horrors of the war had done, the extreme fragility of civilization and the likelihood that the powers over nature now in man's possession, unless controlled by a corresponding increase in his wisdom, may end by destroying civilized life, if not humanity itself.

Sir John Clapham, though he nursed no extravagant hopes, could at least look forward to giving his next address 'in a state of such total peace as six or more years of war may render possible'. The peace came; but it has brought disappointment. We have realized that it is easier to destroy than to rebuild; that we may dissipate in a few years material and spiritual treasures which it will take decades, if not centuries, to restore. Famine and misery have outlived the war which begot them; shortages in the necessities of life—housing, food, clothes, fuel—continue to be acute in most European countries; in some, including our own, they have even been intensified. The paper shortage, which during the war was so serious a handicap to scholarship and education, is still a major problem. This is indeed a matter which concerns us closely and on which some action by the Academy might be advisable. Still more serious than these material difficulties, even than the lack of paper, are the spiritual results of the war. The unity which won victory for the associated nations has not outlived its occasion: mutual fears, suspicions, jealousies, and animosities embitter international relations, and already there are ominous signs that the Great Powers, too exhausted to contemplate immediate hostilities, are at least taking position for a third world war which, all agree, there is little likelihood that civilization could survive.

In such a world what place is there for a body like ours and for the interests which it represents? None at all, some would

assure us. Scholarship, learning, humane letters are doubtless an admirable adjunct to life in periods of peace and security; now they are an irrelevance. Leave your scholarly seclusion, these voices adjure us: while the ship of humanity is in waters so perilous there is no time for your studies; only such activities as have a practical bearing on the problems of the day and will help us to avert the coming catastrophe can be tolerated.

I do not think any Fellow of the Academy is likely to subscribe to such a view. Even if the malady of civilization be as grave as the diagnosis makes it, indeed all the more if the position is in truth desperate, Academies like ours call for our unhesitating support. Who can estimate fully the debt we owe to those fugitives from the unquiet contemporary world who, in monastic communities or remote villas and provincial towns, while ancient civilization and the Roman Empire were falling to pieces, preserved such precious relics of classical letters and learning as have come down to us? If we are indeed living, by the rhythm of history, in one of those ages which witness the end of a civilization and the re-establishment of a period of barbarism, it is surely incumbent on all who have the necessary equipment to keep alive what sparks of learning they can; and an Academy, which exists to organize and encourage humane studies, may be of inestimable help in their efforts. The British Academy, it is true, has been criticized on the ground that its own additions to learning compare unfavourably with those owed to many similar bodies abroad, and it may be admitted that, apart from its lectures (themselves surely not a negligible contribution), its publications contain all too few original studies; but a glance at the Annual Report, with its record of grants made to societies and individuals, of its successful efforts to secure Government support for archaeology, and of the work carried out by societies enjoying its support, will show that, despite the slenderness of its resources, it does much to promote (if I may be allowed a quotation from the marriage service) 'the mutual society, help, and comfort' of scholars and learned bodies working in widely differing fields.

But the time has not yet come to despair of the Republic. The catastrophe is not inevitable, and if it is to be averted there is work to be done which an Academy exists to do. Ancient civilization perished before the assault of barbarians from without the boundaries of the Empire; what threatens ours is the emergence of the barbarian from within. There has, during the present century, been a marked lowering of intellectual and moral standards. We hear to-day with hardly a tremor of basenesses and inhumanities

which half a century ago would have evoked horrified protests in every civilized country. There is observable everywhere a terrible coarsening and hardening of moral fibre. Slovenly usages of all kinds are corrupting one of the noblest parts of our British inheritance, the English language, and not English only; and with slovenliness in the use of words goes a slovenliness of thought which exposes whole populations to the sophistries of adventurers and charlatans. From friends in the educational world, whether in school or university, I hear constant complaints that the standard of scholarship is markedly lower than it was; and despite a gratifying increase in the demand for books and the success of extra-mural classes it may be doubted whether the education acquired is as solidly based as that, less widely diffused no doubt, of an earlier generation.

No doubt this state of things results in part from this very fact of a wider diffusion. It may be doubted whether more than a comparatively small minority of men are at any time capable of the highest cultivation. Certainly it is easier to preserve a high standard in a limited than in a wide community of culture, and the first result of any educational extension is inevitably a decline in quality. This, though regrettable, is no more than the price which must be paid for social justice; but it makes the duty of a body like ours the more urgent. In the circumstances, it may be necessary for the universities to accept, if only temporarily, some lowering of their standards: an Academy should make no such compromise. Its true function is to uphold, through all social and political vicissitudes, the austere ideal of excellence. Whatever the idols of the market-place may be, it at least can recognize no aims lower than the utmost attainable measure of truth and accuracy.

The wider diffusion of education is, however, not the only or the most disquieting factor in that deterioration of which I have spoken. There is a graver and an avoidable cause. During the last quarter of a century we have heard much talk of certain strange varieties of science and scholarship. Communist and fascist, proletarian and bourgeois science and scholarship—such are the demands which have been shouted into the ears of the contemporary world. These conceptions are an illusion. Science and scholarship may be good or bad, but they cannot aim at being anything but good science and good scholarship without some depreciation of quality. Here, in this confusion of voices, lies an obvious and crying duty of our Academy. It must take its stand immovably against all attempts to subordinate scholarship

to any ideal, any ideology as the current term has it, other than scholarship itself. Social, political, religious conceptions, however important as elements in the practical affairs of men, if introduced into the sphere of scholarship, can only confuse and deflect the efforts of the scholar. For it is truth which he would discover, 'to follow the argument whithersoever it leads us', as Plato said, and truth does not change its nature with the varying climate of political opinion. When the Rector of a famous German university proudly proclaimed that the era of disinterested science, of knowledge for its own sake, was ended, he was condemning not science but himself and the régime whose interests he was seeking to serve.

It is true, of course, that pure truth is not, and never can be, attainable by mortal man. We can never know the totality of facts; and the facts we do know require interpretation, a task for the fallible human judgement. The ripest scholar, the most penetrating thinker, can see but one aspect or certain aspects of the truth, and what he sees will be coloured by his personal idiosyncrasies, even if the influence of these show itself in a tendency to tilt the balance against his own natural prejudices. But it is the truth only that he seeks, and the attempt to conform his search to the demands of any ideology must be fatal to success.

Political loyalties are not the sole factors that disturb the objectivity of scholarship. There are also racial and national prejudices. That a man's nationality should affect even his work as a scholar is neither strange nor in itself a fact to be deplored. Nationality is a real thing; it colours all our activities, our method of approach to any question, the patterns of our thought, the subtleties of our feeling. A problem of scholarship is likely to be handled differently according as the scholar is an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, or an Italian. This is so far from being regrettable that it may be a positive gain. Since truth has many facets and absolute truth is unattainable, it is desirable that a subject should be examined from as many points of view as possible. This is indeed the advantage of international co-operation in the world of scholarship; and probably we have all experienced the stimulation to be derived from the treatment by a foreigner, with a different approach from our own, of a question which we have ourselves studied. Of course, there are drawbacks in these national differences, possibilities of serious misunderstanding, of which a striking example is the dispute between East and West as to what constitutes a democratic régime; a dispute perhaps accentuated by deliberate political

propaganda, but in part at least due to a genuine difference in the use of the word 'democracy'. Even here we may find a certain advantage if it be only in the correction of a too one-sided view. I remember how startled I myself was, while a student in Germany, to discover that the Battle of Waterloo, which I had learnt at school to think of as a British victory won with some small help from the Prussians under Blücher, was regarded by German acquaintances as a Prussian victory, to which a minor contribution had been made by the British under Wellington. I venture to think that that view was farther from the truth than my own; but it did help to correct a bias on my side.

There are, however, very narrow limits to the utility which we can attribute to bias of this kind. Untold harm has been done by school text-books which express a selfish and lopsided nationalism, and when a dictator, like Mussolini or Hitler, sets out deliberately to inculcate a nationalistic view of history or politics the result will certainly be to embitter international relations and poison the very springs of truth for a whole generation. Against such perversions an Academy must stand uncompromisingly. Jealous as it may legitimately be for the honour and reputation of the nation it represents, it must remain faithful to its ideal of truth, and must be ready, with whatever authority it possesses, to protest against any governmental attempt anywhere to muzzle or to seduce the community of scholarship. To allow itself to be used for political ends as an organ of national propaganda would be to betray the very cause for which it exists.

But an Academy's functions in this sphere do not end with the defence of scholarly freedom. It is well qualified to make a more positive contribution to the mutual understanding of nations. Scholarship is essentially international; even in such studies as history, where nationalist trends have been particularly harmful, there is a common ground, the quest for an accurate view of events and the understanding of historical causes, on which the scholars of different peoples can meet. No one who has attended an international congress can have failed to be encouraged by the spectacle of men from nations divided, often, by ancient feuds, meeting amicably and with a common enthusiasm in the fellowship of letters. In my own sphere, I was much struck during the recent war to find with what veneration even papyrologists of countries occupied by the Germans continued to regard Wilcken, one of our own Corresponding

Fellows already referred to, who—*felix opportunitate mortis*—died in time to escape the final devastation of Berlin.

Here, in the election of Corresponding Fellows, lies one of the methods by which an Academy can help the cause of international goodwill. There are, of course, others: the promotion or support of international congresses, the welcoming and entertaining of foreign scholars, the interchange of publications, the presentation of complimentary addresses, and the like. Let no one think that these are trivialities—they may have an effect far beyond their apparent importance—nor that, because scholars are of necessity always a small body in any community, their influence must be small. The speculations of the philosopher, the theories of the economist, the opinions of the historian, have a habit of filtering down through the various strata of society till, in however changed and diluted a form, they reach the common man.

The opportunities of such entertainment as I have suggested are limited for our own body by lack of funds. That need not prevent us from contributing as much as our resources allow to the cause of international amity, and we may hope that our Government, which has recently shown an increased readiness to recognize that not only science but the arts and humane studies are important elements in the national life, will some day make it possible for the British Academy to compare less unfavourably in this matter with similar bodies abroad. The Council is at the moment endeavouring to arrange for the dispatch to Germany of a delegation charged with the duty of investigating the present position of scholarship and scholars in that country.

These, then, are the principal functions which I would attribute to an Academy: to be a centre and a rallying-point for the scholars of the country which it represents, stimulating research and honouring meritorious work by election to its ranks; to uphold unwaveringly the standard of scholarship, content with no ideal lower than the best that is obtainable; to oppose always and everywhere any attempt to subject scholarship to political, social, or nationalistic ends; and to form links with scholars of other lands, thereby contributing towards a better understanding between nations. However distressful the times, and whatever the dangers which threaten civilization, these are tasks which our Academy may be justifiably proud that it is privileged to perform.

ANNUAL PHILOSOPHICAL LECTURE
HENRIETTE HERTZ TRUST

NATURALISTIC ETHICS

By W. F. R. HARDIE

Read 5 March 1947

I PROPOSE to consider whether there are good reasons for thinking that the acceptance of a naturalistic theory of knowledge would make it difficult or impossible to give a satisfactory account of our moral knowledge or convictions. 'Naturalism' is not a word with any single or ready-made meaning. But it has been used in a recognizable, and fairly definite, sense in recent discussions of the conceptions expressed by the word 'duty' and its synonyms, and the words 'right' and 'good' in their distinctively moral meanings with their opposites 'wrong' and 'bad'. Naturalism in these discussions is a doctrine primarily epistemological, about the characteristics, in a wide sense of 'characteristic', for which such words stand. It asserts that all such characteristics and the facts in which they are elements are 'natural'. For the purposes of this lecture I venture to borrow the following description of a 'natural' characteristic proposed by Professor Broad in a discussion of the non-naturalistic account of goodness which was maintained in *Principia Ethica* by Professor Moore. 'I propose to describe a "natural" characteristic as any characteristic which either (a) we become aware of by sensing *sensa* which manifest it or by introspecting experiences which manifest it; or (b) is definable wholly in terms of such characteristics and the notions of cause and substance.'¹ Ethical naturalism, or the doctrine that ethical characteristics are 'natural' in this sense, would sometimes be said to give an 'empiricist' account of ethical terms. But 'empiricism' so used must be distinguished from the more extreme doctrine which would hold that 'the notions of cause and substance' are themselves 'definable wholly' in terms of sensible or introspectible characteristics. A philosopher who accepted an account of natural facts which was empiricist in this more extreme sense would have a stronger motive for denying that ethical facts are non-natural than the more moderate empiricist who was prepared to admit a non-empirical element in the notions of substance and cause. But to say this is not to deny that all philosophers, even if they are far from being in sympathy with

¹ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, n.s., vol. xxxiv, 1933-4.

the neo-Humeian contentions of the left, have a strong motive, if only on grounds of economy, for a very persistent inquiry into the tenability of naturalism in moral theory.

The description which I have just given of 'naturalism' is in one respect too narrow to fit contemporary discussion, and must be widened accordingly. For it implies that when we say, for example, of a man that he is morally good or that he has done his duty, or of an action that it is right or that it is virtuous, we are making a statement. The implication may seem to be beyond question. But it is denied by the view which says that the meaning of moral terms, or of terms partly moral so far as they are moral, is 'expressive' or 'emotive', and not 'descriptive'. A view of this kind assimilates 'it is wrong to break promises' to 'down with promise-breakers!' and compares 'generosity is good' with 'hurrah for generous actions!' A variant, or supplement, of the theory adds that moral pseudo-statements, besides expressing the feelings of those who utter them, may be evocative of feelings in others or may have the force of imperatives addressed to others. The meaning of 'you ought not to tell lies' resembles that of 'don't tell lies'; and a commandment is not a statement. Some may be inclined to dismiss such suggestions as wanton paradox, as an extravagance of scepticism not to be taken seriously in the discussion of a serious subject. This would be a mistake. It is a merit in the expressive theory that it warns us against assuming uncritically that sentences grammatically similar are necessarily significant in similar ways. And we shall find later that there are important features of our moral thinking which the expressive theory can account for more easily than the more familiar kind of naturalism, which we may call 'descriptive naturalism'. The expressive theory is to be classed as naturalistic since it denies that non-natural characteristics are required to account for the significance of ethical terms. The theory holds that ethical terms are significant only in the sense of expressing, or evoking, feelings or emotional attitudes; and of these we are, or can become, aware 'by introspecting experiences'.

We are to ask, then, whether naturalism, in the sense described, can 'give a satisfactory account of our moral knowledge or convictions'. In discussing so general an issue it is necessary to lay down beforehand some plan or order of attack; otherwise the main thread of the discussion would soon be lost in the detailed examination of particular naturalistic theories about particular types of moral judgement. A possible plan would be to begin

by making a list, aiming at system and completeness, of the different varieties of naturalistic theory. We have already noticed one division, the division between descriptive and expressive theories. Another important division is made by Sir David Ross when he divides 'theories which offer definitions of ethical terms' (whether or not the definition is purely naturalistic) into 'two main classes'; theories which define the term in question 'by reference to the attitude of some being or other' (attitude theories) and theories which offer definitions 'by reference to the total consequences of the act or moral state in question' (consequence theories).¹ Attitude theories again would be divided according to their answers to the question 'what attitude?'; and again to the question 'whose attitude?', e.g. the person who makes the judgement, the agent, the majority of mankind, or of some particular community. Consequence theories again would be divided according to the features of the consequences held to be relevant; pleasantness, for example, or goodness in some naturalistically defined sense of goodness. And so on. The list having been made, the next step would be to consider which of the abstractly possible theories could be eliminated, and the object of the inquiry would be to reach conclusions as definite as possible on the merits and demerits of any theories which could not be decisively eliminated.

Now, apart from the difficulty of achieving an exhaustive classification of naturalistic theories and the absurdity of attempting exhaustiveness in a brief discussion, there is the following objection to an approach on these lines. The plan as above described suggests that there is some agreed body of 'moral knowledge or conviction', and that, this being so, what we have to do is to test the adequacy of a series of proposed definitions of terms which occur in typical statements expressing such knowledge or conviction. In testing the definitions we should presumably follow whatever agreed canons of method there may be for the testing of philosophical definitions. But, as soon as we began to examine any particular definition of any particular term in any particular alleged use, we should find ourselves embarrassed by doubts as to whether the term had any single ascertainable meaning in statements of the kind we were considering, and even as to whether, if there were such a meaning, statements of the kind in question were capable of being true. For, as philosophers from Plato and Aristotle onward have

¹ *Foundations of Ethics*, pp. 5-7.

rightly pointed out, there is no agreed body of moral conviction, even of the most general kind, waiting to be picked up from the talk of ordinary men. On the contrary, our ordinary moral thinking is full of confusion and inconsistency. For this reason it appears that the right approach to the question is the critical scrutiny of our unphilosophical moral conviction or knowledge. We must be as clear as we can what are the moral statements which, as ordinary thoughtful men, we are prepared to defend as being in some sense true before it is profitable to consider the theories of philosophers concerning the precise nature of the facts which make them true. And it is certainly necessary that anyone who proposes, as I have proposed, to discuss a way of interpreting 'our moral knowledge or convictions' should make clear what he takes to be the convictions which are the most fundamental, and the least liable to be shaken by rational criticism, in our moral thinking.

I wish, then, to focus the discussion on statements of a kind or kinds which seem to express moral knowledge or strong conviction. Such statements will contain at least one moral term, i.e. a word or phrase capable of a moral meaning used with such a meaning. But I must further restrict, and describe with greater precision, the sort of statements I have in mind. It is a commonplace that the words 'ought', 'right', 'good', and their contraries are sometimes used in non-moral senses; as when we speak of a 'good' typewriter or of the 'right' answer to a sum in arithmetic. On the other hand it is easy to point to uses of such words which no one would deny to be moral uses, as in 'I ought to keep my promises' and 'cruelty is evil'. But there are also uses in regard to which, if asked whether they were moral uses, we might hesitate; as when we speak of pain or ignorance as 'bad' or again of promoting the 'good' of other people. Pain and ignorance are not 'morally bad', and by the 'good' of others, or ourselves, we mean happiness rather than virtue. And it may be suggested that this sense of 'good' is a concern of the economist, and of other social scientists, and not merely of the analytic moral philosopher. On the other hand, moral philosophers, from Plato onwards, have discussed these uses of 'good' and 'bad', and it would be arbitrary and inconvenient to deny that they are 'moral' uses. I propose to say that, if moral, they are not 'distinctively moral', and to focus the discussion on distinctively moral meanings.

But, if we are to reach moral statements which we can hold to be fundamental, we must sift further the distinctively moral

meanings of ostensibly moral expressions. We should further classify such meanings as they are 'underivative' or 'derivative', and again as they are 'unmixed' or 'mixed'. If we wish to indicate the positive character of the first of each of these pairs we may speak of meanings which are 'ultimate' and of meanings which are 'pure'.

The meaning of a moral expression is 'derivative' if the expression has another meaning in terms of which the first meaning must be defined; it is 'underivative' if there is no other meaning to which the meaning is thus related. For example, it has been held that an action is morally good if the agent is moved to do it by a desire which is morally good. If this doctrine were acceptable, the sense in which a desire is good would be underivative and the sense in which an action is good would be derivative from the sense in which a desire is good. Relationships of derivation are not all of the same kind, and are not always easy to diagnose. Consider the following example. The word 'angry' and the word 'courageous' are applied both to certain dispositions and to manifestations of those dispositions. Again we say both of courage and of courageous actions that they are morally good. Now the manifestations of a disposition are more fundamental than the disposition in the sense that, as Plato observed in the *Republic*, you cannot describe a disposition without mentioning its manifestations. *Prima facie* a disposition is definable in terms of its manifestations and their occasions together with the notions of causality and possibility or probability. If this is allowed, I think it must be allowed that the sense in which the dispositional characters of moral agents are good or bad is derivative from the sense in which the manifestations of such dispositions are good or bad.

By an 'unmixed' sense of a moral term, say 'good', I mean a sense in which it is asserted of a subject solely in respect of the subject's moral goodness or, if there are different sorts of moral goodness, solely in respect of one sort. It is very easy to see that we often use words in a mixed or muddled way. Thus we may begin by feeling confusedly and saying vaguely that a picture is 'good'. When we later distinguish elements, often heterogeneous, in this 'goodness', our thoughts and feelings, and their expression in words, become concurrently more complex and precise. So again the feeling which we express by speaking of the 'splendid' achievement of the winner of a long-distance race may divide into an aesthetic appreciation of the physical performance and an approval of the moral tenacity

for which we take the victory to be evidence. Such occasional muddles, and correspondingly mixed uses of language, are usually easy to detect. But I am suggesting that we may also find, in our ordinary moral thought and language, muddles which are chronic and endemic. I shall go on to suggest that this is so to a large extent in our recognition of goodness in motives, with the exception of one motive, and in our approval of accepted moral 'virtues'. But my immediate point is that it is futile to consider philosophical definitions of ethical terms, or the issue between naturalistic and non-naturalistic accounts of such terms, until any merely confused and uncritical elements which can be found in our ordinary moral thinking have been eliminated.

I have now described what I mean by the use of a moral expression in a sense which is 'distinctively moral' and also 'underivative' and 'unmixed'. It must be remembered that to say that, in a certain use, a moral term satisfies these descriptions is quite without prejudice to the question whether, in that use, the term is definable, and, if definable, whether it is definable naturalistically. For the order of discussion proposed is first to find statements of kinds which express purely moral conviction or knowledge, and then to consider whether naturalism can give an acceptable account of such statements.

Can we, then, point to any statements which satisfy these requirements? I propose to start with the term 'morally good'. Now I think it would be generally agreed that there is at least one class of moral statements of which we have good reason to say that we know them to be true. These are statements made by an agent about some action which he is doing, or has done, that the action in respect of a certain character which it has, which we may call its 'dutifulness', is morally good. When corresponding statements are made about another person the knowledge which can fairly be claimed is only of the hypothetical fact that, if the action has the character of dutifulness which we believe it to have, then it is morally good. But what is the character of 'dutifulness'? I suggest the following provisional description, and here I must make it clear that I no longer claim 'general agreement'. An action is dutiful if the agent (*a*) believes that it is right, (*b*) knows that it is his duty to do it, and (*c*) does it because it is his duty to do it. The third element in this description would commonly be expressed by saying that the action was done from a 'sense of duty', or that the agent's 'motive' in doing it was the sense of duty. Having come to know in regard to some individual dutiful action that

it is morally good we can generalize by 'intuitive induction' and say that all dutiful actions *qua* dutiful are morally good. Now anyone who agrees that we have the knowledge here claimed, without necessarily agreeing at all points with the description I have given of 'dutifulness', would allow that the goodness of dutiful actions is both 'distinctively' and 'purely' moral; he would have to allow also that their goodness, or at any rate the goodness of their motive, is 'underivative'.

There is much here that is disputable, and in need of further discussion and defence. In particular it will be necessary later to consider the meaning of the distinctively moral terms 'right' and 'duty' as they occur in the definition of dutifulness, and this consideration may lead us to amend the definition. But on certain points, for obvious reasons of space, I can only try to make clear what I mean without here attempting detailed justification. And there are three points in connexion with the language used in the above paragraph on which I must make brief explanations.

1. I prefer the word 'dutiful' to the word 'conscientious' to describe the characteristic in question because 'conscientious' primarily suggests the dominance of certain feelings, and we believe that such feelings may be excessive and even morbid. Now a state of mind or activity may be morbid and also in other respects morally good. But I do not wish to deny that we sometimes think mistakenly that an action which is conscientious, in a sense of 'conscientious' not synonymous with 'dutiful', is, therefore, morally good. This admission seems to me to be compatible with holding that we often *know* that some action is dutiful and, therefore, morally good.

2. The word 'action' has well-known ambiguities. Words in ordinary use which ostensibly describe kinds of action usually signify the bringing about by an act of will of consequences of a certain sort, not necessarily intended; the word 'murder' implies that a certain consequence was intended, the word 'kill' does not. By an 'action' in the expression 'dutiful action', and throughout this discussion, I mean a voluntary activity. In this sense of action the phrase 'trying to move my trigger-finger' describes an action, even if paralysis inhibits success; but the word 'murder' does not strictly describe a kind of action, although it implies an action of a kind of which, in certain situations, trying to move my trigger-finger would be an instance.

3. Expressions like 'because it is his duty' and 'the agent's motive was the sense of duty' conceal problems about the nature

of 'motives' and ignore the fact that motives are often mixed. When we do an action we may have several reasons for doing it (pro-motives) and several against (con-motives). In so speaking we refer to the desires, and hence also to the thoughts, which occur in us before we do the action and which influence us in its favour or against it. When we say of one such desire that it is *the* motive of an action, we might mean to imply that there were no other pro-motives, or at least that the other pro-motive desires were in comparison weak and unimportant. But I think that a truer account of what we ordinarily mean by '*the* motive' is the desire to the object of which our attention, in doing the action, is primarily directed. But, on the face of it, neither account is complete without the other. When we say that one man is to a greater extent than another dominated by the sense of duty we say both that he 'feels' a certain desire or emotion more strongly and also that he 'thinks' more about whether what he is doing or about to do is his duty or not. The precise interconnexions between the 'emotional' and the 'cognitive' elements in dutiful activity need not at the moment be further pursued.

If it is agreed that dutiful actions at least are morally good, the next question to ask is whether any other kinds of action, actions done from any other motive, are also morally good. For uncertainty about the answer to this question would be symptomatic of a need to clarify the sense in which dutiful actions are morally good. To some it may seem obvious that the answer is yes. An action, we have seen, may have more than one pro-motive. A man may give another money both because he has an obligation and because he feels generously disposed towards him. A man may behave well in battle both from a sense of duty and because it is 'second nature' to him to do what is expected of him in such a situation. Is it not clear that in such cases the action has more than one characteristic in respect of which it is morally good? Thus dutifulness is not the only good-making characteristic. It might be suggested that although, if an action is dutiful, it will be better if it is also prompted by generosity or courage, its being dutiful is necessary if it is to be good. But here again the opposite may seem obvious. It may be said that generosity and courage, and other moral virtues, are dispositions to act in ways which are as such morally good, and that actions which manifest generosity or courage are not necessarily dutiful.

But the view that actions which are virtuous, as well as

actions which are dutiful, are as such morally good is open to strong counter-attack. One counter-argument is the following. Consider other ways in which men are graded as better and worse, and which are admitted to be non-moral; in respect, for example, of their ability in the high jump or their power to solve problems in mathematical logic or to compose symphonies. If we are asked why we distinguish sharply between differences in respect of such accomplishments and differences in respect of moral goodness, one thing which we are inclined to say is that men are not morally good or bad in respect of their innate capacities; and, in saying this, we have the thought that men are morally good or bad only in so far as they are themselves responsible for being what they are and behaving as they do. It is, of course, quite untrue that the degree of a physical or intellectual proficiency depends solely on native talent. Of two mathematicians both of whom have a professional duty to pursue the subject the more dutiful may be expected *ceteris paribus* to go further. But, when this is pointed out, we have no hesitation in saying that, while high accomplishment in mathematics or music may sometimes be strong *evidence* of past moral goodness, this admission leaves undisturbed the denial that such accomplishments are, in their own right, morally good. Now, when we reflect, we see that there is a very close parallel between the possession of an accomplishment and the possession of a moral virtue. In the case of both the finished product depends partly on native endowment and environmental influences and partly on activities for which the agent may be held to be responsible. For there are natural differences between men in respect of their tendencies to virtues and vices as in their physique and mental powers; some men are as incapable of the refined perceptions and feelings which manifest a high degree of tact or kindness as are others of running a mile in five minutes or of mastering the calculus.¹ Hence it is plausible to argue that neither an accomplishment nor a virtue, nor again the forms of intelligent behaviour in which they are manifested,

¹ Kant makes this point, conclusively in my opinion, when he classes 'courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament' along with 'intelligence, wit, judgement, and the other talents of the mind' as being 'gifts of nature'. His celebrated distinction between 'practical' and 'pathological' love implies the same doctrine. I do not see how to reconcile with this doctrine Kant's further statement that 'moderation in the affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation', although not 'good without qualification', nevertheless 'constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person'. (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, First Section.)

are as such morally good; while both, so far as they are evidence of dutiful activity, are evidence of moral goodness in their owners. If this conclusion were accepted, we should have to say that the attribution of 'goodness' to the accepted virtues, and their expression in conduct, is a case of a usage which is mixed or muddled in the sense already explained; the elements in the mixture being a moral approval of dutiful activity and non-moral appreciations of, for example, amiability, social usefulness, or quasi-technical dexterities.

The argument is plausible. I believe it to be essentially sound.¹ But it leaves much more to be said than can be said here. I propose to notice three points at which it needs reinforcement, and can, I think, be reinforced.

1. The argument for assimilating virtues to accomplishments leaves unexplained the fact that we are all prone to regard the virtues as in themselves morally good but are not prone to regard an accomplishment as more than evidence of moral goodness. (a) The main answer seems to be that a virtue is a standing pro-motive to certain sorts of action which we tend to think right, and which thus tend to coincide with actions to which we are prompted by the sense of duty. A virtue or a vice has an emotional, as well as an intellectual, aspect in a way in which a mere skill or intellectual ability has not. As Aristotle pointed out, an expert doctor is an expert poisoner. This is an important difference between a virtue and an accomplishment, but it seems to me to leave intact the argument for denying that the dispositions we call virtuous are as such morally good. (b) The following factor is, I think, also at work in our conventional muddle. Since, broadly speaking, we think it right to do actions of sorts which the virtues, if we had them, would incline us to do, there would be a close correlation between dutifulness and virtue, if it were not for inequalities in respect of native temperamental tendencies and environmental advantages. But, being often thoughtless and intolerant, we are apt to overlook such inequalities. On the other hand, congenital differences between one man and another in respect of physical and intellectual endowment are more obvious, and are brought to our notice by such tests as games and examinations. We soon learn that it is not the boy with most 'character' who wins the race,

¹ The view which I here express is, I believe, in substantial agreement with, and is certainly indebted to, the contentions of Professor C. A. Campbell's *Scepticism and Construction*, Ch. VII (The Principle of Moral Valuation), especially Sections 4-6.

or the most industrious boy who gets the best marks. Indeed, we are apt to go to the opposite extreme, and to forget that success in examinations is some evidence of character. Thus in the case of the virtues we are apt to overlook the initial inequalities; in regard to abilities we are apt to forget that moral backbone is a factor in the achievement of exceptional results. Our view of the moral facts suffers from chronic distortion due to the coincidence of these two opposite oversights.

2. The argument might be attacked on the ground that the objections to regarding courage or tact as, in their own right, morally good could be brought against dutifulness itself, namely, that the degree to which it is manifested depends partly on congenital or other factors for which the agent is not responsible. So to argue is in effect to suggest that, just as one man is born with a greater liking for whisky or aptitude for mathematics than another, so too men differ in their native aptitude or liking for doing what they think right. A complete answer to this suggestion would require a full-length discussion of motives and of responsibility. But I think that a short answer is adequate to the present inquiry. The suggestion would presumably have to rest either on analogy or on some kind of introspection or self-awareness. Any argument from analogy would be very weak indeed. For the moral motive arises only in situations where we reflectively consider as moral agents the possible actions open to us, and is, therefore, very different from ordinary congenital propensities.¹ As to the data of my own and others' introspection, I see no reason to think that these would lend any support to the suggestion. Moreover, I have maintained that we clearly do regard dutifulness as being morally good. Now I agree that this conviction would be modified if differences between men in respect of dutifulness could be shown to depend on differences in respect of innate tendencies and environment. I think it is certain that this cannot be shown. And in any case the object of my inquiry at this stage is not to examine the ultimate foundations of our moral convictions but rather to clarify these convictions themselves. Hence I think that for my present purpose further discussion of the issue raised by this possible objection is not required.

3. The third counter-suggestion which I wish to consider is this. It may be said that, even if the doctrine that dutifulness is the only characteristic in respect of which an action or an

¹ See on this point the article by Professor C. A. Campbell, 'Are there "Degrees" of the Moral Emotion?', in *Mind*, vol. xlv, no. 180.

agent is morally good is a tenable reading of the facts, it is an arbitrary and incomplete reading of the facts. What should be said is that there is no other characteristic which makes actions good in the way in which dutiful actions are good. But virtuous actions, even if not as such 'meritorious', are plainly good in their way, and their goodness is a moral goodness. Consider the question who is 'better', the man who gives to charity from a sense of duty in face of counter-inclinations or the man who gives gladly as an effortless expression of his character? Is it not clear that we recognize two distinct scales, and that the order on the scale of merit is reversed on the scale of virtue? But both are scales of moral goodness. Thus to say that only dutifulness is morally good is merely to proclaim an intention to use the term 'morally good' in an arbitrarily restricted way. The answer to this objection which emerges from the preceding discussion is twofold. First, the doctrine that the qualities we call virtues are the ground of an ultimate kind of moral goodness is unnecessary because the facts are sufficiently explained by the hypothesis that the verbal expression of our approval of the virtues is a use of words to be classed as 'mixed' or 'muddled'. Secondly, when in concrete cases we discriminate the elements in the 'mixture', we find that what is left, when we have segregated the approval of dutifulness, is in fact an appreciation or depreciation which we recognize as being non-moral. For instance, we do not regard the victim of an abnormal congenital craving for drugs as morally bad in that respect. Similarly, in so far as we can account for an exceptional display of 'courage' by reference to the absence of fears which would be felt by most men in such a situation, we should regard the exceptional man as, in this respect, perhaps super-normal but not as morally better than the common man.

I have now given my reasons for thinking that statements to the effect that some dutiful action is good are not only 'distinctively' but 'purely' moral, and that certain other 'distinctively' moral statements in which 'good' is a predicate are not 'purely' moral. We can now ask whether 'good', in the use which we have held to be 'purely' moral, can be interpreted naturalistically. An affirmative answer to this question would not carry with it any strong presumption that all ethical terms can be so interpreted. Our description of dutiful action itself contained two distinctively ethical terms, 'right' and 'ought' or 'duty', and the difficulties in the way of interpreting these terms naturalistically will need separate consideration.

Philosophers who maintain that 'good' cannot be defined naturalistically would hold that to say that dutiful actions are good is to assert a necessary synthetic connexion between two characteristics; that a dutiful action is good follows from the fact that it is dutiful. Now, if what I have said about our moral convictions is right, we do think not that all dutiful actions, or all those we have considered, merely happen to be good but that because they are dutiful they must be good. Thus the non-naturalist can rightly claim that his view explains an important fact about our moral thinking. The question to consider is whether the naturalist can offer any acceptable alternative explanation. Some empiricist philosophers would say that it is absurd to question the possibility of an alternative explanation, however difficult it may be to find and formulate such an explanation. For the non-naturalist's explanation implies that goodness is an *a priori* concept and involves synthetic *a priori* judgements in which this concept is an element, and both doctrines are sufficiently discredited to justify us in ruling them out in advance from our account of moral phenomena. But this short cut is not open.¹ For many philosophers still think that there is an *a priori* element at least in our notions of substance and cause; and even the naturalist, in the sense of the definition here adopted, leaves this issue open. And many philosophers still think it impossible to deny that we have synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Moreover, even if, apart from moral theory, the questions at issue cannot be held to be decided against the empiricist, they are at least sufficiently doubtful and disputed to make it obligatory on philosophers to-day to approach moral theory without pre-judging these general issues. For these reasons we should be prepared, when we ask whether there is, or can be, any adequate naturalistic account of our moral thinking, to find ourselves led to give a negative answer.

We have to consider then whether the naturalistic philosopher can give a satisfactory account of those features of the thought expressed by 'this dutiful action is good' which make plausible the interpretation of the non-naturalist. It is clear that we do not become aware of goodness 'by sensing *sensa* which manifest it', and hence that, if we are aware of it naturalistically, it must be by 'introspecting experiences'. 'Good' must be a word which describes or expresses the occurrence of emotion in our-

¹ I am indebted here to Professor Broad's comments on this general argument in his paper on 'Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, n.s. vol. xlv, 1944-5).

selves or others. The suggestion has some initial plausibility for two reasons. For, first, we do feel emotions favourable to the actions and states of character we call good, and adverse to those we call bad. Secondly, it is common, in the case of other emotions too, to feel them towards an object in respect of some definite characteristic which we know or believe it to have. The fact that we feel the moral emotion about an action in respect of its dutifulness would be the basis, on the naturalistic view, of the idea that its goodness is consequential upon its dutifulness. A common and natural objection at this point is that our feeling the moral emotion presupposes that we first have the *thought* that the object about which we feel it, in this case a dutiful action *qua* dutiful, is good. But reflection seems to me to show that the charge of vicious circularity, however difficult it may be to meet in the case of some ethical terms, is inconclusive in this instance. For, in answer to the question whether our emotional reaction is connected directly with an action's dutifulness or is further mediated by the thought that its dutifulness makes it good, we are not inclined to decide without hesitation for the second alternative. And it is this unclarity in our intellectual discrimination that makes us hesitate, and makes it reasonable to hesitate, about accepting the non-naturalistic theory.

But there is a serious difficulty which we have still to consider in the naturalistic account of ethical terms. If what an ethical term stands for is a power to produce a certain emotional reaction, then ethical statements are empirical. But the connexion between an ethical characteristic and the subject of which it is asserted appears to be necessary and synthetic. Thus, in the case we are considering, it is *a priori* impossible, and not merely causally impossible, for an action to be dutiful and not good. Now in his recent paper on 'Moral Sense Theories'¹ Professor Broad has forged and polished a weapon very useful to naturalistic philosophers confronted with applications of this difficulty. He points out that of two token-sentences of the same type one may be synthetic and the other analytic according to the definitions adopted of the words contained in the sentence, and argues that 'it would not be surprising if a person should sometimes become confused in such cases and think that every token of this type expresses *one and the same proposition* which is *both* synthetic and necessary' (p. 157). This idea Broad applies to a naturalistic account of rightness. Thus,

¹ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N.S., vol. xlv, 1944-5.

if the analysis suggested for 'promise-keeping is right' is 'promise-keeping evokes a favourable moral emotion in all normal (or all rational) men', the proposition will be tautologous or empirical according as a disposition to approve promise-keeping is, or is not, included in the definition of normality (or of rationality). In the particular case we are considering I am not inclined to accept this application of the general diagnosis. For, if a naturalistic account of the 'goodness' of dutiful action is to be considered, I think that an account in terms of the reaction of the man who makes the statement is more plausible than an account in terms of the 'normal' reaction. But I am inclined to suggest that a different oscillation between empirical fact and tautology may underlie our tendency to regard the connexion between dutifulness and moral goodness as synthetic and necessary. This oscillation is connected with our natural tendency to define or describe moral emotions in terms of their 'objects'.

The word emotion is notoriously vague and is used to cover a wide range of facts. At one extreme it may refer to what is little more than an internal sensation or feeling. In this sense a man might be said to have the emotion of fear when he merely had a 'sinking feeling' without the thought of any definite danger. But, in its natural sense, an emotion is intimately bound up with belief (which may, of course, be false). It is felt 'about', or directed 'on', an 'object', and it is usually felt about an object in respect of a more or less definite selection of its characteristics (or presumed characteristics). We have seen that this is true of moral emotions. Hence a moral emotion is not to be thought of as a peculiar kind of pang or glow which can occur, like a smell, in isolation from judgement, but rather as the tone or colouring of the thought of a certain sort of object. To say this is not to say that one sort of favourable emotion differs from another only in respect of its object; such an account would inadequately distinguish, for example, our (perhaps reverential) approval of dutifulness from our (certainly not reverential) admiration of physical or intellectual accomplishment. What I am suggesting is that the fact that emotions, like desires, are 'intentional' makes it natural that words standing for emotions should sometimes be so used that it would be a contradiction in terms to say of a certain emotion that it was not directed on a certain sort of object.

Consider now the thought (and feeling) expressed by the statement made about some dutiful action of the speaker or

another that it is good, and the generalization from this that any dutiful action is as such good. The naturalist has to account for the error which he attributes to his opponent of supposing that this generalization is reached by a process of 'intuitive induction' which terminates in the apprehension of a 'synthetic *a priori*' truth. And his account of the error must be consistent with his own positive doctrine that there is nothing in the facts for which 'good' can stand except evocativeness (say in the speaker) of the favourable moral emotion. The first difficulty here for this particular form of naturalism is that it cannot consistently allow that we can strictly know even that some given dutiful action is good; for to 'evoke' means to produce, i.e. to cause. But the naturalist can plausibly account for the presumption of strict knowledge in the individual case by pointing out that we do know by direct reflection that the dutiful action is the 'object' of the moral emotion, and that it is very easy to confuse the statement that the dutiful action causes the emotion with the statement that it is the object of the emotion, and hence, since the latter can be known directly, to suppose that the former can also; or rather to suppose that something is directly known which is not thought of determinately as either the one or the other. It is this assurance which, according to the naturalist, is expressed by the statement that the dutiful action is good. Here the synthetic fact involved is that the thought of the action as being dutiful has a certain emotional colouring. But if good means 'object of moral emotion' and the meaning of 'moral emotion' includes 'emotion of which the object is dutiful action' then the statement that this dutiful action is good means that this dutiful action is the object of that emotion the object of which is dutiful action. Thus the general statement that any dutiful action is good will be equivalent to the statement that (a) any dutiful action arouses an emotion, and (b) the emotion which it arouses is the favourable moral emotion. Here (b) is analytic if the 'moral' emotion is defined as having dutiful action for its object, synthetic but empirical if 'moral' emotion has by definition no specific object but only a certain tone or colouring. In this way the naturalist could allege that a sentence which might be either necessary (but analytic) or synthetic (but empirical) was mistakenly supposed by his opponent to represent a statement which is both necessary and synthetic.

No doubt this kind of explanation would be plainly inadequate if it were the case that non-naturalists had 'intuitions' as

clear and definite as their language sometimes suggests. But I have already professed that, when I say of a dutiful action that it is good, I do not express any clear apprehension of a connexion between two distinct characteristics, even if I have an experience which I find it plausible to describe as being such an apprehension. Hence it seems to me reasonable, and indeed necessary, that the moral philosopher should be prepared to detect in himself confusions of the kind described, even if it seems an elementary kind.

It may be objected that the tentative defence which I have suggested of a naturalistic account of the goodness of dutiful action is inconsistent with my earlier contention that only dutiful actions are morally good, on the ground that the contention implied a reciprocal necessary connexion between dutifulness and moral goodness, whereas I have admitted that, on a naturalistic interpretation, the assertion of such a connexion is either a tautology or an empirical proposition. But the essence of my earlier contention was that our appreciation of the so-called 'moral virtues' is 'mixed', that it contains as one element a non-moral admiration of concrete accomplishments, and that the moral element in it is the approval of dutifulness. These contentions are not tautologous, and, so far as I can see, the argument for them is neutral as between the non-naturalistic and the naturalistic interpretations of moral goodness.

The position so far reached is that reflection upon 'moral goodness' taken by itself leaves open the issue between naturalism and non-naturalism. If the argument rested at this point it would be reasonable to prefer naturalism on general epistemological grounds, if only on grounds of economy. But the argument cannot rest at this point. To name the characteristic in respect of which we have held actions to be good is to speak of 'duty' or 'right', and *prima facie* of both. Both terms are 'distinctively', and both appear to be also 'purely', moral. If one or both of them requires a non-naturalistic interpretation, this result would largely nullify the general ground for preferring a naturalistic interpretation of moral goodness. We must, therefore, now consider the terms 'right' and 'duty'. Here again an attempt to clarify our ordinary thinking seems to me to be a necessary preliminary to the profitable consideration of the issue between naturalism and non-naturalism.

In discussing moral goodness I assumed that we are sometimes in situations in which we should find it natural to say that we believe a certain action to be right and know that we have

a duty to do it. The use of the two words 'right' and 'duty' is necessary in order to eliminate an incoherence into which we are apt to fall when we describe the process of making up our minds what we ought to do. We find ourselves driven to admit that the process often, or always, terminates in belief and not knowledge; but we are tempted to add that, if the belief really is our sincere belief, we ought to act on it, whether it is true or false. Now 'I ought to do what I believe I ought to do' involves a contradiction unless 'ought' is used in two senses. But, when the contradiction is pointed out, we still feel that, even if what we said was absurd, what we meant by it was true; and we, therefore, repeat it in the form 'it is my duty to do what I think right'. And this has an implication which we welcome, namely, that since I know what I believe right, I know what it is my duty to do. We must now try to look more closely at the facts which are roughly summarized in this way, and we may find that our first rough summary needs to be amended and not merely made more precise. I propose to consider what can be said about what I have called 'the process of making up our minds what we ought to do' without begging questions at issue between moral philosophers. I shall use the term 'moral reflection' to refer to the whole process and 'moral decision' to refer to its termination. A 'moral decision' in this sense must not be confused with a decision to do an action. Nor is the decision that we ought to do a certain action necessarily followed by a decision to do it.

Discussion of this question is apt to give the impression of exaggerating the extent to which, in our everyday life, we find ourselves confronted by moral problems and expending time and thought on their resolution. It is, therefore, well to begin by recognizing, in order that we may be able subsequently to ignore, the fact that a large part of our moral reflection is in practice second-hand. We act within the framework of policies previously adopted without repeating to ourselves the reasons for adopting them. We follow working rules and principles and only exceptionally does it occur to us to question them. But, so far as we are rational, we should be capable of setting out our policies and principles if they were challenged. And, on crucial occasions when we have to make an important decision, we try to think the issue out without taking on trust the results of previous reflection, our own or another's. It is with first-hand moral reflection that I am here concerned.

Common sense recognizes two sorts of questions which we

consider in moral reflection, questions of fact concerning the situation in which we are placed and questions as to what it is right or best to do given that the facts of the situation are what we conclude them to be. To accept this division is to hold, not that we necessarily do or should finish considering questions of the former kind before we begin to consider questions of the latter kind, but that any question which we ask ourselves is either of the one kind or of the other. With this proviso, it is convenient to speak of moral reflection as having two stages or phases, a 'factual phase' and an 'ethical phase'. Factual questions are about the past, the present, or the future; and some of the questions about the future are as to what would happen if I did this and what if that. It is a truism that the answers to factual questions are usually, or always, in terms of probability. Thus I might have to ask how probable it is that I made a certain promise, that the man to whom I made it is alive, and that if I took a certain step now, it would result in the fulfilment of the promise. These questions are 'factual'. But to ask what answers to these questions would make it right to take the step is to pass to the ethical phase. Again, if I have to choose between producing greater happiness with less certainty or less happiness with greater certainty, the estimation of the happiness and the certainty in either case is factual; but the question which it is right to choose is not merely factual.

It is important to notice that we often describe a doubt which we feel in moral reflection as if it belonged to the ethical phase when the only real doubt in our minds is factual. Thus I might be certain that I ought to do some action if, but only if, a certain report which I proposed to test was true. Here, although my doubt is purely factual, I should say that I was in doubt as to whether I ought to do the action. Similarly, we are liable to enter into moral disputes in which we discover only gradually, or not at all, that the difference between the disputants is entirely accounted for by differences in their factual beliefs.

Moral reflection may be incomplete or defective in the factual phase in either or both of two ways. The information available, or used as a basis of judgement, may be inadequate; or the judgements of probability which are made on the information available may be unreasonable. In order to see what is involved in the idea that our duty is to do actions which we think right it is necessary to consider the moral aspect of these two defects of reflection in the factual phase.

Ignorance of relevant fact may or may not be attributable

to the agent concerned. It is attributable if there is some practical step which he could have taken and the taking of which would have resulted in his acquiring the information, or if more careful or more prolonged reflection would have disclosed it. But ignorance which is in this sense attributable is not necessarily culpable in a moral sense. Thus, the fact that a man is lying unconscious in a ditch may be relevant in the sense that, if I knew this, I would think it right to render aid. My ignorance may be attributable in the sense that, if I had looked, I would have seen him. But it is not, therefore, culpable if there was nothing to suggest the need for investigation. Again, to take another case, it might occur to a man in the course of moral reflection that more prolonged reflection might disclose a new relevant fact, but he might think sincerely, this chance being very remote, that it would, nevertheless, be wrong to delay further. In this case his ignorance may be attributable to his decision to curtail reflection but is not, therefore, culpable. On the view that it is his duty to do what he thinks right there has been no neglect of duty. On the other hand, defective information can sometimes be traced to omission to make an inquiry which we thought it right to make or to culpable carelessness. But if now, on the basis of our defective information, we do what we think right, then, if it is our duty to do what we think right, the failure to do our duty is confined to our past omission or carelessness.

Parallel considerations show the need for similar distinctions in connexion with incompetence in the estimation of probabilities. Such errors, like ignorance of fact, may or may not be attributable, and, if attributable, may or may not be culpable. The error is attributable if it would have been remedied by further reflection on the part of the agent; whether this condition is fulfilled depends on the difficulty of the problem and the intelligence of the agent. The possibility of error which is attributable but not culpable is less obvious. But that such errors occur becomes clear when we reflect that the condition of attributability may be satisfied without its being the case that the thought occurs, or could be expected to occur, to the agent that further reflection might alter his judgement. Again, even if this did occur to him, he might think, if the chance of such alteration were faint or the need for action urgent, that it would be wrong to prolong his reflection on the matter. The view that it is our duty to do what we think right implies that, if he thinks this, he does his duty in acting on his uncorrected judgement.

Two points arise from this discussion of the 'factual phase' which should be noticed.

1. The general position cannot be described in terms of any simple opposition between the action which is 'objectively right' and the action which is 'subjectively right' in the sense of being the action which the agent believes to be 'objectively right'. Rightness is relative (*a*) to a body of information, and (*b*) to judgements, involving probability, based on such information. Under (*a*) we can distinguish the data actually before the agent, the data he could have obtained, the totality of discoverable, or of actual, relevant facts about the past and the present, and other bodies of data which would result from the removal of the restriction to the present and the past. Under (*b*) we can distinguish the agent's actual judgement, the best judgement he could have made, and the judgement he would have made if he had been completely rational. It is easy to see how possible 'right' actions can be multiplied. And, as we have seen, further complications arise when we consider limitations on (*a*) and (*b*) attributable to the agent's moral convictions. But to pursue this last complication would be to anticipate what I have to say about the 'ethical phase'.

2. The second point is this. There is a close parallelism, or identity, of principle in the reasons for distinguishing between 'attributable' and 'culpable' defects in the factual phase of moral thinking and the reasons given earlier for distinguishing between the way in which virtuous dispositions are good and the way in which dutifulness is good. In both cases we are led to make the distinction when we press home the question, in regard to the actions of a moral agent, in respect of what characteristics of these actions the agent can be held to be morally accountable for them.

The moral reflection of different men on the same situation may reach different conclusions because their judgements rest on different selections from the possible data, or because they have inconsistent beliefs about the same data. But in other cases different moral pronouncements may emerge from similar sets of beliefs about the situation. The 'facts' of the situation are not ethically relevant in respect of all their characteristics; only some of these characteristics, as we may put it, are 'right-tending' or 'wrong-tending'. And men give different answers to the question which of them are right-tending, and again to questions as to the relative degrees in which they are right-tending. We must now briefly consider the apparent facts about

such differences in the 'ethical phase' of moral reflection. The apparent facts involve the interaction of moral theory and moral practice, and are complex. I cannot hope to do more than indicate the most general issues which arise in their interpretation.

No one approaches a situation demanding moral reflection with a mind blank on the question what kinds of fact are right-tending and in what degree. In some cases the ethical phase consists merely in the application of existing convictions on this question; the moral decision is wholly determined by the agent's ethical preconceptions or prejudgements. But in other and more interesting cases ethical preconceptions are too general to be applicable, or different preconceptions incline to different decisions. When this is so a first-hand decision must be taken on the merits of the individual case. It is true that there are moral theories which seem to imply that there are no occasions for decisions of this kind. Thus it might be urged that, if ethical hedonism is true, the only doubts or hesitations which should arise are factual doubts as to what action would maximize happiness. But there is a general consensus that ethical hedonism gives an inadequate account of moral thinking. And, apart from this, hedonists themselves frequently admit by implication that there are situations which are not covered by the instruction to maximize happiness; for example, when we have to choose between a greater quantity and a wider distribution of happiness or again in weighing 'quality' against 'quantity' of pleasure.

When men's answers to questions as to what characteristics are right-tending, or as to where the balance of right lies in an individual situation, are in conflict, we do not think that the issue is a mere 'matter of taste', like the pseudo-dispute as to whether oysters have a 'nice' taste. When we find a man who sees nothing wrong in slavery or the vendetta, or who thinks that the ways in which his actions affect his own race or political community, but not the ways in which they affect the members of other races or communities, are 'right-tending' or 'wrong-tending', we have no hesitation in saying that his mind is defective and that his moral decisions are perverse. The straightforward interpretation of this discrimination is to say that moral principles and decisions are true or false, and that the standard in estimating them is approximation to the truth. But it is worth considering what can be said about the grading of moral conceptions, according as they are enlightened or unenlightened, without the assumption that this objectivist

interpretation is correct. By what criteria can we judge moral decisions, decisions as to what makes right acts right, to be perverse and myopic, or enlightened and far-seeing?

We can at least ask, in regard to any moral decision, the following two questions. (a) Was the moral decision consequential upon a factual belief which, by ordinary criteria, must be judged uncritical or false? (b) Was the man who made the decision a man of experience and knowledge and one fully capable, on purely factual questions, of exercising critical judgement? (a) It would not be difficult to make lists of moral judgements which are 'unreasonable' in the sense that they can be largely accounted for by uncritical factual belief. The unquestioning assumptions that the pronouncements of custom enshrine ancestral wisdom, or that some document is inspired, are obvious instances. A failure to distinguish in oneself between a strong feeling in favour of doing something and insight into the nature of what is being done is another. Again some who have become convinced of pacifism on the ground that it is 'wrong' to kill might modify their conviction if they were capable of carrying further their analysis of the ways in which one instance of killing differs factually from another, and of the nature of the positive action which pacifism enjoins. And so on. Connexions between factual errors and moral principles can sometimes be traced also in the views of philosophers which, formulated in the study, may later influence conduct; for instance, the connexion between the confusions leading to the assertion that only pleasure is desired and the suggestion that conduciveness to pleasure is the only right-tending characteristic. (b) The second criterion is indirect. But, if one man has wider knowledge, more imaginative insight into the minds of others, and greater critical acumen than another, it would be generally thought reasonable to prefer his moral principles and decisions; when the elements in this criterion conflict, we tend to attach more importance to wide knowledge than to intellectual acuteness. In the senses defined by such criteria most people would be prepared to distinguish, at least roughly, between moral decisions as more or less enlightened, and to dismiss some as manifestly perverse. My immediate point is that the bare fact that we can and do make such discriminations leaves open the question what is the ultimate epistemological analysis of the 'ethical phase' of moral reflection.

But, before I return to this final question, there is one further point to consider about the conviction expressed by the statement

that 'it is our duty to do what we think right'. The statement implies that a man can truly be said to be doing his 'duty' even when his action manifests an extreme degree of 'ethical perversity', i.e. when his pronouncements as to what sorts of facts are right-tending, and his individual decisions as to where the balance of rightness lies, are thoroughly bad by the above criteria. Can this implication be maintained? We have already seen that there is a strong case for holding that the doing of duty, and the manifesting of moral goodness, is compatible with gross ignorance of fact and a high degree of incompetence to form rational estimates of evidence. It seems to me that there is an equally strong case, and indeed the same case, for holding that ethical perversity is compatible with the doing of duty. For it is true of ethical perversity, just as it is true of ignorance and of muddle-headedness, that it may or may not be 'attributable', and that, if it is attributable, it may or may not be 'culpable'. The same arguments apply *mutatis mutandis*. The ethical perversity of an African tribesman, or of a fundamentalist, may be non-attributable in the sense that it would not be altered or cured by anything that they could do. And, where the perversity is attributable, in the sense that it would have been improved if the agent had taken some step which was in his power, say consulting a clergyman or a philosopher or a psycho-analyst, it may well be non-culpable. For the agent may be a man to whom it would never occur to consult any such person and who, if the idea were suggested, would not think it right to do so.

I come now to the question which I have been approaching in this discussion of 'moral reflection'. The question may be expressed by asking whether 'moral decisions', in respect of their 'ethical phase', involve facts which are 'non-natural'. This question must be distinguished from the question whether 'moral decisions' are 'objective'. By the statement that they are 'objective' I propose to mean that they are made true or false by some state of affairs other than the present occurrent state of the mind which reaches the decision. Hence I should call 'subjectivist' any view about moral decisions which held either that their verbal utterance is merely reflexively 'descriptive' or that it is 'expressive'. Now (a) if subjectivism is true, it follows from the definition of naturalism that naturalism is true. I am inclined to think (b) that, if objectivism is true, then non-naturalism is true. But I suggest (c) that the issue between an objectivist non-naturalism and a subjectivist naturalism is difficult to decide since either can give a quite plausible account of

the leading features of our moral reflection. I do not, of course, mean that a decision is impossible, but only that I do not now know how to reach one. About (b) I propose to say only a very few words; on (c) I shall indicate the main points on which the two accounts of moral reflection and decision diverge.

(b) Philosophers have formulated many theories of 'rightness' which combine naturalism with objectivism, and it is no doubt arbitrary, in a discussion with the present title, not to deal with such theories. But the objections to most of them are both formidable and familiar. I must here be content to assert, without detailed justification, that no theory of this kind is capable of giving an acceptable account of moral reflection and decision. It is a feature of such theories that they offer some complex characteristic which the non-naturalist would hold to be at most right-tending or right-making as constituting a definition of rightness. This in itself is a difficulty, since we have some inclination to deny that any natural characteristic can exhaust the meaning of an ethical term. On the other hand the subjectivist theory, in its 'expressive' form, has its own way of meeting this difficulty. I do not suggest that this general difficulty is decisive, but there are others peculiar to different varieties of objective naturalism. One such variety, defining rightness in terms of reactions produced in a specified class of men, has the paradoxical implication that the way to reach the goal of moral reflection is to issue a questionnaire. Such theories are also in difficulties over the universality of ethical principles, and here again I shall suggest that the 'expressive' view has an answer, even if it is a difficult answer to accept with conviction. Other theories, often suggestive and illuminating up to a point, are inadequate because their definitions of rightness are so general and indeterminate that many of our most interesting moral decisions are between alternatives either of which would satisfy the definition. An extreme example of such vagueness is 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'; as I indicated earlier, such a formula is so elastic that its support could be claimed by either side on important issues. But similar objections can be urged against theories which seek to explain the difference between right and wrong in conduct in terms of the notions of 'coherence' or 'system', or which define the 'goodness' of the states of affairs which it is right to bring about in such terms as the satisfaction of desires which are strong and persistent and the satisfying of which promotes the satisfying of other desires. These theories, while suggestive

as accounts of criteria which can be found at work in the factual phase of moral reflection, cannot give a sufficiently determinate account of our moral preferences. They cannot account for, and do not describe, our decisions that one sort of coherence or system is preferable to another, or that, of two states of affairs alike in 'goodness' as defined, it is right to promote this and not that.

(c) The account which the non-naturalist gives of the ethical stage of moral reflection has already been indicated. He holds that, when answers have been found to the questions raised in the factual stage, there remains to be answered a question or questions of a different type. The questions would be differently formulated by adherents of different forms of non-naturalism. But they would agree that the typical moral situation contains features which are ethically irrelevant as well as features which are ethically relevant, in the sense of right- or wrong-tending or good- or bad-tending. One theory holds that the process of deciding what action is resultantly 'right' is best described as deciding which of a number of possible actions would have the greatest balance of tendency to be right over tendency to be wrong or, where none would have a favourable balance, the smallest balance of tendency to be wrong over tendency to be right. Another theory makes the process a comparison between states of affairs which would come to exist, if this or that action were done, in respect of their non-natural goodness or badness. The most plausible versions of such theories allow that the moral decision in all cases, and not merely in some, expresses belief and not knowledge. (Either of the theories to which I have just alluded can consistently hold that the decision reached may in some cases be that two or more different actions are indistinguishable in respect of resultant rightness.) Now I have maintained throughout this essay that 'rightness' cannot by the objectivist be identified with 'duty', since 'duty' is relative to personal subjective limitations in a way in which 'rightness' is not. This contention is expressed by the statement that it is our duty to do what we believe to be right. Thus it would be difficult for any non-naturalist who accepted this statement to avoid recognizing in 'duty' a second kind of non-natural fact distinct from 'rightness'.

What is the subjectivist's alternative to such an account of the 'ethical phase'? As regards the 'factual phase' the ethical subjectivist need not differ from the accounts given by other types of theory; he can maintain, for instance, that the question

what action is 'right' or productive of most 'good', in any naturalistically defined sense of 'right' or 'good', is among the questions which may arise in the factual phase. But he differs from the non-naturalist in denying that what supervenes upon the factual phase is a further process of *thinking* in which we seek the true answer to a question. What the 'ethical phase' consists in is to be described rather as the adoption of an attitude or the forming of a preference. It is not a decision that some proposition is true; for it is not true or false. It is not a decision to do something; for moral reflection need not end in a decision in this sense, as is clear from the fact that we can reflect morally about situations in which we ourselves have no part to play. It may be called 'moral option', and the subjectivist holds that sentences of the form 'I ought to do a certain action', in their primary use, express the taking of such options. They are therefore, in this use, not statements because they are not 'descriptive'. They may be said to be 'expressive' of an emotional attitude; it would be better perhaps to say that they are 'optative' or 'quasi-imperative'. It will be seen that, on this view, the formula that 'it is my duty to do what I think right' must be abandoned because of its objectivist implication that a moral option is a decision that a proposition is true. On the subjectivist view the words 'ought', 'duty', 'right', and their synonyms, do not indicate a plurality of facts which are 'distinctively' and 'purely' moral; there is only one such kind of fact, namely that we exercise 'moral options'.

This statement of subjectivism must at once be amplified by making three further remarks, lest I should seem merely blind to obvious and catastrophic objections.

(a) It may be objected that the description given of 'moral option' is vague. In answer to this it must be sufficient to say here, first, that the facts which have led philosophers to differ about the nature of the 'moral faculty' are admittedly elusive. 'It is manifest great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as including both.'¹ Butler himself is, no doubt, fundamentally on the side of objective non-naturalism. Nevertheless what he says about 'conscience', and about the 'authority' of conscience, is often difficult to interpret without

¹ Butler, *Dissertation II, On Virtue*.

attributing to him a confusion between the 'rationalist' view that it is a faculty of intellectual 'discernment' and the subjectivist view that it is a faculty by which we make practical prescriptions of a quasi-imperative kind. A moral agent, we are told, is 'a law to himself'. The subjectivist who maintains that intellectual discernment is operative only in the 'factual phase', and that what supervenes upon it is properly expressed in the imperative or optative, rather than in the indicative, mood can claim with some plausibility to offer a possible interpretation of this undeniably enigmatic dictum. It may be said, secondly, that the naturalist is committed by his naturalism, not to holding that moral option or preference closely resembles, or is compounded from, other things which happen, or are done, in the soul, but only to holding that it involves no non-natural facts.

(b) It will be said that, according to this account of subjectivism, moral options are completely non-rational. A partial answer to this consists in what was said earlier about the senses in which moral decisions may on any view be said to be 'enlightened' or 'perverse'. But the first answer of the subjectivist must be that in a sense what the objector asserts is true, but that his thinking it objectionable involves a mistake of asking why once too often. Important senses can be found in which particular options can be said to be rational in virtue of relations to each other, and to more general or comprehensive options, but to demand a 'reason' for the options which are most general or comprehensive is like asking a hedonist why we should seek pleasure or an Aristotelian for a demonstration of the first principles of demonstrative knowledge. The only way to answer is to reject the question.

(c) It may be objected that subjectivism, as formulated, breaks down because it gives an account of what we mean when we say 'I ought to do so and so' which makes it impossible to give a parallel account of similar sentences in the past tense and in the second or third person. I think that, in meeting this objection, it would be important to point out that the words 'ought', 'duty', and their synonyms, as used about other people, can be used in two quite different ways. In their common use they *express* the result of our moral reflection on the situation as we think it would look to us if we were, or had been, in the other man's shoes. In this use the moral term is still quasi-imperative; it expresses an option which *we* take as the result of our reflection. Such reflection ignores limitations imposed by the other's ignorance of fact, intellectual incompetence, or

ethical preconceptions. When we are thinking of these limitations we use phrases like 'he was doing his duty according to his lights' to *describe* the fact that he acted in accordance with *his* option. The subjectivist can then go on to maintain that the first person sentences, besides their expressive use, have a descriptive use in which they state the fact that the agent takes a certain moral option.

I have expressed the opinion that both the non-naturalist and the naturalist are able to deal, although neither conclusively, with the 'leading features' of our moral reflection. I may end by recapitulating some of these features, and the opposed accounts of them, with which my discussion has been concerned. (a) When we think about a situation which calls for 'moral reflection' we find that it has certain characteristics, or that actions which could be done in it would have certain characteristics, which are 'ethically relevant'. The non-naturalist explains this by his doctrine of 'right-tending' or 'good-tending' characteristics, 'right' or 'good' or both describing non-natural characters or facts. The naturalist holds that 'right-tending' or 'wrong-tending' characteristics are those which influence our 'moral options'. (b) We are inclined to say that the connexion between 'right-tending' or 'right-making' characteristics and ethical characteristics is necessary and universal. The non-naturalist justifies this by his doctrine of ethical propositions which are synthetic and *a priori*. The naturalist's explanation is that ethical terms are used expressively in a way which may be described as 'quasi-imperative' ('quasi-' for a man cannot command himself) and express general prescriptions; and he can appeal to the fact that more than one eminent moral philosopher has assimilated an obligation to a universal command or law. (c) The 'ethical phase' of 'moral reflection' is often marked by doubt and hesitation. The non-naturalist says that this is because it is difficult, in complex cases, to give a true answer to the question where the balance of rightness lies. The naturalist also insists upon the complexity of the decision, and says that the competing ways in which different alternatives are morally attractive or unattractive makes us hesitate to prefer one to the other. Two further points of contrast may be added. (d) Naturalistic accounts of what is asserted by ethical statements are apt to leave us with the feeling that 'something has been left out'. The non-naturalist explains this feeling by his view that his opponent is not defining the ethical term but merely specifying the characteristics the owners

of which will necessarily also have the non-natural ethical characteristic. But the naturalist who maintains that ethical terms have an 'expressive', even if they may also have a 'descriptive', meaning claims to account for just this feeling by his view that what is 'left out' is the 'expressive' function of the term. (e) The non-naturalist and the naturalist agree that there is a distinctively moral emotion; or that there are moral emotions. The non-naturalist holds that such emotion is aroused only by the thought of some person or action or state of affairs as having a non-natural ethical characteristic. The naturalist denies this, and maintains that such emotions are directly evoked by, and directed on, natural characteristics or facts which the non-naturalist holds to be merely the grounds of ethical characteristics.

Suspension between theories so radically opposed is an uncomfortable position; and it is disconcerting that conceptions so familiar, and of such practical importance, should give rise to such perplexities. But I think that this division of mind is a result which might be expected to follow, not merely from the consideration of the complex facts, but from the study of what philosophers have said about the facts. On the one hand philosophers who start from the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking, and are most faithful and acute in their rendering of these facts, have tended to be led to objectivist and anti-naturalistic conclusions. Where they least carry conviction is in the moral epistemology which they assume or defend. When we reflect, with the epistemological issue in mind, on the actual process in ourselves of moral reflection and decision, we are more inclined to sympathize with a 'moral sentiment' theory than we ought to be if the rationalists are wholly in the right. On the other hand, naturalistic philosophers who take epistemological empiricism for granted and assume that ethics is a rudimentary natural science are apt to be naively high-handed in their treatment of the ways in which we in fact think and act as moral beings. The discussion of justice and promise-keeping by hedonistic utilitarianism is a notorious instance. Such dogmatic excesses in the naturalistic treatment of moral facts are enough to drive any candid person into the arms of non-naturalism. But, so long as there seem to be good reasons for doubt concerning the epistemological contentions of the non-naturalist, philosophers are bound to persist in their search for an adequate naturalistic interpretation of our moral experience and convictions. On the other hand, if it

could be shown that naturalism, in the limited epistemological sense in which the term has been used throughout this discussion, cannot be reconciled with our fundamental moral convictions, this would be a fact of great importance for the general theory of knowledge.

ANNUAL LECTURE ON A MASTER MIND
HENRIETTE HERTZ TRUST

MILTON

By T. S. ELIOT

Read 26 March 1947

SAMUEL JOHNSON, addressing himself to examine Milton's versification, in the *Rambler* of Saturday, 12 January 1751, thought it necessary to excuse his temerity in writing upon a subject already so fully discussed. In justification of his essay this great critic and poet remarked: 'There are, in every age, new errors to be rectified, and new prejudices to be opposed.' I am obliged to phrase my own apology rather differently. The errors of our own times have been rectified by vigorous hands, and the prejudices opposed by commanding voices. Some of the errors and prejudices have been associated with my own name, and of these in particular I shall find myself impelled to speak; it will, I hope, be attributed to me for modesty rather than for conceit if I maintain that no one can correct an error with better authority than the person who has been held responsible for it. And there is, I think, another justification for my speaking about Milton, besides the singular one which I have just given. The champions of Milton in our time, with one notable exception, have been scholars and teachers. I have no claim to be either: I am aware that my only claim upon your attention, in speaking of Milton or of any other great poet, is by appeal to your curiosity, in the hope that you may care to know what a contemporary writer of verse thinks of one of his predecessors.

I believe that the scholar and the practitioner in the field of literary criticism should supplement each other's work. The criticism of the practitioner will be all the better, certainly, if he is not wholly destitute of scholarship; and the criticism of the scholar will be all the better if he has some experience of the difficulties of writing verse. But the orientation of the two critics is different. The scholar is more concerned with the understanding of the masterpiece in the environment of its author: with the world in which that author lived, the temper of his age, his intellectual formation, the books which he had read, and the influences which had moulded him. The practitioner is concerned less with the author than with the poem; and with the poem in relation to his own age. He asks: Of what

use is the poetry of this poet to poets writing to-day? Is it, or can it become, a living force in English poetry still unwritten? So we may say that the scholar's interest is in the permanent, the practitioner's in the immediate. The scholar can teach us where we should bestow our *admiration* and *respect*: the practitioner should be able, when he is the right poet talking about the right poet, to make an old masterpiece actual, give it contemporary importance, and persuade his audience that it is interesting, exciting, enjoyable, and *active*. I can give only one example of contemporary criticism of Milton, by a critic of the type to which I belong if I have any critical pretensions at all: that is the Introduction to Milton's *English Poems* in the 'World's Classics' series, by the late Charles Williams. It is not a comprehensive essay; it is notable primarily because it provides the best prolegomenon to *Comus* which any modern reader could have; but what distinguishes it throughout (and the same is true of most of Williams's critical writing) is the author's warmth of feeling and his success in communicating it to the reader. In this, so far as I am aware, the essay of Williams is a solitary example.

I think it is useful, in such an examination as I propose to make, to keep in mind some critic of the past, of one's own type, by whom to measure one's opinions: a critic sufficiently remote in time, for his local errors and prejudices to be not identical with one's own. That is why I began by quoting Samuel Johnson. It will hardly be contested that as a critic of poetry Johnson wrote as a practitioner and not as a scholar. Because he was a poet himself, and a good poet, what he wrote about poetry must be read with respect. And unless we know and appreciate Johnson's poetry we cannot judge either the merits or the limitations of his criticism. It is a pity that what the common reader to-day has read, or has remembered, or has seen quoted, are mostly those few statements of Johnson's from which later critics have vehemently dissented. But when Johnson held an opinion which seems to us wrong, we are never safe in dismissing it without inquiring why he was wrong; he had his own 'errors and prejudices', certainly, but for lack of examining them sympathetically we are always in danger of merely countering error with error and prejudice with prejudice. Now Johnson was, in his day, very much a modern: he was concerned with how poetry should be written in his own time. The fact that he came towards the end, rather than the beginning of a style, the fact that his time was rapidly passing away, and that

the canons of taste which he observed were about to fall into desuetude, does not diminish the interest of his criticism. Nor does the likelihood that the development of poetry in the next fifty years will take quite different directions from those which to me seem desirable to explore, deter me from asking the questions that Johnson implied: How should poetry be written now? and what place does the answer to this question give to Milton? And I think that the answers to these questions may be different now from the answers that were correct twenty-five years ago.

There is one prejudice against Milton, apparent on almost every page of Johnson's *Life of Milton*, which I imagine is still general: we, however, with a longer historical perspective, are in a better position than was Johnson to recognize it and to make allowance for it. This is a prejudice which I share myself: an antipathy towards Milton the man. Of this in itself I have nothing further to say: all that is necessary is to record one's awareness of it. But this prejudice is often involved with another, more obscure: and I do not think that Johnson had disengaged the two in his own mind. The fact is simply that the Civil War of the seventeenth century, in which Milton is a symbolic figure, has never been concluded. The Civil War is not ended: I question whether any serious civil war ever does end. Throughout that period English society was so convulsed and divided that the effects are still felt. Reading Johnson's essay one is always aware that Johnson was obstinately and passionately of another party. No other English poet, not Wordsworth, or Shelley, lived through or took sides in such momentous events as did Milton; of no other poet is it so difficult to consider the poetry simply as poetry, without our theological and political dispositions, conscious and unconscious, inherited or acquired, making an unlawful entry. And the danger is all the greater because these emotions now take different vestures. It is now considered grotesque, on political grounds, to be of the party of King Charles; it is now, I believe, considered equally grotesque, on moral grounds, to be of the party of the Puritans; and to most persons to-day the religious views of both parties may seem equally remote. Nevertheless, the passions are unquenched, and if we are not very wide awake their smoke will obscure the glass through which we examine Milton's poetry. Something has been done, certainly, to persuade us that Milton was never really of any party, but disagreed with everyone. Mr. Wilson Knight, in *Chariot of Wrath*, has argued that Milton was

more a monarchist than a republican, and not in any modern sense a 'democrat'. And Professor Saurat has produced evidence to show that Milton's theology was highly eccentric, and as scandalous to Protestants as to Catholics—that he was, in fact, a sort of Christadelphian, and perhaps not a very orthodox Christadelphian at that; while on the other hand Mr. C. S. Lewis has opposed Professor Saurat by skilfully arguing that Milton, at least in *Paradise Lost*, can be acquitted of heresy even from a point of view so orthodox as that of Mr. Lewis himself. On these questions I hold no opinion: it is probably beneficial to question the assumption that Milton was a sound Free Churchman and member of the Liberal Party; but I think that we still have to be on guard against an unconscious partisanship if we aim to attend to the poetry for the poetry's sake.

So much for our prejudices. I come next to the positive objection to Milton which has been raised in our own time, that is to say, the charge that he is an unwholesome influence. And from this I shall proceed to the permanent strictures of reproof (to employ a phrase of Johnson's) and, finally, to the grounds on which I consider him a great poet and one whom poets to-day might study with profit.

For a statement of the *generalized* belief in the unwholesomeness of Milton's influence I turn to Mr. Middleton Murry's critique of Milton in his *Heaven and Earth*—a book which contains chapters of profound insight, interrupted by passages which seem to me intemperate. Mr. Murry approaches Milton after his long and patient study of Keats; and it is through the eyes of Keats that he sees Milton.

Keats [Mr. Murry writes] as a poetic artist, second to none since Shakespeare, and Blake, as a prophet of spiritual values unique in our history, both passed substantially the same judgment on Milton: 'Life to him would be death to me.' And whatever may be our verdict on the development of English poetry since Milton, we must admit the justice of Keats's opinion that Milton's magnificence led nowhere. 'English must be kept up,' said Keats. To be influenced beyond a certain point by Milton's art, he felt, dammed the creative flow of the English genius in and through itself. In saying this, I think, Keats voiced the very inmost of the English genius. To pass under the spell of Milton is to be condemned to imitate him. It is quite different with Shakespeare. Shakespeare baffles and liberates; Milton is perspicuous and constricts.

This is a very confident affirmation, and I criticize it with some diffidence because I cannot pretend to have devoted as much study to Keats, or to have as intimate an understanding of his

difficulties, as Mr. Murry. But Mr. Murry seems to me here to be trying to transform the predicament of a particular poet with a particular aim at a particular moment in time into a censure of timeless validity. He appears to assert that the liberative function of Shakespeare and the constrictive menace of Milton are permanent characteristics of these two poets. 'To be influenced beyond a certain point' by any one master is bad for any poet; and it does not matter whether that influence is Milton's or another's; and as we cannot anticipate where that point will come, we might be better advised to call it an *uncertain* point. If it is not good to remain under the spell of Milton, is it good to remain under the spell of Shakespeare? It depends partly upon what genre of poetry you are trying to develop. Keats wanted to write an epic, and he found, as might be expected, that the time had not arrived at which another English epic, comparable in grandeur to *Paradise Lost*, could be written. He also tried his hand at writing plays: and one might argue that *King Stephen* was more blighted by Shakespeare than *Hyperion* by Milton. Certainly, *Hyperion* remains a magnificent fragment which one re-reads; and *King Stephen* is a play which we may have read once, but to which we never return for enjoyment. Milton made a great epic impossible for succeeding generations; Shakespeare made a great poetic drama impossible; such a situation is inevitable, and it persists until the language has so altered that there is no danger, because no possibility, of imitation. Anyone who tries to write poetic drama, even to-day, should know that half of his energy must be exhausted in the effort to escape from the constricting toils of Shakespeare: the moment his attention is relaxed, or his mind fatigued, he will lapse into bad Shakespearian verse. For a long time after an epic poet like Milton, or a dramatic poet like Shakespeare, nothing can be done. Yet the effort must be repeatedly made; for we can never know in advance when the moment is approaching at which a new epic, or a new drama, will be possible; and when the moment does draw near it may be that the genius of an individual poet will perform the last mutation of idiom and versification which will bring that new poetry into being.

I have referred to Mr. Murry's view of the bad influence of Milton as generalized, because it is implicitly the whole personality of Milton that is in question: not specifically his beliefs, or his language or versification, but the beliefs as realized in that particular personality, and his poetry as the expression of it. By the *particular* view of Milton's influence as bad, I mean that

view which attends to the language, the syntax, the versification, the imagery. I do not suggest that there is here a complete difference of subject-matter: it is the difference of approach, the difference of the focus of interest, between the philosophical critic and the literary critic. An incapacity for the abstruse, and an interest in poetry which is primarily a technical interest, dispose my mind towards the more limited and perhaps more superficial task. Let us proceed to look at Milton's influence from this point of view, that of the writer of poetry in our own time.

The reproach against Milton, that his technical influence has been bad, appears to have been made by no one more positively than by myself. I find myself saying, as recently as 1936, that this charge against Milton

appears a good deal more serious if we affirm that Milton's poetry could *only* be an influence for the worse, upon any poet whatever. It is more serious, also, if we affirm that Milton's bad influence may be traced much farther than the eighteenth century, and much farther than upon bad poets: if we say that it was an influence against which we still have to struggle.

In writing these sentences I failed to draw a threefold distinction, which now seems to me of some importance. There are three separate assertions implied. The first is, that an influence has been bad in the past: this is to assert that good poets, in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, would have written better if they had not submitted themselves to the influence of Milton. The second assertion is, that the contemporary situation is such that Milton is a master whom we should avoid. The third is, that the influence of Milton, or of any particular poet, can be *always* bad, and that we can predict that wherever it is found, at any time in the future, however remote, it will be a bad influence. Now, the first and third of these assertions I am no longer prepared to make, because, detached from the second, they do not appear to me to have any meaning.

For the first, when we consider one great poet of the past, and one or more other poets, upon whom we say he has exerted a bad influence, we must admit that the responsibility, if there be any, is rather with the poets who were influenced than with the poet whose work exerted the influence. We can, of course, show that certain tricks or mannerisms which the imitators display are due to conscious or unconscious imitation and emulation, but that is a reproach against their injudicious choice of a model and not against their model itself. And we

can never prove that any particular poet would have written better poetry if he had escaped that influence. Even if we assert, what can only be a matter of faith, that Keats would have written a very great epic poem if Milton had not preceded him, is it sensible to repine for an unwritten masterpiece, in exchange for one which we possess and acknowledge? And as for the remote future, what can we affirm about the poetry that will be written then, except that we should probably be unable to understand or to enjoy it, and that therefore we can hold no opinion as to what 'good' and 'bad' influences will *mean* in that future? The only relation in which the question of influence, good and bad, is significant, is the relation to the immediate future. With that question I shall engage at the end. I wish first to mention another reproach against Milton, that represented by the phrase 'dissociation of sensibility'.

I remarked many years ago, in an essay on Dryden, that

In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered; and this dissociation, as is natural, was due to the influence of the two most powerful poets of the century, Milton and Dryden.

The longer passage from which this sentence is taken is quoted by Dr. Tillyard in his *Milton*. Dr. Tillyard makes the following comment:

Speaking only of what in this passage concerns Milton, I would say that there is here a mixture of truth and falsehood. Some sort of dissociation of sensibility in Milton, not necessarily undesirable, has to be admitted; but that he was responsible for any such dissociation in others (at least till this general dissociation had inevitably set in) is untrue.

I believe that the general affirmation represented by the phrase 'dissociation of sensibility' (one of the two or three phrases of my coinage—like 'objective correlative'—which have had a success in the world astonishing to their author) retains some validity; but I now incline to agree with Dr. Tillyard that to lay the burden on the shoulders of Milton and Dryden was a mistake. If such a dissociation did take place, I suspect that the causes are too complex and too profound to justify our accounting for the change in terms of literary criticism. All we can say is, that something like this did happen; that it had something to do with the Civil War; that it would even be unwise to say it was caused by the Civil War, but that it is a consequence of the same causes which brought about the Civil War; that we must seek the causes in Europe, not in England alone;

and for what these causes were, we may dig and dig until we get to a depth at which words and concepts fail us.¹

Before proceeding to take up the case against Milton, as it stood for poets twenty-five years ago—the second, and only significant meaning of ‘bad influence’—I think it would be best to consider what permanent strictures of reproof may be drawn: those censures which, when we make them, we must assume to be made by enduring laws of taste. The essence of the permanent censure of Milton is, I believe, to be found in Johnson’s essay. This is not the place in which to examine certain particular and erroneous judgements of Johnson; to explain his condemnation of *Comus* and *Samson* by his applying dramatic canons which to us seem inapplicable; or to condone his dismissal of the versification of *Lycidas* by the specialization, rather than the absence, of his sense of rhythm. Johnson’s most important censure of Milton is contained in three paragraphs, which I must ask leave to quote in full.

Throughout all his greater works [says Johnson] there prevails an uniform peculiarity of *diction*, a mode and cast of expression which bears little resemblance to that of any former writer; and which is so far removed from common use, that an unlearned reader, when he first opens the book, finds himself surprised by a new language.

This novelty has been, by those who can find nothing wrong with Milton, imputed to his laborious endeavours after words suited to the grandeur of his ideas. *Our language*, says Addison, *sunk under him*. But the truth is, that both in prose and in verse, he had formed his style by a perverse and pedantic principle. He was desirous to use English words with a foreign idiom. This in all his prose is discovered and condemned; for there judgment operates freely, neither softened by the beauty, nor awed by the dignity of his thoughts; but such is the power of his poetry, that his call is obeyed without resistance, the reader feels himself in captivity to a higher and nobler mind, and criticism sinks in admiration.

Milton’s style was not modified by his subject; what is shown with greater extent in ‘Paradise Lost’ may be found in ‘Comus’. One source of his peculiarity was his familiarity with the Tuscan poets; the disposition of his words is, I think, frequently Italian; perhaps sometimes

¹ On one point I should take issue with Dr. Tillyard. A little further on he quotes another phrase of mine, of earlier date: ‘The Chinese Wall of Milton’s blank verse.’ He comments: ‘It must have been an ineffective wall, for *Venice Preserved*, *All for Love* and similar plays in blank verse were not confined by it; they owe nothing to Milton’s versification.’ Of course not—these were *plays*, and I have long maintained that dramatic blank verse and non-dramatic blank verse are not the same thing. The Chinese Wall there, if it existed, was erected by Shakespeare.

combined with other tongues. Of him at last, may be said what Jonson said of Spenser, that he *wrote no language*, but has formed what Butler called a *Babylonish dialect*, in itself harsh and barbarous, but made by exalted genius and extensive learning the vehicle of so much instruction and so much pleasure, that, like other lovers, we find grace in its deformity.

This criticism seems to me substantially true: indeed, unless we accept it, I do not think we are in the way to appreciate the peculiar greatness of Milton. His style is not a *classic* style, in that it is not the elevation of a *common* style, by the final touch of genius, to greatness. It is, from the foundation, and in every particular, a personal style, not based upon common speech, or common prose, or direct communication of meaning. Of some great poetry one has difficulty in pronouncing just what it is, what infinitesimal touch, that has made all the difference from a plain statement which anyone could make; the slight transformation which, while it leaves a plain statement a plain statement, has made it at the same time great poetry. In Milton there is always the maximal, never the minimal, alteration of ordinary language. Every distortion of construction, the foreign idiom, the use of a word in a foreign way or with the meaning of the foreign word from which it is derived rather than the accepted meaning in English, every idiosyncrasy is a particular act of violence which Milton has been the first to commit. There is no cliché, no poetic diction in the derogatory sense, but a perpetual sequence of original acts of lawlessness. Of all modern writers of verse, the nearest analogy seems to me to be Mallarmé, a much smaller poet, though still a great one. The personalities, the poetic theories of the two men could not have been more different; but in respect of the violence which they could do to language, and justify, there is a remote similarity. Milton's poetry is poetry at the farthest possible remove from prose; his prose seems to me too near to half-formed poetry to be good prose.

To say that the work of a poet is at the farthest possible remove from prose would once have struck me as condemnatory: it now seems to me simply, when we have to do with a Milton, the precision of its peculiar greatness. As a poet, Milton seems to me probably the greatest of all eccentrics. His work illustrates no general principles of good writing; the only principles of writing that it illustrates are such as are valid only for Milton himself to observe. There are two kinds of poet who can ordinarily be of use to other poets. There are those who suggest to one or another of their successors, something which they have

not done themselves, or who provoke a different way of doing the same thing: these are likely to be not the greatest, but smaller, imperfect poets with whom later poets discover an affinity. And there are the great poets from whom we can learn negative rules: no poet can teach another to write well, but some great poets can teach others some of the things to avoid. They teach us what to avoid, by showing us what great poetry can do without—how *bare* it can be. Of these are Dante and Racine. But if we are ever to make use of Milton we must do so in quite a different way. Even a small poet can learn something from the study of Dante, or from the study of Chaucer: we must perhaps wait for a great poet before we find one who can profit from the study of Milton.

I repeat that the remoteness of Milton's verse from ordinary speech, his invention of his own poetic language, seems to me one of the marks of his greatness. Other marks are his sense of structure, both in the general design of *Paradise Lost* and *Samson*, and in his syntax; and finally, and not least, his inerrancy, conscious or unconscious, in writing so as to make the best display of his talents, and the best concealment of his weaknesses.

The appropriateness of the subject of *Samson* is too obvious to expatiate upon: it was probably the one dramatic story out of which Milton could have made a masterpiece. But the complete suitability of *Paradise Lost* has not, I think, been so often remarked. It was surely an intuitive perception of what he could not do, that arrested Milton's project of an epic on King Arthur. For one thing, he had little interest in, or understanding of, individual human beings. In *Paradise Lost* he was not called upon for any of that understanding which comes from an affectionate observation of men and women. But such an interest in human beings was not required—indeed its *absence* was a necessary condition—for the creation of his figures of Adam and Eve. These are not a man and woman such as any we know: if they were, they would not be Adam and Eve. They are the original *Man* and *Woman*, not types, but prototypes: if they were not set apart from ordinary humanity they would not be Adam and Eve. They have the general characteristics of men and women, such that we can recognize, in the temptation and the fall, the first motions of the faults and virtues, the abjection and the nobility, of all their descendants. They have ordinary humanity to the right degree, and yet are not, and should not be, ordinary mortals. Were they more particularized they would be false, and if Milton had been more interested in

humanity, he could not have created them. Other critics have remarked upon the exactness, without defect or exaggeration, with which Moloch, Belial, and Mammon, in the second book, speak according to the particular sin which each represents. It would not be suitable that the infernal powers should have, in the human sense, characters, for a character is always mixed; but in the hands of an inferior manipulator, they might easily have been reduced to *humours*.

The appropriateness of the material of *Paradise Lost* to the genius and the limitations of Milton, is still more evident when we consider the visual imagery. I have already remarked, in a paper written some years ago,¹ on Milton's weakness of visual observation, a weakness which I think was always present—the effect of his blindness may have been rather to strengthen the compensatory qualities than to increase a fault which was already present. Mr. Wilson Knight, who has devoted close study to recurrent imagery in poetry, has called attention to Milton's propensity towards images of engineering and mechanics; to me it seems that Milton is at his best in imagery suggestive of vast size, limitless space, abysmal depth, and light and darkness. No theme and no setting, other than that which he chose in *Paradise Lost*, could have given him such scope for the kind of imagery in which he excelled, or made less demand upon those powers of visual imagination which were in him defective.

Most of the absurdities and inconsistencies to which Johnson calls attention, and which, so far as they can justly be isolated in this way, he properly condemns, will I think appear in a more correct proportion if we consider them in relation to this general judgement. I do not think that we should attempt to *see* very clearly any scene that Milton depicts: it should be accepted as a shifting phantasmagory. To complain, because we first find the arch-fiend 'chain'd on the burning lake', and in a minute or two see him making his way to the shore, is to expect a kind of consistency which the world to which Milton has introduced us does not require.

This limitation of visual power, like Milton's limited interest in human beings, turns out to be not merely a negligible defect, but a positive virtue, when we visit Adam and Eve in Eden. Just as a higher degree of characterization of Adam and Eve would have been unsuitable, so a more vivid picture of the earthly Paradise would have been less paradisiacal. For a

¹ In *Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association*, vol. xxi, 1936, pp. 32 ff.

greater definiteness, a more detailed account of flora and fauna, could only have assimilated Eden to the landscapes of earth with which we are familiar. As it is, the impression of Eden which we retain, is the most suitable, and is that which Milton was most qualified to give: the impression of *light*—a daylight and a starlight, a light of dawn and of dusk, the light which, remembered by a man in his blindness, has a supernatural glory unexperienced by men of normal vision.

We must, then, in reading *Paradise Lost*, not expect to see clearly; our sense of sight must be blurred, so that our *hearing* may become more acute. *Paradise Lost*, like *Finnegans Wake* (for I can think of no work which provides a more interesting parallel: two great books by blind musicians, each writing a language of his own based upon English) makes this peculiar demand for a readjustment of the reader's mode of apprehension. The emphasis is on the sound, not the vision, upon the word, not the idea; and in the end it is the unique versification that is the most certain sign of Milton's intellectual mastership.

On the subject of Milton's versification, so far as I am aware, little enough has been written. We have Johnson's essay in the *Rambler*, which deserves more study than it has received, and we have a short treatise by Robert Bridges on *Milton's Prosody*. I speak of Bridges with respect, for no poet of our time has given such close attention to prosody as he. Bridges catalogues the systematic irregularities which give perpetual variety to Milton's verse, and I can find no fault with his analysis.¹ But however interesting these analyses are, I do not think that it is by such means that we gain an appreciation of the peculiar rhythm of a poet. It seems to me also that Milton's verse is especially refractory to yielding up its secrets to examination of the single line. For his verse is not formed in this way. It is the period, the sentence and still more the paragraph, that is the unit of Milton's verse; and emphasis on the line structure is the minimum necessary to provide a counter-pattern to the period structure. It is only in the period that the wave-length of

¹ Beyond raising one question, in connexion with Bridges's account of Milton's use of recessive accent. It does not seem to me that such recession, as of *obscène* to *obsceue* in the line

Next Chemos, the obscene dread of Moab's sons
 simply reverses the value of the two syllables: I should say that the second syllable retains something of its length, and the first something of its shortness, and that the surprise and variety are due to each syllable becoming *both* long and short. The effect is like that of a tide-rip, in which a peculiar type of wave is produced by the conflict of two opposing forces.

Milton's verse is to be found: it is his ability to give a perfect and unique pattern to every paragraph, such that the full beauty of the line is found in its context, and his ability to work in larger musical units than any other poet—that is to me the most conclusive evidence of Milton's supreme mastery. The peculiar feeling, almost a physical sensation of a breathless leap, communicated by Milton's long periods, and by his alone, is impossible to procure from rhymed verse. Indeed, this mastery is more conclusive evidence of his intellectual power, than is his grasp of any *ideas* that he borrowed or invented. To be able to control so many words at once is the token of a mind of most exceptional energy.

It is interesting at this point to recall the general observations upon blank verse, which a consideration of *Paradise Lost* prompted Johnson to make towards the end of his essay.

The music of the English heroic lines strikes the ear so faintly, that it is easily lost, unless all the syllables of every line co-operate together; this co-operation can only be obtained by the preservation of every verse unmingled with another as a distinct system of sounds; and this distinctness is obtained and preserved by the artifice of rhyme. The variety of pauses, so much boasted by the lovers of blank verse, changes the measures of an English poet to the periods of a declaimer; and there are only a few skilful and happy readers of Milton, who enable their audience to perceive where the lines end or begin. *Blank verse*, said an ingenious critic, *seems to be verse only to the eye*.

Some of my audience may recall that this last remark, in almost the same words, was often made, a literary generation ago, about the 'free verse' of the period: and even without this encouragement from Johnson it would have occurred to my mind to declare Milton to be the greatest master of free verse in our language. What is interesting about Johnson's paragraph, however, is that it represents the judgement of a man who had by no means a deaf ear, but simply a *specialized* ear, for verbal music. Within the limits of the poetry of his own period, Johnson is a very good judge of the relative merits of several poets as writers of blank verse. But on the whole, the blank verse of his age might more properly be called unrhymed verse; and nowhere is this difference more evident than in the verse of his own tragedy *Irene*: the phrasing is admirable, the style elevated and correct, but each line cries out for a companion to rhyme with it. Indeed, it is only with labour, or by occasional inspiration, or by submission to the influence of the older dramatists, that the blank verse of the *nineteenth* century

succeeds in making the absence of rhyme inevitable and right, with the rightness of Milton. Even Johnson admitted that he could not wish that Milton had been a rhymers. Nor did the nineteenth century succeed in giving to blank verse the flexibility which it needs if the tone of common speech, talking of the topics of common intercourse, is to be employed; so that when our more modern practitioners of blank verse do not touch the sublime, they frequently approach the ridiculous. Milton perfected non-dramatic blank verse and at the same time imposed limitations, very hard to break, upon the use to which it may be put if its greatest musical possibilities are to be exploited.

I now come to the point at which it is desirable to quote passages in illustration of what I have been saying about Milton's versification. It is best, I think, to take familiar passages, rather than to seek originality by choosing those which have been less often drawn to our attention. The first is the Invocation which opens Book III of *Paradise Lost*.

Hail holy light, offspring of Heaven first-borne,
Or of th' Eternal Coeternal beam
May I express thee unblam'd? Since God is light,
And never but in unapproach'd light
Dwelt from Eternitie, dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright essence increate.
Or hear'st thou rather pure Ethereal stream,
Whose Fountain who shall tell? before the Sun,
Before the Heavens thou wert, and at the voice
Of God, as with a Mantle didst invest
The rising world of waters dark and deep,
Won from the void and formless infinite.

This passage is compact of Miltonic philosophy, but for that I must refer you to such critics as Professor Saurat and Mr. Lewis. For my purpose, it illustrates, first, Milton's power in the use of imagery of light. Second, it illustrates the closeness of the structure. If we were to attempt to analyse the Miltonic music line by line, that music would be lost: the individual line is right, not merely in itself, not merely in relation to the lines immediately preceding and following, but in relation to every other line in the passage. To extract this passage of twelve lines is to mutilate it. I contrast with this passage the following. In what I have just read there is no divagation from the point; the next passage is chosen to show Milton's skill in extending a period by introducing imagery which tends to distract us from the real subject.

Thus Satan talking to his nearest Mate
 With Head uplift above the wave, and Eyes
 That sparkling blaz'd, his other Parts besides
 Prone on the Flood, extended long and large
 Lay floating many a rood, in bulk as huge
 As whom the Fables name of monstrous size,
Titanian or *Earth-born*, that warr'd on *Jove*,
Briarios or *Typhon*, whom the Den
 By ancient *Tarsus* held, or that Sea-beast
Leviathan, whom God of all his works
 Created hugest that swim th' Ocean stream:
 Him haply slumbring on the *Norway* foam
 The pilot of some small night-founder'd Skiff,¹
 Deeming some Island, oft, as Sea-men tell,
 With fixed Anchor in his scaly rind
 Moors by his side under the Lee, while Night
 Invests the Sea, and wished Morn delays:
 So stretcht out huge in length the Arch-fiend lay
 Chain'd on the burning Lake. . . .

There are, as often with Milton, criticisms of detail which could be made. I am not too happy about eyes that both blaze and sparkle, unless Milton meant us to imagine a roaring fire ejecting sparks: and that is *too* fiery an image for even supernatural eyes. The fact that the lake was burning somewhat diminishes the effect of the fiery eyes; and it is difficult to imagine a burning lake in a scene where there was only darkness visible. But with this kind of inconsistency we are familiar in Milton. What I wish to call to your attention is the happy introduction of so much extraneous matter. Any writer, straining for images of hugeness, might have thought of the whale, but only Milton could have included the anecdote of the deluded seamen without our wanting to put a blue pencil through it. We *nearly* forget Satan in attending to the story of the whale; Milton recalls us just in time. Therefore the diversion strengthens, instead of

¹ The term *night-foundered*, which I presume to be of Milton's invention, seems unsuitable here. Dr. Tillyard has called my attention to the use of the same adjective in *Comus*, i. 483:

Either som one like us night-foundered here

where, although extravagant, it draws a permissible comparison between travellers lost in the night, and seafarers in extremity. But when, as here in *Paradise Lost*, it is transferred from the travellers on land to adventurers by sea, and not to the men but to their *skiff*, the literal meaning of *founder* immediately presents itself. A *foundered* skiff could not be *moored*, to a whale or to anything else.

weakening, the passage. Milton plays exactly the same trick a few lines further on, when he speaks of Satan's shield:

the broad circumference
Hung on his shoulders like the Moon, whose Orb
Through Optic Glass the *Tuscan* Artist views
At Ev'ning from the top of *Fesole*,
Or in *Valdarno*, to descry new Lands,
Rivers or Mountains in her spotty Globe.
His Spear, to equal which the tallest pine
Hewn on *Norwegian* hills, to be the Mast
Of some great Ammiral, were but a wand. . . .

Here I think that the two sudden transitions, to the Tuscan astronomer and thence to the Norwegian pine, followed by the concentrated astonishing image of sea-power, are most felicitous. If I may put it in this way without being misunderstood, I find in such passages a kind of inspired *frivolity*, an enjoyment by the author in the exercise of his own virtuosity, which is a mark of the first rank of genius. Addison, whose opinion is quoted and confirmed by Johnson, said that *Paradise Lost* is 'universally and perpetually interesting'; the two critics found the source of this perpetual interest in the subject matter; but the assertion of Johnson that 'all mankind will, through all ages, bear the same relation to Adam and Eve, and must partake of that good and evil which extend to themselves', even when it commands the assent of the Christian believer, will not wholly account for the absorbed attention which I think any poetry lover to-day ought to be able to give to the poem from end to end. I find the reason more certainly in the extraordinary style which because of its perpetual variety compels us to curiosity to know what is coming next, and in the perpetual surprises of reference such as those I have just quoted.

It may be observed also, that Milton employs devices of eloquence and of the word-play in which poets of his time were practised, which perpetually relieve the mind, and facilitate the declamation. Frequently the same word is happily repeated.

My sentence is for open Warr: Of Wiles,
More unexpert, I boast not: then let those
Contrive who *need*, or when they *need*, not now.
For while they *sit contriving*, shall the rest,
Millions that stand in Arms, and longing wait
The Signal to ascend, *sit* lingring here
Heav'ns fugitives . . .¹

¹ It might, of course, be objected that 'millions that stand in arms' could not at the same time '*sit* lingring'.

To give another instance:

Receive him coming, to *receive* from us
Knee-tribute still unpaid, prostration vile,
Too much *to one*, but double how endur'd,
To one and to his image now proclaim'd?

He also uses alliteration, and most effectively:

Of midnight march, and hurried meeting here.

Of such devices, none is quite original; Milton's blank verse would not have been possible without developments which had taken place in the two generations preceding; but what Milton made from what he learned is unique. Some of these devices appear in the late plays in which Shakespeare returned to realize surprising possibilities of his earliest manner:

'Tis still a dream; or else such stuff as madmen
Tongue, and brain not; either both, or nothing;
Or senseless speaking, or a speaking such
As sense cannot untie . . .

Nobly he yokes
A smiling with a sigh, as if the sigh
Was that it was, for not being such a smile;
The smile mocking the sigh, that it would fly
From so divine a temple to commix
With winds that sailors rail at.

The long and involved sentence structure is conspicuously developed by Massinger, from whom Milton may have taken a hint. I quote again a passage from Massinger which I quoted long ago in an essay on that dramatist:

What though my father
Writ man before he was so, and confirm'd it,
By numbering that day no part of his life
In which he did not service to his country;
Was he to be free therefore from the laws
And ceremonious forms in your decrees?
Or else because he did as much as man
In those three memorable overthrows,
At Granson, Morat, Nancy, where his master,
The warlike Charalois, with whose misfortunes
I bear his name, lost treasure, men and life,
To be excused from payment of those sums
Which (his own patrimony spent) his zeal
To serve his country forced him to take up?

The talent expended upon such a construction was, of course,

ill-applied to the theatre. The verse has got out of hand, for dramatic purposes; and its only possible future was through the genius of Milton.

I come at last to compare my own attitude, as that of a poetical practitioner perhaps typical of a generation twenty-five years ago, with my attitude to-day. I have thought it well to take matters in the order in which I have taken them: to discuss first the censures and detractions which I believe to have permanent validity, and which were best made by Johnson, in order to make clearer the causes, and the justification, for hostility to Milton on the part of poets at a particular juncture. And I wished to make clear those excellences of Milton which particularly impress me, before explaining why I think that the study of his verse might at last be of benefit to poets.

I have on several occasions suggested, that the important changes in the idiom of English verse which are represented by the names of Dryden and Wordsworth, may be characterized as successful attempts to escape from a poetic idiom which had ceased to have a relation to contemporary speech. This is the sense of Wordsworth's Prefaces. By the beginning of the present century another revolution in idiom—and such revolutions bring with them an alteration of metric, a new appeal to the ear—was due. It inevitably happens that the young poets engaged in such a revolution will exalt the merits of those poets of the past who offer them example and stimulation, and depreciate the merits of poets who do not stand for the qualities which they are zealous to realize. This is not only inevitable, it is right. It is even right, and certainly inevitable, that their practice, still more influential than their critical pronouncements, should attract their own readers to the poets by whose work they have been influenced. Such influence has certainly contributed to the taste, if we can distinguish the *taste* from the *fashion*, for Donne. I do not think that any modern poet, unless in a fit of irresponsible peevishness, has ever denied Milton's consummate powers. And it must be said that Milton's diction is not a poetic diction in the sense of being a debased currency: when he violates the English language he is imitating nobody, and he is inimitable. But Milton does, as I have said, represent poetry at the extreme limit from prose; and it was one of our tenets that verse should have the virtues of prose, that diction should become assimilated to cultivated contemporary speech, before aspiring to the elevation of poetry. Another tenet was that the subject-matter and the imagery of poetry should be

extended to topics and objects related to the life of a modern man or woman; that we were to seek the non-poetic, to seek even material refractory to transmutation into poetry, and words and phrases which had not been used in poetry before. And the study of Milton could be of no help: it was only a hindrance.

We cannot, in literature, any more than in the rest of life, live in a perpetual state of revolution. If every generation of poets made it their task to bring poetic diction up to date with the spoken language, poetry would fail in one of its most important obligations. For poetry should help, not only to refine the language of the time, but to prevent it from changing too rapidly: a development of language at too great a speed would be a development in the sense of a progressive deterioration, and that is our danger to-day. If the poetry of the rest of this century takes the line of development which seems to me, reviewing the progress of poetry through the last three centuries, the right course, it will discover new and more elaborate patterns of a diction now established. In this search it might have much to learn from Milton's extended verse structure; it might also avoid the danger of a *servitude* to colloquial speech and to current jargon. It might also learn that the music of verse is strongest in poetry which has a definite meaning expressed in the properest words. Poets might be led to admit that a knowledge of the literature of their own language, with a knowledge of the literature and the grammatical construction of other languages, is a very valuable part of the poet's equipment. And they might, as I have already hinted, devote some study to Milton as, outside the theatre, the greatest master in our language of freedom within form. A study of *Samson* should sharpen anyone's appreciation of the justified irregularity, and put him on guard against the pointless irregularity. In studying *Paradise Lost* we come to perceive that the verse is continuously animated by the departure from, and return to, the regular measure; and that, in comparison with Milton, hardly any subsequent writer of blank verse appears to exercise any freedom at all. We can also be led to the reflection that a monotony of unscannable verse fatigues the attention even more quickly than a monotony of exact feet. In short, it now seems to me that poets are sufficiently removed from Milton, and sufficiently liberated from his reputation, to approach the study of his work without danger, and with profit to their poetry and to the English language.

ANNUAL SHAKESPEARE LECTURE
SHAKESPEARE AND THE TERMERS

By G. M. YOUNG

Read 23 April 1947

IN the fabric of English civilization few strands are of greater consequence than the tidal flux and reflux between London and the country. It is true of our politics: it is true of our literature. Books were sold in Paul's Churchyard to be read at Oxford and Cambridge, in the manor houses and the parsonages, and in no other way could a national literature have come into being. At the beginning of the sixteenth century even the vernacular was not yet stabilized: you remember Caxton's difficulty over the plural of *egg*: was he to print *egges* or *eiren*? And the metrical fumbblings of Wyatt and his contemporaries show that the key to the old music had been lost and the key to the new music not yet found. The Queen's English, when the Queen was young, hardly reached sixty miles from London—far enough to take in Oxford and Cambridge—and that, as the Spanish Ambassador once hinted, was about as far as her religion reached either. The English which we speak, our diction, grammar, and rhythm, has, I suppose, its origins in the *lingua franca* of those three centres, carried about the country by judges and counsel on assize, by Parliament men sitting in Quarter Sessions, by preachers, by players, by the termers, law students, in vacation.¹ By the mid-Elizabethan time, I think we can say 'here is at last a language, waiting only for a poet to teach it how to sing'.

This was the moment when Philip Sidney, Shrewsbury, Christ Church, and Gray's Inn, struck out with his *Defence of Poesie*, at once a challenge to the poets to show themselves and an appeal to the world to give them audience: to have done with Gascoyne and Turberville and Watson—with book-made imitations of Ronsard and Petrarch—with doggerel lyric that offends the ear—with chronicle plays, that would shock even 'the common actors of the Italian stage'. And here we feel the breath of that enchantment which had lured Sidney

¹ We often forget how medieval Tudor England still was: it startles us, perhaps to learn that down to the Dissolution the girls at Lacock Abbey spoke Norman French. Even Cromwell's visitors seem to have felt the charm of that.

and so many others, which was to lure Milton and so many more, across the Alps, the belief that Italy had the key to that culture towards which the north is always straining—Italy, partly in virtue of Ariosto and more lately Tasso, of the great historians, and the great story-tellers, of Machiavelli and Castiglione, but also as the chief transmitter of antiquity and still therefore the head of the civilization of the West. Spain had bowed: France had bowed. England also must go to school. To learn what? Accomplishment, *métier*, style—and so take her place—and it might not be the second place—in that same Western civilization.

Or should we careless come behind the rest
 In power of words, that go before in worth;
 When as our accent's equal to the best,
 Is able greater wonders to bring forth?
 When all that ever hotter spirits expressed
 Comes better'd by the patience of the north.

And to this end, Sidney's practice, chiming as it did with the spell he seems to have laid on his whole generation, was even more effectual than his doctrine. It was, I suppose, in the early eighties that his Sonnets began to pass from hand to hand. They were published in 1591, not long after the *Faerie Queene*, and soon everybody was writing sonnets or—and this is Sidney again—setting words to music or music to words, in the true and native lyric vein. The winter was past: the rain was over and gone: the time of the singing of birds had come.

But let anyone read or recall such pieces in any of the Western tongues as seem to him to have come nearest to perfection, Camoens or Joachim du Bellay, Lope de Vega or Shakespeare:

Since there's no help, come let us kiss and part,

or

Quand vous serez bien vieille, au soir, à la chandelle:

and I think he will admit that while, as Sidney demanded, they are indeed written from the heart, they are all impressed with the same discipline, and it is the discipline that releases the poetry. But what would Chaucer have been without the poetic learning of France? Catullus—or Virgil himself—if they had not gone to school at Alexandria? Or Shakespeare, if he had come ten years earlier and had been constrained to deliver himself, as he sometimes was, in the asphyxiating doggerel of the eighties?

But yet, Usurie, consider the lamentable voice of the poor:
 For lack of hospitality fatherless children are turned out of doore:
 Is the fear of God so farre from thee that thou hast no feeling at all?
 O, repent, Usurie: leave Hospitalitie, and for mercie at the Lord's
 hande call.

The verse is execrable: the theme, we may see, is one of some significance.

But the world, or more exactly, the London, on which the young countryman entered, was a London bubbling with poetry, with delight in poetry and argument about poetry. (More than argument sometimes: it was for rude words spoken about a sonnet that John Davies, afterwards Lord Chief Justice of England, thrashed Robert Martin, afterwards Recorder of London, in the presence of the Benchers in Middle Temple Hall.) What brought him there? We can only say that if a man felt he had it in him to write poetry, he must go where poetry was printed and sold: if to write plays, he must go where plays were acted. Is not that enough? There *may* have been links of neighbourhood. Burbage *may* have come from Warwickshire: Alleyne certainly married the widow Woodward and there were Woodwards, gentlefolk, in Stratford town. Of one thing only, or perhaps two, can we be sure—that Shakespeare had his own views of gentility, and that he had no intention of becoming, like Richard Hathaway, one of Henslowe's sweated gang. Quick-witted and helpful, straightforward in his dealings, attractive in bearing—that is the picture we have of him in those early days: we might have learned as much from half an hour in his company, and we shall never know more.

But those sugared sonnets among his private friends, those modish epyllia, *Venus and Adonis* and *Lucrece*, do suggest that his first dream was to be a poet in the approved style—like Spenser or Drayton or Daniel—if (and the thought will suggest itself) if poetry could be made to pay in anything but patronage: if it could buy land and meet the heralds' charges for a coat of arms and a pettigrew. And I do not think it venturesome to guess that the decision to follow his genius along the lower walk of stage-writing was not taken without a wrench.

Desiring this man's art and that man's scope,
 With what I most enjoy contented least.

Lines which may be read in two ways. To follow up *Lucrece* with something in the grand manner on a larger scale—something like *The Faerie Queene*—or earn a modest fortune by turning

out plays for the Company? To know that he was the greatest playwright of the day, and go through life with the label 'Author of *Venus and Adonis*' always sticking to him? Either way was hard. But if Shakespeare had sought a friend's advice, bringing with him in one hand *Venus and Adonis* and *Lucrece*, and in the other his dramatic work to date, I do not see what counsel that friend could have given him except to make the theatre his business. The poems sold well: they were prodigiously admired: undergraduates slept with them under their pillows. But—except for those famous vignettes of country life and sport—are they anything more than ripe, Ovidian Baroque?

I remember once putting to myself the question: Was Shakespeare a great poet accidentally bound up with a great playwright, or were these powers but different facets of a single unitary capacity? Was it the poet or the playwright who knew that Antony *must* say:

Unarm, Eros, the long day's task is done,
And we must sleep,

And Iras must echo:

Finish, good Lady, the bright day is done
And we are for the dark:

because a man might be a very great dramatist and never think of that—Ibsen would not, Chekhov would not, Ben Jonson would not. Contrariwise, he might strike off such phrases by the score and yet fail to make them, each and all, go to the building of a character. And then I asked: 'If I had been there, how should I have felt?' Fragmentary as our record is, we know that Shakespeare's audiences followed the acting in breathless delight. But the epithets contemporaries bestow on him, mellifluous, honey-tongued, silver-tongued, golden-tongued, all point to another source of enchantment: an aptness of phrasing, a sweetness of utterance such as had never fallen on their ears before. I should have felt that, I am sure. I should have held my breath when Berowne was speaking.

O me, with what strict patience have I sat,
To see a King transformed to a gnat:
To see great Hercules whipping a gig,
And profound Solomon to tune a jig:
And Nestor play at push-pin with the boys,
And critic Timon laugh at idle toys.
Where lies thy grief, O tell me, good Dumain?
And gentle Longaville, where lies thy pain?

The urbanity, the accomplishment, and withal the freshness of such verse! But then in that Elizabethan audience who am I? One of the penny-knaves whose disapproval—their manifest boredom—disconcerted Lodge? One of Southampton's gentlemen sent to report on the latest play? Or—and I remembered the casual fling of some Elizabethan wit that the lawyers should be obliged to the players for giving them something to do of an afternoon—should I have been a young Templar, knowing something of my classics, and something of my Italians, relaxing my brain between a morning over Lyttleton's *Tenures* and my evening moot? And when the quartos began to appear in '97, should I have hurried back across the water to Paul's to buy whatever was in print of Mr. Shakespeare, and to leave an order for the next quarto as soon as it was out? I think I should. I should have wanted to go over it all again, to read Mercutio's speech till I had it by heart, and, returned to the country in vacation, compel a submissive family to listen to me declaiming

Will the king come that I may breathe my last
In wholesome counsel to his unstaidd youth?

or

O who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus:

explaining no doubt, with a lordly certitude, that *Euphues* was out of date, that alliteration was bad form: that Marlowe's mighty line was merely comic, and that Shakespeare, sweet Mr. Shakespeare, was the only wear.

'If the Muses spoke English, they would speak with the fine-filed phrase of Shakespeare.' No small thing to have that said about you at thirty-four, even if the writer is only reporting the extravagances of some College Literary Society. But that is how things happen: whether it be the people of Abdera singing the choruses of the *Andromeda* all a summer through, or the undergraduates of whom our fathers have told us, with linked arms in King's Parade chanting,

When the hounds of Spring are on Winter's traces.

Sometimes they try to look like Byron, sometimes to talk like Oscar Wilde. *Semel insanivimus omnes*, and the reader who doodled *Will Shakespeare, Will Shakespeare, Will Shakespeare* all over a title-page must have had it very badly. (By choosing a pamphlet of Francis Bacon's for his scene of operations he did indeed call fools into a circle.) That is how things happen—especially

among young men in universities, and we are sometimes apt to forget that Elizabethan London was a university town.

The story begins with Fortescue, and his fond account of life in the Inns of Court in the time of Henry VI. It has, I know, been said that Fortescue's picture is too fond, and that, writing in exile from Paris, he looked towards the home of his youthful studies as another exile writing in Dublin looked back to Oriel and Trinity. But of the Inns of Court in Elizabethan days, we can say with assurance, speaking from the record, that they bear all the marks of a true collegiate life. Sons follow fathers: brothers are in residence together: country neighbours go bond for each other: Carey of Clovelly for Coplestone of Yealmton. Old members press forward with gifts of plate and books, of money to build the new chapel. At the high table on Grand Night are the Honorary Fellows—the great captains, Norris and Vere, Frobisher and Drake. The studies are regular: the teaching—we have Coke's word for it—admirable: the discipline is firm—

How could communities,
Degrees in Schools and brotherhoods in cities,
But by degree stand in authentic place?

—with just enough breaking into chambers, and outcries on a winter's night, to remind us that youth will be served. Gentlemen must not wear gay-coloured clothes; gentlemen must not carry beards of more than three weeks' growth; gentlemen must not keep hawks in college. Poor boys: in that pestilential London where the arrangements, as we may call them, seem to have got steadily worse since the departure of the Romans, how they must have longed, when wheat is green, when hawthorn buds appear, to be home again, welcomed by Blanch and Tray and Troilus the spaniel, and take Old Kate the falcon out for a morning after a heron. And how well Shakespeare understood all that; with what cunning sympathy he ministers to that homesickness.

The Four Inns of Court were indeed, as Sir George Buck said, the Third University of England. And out of college hours what rich fare London offered to satisfy the ardours and curiosities of youth. The Inns themselves provided instruction in music—it is the London of Morley and Gibbons—and in dancing, which was part of the ancient ritual of the place: the Revels, the Reader's Feast, the Grand Christmas: there were masters of tongues, of fencing, and riding; there were the Gresham lectures:

not least there were the sermons at Paul's Cross: or, in the Temple Church, with Hooker answering Travers; and the greatest of Elizabethan preachers, Silvertongue Smith, was just across the way at St. Clement Dane's.

Who are these gentlemen? Turn over the Books of Admission. Here are two friends—we may meet one of them again—Edwin Sandys and George Cranmer: here are Courtenays of Devon and Derings of Kent: Edgcumbes of Mount Edgumbe, Delavals of Seaton Delaval: Harcourt and Montagu, Hazelrigg and Strode, Hyde and Danvers and Ludlow. They are the fathers of the Long Parliament. But what was of more immediate concern to authority, they were the sons and heirs of the Justices of the Peace, successors in that Irenarchy which was the groundwork and framework of Tudor administration: patrons not only of plays and poetry, but of Church livings, and the mainstay of that London book-market which Walsingham's agents watched so carefully. 'What do you think of Travers?' the Queen once asked Cecil: 'the Archbishop doesn't seem to like him.' The Archbishop did not! And 'knowing how much the doctrine and converse of the Master would influence the gentlemen; and their influence and authority prevail in all parts of the realm where their habitations and estates were, that careful prelate made it his endeavour' to see that Travers should not become Master of the Temple.

The four societies were, of course, first of all schools for lawyers. But no gentleman of account, 'being of ability in living' and—significantly—not likely to practice at the Bar—seems to have been denied an opportunity of spending some years in what was, I should judge, the liveliest, the most intelligent, and certainly the most influential society England could furnish. Some of them are tiresome and have to go down. Some, pigeons ripe for the plucking, fall among rooks, and Burleigh once suggested that those who write plays should make a comedy on that theme with the sharper's name and all. Mr. Walter's religious demeanour occasions concern: he is to have conference with Master Hooker: the conference was satisfactory and Mr. Walter resumed his attendance at chapel. But the Inns, drawing their men from far beyond the Queen's radius, from the fells and dales, from Radnor and the Peak, seem to have been very nests of papistry—which may be the simple explanation of the respect which Elizabethan playwrights habitually show for the Old Religion. Mr. Young, I observe with sympathy, after a blameless, and indeed unnoticed, residence of five years, is discovered

to have attended no readings and performed no exercises whatever. Perhaps he was better employed.

Only, good master, while we do admire
 This virtue and this moral discipline,
 Let's be no stoics nor no stocks I pray,
 Or so devote to Aristotle's ethics
 As Ovid be an outcast quite forgot.
 Balk logic, with acquaintance that you have,
 And practice rhetoric, in your common talk.
 The mathematics and the metaphysics
 Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you:
 No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en:
 In brief, Sir, study what you most affect.

Or he may have been the diligent convener of a literary club such as Chapman's hero projected.

A rendezvous of good wits, the shop of good words, the mint of good jests: an ordinary of fine discourse—critics, essayists, linguists, poets.

Is it perhaps worth observing that in Andrew Maunsell's catalogue, 1595, books of law, history, policy, and poetry are classed together as works of entertainment and delight? That Lambarde's *Saxon Laws* could be cited in Parliament as part of the English birthright: while—so I have read—in Germany the *Leges Burgundionum* and suchlike stuff were pushed back into darkness as relics of a barbarous and best-forgotten past? There is some history in that, I think.

Now here it seems to me we have a public—gently bred and country bred—young, ardent, sensitive, disputatious, such as Shakespeare, country bred and gently given, needed. Marlowe and his fellows had proved that fine verse was an acceptable medium for drama, and drama an acceptable vehicle of great poetry. Shakespeare must have known that he could write poetry as grandly as Marlowe, as prettily as Greene, as musically as Peele: that he could match Lyly at a song and Spenser's self at a sonnet. By practice he learned as much as he ever troubled to know about the conduct of a fable through five acts to the appointed end, in tragedy a huddle of corpses, in comedy a cuddle of engaged persons. And very soon he must have discovered that secret of his, the phrase that makes a character leap to life. Johannes Factotum indeed! What seems to have struck his contemporaries was just the quality at which Greene had sneered—his amazing versatility. *Venus and Adonis* or *Richard III*, the *Sonnets* or *Richard II*, *Midsummer Night* or *Twelfth Night*,

Falstaff or Rosalind, no one knows what he will give us next. The one thing we can be sure of when we take oars and cross from Temple stairs is that, whatever the piece be, it will be starred with memorable phrases, and flooded with poetry, landscape poetry from sunrise to sunset and by moonlight round to dawn again,

rural rural keeping, folk flocks and flowers.

And these young people understand all that. They can take a point. They can dissect a character; they can treasure a phrase, and keep it alive from one supper party to another. They are worth writing for.¹ And is it not just there that the answer to our question, poet or playwright?, lies: in Shakespeare's unparalleled genius for saying, quite unexpectedly sometimes, what when said we feel to be absolutely right for the business in hand, while at the same time it starts overtones which seem to mean more and more the farther they travel: whether it be the French King,

I fill a place, I know it:

or, in *Cymbeline*,

The bird is dead
That we have made so much on.

Can we go beyond an imaginative probability and give reason positive for thinking that Shakespeare wrote with these patrons and critics in his eye? We must go cautiously, never forgetting that Gardiner once furnished Philip Massinger with a complete political philosophy drawn from a play which turned out to be an adaptation from the French. It is at first sight curious that

¹ There is good evidence that Shakespeare's phrasing was picked up, was quoted, was widely familiar. The proof is that it could be parodied, and parody is pointless unless the original is well known. Thus in *Love's Labour's Lost* Moth says:

'My father's wit and my mother's tongue assist me!'

Armado comments:

'Sweet invocation of a child—most pretty and pathetic!'

Five years later Chapman could get his laugh by a mischievous appropriation, when the old count designing a jewel for his young wife,

'God will reward her a thousand fold
That takes what age can and not what age would,'

remarks

'I hope 'tis pretty and pathetic.'

Shakespeare seems to avoid all reference to the larger doings of his time—unless we suppose, as indeed we may, that it was a House-rule of the Lord Chamberlain's men, being on the verge as they were of Court-employment, to say nothing that might make the licenser raise a doubtful eyebrow or reach out for his pen. The fact is indisputable. From Tennyson—even when his Laureate work is set aside—a careful reader could learn much of English history in the nineteenth century. He would know, for instance, that England had been at war with Russia. Would anyone guess that for sixteen years of Shakespeare's life England was at war with Spain? His one Spaniard—Aragón apart—is treated with bantering affection, a foolish gentleman, but still a gentleman and

This child of fancy that Armado hight

inspired Shakespeare with one of his grandest lines and the phrase that Gibbon took to wind up the story of the Crusades.

This child of fancy that Armado hight,
For interim to our studies shall relate
In high born words the worth of many a knight
From tawny Spain, lost in the world's debate.

Shakespeare was not insensitive to the chivalry of the past:

And beauty making beautiful old rhyme
In praise of ladies dead and lovely knights:

or the adventure of his own times:

. Some to discover islands far away,
Some to the studious universities:

but from the icicle on a Dutchman's beard a rash scholiast might infer that no English crew had ventured beyond the Arctic circle. And what allusions have been caught are for the most part too trivial to be worth bringing home. The King's poor cousin? Well, it amused Gloriana to call Arthur Hildersam, the Puritan divine, Cousin Hildersam, because he was remotely a de la Pole. Old Dr. Bullein, a nearer kinsman, provides the simple joke in *Twelfth Night* to give a dog and desire a dog. May I add a couple more? Olivia we know wrote a sweet Roman hand. Has it been observed (probably it has) that, according to Billingsley the writing-master, women were taught the Roman hand as being 'fantastical and humoursome'? It does, I think, throw light on Shakespeare's conception of Olivia, who, having resolved to live immured in mourning for seven

years, falls in love with the first handsome boy she meets and marries the second.

The mortal moon hath her eclipse endured.

How many pages have been written, what deep deductions have been made from that one line! Was Shakespeare thinking of the Queen's illness and recovery? Of the tranquil succession of King James? Of the return of peace to Europe following the Treaty of Vervins? We do not know. What we do know is that Moonet of East Kent bore for arms: *sable, six moonets argent*: and for *impresa*:

Luna suac perfert argentea lucis eclipsim
The silver moon doth her eclipse endure.

And if we choose to think that the line was struck out, in answer to a challenge, at some Ordinary of fine discourse, no commentator can deny the likelihood. But it is not surely beyond the limits of fair conjecture to suppose that Shakespeare had the entry into some circle, habitually moved in some circle, where such things came up in talk, mixed with the latest story, the latest epigram, the latest poem, the latest scandal? And where shall we look for such a circle? Where should we find it to-day? At a university: in Elizabethan London, among the Termers.

Apply our conjecture to that question upon which even Lord Chancellors have been known to engage—Shakespeare's knowledge of the law. To begin with, everybody who aspired, as Shakespeare unquestionably did, to be anybody, in shire or borough, had to know some law, just as he was bound to know some Latin, if only enough to see that when the steward wrote

pro radelinga et daubura VI denarii

he meant

for raddle and daub, *6d.*

And that, with some well-flogged memories of Lyly's *Grammar* and Phaedrus his *Fables*, was enough for a clever man to pick his way through the *Adagia* of Erasmus, or, with help from Golding's translation, the tales in the *Metamorphoses*: and the thesis which is to prove that Shakespeare was a stupid man still awaits its Ph.D. Further than that I doubt if Shakespeare ever penetrated in Latin or in law: and further than that a good many law students never penetrated either. The terms of the law flow freely from his pen but do they always flow correctly?

He evidently thought that *misprision* was such a good word for poetry that the meaning did not greatly matter.

It had a violent commencement and thou shalt
see an answerable sequestration.

suggests that Shakespeare thought a sequestration to be something between a separation and a sequel. But, if I may be allowed the comparison, I should guess that there are in this room to-day ten people who know the joke about the rule in Shelley's case for one who knows what the rule in Shelley's case was: and all we can safely affirm of Shakespeare, and that I believe we can affirm, is that he mixed in a society where the terms of the law were current coin and wrote for an audience which accepted them as such. I have myself no doubt whatever that Hamlet's phrase

native here
And to the manor born

was meant to be taken, and would have been taken, as meaning *nativus manerii*, a *neif regardant* to the manor, and in one place I think we can restore Shakespeare's text by asking how a lawyer would have read it. In *Love's Labour's Lost* we have the mysterious reading

not so, gentle beast:
My lips are not common, though several they be.

Here, I feel sure, Maria gives her hand to Boyet to kiss—

Woot so, gentle beast?

He tries for more, and averting her face, she says:

My lips are not common, though: several they be.

What is the law? Take it from Gray's Inn. 'If I grant common *in omnibus terris meis* in Dale, and I have in Dale both open ground and several, it shall not be stretched to common in my several, much less to my garden or orchard.' What was Maria's knowledge of the law? Enough to flirt with.

Here and there we may come perhaps on something more substantial. One of His Majesty's Judges has reminded me that the logic of the gravediggers in Hamlet closely accords with the reported argument in the case of Sir John Hale *felo de se*: and that the suit of Shylock against Antonio has matter both of law and equity well worth the bolting. Elizabethan audiences loved to see great men charactered: to identify or imagine they could

identify the portrait: and nothing forbids us to believe that the Lord Chief Justice in *Henry IV* is Shakespeare's homage to Popham or Anderson, or that the tribute was loudly applauded by an audience which held those two great judges for pillars of the common law. Certainly at almost the first words of the *Merry Wives*

I will make a Star-chamber matter of it

young lawyers must have pricked up their ears in expectation of mirth to come, because Shallow is just such a foolish justice as Star Chamber was for ever sending about his business.

For that tidal movement of which I have spoken was vigilantly observed and controlled by the State:

Our radiant Queen hates sluts and sluttery,

and there was a terrible lot of sluttery in that last Elizabethan decade, when, I sometimes think, the only thing really well managed was the Globe Theatre. The Three Quarter men, for example, who lay about the town for nine months and only went down to the country for the hawking and hunting and are for ever being scolded home by the queen, to keep hospitality, to care for the poor, and 'exercise justice with Herculean courage': never more vehemently than in the hungry year that followed the disastrous harvest of '94 when

The ploughman lost his sweat and the green corn
Hath rotted ere his youth attained a beard.

To keep hospitality. Rural hospitality was one of the keys to Tudor Government, for a reason among others which Sidney, who knew the ways of State, lets slip. His fine old country gentleman, Kalander, is 'for his hospitality so much haunted that no news sturre but comes to his ears' and so in due course no doubt to the ears of the Lord Lieutenant and the Privy Council. And the Irenarchy, the Government by Justices, was endangered by the lure of London and the Court. It is an old story: Bishop Ayscue of Salisbury had been slain by angry citizens for no other reason: and the tension between the Land and the City, between the Counting House and the Manor House, between Usury and Hospitality, which was to have such marked consequences for our political development, was making itself felt in Elizabeth's time.

So, at the end of *Henry IV*, the audience may well have gone home not greatly distressed over Falstaff—a fortnight in the Fleet was the sort of thing that might happen to any gentleman—

but laughing merrily over the forlorn, familiar figure of Shallow, the country justice who supposed that by putting down £1,000 he could make his fortune at Court and must now pack home to maintain good hospitality if he could find the wherewithal, and be struck out of the Commission if he could not. And that figure, we know, took town and country by storm. If Shallow indeed be Lucy, then Shakespeare indeed has had his revenge.

Again, the rigging of the musters by Falstaff and Bardolph in *Henry IV* may very well be the comic echo of a recent case which must have brought the gentlemen flocking and squeezing into court. The culprit was a Norfolk man, and so was the Attorney General, and the aged Buckhurst greatly commended his fealty and trouble in tracking down offenders in his own county. 'The lion goes forth to war', said Abbot, Bishop of London, 'and the wolves and foxes follow in his train.' And even in the hurried notes of the clerk we can hear the impetuous eloquence of Essex—or is it Hotspur?—and understand perhaps what it was in him that the commons of England adored. 'What nation in Christendom', he asked, 'is more defensive in itself than this unconquerable island, or has more use of warlike instruments? And are the free people of this realm to be sold like cattle in the market? If any that I have preferred, Captains, Lieutenants, or muster masters have offended, I wish they may be prosecuted to the death: for the Queen, far above her own honour and revenue sets the love and good estate of her people.' It is the Tudor note: which the Stuarts never learned to strike.

But is it fancy or reasonable conjecture that of these great men we have one portrait, built up perhaps out of the mimicry of irreverent juniors at supper? None of his characters seems to have amused Shakespeare so much as Polonius, and there are moments when we wonder how he will get rid of him and whether without him the play can go on. Judge for yourselves.

In the time of King Edgar there was a law that a slanderer should lose his tongue. And a very good law it was.

Let Counsellors at law remember that their profession is honourable, but if God be not at the getting, God will not be at the spending.

A Counsellor at law must be discreet and of good governance, for he is called Counsellor not only to give Counsel but to keep Counsel.

Drunkness is *voluntarius demon*: he carrieth a legion with him. So, if the beginning of a riot be in a tavern should not the taverner be punished as *Causa sine qua non*?

Respectful laughter in court, I guess.

But when a riot did break out and the company sallied forth

to beat the watch in Paul's Churchyard, the tributes to the taverner's good behaviour were so prompt and cordial as to suggest that a fair part of the bar was running a bill at the Mermaid; and I cannot keep out of my mind the fancy that the crown of an evening's entertainment was a call to Master William Silence to take his seat and do Lord Keeper Egerton, averring for the twentieth time, but always with the same bright originality, that solicitors are caterpillars of the commonwealth.

Such things are trifles, but we must remember that Star Chamber and Chancery, the Courts and the Inns, the stories that came back from assizes, and the evidence of rustics taken on commission, furnished a mirror in which the whole of English life from high to low could be observed. What would have happened if Dogberry and Verges in *Much Ado* had encountered Barnadine, discharged from his captivity in Vienna? Well, they did encounter once, in Marlborough High Street; and in Peter Peers, the forester, with six arrows under his belt, flatly refusing to go to prison when the watch charged him, or to come out of prison when the mayor invited him, Shakespeare himself might have owned that Nature had outgone Invention.

But among the famous causes of the day—such things as must have set Court and Temple abuzz with gossip and argument, can we find one in which we may believe that Shakespeare's heart was engaged? I think we can. One of the few things we really know about Shakespeare is that in middle life something happened to lift the gay and splendid tapestry against which his early work was performed, that what he saw then sickened him of life and sex, and that he recovered his self-mastery by bringing his imagination to rest on such creations as Imogen and Perdita and Miranda, just as in his brilliant young days it had dwelt most fondly on Rosalind and Beatrice. In this later gallery the most completely conceived—and we may well think the best loved—character is Cordelia, with her obstinate pride, her impatient common sense, her determination to stand no nonsense even from her adored father. Cordelia—Andrew Bradley once made the observation—would have torn through Iago's web before it was woven; and, translated to the Court of Elsinore, she would have boxed Ophelia's ears, told Hamlet not to walk about with his stockings down, and stopped the tragedy before the curtain rose. And the miracle is that Shakespeare has given her no more than eighty or ninety lines. But in these lines, I am sure, we hear the beating of Shakespeare's own heart.

On the stump of Lee Old Church near Blackheath—where the road to Dover runs—may be seen the monument to Sir Brian Annesley, thirty years Gentleman Pensioner to Queen Elizabeth, and father to Grace Mrs. Wildgoose, Christian Lady Sandys, and Cordell, ‘who at her own proper cost and charges in further testimony of her dutiful love unto her father and mother, caused this monument to be erected for the perpetual memorie of their names against the ungrateful nature of oblivious time’. Struck by the phrasing, and the situation it seemed to disclose, I made inquiry for the rest of the story. Sir Brian made his will in 1600. Three years later the widow Wildgoose tried to get her poor old father certified as unable to manage his affairs. Cordell to the rescue! She wrote to Robert Cecil and the Wildgoose was frustrated. Sir Brian died, and the Wildgoose contested the will. Chancery upheld the will, and with it Cordell’s rights in her father’s Kentish manors. And then, no longer young, thinking, we may suppose, that she had merited some happiness on her own account, she married, a knight worthy of such a lady. In ’88 he had fought sword to sword with a Spanish captain on the deck of his own galleon. He had been with Essex at the taking of Cadiz, and on the Island Voyage. He had served valiantly and long against the Irish rebels. He was William Harvey, the stepfather of Shakespeare’s Southampton. Was it Cordell Annesley that saved Shakespeare from shipwreck?

At any rate, if I am told to believe that all that is mere coincidence, that Shakespeare at the height of his powers, *Othello* just behind him, *Antony and Cleopatra* just in front, took the old play, ill contrived and ill written, out of the cupboard and wrote it up again because he had to write something and by now the public would take anything he gave them, I can only reply that miracles of that sort do not happen. Great effects require great causes. If I were asked to name the masterpiece of tragic power in poetry, I should say—the agony of Cassandra in the *Agamemnon*; of tragic beauty, the awakening of Lear to the low music of Cordelia’s voice:

Do not laugh at me,
 For as I am a man I think this lady
 To be my child Cordelia.
 And so I am, I am.
 I know you do not love me; for your sisters
 Have, as I do remember, done me wrong:
 You have some cause, they none.
 No cause, no cause.

If I err, I err in a good tradition because the first critic to match Shakespeare with Aeschylus was John Dryden. And Dryden had known men who had known Shakespeare: he may have known Shakespeare's son. And none of them, it seems, could remember anything about him. It is very strange.

But the rise of Shakespeare, swift and unmistakable, to the foremost place among the poets of his age and country, hampered only by his resolute ignorance of classical rules, and the incondite and sometimes tasteless exuberance of his style, that is only one part of our story. The other part—perhaps I can bring it home by an illustration:

If ever it occurs to us to value the honour of the mind equally with the honour of the body, we shall have a social revolution of a quite unparalleled sort.

An admirable and timely sentiment: and if I told you I had heard it in a speech at Unesco or a lay sermon in Balliol, you would think nothing more natural. That is where we go for such sentiments and those are the sentiments we expect to hear. I took it from a detective story. And I have often thought that to a contemporary, accustomed to go for instruction in life and example of manners to antiquity or the Italian Platonists, to Cicero *De Officiis* or Plutarch's *Moralia* for his oracles, to Pliny for his *flosculi* and Tacitus for his *sententiae*—in a word, for everything that the Elizabethans called policy—it must have been very difficult to realize that the same sort of thing was to be had for the hearing at the Globe: that books of equal wit and worth with Terence and Seneca could be bought for a few pence in Paul's Churchyard: and that a new world was coming into being to redress the balance of the old. *England's Parnassus*, 1600, shows that contemporary literature is being searched for oracles as ancient literature always had been, but still Shakespeare is the author of *Venus and Adonis* and a play or two beside, and I have suggested that to pass along the years so rubricated cannot have been altogether grateful to the creator of Richard and Malvolio, Claudio and Helena, Lady Macbeth and Othello; while the shouts of delight that greeted every word, every movement, of Falstaff and Shallow must often have left him glad to think he had a more refined, in Hamlet's words a more judicious, public.

The Elizabethan play had to satisfy a demand created by a threefold tradition—the Morality, the Chronicle, and the Farce: character, incident, and clownage: with perhaps a second infusion of the Morality, to provide and justify those gnomic and

ethical discourses of which, once more, Shakespeare showed himself, in *Henry IV* the most memorable, in *Troilus* the most majestic, contriver. But what did the Judicious really think of him? What did Hooker think of him? Is there any reason to suppose he thought at all? The gentlemen must often have capped him on their way to take oars for the Globe. Did they ever tell him what they had heard there?

In September '99 a Swiss visitor went to the Globe to see *Julius Caesar*. Weary and disdainful of theologic debate, Hooker had left London and was far more happily bestowed in a country living, Bishopsbourne, by Canterbury. Cartwright and his friends had brought out their *Christian Letter* against the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, *Christian* here being used rather in a technical sense, and Hooker was working on his reply. We have his notes, written in the margin of the *Letter*: and among them are two or three, to my ear demonstrably, drawn from a friend's account of the new play.

Thus the Puritans write:

We do not take upon us to censure your books but we could not but utter our inward grief, and yet in as charitable manner as the cause in hand would suffer.

And Hooker comments:

As if Cassius and Brutus having slain Caesar, they should solemnly have protested to his friends they meant him nothing but goodwill and friendship.

(As the play says:

Why he that cuts off twenty years of life
Cuts off so many years of fearing death.
Grant that and then is death a benefit.
So are we Caesar's friends that have abridged
His time of fearing death.)

The note goes on:

Only they feared lest the Commonwealth should take ill by his means.
(This is Brutus's plea in self-justification.)

Was there any friend he had so ill-minded as not to believe such honest protestations?

(And Brutus is an honourable man.)

And Hooker ends:

An imitation of this conclusion in the person of Brutus and Cassius.
You have given me as many stabs as my body can receive at your hands.

If I am asked, what friend? I should say—that one we have met before, George Cranmer, because he was a Fellow of Corpus where the notes are still preserved and he may well have gone down to bid his old tutor good-bye before sailing to Ireland, where he died in battle the next spring.

If I am right, then here we may say we mark the flood of the Italian Renaissance beginning to turn on itself and run backwards. Soon we shall be saying not that Shakespeare is the English Ovid, but that Ovid is the Roman Shakespeare. By climbing on the shoulders of the Italians we had reached and joined hands with the ancients: we had done what the men of the nineties had set out to do: we had placed ourselves in the front of a new civilization with Shakespeare for its oracle. And it all begins with a crowd of apprentices a-roar at bawdy jokes, languishing at a love-scene, or shouting 'a horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse', whenever a gentleman had trouble with his mount in Cheapside: and with those others, *apprenticii nobiliores*, buying a quarto to read under cover of *Coke Upon Lyttleton* or carry down to the country: and it goes on to that garden in Essex where dear scatterbrained Margaret Lucas, Duchess of Newcastle, debates with her girl friends whether they would rather marry Julius Caesar or Shakespeare: while Mr. Richardson of Magdalen, in a sermon at St. Mary's, quotes from *Romeo*, applying it, one hearer writes, 'to God's love for His saints, either hurt with sin or in adversity never forsaking them',

I would have thee gone
And yet no further than a wanton's bird,
Who lets it hop a little from her hand,
Like a poor prisoner in his twisted gyves,
And with a silk thread plucks it back again,
So loving-jealous of his liberty.

Surely it adds something to the fame even of St. Mary's that in that pulpit first, the music, and the mystery, of Shakespeare's phrase was heard.

RALEIGH LECTURE ON HISTORY

THE RISE OF NORMANDY

By DAVID DOUGLAS

Read 28 May 1947

THE history of Normandy before the Norman Conquest possesses a special interest for English historians, and a man who ventures to-day on its investigation, while fully conscious of his own temerity, may at least take comfort that so many distinguished scholars have emphasized the importance of his task. The labours of Stapleton, of J. H. Round, and of Professor Powicke in this country, of C. H. Haskins in America, of Le Prévost, Charles de Beaurepaire, and Ferdinand Lot in France (to name no others) have illuminated the historic function of medieval Normandy, and all students of Norman history are proud to claim Léopold Delisle for their especial master. But only a fraction of the work of these scholars was devoted to the formative period of Norman growth before 1066, and no integration of their researches has yet been made.¹ Doubtless the time has not yet arrived when such a synthesis is possible, and certainly the purpose of this lecture is to indicate problems rather than to attempt their solution. Nevertheless, the theme invites attention. Far less is known about pre-Conquest Normandy than about pre-Conquest England, and the unfortunate consequences of this gap in our knowledge were properly indicated by W. H. Stevenson.² The long debate about the Norman contribution to English growth can now no longer be profitably sustained unless a new attempt be made to examine for its own sake the story of the rise of Normandy.³

In one respect at least the way has been prepared for a new advance in this study, for in recent years some of the sources of early Norman history have been subjected to a fresh criticism that has resulted in a re-appraisal of their value. Thus the panegyric of the Norman dukes composed in the early years of the eleventh century by Dudo, canon of St. Quentin, has been so discredited that Norman history in its first phase must now be explored with but scant reference to the book which was for so long considered indispensable to its study.⁴ Consequently, although the narrative of William of Jumièges which begins to be contemporary in the reign of Robert I has in the

edition of Jean Marx⁵ been separated from its later accretions, much less reliance than formerly can to-day be placed on the Norman chronicles as a source of early Norman history. Any future reconstruction of that history must therefore depend in large measure upon the evidence of the Norman charters. In the long series of these instruments is in truth to be found a precious historical source which has not yet attracted the attention it deserves. A critical edition of the charters of the early dukes has become an urgent need of Norman scholarship.

It is probably not an accident that no instrument of Rollo or of William Longsword is known to exist, for a diploma⁶ alleged to have been given by Duke Richard II to St. Ouen when recording earlier gifts to that abbey states that such benefactions were then made without written sanction; and another charter of Richard II, this time for Jumièges, adds that it was rare even for his father to record his gifts.⁷ Both the surviving charters of Duke Richard I, in fact, date from the latter part of his reign and seem to be exceptional instruments.⁸ But with the reign of Richard II ducal charters were issued much more frequently. Not less than eighteen charters of this duke⁹ covering the period 1006-26 are extant and in print: one in favour of his wife Judith; ten to churches within Normandy; and seven to churches outside the province. The series continues with the so-called *Donatio Adelae* of Richard III;¹⁰ and during his short reign Robert I issued not less than thirteen charters to eight ecclesiastical foundations.¹¹ It is possible that research in the *archives* of Normandy, and particularly in those of Seine-Inférieure, would bring to light other charters of Richard II and Robert I, but judged even by the documents now available, this material is copious. Much of it, however, still awaits analysis. A few of these instruments have been admirably edited in such editions as that made by Monsieur Lot of the muniments of Saint Wandrille; others are scattered in local histories of varying merit; whilst some still remain in the printed versions prepared in the seventeenth century. The full value of these important texts will therefore not appear until they have all been critically re-edited. But, already, by bringing them together in a single collection, it may be possible to pass a provisional judgement upon some of them, to identify many of the persons and places to which they refer, and to employ them to throw a new light upon some of the cardinal problems of early Norman growth.

The starting-point in the development of medieval Normandy was the intrusion of a Scandinavian population into a province of Gaul. But while scholars are agreed that during the ninth and tenth centuries Normandy was subjected to a long process of colonization from the northern lands, the density of the Scandinavian settlements then formed has remained a matter of some dispute. The latest study of Norman place-names, for example, has been held to indicate a marked contrast in this respect between Normandy and the English Danelaw, suggesting that, in the former province, Scandinavian colonization was 'essentially aristocratic'—'a process in which the settlement of large groups of peasant warriors was to say the least exceptional'.¹² The historical evidence supporting this conclusion is, however, less clear. All accounts emphasize the depopulation of the lower Seine basin towards the close of the ninth century; and the statement of an Anglo-Saxon chronicler that after Halfdan's conquest of Northumbria his followers 'began to plough and provide for themselves', may in some sense be paralleled by Dudo's remark that after the establishment of Rollo 'the land that had lain waste was put to tillage'.¹³ Moreover, the agrarian revolt¹⁴ which broke out in Normandy in the early years of Duke Richard II was so remarkable both for its date and in its organization that it might be tempting to explain it by the survival among the peasantry of traditions of freedom comparable to those which the Scandinavian peasantry of the Danelaw retained until the time of Domesday.

Such general considerations, whatever their worth, only become interesting when they can be particularly reinforced. Dudo's allusion to allocations of land *funiculo* and *sorte*¹⁵ is vague, but it not improbably refers to Scandinavian systems of land-sharing, and a clerk newly arrived from the Vermandois can hardly have derived such phrases from his imagination. Consequently, considerable significance must attach to a passage in a charter given by Robert I to Rouen cathedral in which the duke restored to the church 'in villa quae Oilliacus vocatur xxxiii partes quae vulgo masloth dicuntur'.¹⁶ Oilliacus may be identified as either OUILLY-le-Tesson or OUILLY-le-Basset, both in the Hiémois,¹⁷ and a variant reading describes the *partes* within OUILLY as *Mansloht*. Now the word *manlot* occurs in a tenth-century Nottinghamshire charter, in an eleventh-century survey of lands in Norfolk, in two twelfth-century Lincolnshire charters, and in an East Anglian extent of the thirteenth century, and in all these cases it has been held to

indicate the survival of land-sharing arrangements consequent upon the Scandinavian settlements in those districts.¹⁸ Its appearance in a Norman charter belonging to the second quarter of the eleventh century is thus of interest. The thirty-three shares assigned as *manlots* in the village of OUILLY cannot have been large holdings, and while it would certainly be very rash to generalize from a single text,¹⁹ its language may reasonably be held to suggest that in one place at least in Normandy some of the 'rank and file' of the Scandinavian army may have settled down, as in England, to till the soil.

Probably, however, the extent of Viking colonization varied in Normandy from district to district. Latin-Scandinavian hybrids are very common in Norman place-names, and, where they occur, they are considered to point to a state of society in which immigrants from the North formed a minority of the population.²⁰ Full allowance must certainly be made for local divergencies, and the miscellaneous character of the settlement is apparent in the early history of the province. The warfare which ravaged Normandy during the earlier half of the tenth century was often waged between men who bore Scandinavian names. Much, for instance, is obscure about that 'Harold' who supported 'Bernard the Dane' against Louis d'Outre-Mer, but he appears to have been the leader of a Viking colony in the Bessin; and if the story of Turmod and Sihtric as told by the chroniclers of Rheims contains legendary elements, there is good reason to believe that the one was a Viking settled in Normandy while the other was a recent pagan arrival from overseas.²¹ The new dynasty which had established itself in Rouen had to fight for its supremacy against rivals of Scandinavian race, and the dichotomy between Upper and Lower Normandy long endured. In effect, the Scandinavian impact entailed more lasting results in the western than in the eastern section of the province. In the second quarter of the tenth century Scandinavian speech was apparently already exceptional at Rouen while it was still dominant in Bayeux.²²

The duration and the miscellaneous character of the Viking colonization of Normandy make it impossible to speak with any precision about the parts of Scandinavia from which the new settlers came. The general course of Scandinavian expansion westward in the ninth century might perhaps suggest that apart from those invaders who penetrated into the province from the south by way of the Loire, the bulk of the settlers in Normandy would be Danes. Certainly the Great Army which occupied

the English Danelaw established in that district a population which was predominantly Danish,²³ and, equally certainly, the same Great Army conducted its operations indiscriminately on both sides of the Channel.²⁴ In a similar sense, the place-names of Normandy have been held to indicate 'a strong East Scandinavian element in the Norman settlement'.²⁵ Nevertheless, the question should not yet be regarded as finally settled. The Frankish evidence from the *Lament for William Longsword* when brought into juxtaposition with the testimony of Ari the Learned, and with later Scandinavian tradition, indicates that Rollo, the first of the Norman dukes, was himself of Norwegian stock,²⁶ and even the place-name evidence does not seem to be wholly unequivocal.²⁷ Doubtless, a final solution to this problem will not be obtained until the place-names in the earliest Norman charters have been subjected to exhaustive analysis. In the meantime, however, it has been assumed, and perhaps with justice, that the bulk of the Viking settlers were Danish but that men from Norway were intermingled among them in a proportion not yet known.

Some new evidence may, however, be cited as to the manner in which the Viking dynasty was established in the province. Dudo's account of Rollo has now been shown to be completely unreliable,²⁸ and scholars have therefore been constrained to depend upon Flodoard of Rheims as the main source of his career. According to Flodoard, the agreement between Rollo and Charles the Simple (traditionally associated with the village of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte) took place immediately after the defeat of the Viking chief at Chartres on 20 July 911;²⁹ and, in this, Flodoard is in some measure confirmed by a dated charter of Charles the Simple³⁰ which indicates that these arrangements had already taken effect before 918. But Flodoard also states (against the testimony of Dudo) that the conquest of Normandy was a gradual process. Rollo, he asserts, entered Normandy not from the sea but from the landward side; his first acquisition, given him in return for his baptism and by the agreement on the Epte, was a territory comprising the neighbourhood of Rouen together with certain districts on the sea coast pertaining to the city. Not until 924, by agreement with King Rudolf, was Rollo's power extended to the Bessin and Maine; and not until 933, that is to say after Rollo's death, were the Cotentin and the Avranchin acquired by William Longsword, his son.³¹

Now, Flodoard was not a contemporary witness of the events

he here describes, and he lived some distance away from the region where they occurred. Consequently, it is of crucial importance that his account can in large measure be confirmed by the testimony of early Norman charters. Thus, a charter of Richard II³² for St. Ouen enumerates a number of estates,³³ alleging that these were given to that church by Rollo, and the great majority of these can now be confidently identified as lying within twelve miles of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte, being all situate together in the modern canton of Écos.³⁴ Similarly, the benefactions alleged to have been made by William Longsword to the same monastery^{34a} may be discerned in a cluster of adjacent villages lying immediately across the Seine from Écos;³⁵ and a group of early charters further shows that William's step-son, Count Rodulf, likewise held extensive estates in the same district or its immediate neighbourhood.³⁶ Again, an agreement made in 1012 between the abbots of Bourgueil and Jumièges³⁷ reveals that William Longsword, after his marriage with Liutgarde, endowed his wife with large estates in the adjoining neighbourhood of Vernon.³⁸ Finally, another charter of Richard II, this time for Jumièges,³⁹ displays this same William Longsword as possessed of a compact block of estates on the banks of the lower Seine in the vicinity of Rouen.⁴⁰ In short, the evidence of the charters indicates that the earliest possessions of the ducal house were in the neighbourhood of Rouen, and more particularly in the region formed by the angle of the Seine and the Epte—precisely, that is to say, in the district which, according to the chroniclers of Rheims, was first acquired by Rollo.

The most ancient muniments of Jumièges and St. Ouen thus suggest that the original demesne of the Norman dukes was confined to an area bounded by the Epte, the Vire, and the sea, and that it was concentrated in the small district lying on both sides of the Seine between Les Andelys and Vernon, stretching to the west nearly as far as Évreux, and to the east along the Epte towards St. Clair. Correspondingly, the charters of Le Mont Saint-Michel indicate the manner in which this demesne was extended. A charter of Richard II⁴¹ restored to that monastery a group of estates which it asserts had originally been granted to the monastery by William Longsword but of which the monastery had subsequently been deprived. These too can now be placed in a number of contiguous villages⁴² which, in this case, all lie within a very few miles of Pontorson; and they must surely represent the acquisitions made by the son of Rollo on the Breton frontier during the successful campaigns

which, according to Flodoard, were carried out in that district in 933.⁴³ Whether or not this warfare was connected with the alleged rebellion of 'Riulf'⁴⁴ which is stated to have occurred in Lower Normandy about this time must remain doubtful, but it is significant that while William of Jumièges asserts that 'Riulf' was finally defeated at a battle just outside Rouen,⁴⁵ a charter of Duke Robert I mentions Amfreville-la-Mivoie (some four miles from the city) as being among the places which 'William the Count' gave to Rouen cathedral when 'he returned as victor over his conquered enemies'.⁴⁶

The early history of the Norman dynasty illustrates at once the strength of the Viking traditions which it inherited and the manner in which these were modified after its establishment in Gaul. Rollo remained the Viking after his baptism. In 925, according to Flodoard,⁴⁷ 'the Normans of the Seine' broke the treaty and ravaged the territory of Beauvais and Amiens, penetrating as far as Noyon, and in 942, after the murder of William Longsword, the whole of the province was given over to strife between rival Viking hands. During the early years of the reign of Richard I the chief supporter of settled order in the province was thus not the young Duke but Louis d'Outre-Mer, who overthrew the pagan Sihtric in 942 and himself suffered defeat at the hands of Harold in 945.⁴⁸ Sixteen years later, a veritable crisis developed when Richard called on Scandinavian support against Lothair, and once again a Viking power established on the Seine was seen to challenge the stability of Gaul by carrying destruction over the Breton march and southwards from Rouen towards Chartres. The terrible Norman war of 961-5⁴⁹ reproduced many of the worst conditions of the ninth century, and the settlement which marked its close was a cardinal event in the history of Normandy. The pact made between Richard and Lothair at Gisors in 965⁵⁰ was scarcely less important than the similar agreement of 911.

From this time forward the position of the Viking dynasty in Gaul began more rapidly to change, but none the less for more than a half a century after the pact of Gisors Normandy continued to receive settlers from the Baltic lands, and the Scandinavian affinities of the province remained strong. Towards the close of the tenth century, Viking raiders of England appear to have received much hospitality and assistance in the Norman ports, and the intervention of Pope John XV in the ensuing dispute between Ethelred and Richard seems to have been inspired by a fear that the ruler of Normandy might once again associate

himself with a Viking attack upon western Christendom. The treaty effected at Rouen in March 991⁵¹ in the presence of the papal envoy, the bishop of Sherborne, and two English thegns thus illustrates the equivocal position occupied by the Norman dynasty at the time. Nor was it permanent in its results. Not without cause did Richer of Rheims⁵² as late as 996 refer to the ruler of Normandy as *pyratarum dux*. A Norman tradition which has some claims to credence refers to an unsuccessful English attack upon the Cotentin in 1000, and if this in fact occurred it was probably a cutting-out expedition designed to inflict punishment upon a Viking fleet which had recently raided England and which was refitting in Norman harbours.⁵³ The famous marriage between Ethelred and Emma in 1002 was probably itself not unconnected with these events. It marked a new attempt to cement an alliance between the English king and the Norman duke, and by this means to detach the ruler of the Viking province from further co-operation with the Viking raiders of western Europe.

Doubtless there is in this respect a personal contrast to be drawn between Richard I, who had been brought up in an atmosphere charged with pagan memories from the Viking past, and Richard II, who was later alleged to have transformed his realm into a *patria Christi*.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, even Richard II seems in this matter to have earned somewhat easily his traditional title of 'the Good'. Both Burgundian and Flemish annalists noted the special barbarity of his troops in 1005 and 1006, and attributed this to their Viking affinities,⁵⁵ and eight years later Richard II actually followed the fell example of his father by summoning pagan allies from Scandinavia to assist him in his wars in Gaul.⁵⁶ In 1013-14, during the same months when Sweyn Forkbeard was assaulting England, Olaf and Lacman were ravaging northern Gaul at the invitation of the Norman duke. Laden with booty from the sack of Dol they at length reached Rouen, where Richard received them with honour.⁵⁶ The French king was clearly apprehensive that the conditions of the Norman war were again to be repeated, and the assembly of Gaulish notables which he convoked at Coudres was a measure of his concern.⁵⁷ The danger was averted when Richard, perhaps by bribery, divested himself of his Viking allies, and the conversion of Olaf may have seemed to blunt the significance of the crisis. Nevertheless, in considering the formation of medieval Normandy, it deserves some emphasis that, within twenty years of the birth of William the Conqueror,

a Norman duke welcomed in his capital a pagan army from Scandinavia which had recently spread devastation over a considerable part of north-western France.

It is only in the light of such considerations that can be appreciated the developing relations during this period between the Viking dynasty and the ruling houses of Gaul.⁵⁸ The original concession to Rollo had undoubtedly been made under conditions. Charles's own diploma states that the grant had been made *pro tutela regni*,⁵⁹ and Flodoard three times speaks apparently of formal commendation.⁶⁰ The practical obligations of vassalage were, it is true, often ignored by Rollo and his immediate successors, but the claim undoubtedly remained and sometimes it was acknowledged. The solemn reception of Louis d'Outre-Mer by William Longsword at Rouen in 942⁶¹ was probably a recognition of this relationship and the subsequent murder of the duke was not unconnected with it.⁶² The famous story of the abduction of the young Duke Richard⁶³ cannot be substantiated by reliable evidence, but it may well represent the assertion by an overlord of his undoubted right to bring up the infant son of a defunct vassal at his own court.⁶⁴ What, in fact, is most interesting about this vassalage is not the fact that it was always claimed and sometimes admitted, but that during the earlier half of the tenth century it was transferred from one overlord to another, so that the Capets gained what the Carolingians had lost. Robert the Strong was probably sponsor to Rollo at his baptism,⁶⁵ and Hugh the Great was regarded as *princeps* over Normandy.⁶⁶ As early as 942 groups of Norman notables were commending themselves to Hugh, and during the minority of Richard I he invaded Normandy in their interests and his own.⁶⁷ Hugh Capet in his turn concerned himself directly with Norman affairs and in 960 Richard married his sister.⁶⁸ It was therefore a part of Hugh's policy to observe during the Norman war a studied neutrality in the struggle between Richard and his Carolingian overlord, and here again the events of 965 would seem to have been of capital importance. Their significance in this respect may indeed be aptly illustrated in two charters of the period. When in 966 Lothair confirmed by charter⁶⁹ the restoration of the monastery of Le Mont Saint-Michel, he described the Norman duke as *marchisus* and not, as might have been expected, as *fidelis*, but in 968, when Richard himself bestowed Berneval upon St. Denis, he stated as necessary to the validity of his gift the assent of *senioris mei Hugonis Francorum principis*.⁷⁰ It is

impossible to escape the conclusion that the transference of allegiance had taken place.

The importance of the change was soon to be exemplified. Only twenty-two years separated the pact of Gisors from the coronation of Hugh Capet as king, and although Norman support was not essential to the Capetian triumph it undoubtedly contributed thereto. Just after the coronation of Hugh, Richard took action on his behalf against the Count of Vermandois;⁷¹ and between King Robert I and Duke Richard II the association was yet closer. In 1005 the duke assisted the king in the siege of Auxerre, and in the next year they kept the Feast of the Ascension together at Fécamp.⁷² In 1017 Richard was present at the coronation of the young King Henry, marking the occasion with the gift of a silver cup,⁷³ and in 1023 he acted on behalf of the king in the matter of the succession of the county of Champagne.⁷⁴ In January 1024 he once again welcomed the king with honour at Rouen.⁷⁵

In view of subsequent controversies these events deserve record, for there can be little doubt of the quality of the relationship they reveal. Norman chroniclers were later to explain them as indicating an alliance between equals, but the facts seem decisive against such an interpretation. After 965 the allegiance of the ducal dynasty was transferred from the Carolingians to the Capets. After 987 the French king regarded the Norman duke as his vassal and on many occasions Richard II discharged the duties which such vassalage entailed. The relationship so frequently exhibited during his reign was in fact after its close to be a decisive factor in the survival of both the dynasties concerned. In 1031 the young King Henry, flying from the wrath of his mother Constance, took refuge at Rouen and, calling on his Norman vassal for support, was enabled thereby to regain his inheritance.⁷⁶ In 1047 it was the intervention of King Henry which alone secured the defeat of the Norman rebels at Val-ès-Dunes. During the nineteen years which separated Val-ès-Dunes from Hastings, Duke William II was enabled to acquire in practice a new independence from his French overlord, but the position he then achieved would never have been attained if between 965 and 1047 Normandy had not become an integral part of the political system of Gaul.

The history of the ducal dynasty might thus in some sense be taken to symbolize the gradual transformation of the Viking province. The character of medieval Normandy was, however, moulded more fundamentally by two other distinct though

related developments: the one involving an ecclesiastical revival, and the other the establishment of a new aristocracy. The baptism of Rollo was to prove the most important feature of the arrangements of 911, and his establishment in Rouen associated his fortunes to some extent with those of the ecclesiastical capital of the province. Many of the benefactions he is alleged to have made to the Church in 911 were certainly fictitious, since they concerned estates which at that time were not yet in his possession. But it is likely that some concessions to the Church were extracted from the newly converted Viking, and the record in later charters of his gifts to St. Ouen⁷⁷ and St. Denis⁷⁸ may represent the truth. The reputation of his son as a friend to the Church rests, however, upon surer foundations. It seems incredible that the charters of no less than three religious houses—St. Ouen, Jumièges, Le Mont Saint-Michel⁷⁹—should ascribe to William Longsword gifts whose location conforms so closely to the political history of the reign unless some at least of those benefactions had been made. The evidence of the charters also lends some support to later legends⁸⁰ associating this duke in an especial manner with Jumièges. Certain monks of the original community returned to Jumièges during his reign,⁸¹ and in addition the Duke established in this house twelve monks from the abbey of St. Cyprien of Poitou who had been sent to Normandy by his sister the wife of Count William Towhead.⁸² It is perhaps indicative of the changing character of the Viking province that when in 932 the monks of Rebais fled from the ravages of the Hungarians, it was to Normandy that they turned, taking refuge at Marcilly near Évreux, where they deposited their relics.⁸³

The progress reflected in such events might, however, easily be exaggerated. It deserves the fullest emphasis that the Latinization of Normandy under ecclesiastical influence was accomplished in face of the stubborn resistance of an alien culture. It is not impossible that Rollo renounced Christianity before his death,⁸⁴ and it is certain that a pagan reaction swept through the province after the murder of his son in 942.⁸⁵ The ecclesiastical development of Normandy was so remarkable that it is easy to misconceive the hazardous nature of its early stages. In the earlier half of the tenth century the flourishing ecclesiastical life which had formerly distinguished the province of Rouen was all but destroyed. The sees had disintegrated and the monasteries were destroyed. The surviving lists of Norman bishops show gaps at this period which are significant, and

five successive bishops of Coutances in the tenth century were resident at Rouen.⁸⁶ The monastic collapse was even more notable. The houses were desolate, the congregations dispersed. Some maintained a precarious existence by migration, but more often the desolation of the site of a monastery entailed the extinction of the community, and in the third decade of the tenth century it is probable that not a single monastery remained in the Norman land. Such ruin was not rapidly to be repaired, and the political chaos which marked the early years of Richard I was fatal to an ecclesiastical revival. Not until after the treaty of 965 could any effective action be taken, but then its consequences were immediate. The treaty between Lothair and Richard was followed at once by the king's charter confirming Richard's restoration of Le Mont Saint-Michel,⁸⁷ and the pact of Gisors may be said to mark an epoch in the growth of the Norman Church even as it marks a period in the development of the Norman State.

The importance of the latter part of the reign of Richard I in the history of the Norman church has perhaps been unduly minimized. The duke's own interest in Le Mont St.-Michel is well attested, and a detailed schedule of his gifts to St. Taurin of Évreux is preserved in both the cartularies of that house.⁸⁸ Charters of Richard II, likewise, display his father as a benefactor of St. Ouen and Jumièges,⁸⁹ and the former monastery apparently experienced a revival about this time. More important, however, were the relations developed during the latter part of the tenth century between Normandy and movements of reform outside the province. In particular, the fortunes of the dispersed congregation of Fontanelles, which took the community first to Boulogne and then in 944 to Ghent, supplied a link between the Viking province and the revival associated with St. Gérard de Broigne. For in 961 there departed from Ghent to Normandy a party of monks belonging to this congregation under the leadership of one of Gérard's disciples named Mainard who obtained from Richard I the ancient site of Fontanelles on which to re-establish a monastery to be dedicated to St. Wandrille.⁹⁰ Mainard's own sojourn at Fontanelles was short, for in 966 Richard transferred him to Le Mont Saint-Michel where he remained for twenty-five years.⁹¹ Throughout he worked in close co-operation with the duke, and his influence was pervasive. His career would repay a closer study.⁹² The effects of the Flemish ecclesiastical revival on the English Church in the age of Dunstan and Ethelwold have been well established.⁹³

Its influence on the contemporary Norman Church is less generally appreciated.

The dominant external influence on the Norman Church before the Norman Conquest was, however, derived not from Flanders but from Cluny, or at least from the movement which, starting at Cluny, achieved new life at centres such as Dijon and its spiritual descendants.⁹⁴ The Cluniac ascendancy in Normandy may, moreover, be regarded as characteristic not of the reign of Richard I but of Richard II. It is true that Richard I, after rebuilding the church at Fécamp and establishing thereat a community of secular canons, applied to St. Maieul for monks to replace them,⁹⁵ but the appeal was unsuccessful, and though Richard I's charter to Fécamp⁹⁶ in its present form contains a clause indicative of the Cluniac exemption, this is usually to-day regarded by scholars as a later interpolation.⁹⁷ On the other hand, William of Dijon is known to have arrived in Normandy in 1001,⁹⁸ and in 1006 the Cluniac exemption appears unmistakably in two charters given to Fécamp respectively by Duke Richard II and King Robert I.⁹⁹ Later this exemption was repeated and extended¹⁰⁰ by Duke Robert I in his charters to Cerisy-la-Forêt¹⁰¹ and Montivilliers.¹⁰² During this period, in fact, the revival of the Norman Church may be said to have been dominated by Cluniac ideas. At first the centre of the movement was undoubtedly Fécamp, and its most prominent figures William of Dijon and his successor Abbot John. But William's influence¹⁰³ fortified by his personal prestige permeated through the province. He is alleged to have introduced reforms at St. Ouen and Jumièges, and according to Robert of Torigny he also had Le Mont Saint-Michel *sub regimine suo*.¹⁰⁴ His interpretation of the Cluniac life as embodied in the customs of Fruttuaria in Italy¹⁰⁵ was doubtless applied to the monasteries in Normandy which he controlled, and it is noteworthy that, whereas Cluniac monasticism developed in conscious independence of episcopal control, so also was the revival of the Norman Church in the earlier half of the eleventh century not episcopal but monastic.

Only slowly was the Norman episcopate to be re-established, and its members for long continued to be representative not of the reforming movement so much as of the lay aristocracy from which they were drawn. Between 990 and 1054 the archiepiscopal see of Rouen was held by two sons of Norman dukes, and Herbert, who was bishop of Lisieux at least from 1025, was alleged to be *Normannorum ducum propinquus*. After 1015 the

bishopric of Bayeux was occupied first by a son of Count Rodulf, and then by Odo, half-brother of the Conqueror, whilst William, bishop of Évreux from 1050 to 1066, was a son of Gérard Flaitel.¹⁰⁶ It would, of course, be wrong to minimize the ability of many of the prelates drawn from this class. Ivo, bishop of Seez from 1035, who was head of the great house of Bellesme,¹⁰⁷ was a notable bishop; Hugh, bishop of Lisieux, son of Count William of Eu, was a prelate of good repute; and Geoffrey Mowbray, bishop of Coutances, despite his secular activities reorganized his diocese and left a great cathedral as his memorial.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, these men are to be regarded as outstanding members of a company which sustained an older ecclesiastical tradition and they were out of touch with Leonine policy. Before the appointment of Maurilius as archbishop of Rouen in 1055, it would be hard to find a member of the Norman episcopate as pledged to the reforms, and the Norman bishops who brought the reforms to England had for the most part been trained in Norman monasteries.

It was through the agency of the reformed monasteries that the Norman Church was revived, and the rapid growth of monastic life in Normandy during the earlier half of the eleventh century is in every way remarkable. Before 1030 no Norman monastery was founded except by the ducal house, but afterwards the Norman magnates played a large part in the endowment of new houses. The initial inspiration of this astonishing growth undoubtedly came from outside the province, but Norman monasticism, once re-established, none the less speedily developed within the Cluniac framework its own special features. Thus, although the great abbots of Cluny were always the unflinching opponents of lay control, William of Dijon relied on ducal support scarcely less than Mainard had done before him. The weakness of the Papacy between May 1003 and 1009 probably explains¹⁰⁹ why the Pope was apparently not consulted about the exemption of Fécamp in 1006, but Benedict VIII was 'an able and vigorous pontiff',¹¹⁰ and if his bull of 1016 respecting Fécamp is genuine,¹¹¹ it is significant that it speaks of that monastery as a ducal church, and is addressed not to the abbot but to the duke. The integration of the Norman monasteries into the feudal structure of the province was the work of the Conqueror and its importance has been properly emphasized by scholars.¹¹² But the conditions which made this possible had been formed at an earlier date. The part played by previous dukes, by Richard I, and more particularly by

Richard II, in the revival of Norman monasticism was not without its influence in promoting that co-operation between the secular and ecclesiastical powers which was so marked a feature of the Norman settlement of England. The revived Norman monasticism of the early eleventh century was not only Cluniac in spirit; it was also ducal in direction. The work of William of Dijon has here some links with that of Lanfranc.

In other ways also did Norman monasticism, while drawing its main inspiration from Cluniac circles, preserve its own special qualities.¹¹³ Its loose organization allowed for wide variations of type. The earlier impetus from Ghent represented in the monastery of St. Wandrille was doubtless to some extent preserved in the daughter houses of Préaux and Grestain, whilst elsewhere the personal influence of William of Dijon survived in the monasteries he restored. Perhaps for this reason the ascetic and ritualistic spirit which came later to inform Cluniac practice was much modified in Normandy, and the four great ultramontanes who in turn dominated Norman monasticism—William of Dijon, John of Fécamp, Lanfranc, and Anselm—were all men who possessed a devoted interest in the things of the mind. It would, of course, be easy to judge the cultural consequence of Norman monasticism too exclusively by reference to its most distinguished community, and one which was not itself a Cluniac foundation. The outstanding achievement of Le Bec-Hellouin offers at once an explanation and the gauge of the influence of the Norman Church. But its brilliance must not obscure the work performed in other religious houses. From the start the revived monasticism exercised an educative and a cultural influence which was a cardinal factor in the rise of Normandy.

Scarcely less significant to the formation of medieval Normandy than the new monasticism was the establishment in the province of a new aristocracy, and the evidence which illustrates the history of particular families leaves little doubt as to the period when this new nobility arose. The pedigrees which Robert of Torigny added to the eighth book of William of Jumièges¹¹⁴ are certainly inaccurate in many of their details, but they indicate that the advancement of the kindred of the Duchess Gunnor was a factor in the rise of many Norman houses, and the charters likewise place the origin of these and other families in or after the reign of Duke Richard II. Thus the family of Tosny might in the twelfth century claim to be descended from an uncle of Rollo,¹¹⁵ but the earliest member of

this house whose existence is warranted by sound testimony is Ralf I of Tosny, who in 1013 or 1014 was entrusted with the defence of Tillières and who was probably the original grantee of Tosny itself.¹¹⁶ It is seldom, indeed, that a Norman family can be traced back earlier than this, and rare indeed that a territorial appellation can be found descendible in the manner of a surname during the earlier half of the eleventh century. The earliest known ancestor of the family of Montfort-sur-Risle is Thurstan of Bastembourg, who shortly before 1025 gave land at Pont Authou on the Risle, four miles from Montfort; his son Hugh I of Montfort perished in private war about 1040; and it was his grandson Hugh II who brought the fortunes of the family to England.¹¹⁷ The father of Gilbert of Auffay who was probably present at Hastings was Richard, who took his name from Hugleville,¹¹⁸ and Hugh de Grandmesnil, the Domesday tenant, belonged but to the third recorded generation of the house so styled. In western Normandy the house of Saint Sauveur, hereditary *vicomtes* of the Cotentin, may be referred to Néel who witnessed charters about 1020-5.¹¹⁹ The hereditary *vicomtes* of the Avranchin, later to become Earls of Chester of the first line, can be traced no farther than Thurstan Goz, who appears in the period 1017-25;¹²⁰ while the first recorded ancestor of the hereditary *vicomtes* of the Bessin, later Earls of Chester of the second line, is Anschetil, whose earliest attestation may probably be placed in the years 1015-22.¹²¹ These examples have been selected deliberately from among the most illustrious houses of feudal Normandy. The story which they reveal is clear. The Norman nobility which was to give a new aristocracy to England did not arise before the first quarter of the eleventh century.

The manner in which the great families of medieval Normandy acquired their land can only be sparsely illustrated. The extensive possessions of the ducal house at an early date are only partially defined in the surviving charters, and it is rare that the process can be elucidated whereby the feudal lords of a subsequent period became possessed of some of them. A certain precision may, however, sometimes be achieved. Thus among the estates given by Richard II to his first wife, Judith, was a large block of territory in the Lieuvin.¹²² After her death most of this went to the abbey of Bernay, but among the manors not so bestowed were Ferrières-Saint-Hilaire and Chambrais, and these were to form the endowment of a notable family. Walkelin de Ferrières was clearly established at that place before

his death in 1040, and Chambrais probably came into the possession of the family about this time.¹²³ The more famous case of Beaumont is in this respect particularly eloquent. Both Vieilles and Beaumont on the Risle had likewise belonged to the Duchess Judith, and in due course they passed to the abbey of Bernay, which still held them in 1025.¹²⁴ But in or before 1035 Humfrey, styled of Vieilles, obtained them from Ralf *custos* of Bernay, and his son Roger de Beaumont built his castle on the adjoining hill.¹²⁵

There can be no doubt that this new nobility was further enriched by lands which had previously been possessed by the Church. An interesting record,¹²⁶ which provides one of the rare illustrations of the diocese of Rouen in the time of Archbishop Hugh I, shows that already in his time lands were being alienated at Douvrend and in the neighbourhood of Envermeu. Similarly, when Ralf I of Tosny went to Apulia about 1015, he was already known by his chief possession in Normandy, but Tosny had previously belonged to Rouen cathedral.¹²⁷ Duke Richard II was likewise constrained specifically to restore to the abbey of Le Mont Saint-Michel estates which had been taken from the abbey by the first known count of Mortain,¹²⁸ and shortly after 1026 the family of Montgomery, which can be traced no farther than this period, acquired from the abbeys of Jumièges and Fécamp lands which a short time before had actually been confirmed to these monasteries by specific ducal grants.¹²⁹ Such transactions must clearly be regarded as representative, for knowledge of them depends on the chance survival of texts. It should, moreover, be noted that ecclesiastical alienations naturally figure with undue prominence in the documents, and that the transference of lay lands must have been at least as extensive. Only because the abbey of St. Taurin was apparently interested in the property can any conjecture be made as to the manner in which Meules, which seems to have been part of the demesne of Richard the Fearless, passed into the hands of Gilbert of Brionne, the count, to supply at last a territorial name for the first Norman Sheriff of Exeter.¹³⁰

The establishment in Normandy during the earlier half of the eleventh century of many of the families which were later to dominate the feudal province contributed also to the advancement of their dependants. The rise of the Harcourts cannot have been unconnected with the prosperity of the related family of Beaumont.¹³¹ Again, as tenants in England of Richard Fitz-Gilbert who succeeded his father, the count, about 1040, can

be found men who took their names from Abenon and La Cressonnière, both of which are in the neighbourhood of Orbec, the *caput* of Richard's Norman barony.¹³² Similarly, later tenants of the counts of Eu in Sussex bore names denoting their original provenance at Normanville and Mesnières, in whose neighbourhood the Counts of Eu had an ancient interest.¹³³ Express testimony that these families arose with the houses that supplied their later feudal overlords is, however, lacking, but occasionally the earlier association can be precisely shown. The connexion between Pantulf and Montgomery, which in 1086 was strikingly exhibited in Shropshire,¹³⁴ must be referred to the time of Roger I of Montgomery, who between 1027 and 1035 issued for the abbey of Jumièges a charter which is subscribed with the sign of *Willelmi Pantulf*.¹³⁵ Equally significant is the connexion between Tosny and Clères. The latter were the feudal under-tenants of the former from shortly before the Conquest until the last quarter of the twelfth century.¹³⁶ But the association between the two families can be traced to a yet earlier date. About 1040 two notable acts of violence were committed: Roger I of Tosny was killed by Roger of Beaumont,¹³⁷ and shortly afterwards Robert of Beaumont, Roger's brother, was assassinated by Roger I of Clères.¹³⁸ In the light of subsequent family history it is hard not to see in the latter act the revenge of a vassal for the murder of his overlord.

These early connexions between Norman families are challenging, but it would be wrong to deduce from them a conclusion that during the earlier half of the eleventh century the structure of Norman society had as yet been made to conform with any rigidity to an ordered feudal plan. In the absence of any cataclysm comparable to the Conquest the introduction of feudal practices was a more gradual process in the duchy than in the kingdom, and all the evidence suggests that it took place sporadically and by degrees. It would be difficult to define the obligations of a canon of St. Quentin who in 1015 was the *fidelis* of a Norman duke,¹³⁹ and the status of those *milites* of Arfast, father of Osbern the Steward, who in a deed of 1022-4 are named *cum beneficiis suis*, would be hard to appraise.¹⁴⁰ Nor has any reference to a relief apparently been found earlier than in a charter a few years anterior to the Conquest.¹⁴¹ Still more rash would it be to assume that in the time of Richard II and Robert I the new aristocracy had in any general sense been made to regard their position as dependent upon ducal grant. The newly established Norman lords in this period set up their

own military tenants for their own purposes. They desired to sustain a position which had recently been won by the sword.

There is therefore little indication among them that they held their lands conditionally upon their performing military service for the duke. No ruler able to exact a *servitium debitum* of knights from all his magnates would, like Duke Robert I, have allowed so many of them to depart with their followers to distant lands. The civil war which broke out on the death of Duke Richard II, and the anarchy which debauched Normandy from 1035 to 1047, also contributed to the failure of the ducal dynasty to co-ordinate the feudal development of the province to serve its own interests, and Duke William II had to crush not less than four revolts between 1047 and 1053.¹⁴² The persistence of private war as a recognized institution in Normandy must, moreover, have encouraged subinfeudation in excess of the requirements of the duke, and it is in itself evidence of the manner in which the feudal organization of the province developed gradually at the will of an aristocracy and not suddenly as in England by the administrative policy of a prince. If by 1066 Normandy had become a feudal—and, to some degree, a centralized—state, this was due primarily to the work of Duke William II during the previous fifteen years—and it was one of his greatest achievements. Even so, it is significant that the *servitia debita* remained lighter in the duchy than in the kingdom, and that before the Conquest they were apparently imposed with greater uniformity upon the Church than upon the lay magnates.

The establishment of a new nobility in Normandy was the most significant feature of the reigns of Richard II and Robert I; and its appearance sharply distinguishes the social structure of the province in the eleventh century from what it had been in the tenth. The men who then first arose to greatness were as yet unorganized in any rigid feudal scheme, but together with their successors and their dependants they were to supply the ruling class of feudal Normandy. Knit together by kinship, strong in their newly won possessions, they speedily advanced to dominance. They were stained with the worst vices of a violent age, but many of them learnt early that political sagacity which won for them the admiring panegyric of William of Poitiers.¹⁴³ Unamenable to control, they yet contrived to co-operate in some measure with their dukes. Secular and rapacious in their habits, they came at last in some degree to foster and to govern the Norman Church. The superabundant virility which was

apparent in their private lives brought them to supremacy within their own province and enabled them to carry its influence beyond the sea. They claimed the future for their inheritance, and henceforward the history of Normandy was to be essentially a record of their acts.

The dominant theme in early Norman history is the modification of a Scandinavian inheritance through the consolidation of a dynasty, the revival of a Church, and the formation of an aristocracy, and the greatest period of Norman achievement began when these three movements, which were never unrelated, were fused together by a great constructive genius to provide the overmastering energy of a province unique in Christendom. It is no part of my present purpose to attempt any new estimate of the career of William the Conqueror, but the evidence here considered suggests that his achievement would never have been possible apart from the previous development of the province which he ruled. Further study of early Norman charters will doubtless in time illuminate further the details of that growth, but already it appears to fall chronologically into three main divisions, divided roughly by the dates 965 and 1047. Before the pact of Gisors the Scandinavian affinities of Normandy, though weakening, were still dominant. After the battle of Val-ès-Dunes the stage was set for the work of the greatest of the Norman dukes. Between 965 and 1047 was, however, the formative period of Norman development, and every fresh study serves further to emphasize the critical importance of the reign of Duke Richard II. If, therefore, this afternoon I have ventured to transport a modern audience to a French province in an obscure age, I am not without my apology. The transformation of the Normandy of Rollo into the state which confronted England in 1066 is one of the most remarkable in history, and it presents to any student of historical causation a problem of the first magnitude. The complexities of Norman history in the tenth and eleventh centuries may doubtless be relegated to esoteric investigation, but the consequences of the rise of Normandy which then occurred are still alive among us to-day.

NOTES

1. A partial synthesis is contained in J. C. H. R. Steenstrup, *Normandiets Historie under de syv første hertuger* (1925), but the importance of this interesting book is diminished by the learned author's refusal to take account of the criticism of Norman sources, and particularly of Dudo, which has been made since the publication of his *Normannerne* in 1876-82.
2. Cf. *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xi. 733.
3. In connexion with this lecture I wish very gratefully to record my debt to the late Mr. L. C. Loyd.
4. 'You may abandon the history of Normandy if you choose', wrote Palgrave (*Collected Works*, ii. 500), 'but if you accept the task you must accept Dudo or let the work alone.' The erudite attempt of Jules Lair, in his edition of Dudo published in 1865, to rehabilitate this chronicler may, however, be said to have failed, despite the support it received from Steenstrup. A comprehensive appraisal of recent criticism of Dudo is contained in H. Prentout, *Étude critique sur Dudon de Saint-Quentin* (1916).
5. Published by the Société de l'Histoire de Normandie in 1914. See review by C. H. Haskins in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xxxi (1916), 150.
6. Printed by F. Pommeraye in his *Histoire de l'abbaye royale de Saint Ouen* (1662), p. 404.
7. J. J. Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges* (1916), i. 30, no. xii.
8. One of these (Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* ix. 731) was issued in 968 in favour of Saint-Denis, and there is little doubt it was a product of Parisian initiative and Parisian workmanship. The other (J. F. Lemarignier, *Privilèges d'exemption* (1937), p. 291) was issued for Fécamp, apparently in 990, on the occasion of the consecration of the restored church in that place. A record of Richard I's benefactions to Saint-Taurin is printed in T. Bonnin, *Cartulaire de Louviers* (1870), i. 1, no. i.
9. A list of these is given in C. H. Haskins, *Norman Institutions* (1918), p. 59, note 291.
10. Printed in Achery, *Spicilegium* (1723), iii, col. 390. Cf. R. L. Poole, *Studies in Chronology and History* (1934), p. 17, and H. Hall in *Genealogist*, n.s. xvi. 140-52.
11. Cf. Haskins, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-4.
12. F. M. Stenton, 'The Scandinavian Colonies in England and Normandy' (*R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, 4th ser., xxvii (1945), 6).
13. C. Plummer, *Two Saxon Chronicles* (1892), p. 74; Dudo (ed. Lair), p. 171.
14. Will. Jum., Bk. v, chap. 2 (ed. Marx, pp. 73, 74). He adds that the revolt was not confined to one district of Normandy but involved the whole province.
15. Dudo (ed. Lair, pp. 171 and 182).
16. The charter is printed in Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus novus Anecdotorum* (1717), i, col. 145. Issued by the Duke in conjunction with his uncle, the archbishop of Rouen, it probably passed at the time of their reconciliation in or about 1030. The clause here to be examined is further discussed

- in A. Le Prévost, 'Anciennes divisions territoriales de la Normandie' (*Mém. Soc. Antiq. Norm.*, 2nd ser., i (1840), 49). Le Prévost quotes as his sources 'Neustria Christiana', which is an unpublished MS. of A. du Moustier, now in the Bibliothèque Nationale (see E. Frère, *Manuel de la Bibliographie normande* (1858), i. 399), and also a cartulary which seems to be that numbered 3255 in H. Stein, *Bibliographie des Cartulaires* (1907), p. 445, a MS. of the thirteenth-fourteenth century in the Municipal Library of Rouen.
17. *Oilliacus* is in the charter mentioned in connexion with *Leisia* and *Bolon*. The former must be Laize-la-ville (Calvados, arr. Caen, cant. Bourguébus): not only was this place in the patronage of Rouen cathedral, but it was in the diocese of Rouen (A. du Caumont, *Statistique monumentale du Calvados* (1846-67), ii. 173). The latter is clearly Boulon (arr. Falaise, cant. Bretteville-sur-Laize), three miles from Laize-la-ville. In the Hiémois there are two places called OUILLY: OUILLY-le-Tesson, nine miles south-east of Laize-la-ville; and OUILLY-le-Basset, eleven miles south of Laize-la-ville.
18. See Douglas, *Social Structure of Medieval East Anglia* (1927), pp. 30 sqq.; 'Fragments of an Anglo-Saxon survey from Bury St. Edmunds' (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* xliii (1928), 376); and the authorities there cited.
19. The possibility must even be considered that these holdings might perhaps not have involved ploughing. In the Middle Ages the vine was cultivated in the neighbourhood of OUILLY-le-Tesson, at Bretteville, and at Ussy, while the wine of Argences some ten miles to the north was, comparatively speaking, famous (L. Delisle, *Classe agricole*, ed. 1903, pp. 439, 440, 442).
20. Stenton, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
21. Cf. P. Lauer, *Louis d'Outre-Mer* (1900), pp. 100, 287-92.
22. Dudo (ed. Lair, p. 221); cf. Adémar of Chabannes (ed. J. Chavanon, 1897, p. 148).
23. F. M. Stenton, *Danes in England* (British Academy, 1927).
24. Cf., for example, *A.S. Chron.* 'A', s.a. 880, 881, with *Mirac. S. Bertin* (Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* ix. 118). See also the remarks of Fulk, archbishop of Rheims, writing in 886 (Bouquet, *op. cit.* viii. 156).
25. Stenton in *R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, 4th ser., xxvii. 9.
26. Douglas, 'Rollo of Normandy' (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* lvii (1942), 418-23).
27. Compare the examples given on pp. 8 and 9 of Professor Stenton's essay quoted above.
28. H. Howorth in *Archaeologia*, xlv (1880), 235-50; A. Bugge in *Historisk Tidsskrift* (1912), pp. 160 sqq.; Prentout, *op. cit.*, pp. 111 sqq.
29. Flodoard, *Annales*, ed. Lauer (1905), p. 16; *Hist. Rem. Eccl.* (Bouquet, *op. cit.* viii. 163), and cf. Douglas, *op. cit.*, pp. 426-9.
30. Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* ix. 536.
31. *Hist. Rem. Eccl.* (Bouquet, *op. cit.* viii. 163); *Annales* (ed. Lauer, pp. 24, 55).
32. Printed Pommeraye, *Hist. St. Ouen* (1662), p. 404.
33. 'Id est Uuadiniacum cum ecclesia et omnibus appenditiis suis videlicet Torsiacum, Cupim, Furcas, Maisnile quod dicitur Sanctus Remigius cum ecclesia; Debucin custe quintam partem; Bionval cum ecclesia; Milonis

maisnile; Rainolt cistem; villam quae dicitur Sancta Geneveva cum ecclesia; Falesiam Giuerniacium cum ecclesia; . . . Quae omnia atavus Rolphus praenominato loco partim restituit, partim et dedit sed propriis cartulis ad noticiam futurorum minime descripsit.'

34. I suggest the following identifications: Uuadiniacum—Gasny; Cupim—Coupigny; Furas—Fourges; Maisnile . . . S. Remigius—Bus St. Rémy; Bionval—Bionval; Milonis maisnile—Le Mesnil Milon; villam . . . S. Geneveva—Ste-Geneviève-lès-Gasny; Falesiam Giuerniacium—Givernay (which is backed by high limestone cliffs—*falaies*). All these are in the canton of Écos.
- 34a. 'Huic subnectimus cessioni quae etiam avi nostri Willermi industria simili modo absque cartarum notamine concessit: id est Balliolium cum ecclesia . . . ; Regionvillam cum ecclesia; Campum Mainardi; maisnil quod dicitur sancti Audoeni de Colmont; villam quae dicitur sancti Petri cum ecclesia; Turlevillam; Smitvillam; Batheller; ecclesiam in honore sanctae Mariae et terram cum insula quae dicitur Sancti Petri et aliis insulis et aquis usque ad medium Sequanae fluminis et usque ad medium vallis quae est sub castelliolo.'
35. I suggest the following identifications: Balliolium—St. Pierre-de-Bailleul (Eure, arr. Louviers, cant. Gaillon); Regionvillam—Réanville (Eure, arr. Les Andelys, cant. Vernon); villam . . . Sancti Petri—St. Pierre de la Garenne (Eure, arr. Louviers, cant. Gaillon). Turlevillam may possibly be Tourneville, about one mile from St. Pierre de la Garenne, and Batheller is perhaps Bailly, a hamlet close to Tourneville. The *insula quae dicitur Sancti Petri* is the Île St. Pierre which stretches upstream in the Seine from a point opposite Notre-Dame-de-la-Garenne (the *ecclesiam . . . sanctae Mariae* of the charter), and above it are four other islands in a line (*aliis insulis*). Finally, even the 'little castle' comes into the picture, for the lands here in question stretch into the middle of a valley ('ad medium vallis quae est sub castelliolo') dominated by the hill above Gaillon, where there originally existed the remains of a Gallo-Roman fort.
36. See Douglas, 'Ancestors of William fitz Osbern' (*Eng. Hist. Rev.* lix (1944) 68–70); 'The Earliest Norman Counts' (*ibid.* lxi (1946), 131, 132).
37. Printed J. J. Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i. 16–19, from the original. Vernier dates it '13 avril 1012—4 avril 1013', that is to say he reckons the year as beginning at Easter. The Indiction, Epact, and Concurrents are all those of 1012, and the statement that the year was bissextile points the same way. Clearly the year began at Christmas and the date is 1012.
38. The estate in question is described as 'terra in villa que dicitur Longavilla'. This is not, as might be supposed, Longueville near Dieppe. 'On appelait Longueville le territoire qui environnait Vernon', remarks Delisle (*Classe agricole*, p. 421). 'On l'a quelquefois pris pour le nom d'une paroisse ou d'un village; mais il désigne ordinairement tout un pays, dans lequel se trouvaient compris une partie de Vernon, Saint-Marcel, Saint-Just et Saint Pierre d'Autils.' Delisle cites charter evidence for each of his statements and there is no need to quote evidence in support of the opinions of such an authority. It may, however, be added that in Duke Richard II's charter of 1025 for Jumièges (J. J. Vernier, *op. cit.* i. 37) there is confirmation of this exchange: *In Longavilla dedimus Haltitz*. This

- identifies the land now in question as lying in Saint-Pierre-d'Autils (Eure, arr. Évreux, cant. Vernon) in the district of Longueville, and the identification is confirmed by the fact that the abbot of Jumièges presented to the church.
39. J. J. Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i. 30, no. xii.
 40. Among the places named as having been bestowed by William Longsword are Yainville, Le Trait, Saint-Paul, Duclair, and Épinay.
 41. *Cartulaire des Îles Normandes* (Soc. Jersiaise, 1924), p. 5, no. 3.
 42. Moidrey, Curey, Macey, Cormeray, Vergoncey. For these identifications see *Eng. Hist. Rev.* lxi (1946), 144.
 43. Flodoard, *Annales* (ed. Lauer, p. 55).
 44. The name may represent O. Norse *Hraithulfr*, or O. Swed. *Hrithulf*.
 45. Will. Jum., Bk. iii, chap. 2 (ed. Marx, p. 33). This is derived from Dudo (ed. Lair, p. 188).
 46. See Le Prévost, *Mémoires . . . sur Eure* (1862-9), ii. 520: 'in eodem comitatu Amfridi villam et Fredisvillam quas Willelmus comes dedit triumphatis hostibus victor rediens.' It is hard to see to what 'Count William' this could refer unless to William Longsword.
 47. *Annales* (ed. Lauer, p. 24).
 48. See P. Lauer, *Louis d'Outre-Mer* (1900), pp. 100, 287-92.
 49. F. Lot, *Les Derniers Carolingiens* (1891), pp. 346-57.
 50. Lot, op. cit., gives the date as 966. I prefer 965 for the reasons given in Prentout, *Étude sur Dudon*, App. iv, pp. 447-51.
 51. See F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (1943), pp. 370-1.
 52. Ed. Waitz (1877), p. 180.
 53. The story is found only in William of Jumièges (Bk. v, chap. 4, ed. Marx, pp. 76-7), and has therefore been treated with a proper scepticism. (Cf. E. A. Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, i (1870), 632; F. M. Stenton, op. cit., p. 374, apparently suspends judgement.) It should be noted, however, that *A.S. Chron.* 'E' (s.a. 1000, 1001) states that in 1000 a Viking fleet on leaving England went to Normandy, and that in the next year the coasts of England opposite to Normandy were ravaged. This to some extent helps to confirm William of Jumièges at this point.
 54. Will. Jum., Bk. v, chap. 1 (ed. Marx, p. 73).
 55. Compare the lurid account given by Rodulf Glaber (ed. Prou, p. 43) with that supplied by the *Gesta Episc. Cameracensium* (*Mon. Germ. Hist.* SS. vii. 464).
 - 55a. 'Translatio S. Maglorii', ed. Merlet (*Bibl. Éc. Chartes*, lvi. 247-8).
 56. Will. Jum., Bk. v, chap. 11 (ed. Marx, pp. 85, 86).
 57. *Ibid.*, Bk. v, chap. 12 (ed. Marx, p. 87). See also C. Pfister, *Robert le Pieux* (1885), pp. 214, 215.
 58. See Lot, *Fidèles ou Vassaux?* (1904), pp. 177-237, which in general is here followed in this matter as opposed to Flach, *Origines de l'ancienne France*, iv (1917), 111-72.
 59. Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* ix. 536.
 60. *Annales* (ed. Lauer, pp. 39, 55, 75).
 61. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

62. Richer (ed. Waitz (1877), p. 53).
63. Dudo (ed. Lair, p. 209).
64. During the two years which followed the murder of William Longsword, Louis d'Outre-Mer was in Rouen no less than five times, and on one occasion for a considerable period (cf. Lauer, *Louis d'Outre-Mer*, p. 131).
65. Dudo (ed. Lair, pp. 167, 168). Rollo's baptismal name was Robert.
66. 'princeps Francorum, Brittonum atque Nortmannorum' (*Annales Floriacenses* s.a. 956).
67. Flodoard, *Annales* (ed. Lauer, pp. 86, 87).
68. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
69. L. Halphen, *Rec. des actes de Lothaire et de Louis V* (1908), p. 53, no. xxiv.
70. Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* ix. 731.
71. Cf. Lot, *Derniers Carolingiens*, p. 215.
72. Will. Jum., Bk. v, chap. 15 (ed. Marx, pp. 93, 94); Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* x. 270 (a chronicle of Auxerre). King Robert's charter of 30 May 1006 is dated at Fécamp (*Gall. Christ.* xi, Instr. cols. 8-9).
73. See the *Vita Roberti regis* (Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* x. 106); cf. *Chron. of Auxerre* (*ibid.* x. 270).
74. The letter of Odo to King Robert (Bouquet, *op. cit.* x. 501) discusses the part played by Duke Richard in this famous affair. Duke Richard is there styled as *fidelis*.
75. *Gesta Episc. Cameracensium* (*Mon. Germ. Hist.* SS. vii. 462), confirmed by Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i. 25, no. x.
76. Will. Jum., Bk. vi, chap. 7 (ed. Marx, p. 105) confirmed by Lot, *Saint-Wandrille*, pp. 52-4, no. 13.
77. See above.
78. Duke Richard I's charter for St. Denis (Bouquet, *Rec. Hist. Franc.* ix. 731) alleges that a gift at Berneval to St. Denis was originally made by *avus meus Robertus nomine*. The reference is to Rollo by his baptismal name.
79. See above.
80. See especially the *Lament* printed with facsimiles and discussed in J. Lair, *Étude sur la vie et la mort de Guillaume Longue Épée* (1893).
81. Will. Jum., Bk. ii, chap. 7 (ed. Marx, p. 38) and cf. the authorities quoted by H. Prentout (*Étude*, pp. 30 sqq.).
82. Will. Jum., Bk. iii, chap. 8 (ed. Marx, p. 39), confirmed by Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i. 16-19, no. vii.
83. *Translatio B. Agili Resbaciensis*, cited by Aubrey of the Three Fountains (*Mon. Germ. Hist.* SS. xxiii. 762).
84. See Adémar of Chabannes, ed. J. Chavanon, pp. 139-40, and cf. p. 198.
85. Flodoard, *Annales* (ed. Lauer, p. 63).
86. *Gallia Christiana*, vol. xi *passim*; for Coutances, see *Gall. Christ.* xi. Instr. 217.
87. L. Halphen, *Rec. des actes de Lothaire et de Louis V*, p. 53, no. xxiv.
88. T. Bonnin, *Cartulaire de Louviers* (1870), i. 1, no. i.
89. F. Pommeraye, *Hist. St. Ouen*, p. 404; Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i, no. xii, at p. 35.

90. Lot, *Saint-Wandrille*, pp. xxxi-xxxvi, and authorities there cited.
91. *Gall. Christ.* xi, cols. 513-14.
92. A preliminary reference may here perhaps be usefully made to the 'Inventio et Miracula Sancti Wulfranni' which was apparently composed in the time of Duke William II, and which has recently been edited by Dom J. Laporte (*Soc. Hist. Norm. Mélanges*, 1938). This contains (pp. 28 sqq.) an account of Mainard and his influence.
93. Cf. A. Robinson, *Times of St. Dunstan* (1923), pp. 132 sqq.
94. Cf. D. Knowles, *Monastic Order in England* (1940), pp. 83-99.
95. 'Liber de Revelatione' (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, vol. 151, cols. 718, 719). Cf. H. Prentout, *Étude*, pp. 405, 406.
96. Printed J. F. Lemarignier, *Privilèges d'exemption* (1937), pp. 291-3.
97. C. H. Haskins, *Norman Institutions* (1918), pp. 252-3; Lemarignier, op. cit., pp. 50-6. Their opinion that the clause is an interpolation is doubtless correct, but the matter does not appear to me to have been finally settled. That the charter was in fact issued by Richard I and not by his son, as has been sometimes suggested, is shown by the subscription of *Radulfi fratris comitis*. This seems to be the half-brother of Richard the Fearless.
98. 'Chron. Fiscarnn.' (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, vol. 147, col. 480); 'Chron. S. Benign.' (ibid., vol. 141, col. 864).
99. C. H. Haskins, op. cit., pp. 253-5, with illustration; *Gall. Christ.* xi, Instr., cols. 8, 9. Facsimile of original in Lemarignier, op. cit.
100. The development of the exemption is discussed in Lemarignier, op. cit., pp. 32-64.
101. *Monasticon Anglicanum*, vi. 1073.
102. Lemarignier, op. cit., pp. 241-5.
103. On this see the remarkable article by Watkin Williams in *Downside Review*, lii (1934), 520-45.
104. 'Chron. S. Benign.' (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, vol. 141, col. 885).
105. See Watkin Williams, op. cit., pp. 537 sqq.
106. *Gall. Christ.* xi, cols. 26-30; 333-4; 571; 766.
107. G. H. White, *R. Hist. Soc. Trans.*, 4th ser., xxii. 81.
108. Cf. *Gall. Christ.* xi, col. 870.
109. Lemarignier (op. cit.), in stressing the absence of Papal action in respect of Fécamp in 1006, appears to me to take too little cognizance of conditions at Rome at this time. After the death of Sylvester II in May 1003 there succeeded to the Papacy first John XVII, who reigned only seven months, and then John XVIII, who survived until 1009. Both these popes seem to have been almost powerless and under the strict control of the counts of Tusculum; and their reigns are wrapped in great obscurity (R. L. Poole, *Studies in Chronology and History*, pp. 147, 155; cf. F. Gregorovius, *The City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, Eng. trans., vol. iv, pt. i, p. 7). Jaffé, *Reg. Pontif. Rom.*, gives no instrument under John XVII, and under John XVIII sixteen instruments of which six are for France. The absence in 1006 of a bull directed to a northern province is not surprising.
110. R. L. Poole, op. cit., p. 201.

111. Pflugk-Hartung, *Acta pontificum inedita* (1881), i. 10. Some doubts have, however, been expressed respecting the authenticity of this act.
112. Esp. C. H. Haskins, op. cit., chap. i.
113. D. Knowles, *Monastic Order*, pp. 87-99.
114. Will. Jum., ed. Marx, pp. 320-9, and cf. G. H. White in *Genealogist*, n.s. xxxvii, 59.
115. Ord. Vit. interp. Will. Jum., Bk. vii, chap. 3 (ed. Marx, p. 157).
116. Will. Jum., Bk. v, chap. 10 (ed. Marx, p. 84). For the date see Pfister, *Robert le Pieux*, p. 215. It is alleged that Tosny was given him by Hugh, archbishop of Rouen until 989 (*Gall. Christ.* xi, col. 25, quoting *Acta Archiep. Rothom.* from Mabillon, *Analecta*, ii. 437). There seems here to be a serious chronological difficulty, but Ralf was probably the original grantee of Tosny. Tosny, it may be noted, is just across the Seine from Les Andelys, which was an archiepiscopal demesne of old standing.
117. Vernier, op. cit., i. 41, no. xii. For the family see Douglas, *Domesday Monachorum* (1944), pp. 65, 66.
118. Ord. Vit., ed. Le Prévost, iii. 41, 42, 257.
119. L. Delisle, *Hist. du Château et Sires de Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte* (1867), Preuves, pp. 4-6; Round, *Cal. Doc. France*, no. 703.
120. Between 1017 and 1025 charters for Fécamp were witnessed by a certain *vicecomes* named Thurstan (Haskins, op. cit., p. 256; Bonnin, *Cartul. de Louviers*, i, p. 3, no. 2), who also, between 1023 and 1032, attested charters for Le Mont Saint-Michel (*Cartul. des Îles Normandes*, pp. 5-8, no. 3; pp. 182-4, no. 114). This Thurstan was clearly a man of importance, and, although the proof is somewhat complicated, it seems possible to identify him with Thurstan Goz, ancestor of Hugh, Earl of Chester. Thus William of Jumièges states that a Thurstan whom he describes as *praeses* of the Hiémois rebelled against Duke William during the minority of that duke (Bk. vii, chap. 3, ed. Marx, p. 118), and Orderic interpolating this passage (*ibid.*, p. 160) observes that this Thurstan was surnamed 'Goz', and had a son named Richard. Similarly in his own history Orderic twice asserts that Richard, *vicomte* of the Avranchin, was son of Thurstan (ed. Le Prévost, ii. 60, 105), and this same Richard is shown in charters to have been the son of Thurstan Goz (*Cart. Antiq. Baioc.*, Livre Noir (1902), i. 3-4; Bertrand de Broussillon, *Maison de Laval* (1895), i. 39, no. 27).
121. Before 1022 a certain Anschitil witnessed Gunnor's charter for Le Mont Saint-Michel, and between 1028 and 1034 another charter for the same house was attested by 'Anschetillus Baiocensis vicecomes' (Round, *Cal. Doc. France*, nos. 703-4). He survived until after 1031, for between that year and 1035 he attested two ducal grants for St. Wandrille (Lot, *Saint-Wandrille*, pp. 53, 56, nos. 13, 14). After his death his office continued in his family, for among the rebels at Val-ès-Dunes in 1047 was Ranulf, *vicomte* of the Bessin, and it is reasonable to suppose that this was the son of Anschitil, since about 1042 Duke William had restored to *Rannulfo filio Anschitilli* land in Guernsey which his father had given to Le Mont Saint-Michel (Will. Poit., ed. Giles, *Scriptores*, p. 80; Delisle, op. cit., Preuves, p. 19, no. 17). He married Alice, daughter of Duke Richard III (*Robert Torigny*, ed. Delisle, i. 34) and was succeeded as *vicomte* of the Bessin by another Ranulf (II) who was presumably his son, and who occurs in or before 1066

- (Bertrand de Broussillon, *Maison de Laval*, i. 39-42; Davis, *Regesta*, no. 4). This Ranulf II married Maud, daughter of Richard, *vicomte* of the Avranchin (Ord. Vit. iv. 422), and it was his son, Ranulf III, who became *vicomte* of the Bessin at some date after 24 April 1089 (see *Cart. Antiq. Baioc.*, ed. Bourrienne, pp. 7-8), and who in due course became Earl of Chester (see *Complete Peerage*, iii. 166).
122. Richard II's charter for Judith is printed in Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus novus Anecdotorum* (1717), i, col. 122.
123. For Ferrières see Will. Jum., Bk. vii, chap. 1 (ed. Marx, pp. 116, 155); Ord. Vit. i. 180. Chambrais, whose name was later changed to Broglie, adjoins Ferrières, and was, at a subsequent date, the *caput* of the barony.
124. See Richard II's charter for Bernay, the best printed text of which is in *Mém. Soc. Norm. Antiq.* iv (1828), 377-83. There seems no reason to distrust the information given in this charter, but the long list of witnesses may be inflated.
125. Robert of Torigny, 'De Immutatione ordinis monachorum' (*Monasticon Anglicanum*, vi. 1063).
126. The record of a plea in the time of Duke Richard II printed as an appendix to L. Valin, *Le Duc de Normandie et sa cour*, at p. 257, reveals the situation of the estate which was alienated at this early date. The central manor is 'Douvrenc' which is Douvrend (Scine-Inf., arr. Dieppe, cant. Envermeu), and which appears in other Rouen documents as belonging to the cathedral (cf. Martène and Durand, op. cit., i, col. 146, and Bouquet, op. cit., 4to continuation, Pouille . . . de Roucn, 40). The dependent estates include 'Montciit', 'Montane', 'Extrie Montes', 'Dowrendel', 'Puteolis', 'Hugonis mesnil', and 'Baslei'. These are Monthuit, Montigny, Étrimont, Douvrendel, Pulcheux, Humesnil, Bailly-en-Rivière. It should be noted also that the plea concerning this estate was held in a wood called 'Blanca', and in 1815 there was still in the vicinity of Douvrend a wood called 'Le Clos Blanc' (J. B. D. Cochet, *Rép. archéol. . . . de la Seine-Inférieure* (1871), p. 27).
127. F. Chalandon (*La Domination normande en Italie*, at p. 52) mentions Ralf de Tosny as arriving at Salerno, whilst at p. 49 he places the siege of Salerno late in 1015 and early in 1016. This date should be preferred to that given (1012) in the 'Chron. Mon. Cassinensis' (*Mon. Germ. Hist.* SS. vii. 652), since in 1013 or 1014 Ralf was apparently conducting the defence of Tillières (Will. Jum., Bk. v, chap. 10, ed. Marx, p. 84).
128. *Cartul. des Îles Normandes*, p. 5, no. 3.
129. Thus the family held Troarn, where before 1050 Roger I of Montgomery founded a church of secular canons (*Ord. Vit.* ii. 21-2: the date is shown by a charter of Roger given on the day of the dedication of the church which contains the confirmation of Hugh, bishop of Lisieux (R. N. Sauvage, *Saint Martin de Troarn*, p. 347, Preuves, no. 1); although Sauvage relates it to the foundation of the later abbey the occurrence of Bishop Hugh who died in Oct. 1049 shows it to refer to the earlier foundation. But a charter of Duke Richard II (Bonnin, *Cartulaire de Louviers*, no. ii, at p. 4) had previously confirmed to Fécamp: 'Troadum et quicquid ad ipsum pertinet'. Similarly 'Almasniacus', which was likewise confirmed to Fécamp by Richard II, is clearly Almenèches, where Roger II of Mont-

- gomery established on his estates an abbey of Benedictine nuns. Finally before his death Duke Richard II confirmed to the abbey of Jumièges land, toll, and a fair at Vimoutiers (Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i, no. xii, at p. 35), but Roger I of Montgomery seems to have acquired these shortly after the Duke's death, since between 1028 and 1035 he restored to the monks the market at that place (Vernier, *op. cit.* i. 43, no. xiii: the editor refers this charter wrongly to Roger II, whom he strangely describes as 'Comte de Montgomery').
130. The document printed as No. 1 in the *Cartulaire de Louviers* compiled by Bonnin indicates that Richard I gave to St. Taurin *de dominico suo* land *apud Molas*. This is very possibly Meules (Calvados, arr. Lisieux, cant. Orbec), which in due course became the *caput* of the Norman barony of Baldwin son of Count Gilbert. One of Baldwin's tenants in England in 1086 was Roger 'de Moles' (D.B. i, fol. 106).
131. Robert of Torigny interpolating Will. Jum. (Bk. viii, chap. 37, ed. Marx, p. 324). The pedigree suggested by Robert cannot be correct, but a connexion between the two families may be assumed.
132. In 1086 Roger 'de Abernon' held Molesham (Surrey) and Freston (Suffolk) from Richard fitz-Gilbert (D.B. i, fol. 35; ii, fol. 395b). A charter of Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury (*Monasticon Anglicanum*, vi. 1659), enumerates among the gifts of the men of the lords of Clare certain benefactions 'ex dono Radulfi de la Cressimera'. Both Abenon and La Cressonnière are within three miles of Orbec.
133. In 1106 Gerold de Normanville witnessed a charter of Henry, count of Eu, giving the manor of Hooe, Sussex, to the Priory of St. Martin de Bosc (Round, *Cal. Doc. France*, no. 399). Normanville is some fifteen miles south of Neufchâtel-en-Bray. Neufchâtel is the ancient Drincourt, and a charter in the cartulary of Holy Trinity, Rouen (ed. Deville, p. 423, no. ii), the date of which may be roughly placed *c.* 1040-50, shows William the younger, brother of Robert, Count of Eu, as having a contingent interest in Drincourt.
134. D.B. i, fols. 257, 257b. Ord. Vit. ii. 427 gives particulars which place the family of Pantulf at Noron within the Hiémois, where Roger I of Montgomery was *vicomte*.
135. Vernier, *Chartes de Jumièges*, i. 43, no. xiii.
136. Ord. Vit. iii. 426, 427; *Gall. Christ.* xi, Instr., col. 132. A branch of the family is found in Yorkshire on those lands which at the time of Domesday had been held by Berengar de Tosny of Belvoir (Farrer, *Early Yorkshire Charters* (1914), i. 466 sqq.). For further evidence of the early connexion between Clères and Tosny in England see Round, *Cal. Doc. France*, no. 626. Before the Conquest Roger I of Clères made a grant to Saint-Ouen of land at Blainville in the vicinity of Clères with the assent of his lord, Ralf de Tosny (Le Prévost, *Mémoires . . . sur Eure*, iii. 467).
137. Ord. Vit. i. 180; ii. 40, 41.
138. Ord. Vit. iii. 426, 427. The editor wrongly identifies 'Rogerius de Clara', here mentioned, with Roger de Clare, son of Richard fitz-Gilbert. The families of Clères (Seine-Inf., arr. Rouen, cant. Clères) and of Clare (Suffolk) are of course quite distinct.

139. See Duke Richard II's charter for St. Quentin (*Nouveau traité de Diplomatique*, iv. 225).
140. Arfast's charter for Saint-Père of Chartres (*Cartulaire*, ed. Guérard, 1840, i. 108) names these *militēs* as 'Rollo et Angoht et Unbeina'. The names are apparently Scandinavian (see E. Björkman, *Nordische Personennamen in England* (1910), pp. 4, 14, 113, 169, 170).
141. Le Prévost, *Mémoires . . . sur Eure*, iii. 467; Haskins, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
142. See Haskins, *op. cit.*, chap. i, and F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, pp. 549-51.
143. Ed. Giles, *Scriptores . . . Willelmi Conquestoris* (1845), pp. 121, 122.

ANNUAL LECTURE ON ASPECTS OF ART
HENRIETTE HERTZ TRUST

BAROQUE ART

By G. WEBB

Read 18 June 1947

THREE major aspects of the subject seem to stand out when one is required to discuss Baroque Art without any limitation or qualification to the request. These are: the works of Rubens and van Dyck, both in relation to Italy and to all north Europe; the work of Bernini, and the Rome of his time; and the problem of what is meant by the expression 'the International Baroque of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries'. These are, as it were, the great bastions of the position one is required to attack, and it is probable that the last of these cannot be attacked without a serious attempt being undertaken against the first two. These great operations I have neither the strength nor the equipment to fulfil, and to undertake the task imposed on me to-day I must seek some way of approach less direct, but affording advantages from the point of view of one who has always been primarily interested in the art of this country.

For this purpose I have chosen three moments in the history of English art. The first of these is in the middle of the seventeenth century, the second in the 1670's, and the last, which can scarcely be called a moment, in the later years of the seventeenth and the first years of the eighteenth century; all moments when there were signs in England of very marked Baroque tendencies. In discussing these three moments it may be that some light may be shed on at least the last of the three major problems, and perhaps even on the problem of Baroque art as a whole. The first of these moments is associated with the name of John Webb, the pupil and assistant of Inigo Jones; the second with the restoration of Windsor Castle for Charles II; and the third with the work of Sir Christopher Wren and the men who surrounded him in the last years of his life—the last being by far the richest in surviving works of importance, and in work which shows that union of architecture, painting, and sculpture which is one of the accepted characteristics of Baroque art.

John Webb is the most important architect in England during the years 1640-70 of whom we have any adequate knowledge.

His master, Inigo Jones, died in 1652, and there is reason to believe that he had not been very active for some years before that. Webb had come to him as a lad of 17 in 1628, but it is not until the 1640's that we have any very important evidence of his activities; when at last we come upon designs and buildings which can reasonably be regarded as his, i.e. the later versions of the designs for Whitehall, the designs for Durham House, for Belvoir Castle, and probably for Wilton, and the designs for Charles II at Greenwich, they are distinguished by certain Baroque qualities that seem to differentiate them from the work of his master as we know it. The most notable example of this is one of the designs for Whitehall, dated by Dr. Whinney to the early 1660's. This drawing, in addition to the colossal order, which as far as the Whitehall scheme is concerned seems to be Webb's idea rather than Jones's, shows an elaborate attempt to give an effect of depth in the main feature of the façade. This design has the real smack of the Rome of Bernini and Boromini, and seems to be the culmination of a tendency that can be observed as far back as 1647-8-9 in designs such as Durham House and the scheme for Whitehall marked 'Taken', of which it is a modification. I know of no other design by Webb, or indeed by any other English architect as early as this, which has quite this quality of design in depth, of movement that is inwards from the main plane of the elevation; and this essentially Baroque characteristic is enhanced by the handling of the colossal Corinthian order and its entablature with its strongly emphasized verticals. To the best of our knowledge Webb had never left England, though we may reasonably assume that he had a knowledge of Italian buildings of this character from engravings, and even possibly from the drawings of such men as the younger Stones, who had visited Rome—though we have no knowledge of them as draughtsmen—and it is a matter of some interest to inquire what were the circumstances which might favour such a departure from the apparent tendencies of the training of Inigo Jones. Webb came to Jones about half-way through that artist's long career, which may be taken as extending from 1605 to 1645. As yet no attempt has been made to analyse Jones's work and trace as far as possible any change in his attitude towards architecture. This is because the nature of his practice as an architect, apart from the routine day-to-day work of the Royal Surveyor, consisted in a series of tasks of widely different nature: the Banqueting House, St. Paul's, Covent Garden, the nave and portico of St. Paul's Cathedral,

the Queen's House at Greenwich, the designs for the chapels at Somerset House and St. James's, and the designs for the rebuilding of Somerset House and Whitehall; all these are so various in character that they make comparison very difficult. There is, however, another aspect of Jones's work with which Webb was intimately concerned, which is admirably documented in every sense, and which affords just that sort of continuous series of examples that makes analysis possible and profitable—I refer to his theatrical work. A large body of drawings for scenery, costumes, &c., has come down to us, the greater part of which can be associated with masques and plays which are extant with descriptions of their presentation, and these form a series extending from 1605 to 1640. The later of this series, those designs that were undertaken after John Webb was working with Jones, do exhibit certain significant characteristics. The notorious quarrels between Jones and his great collaborator, Ben Jonson, culminated in 1631 after the production of *Love's Triumph through Callipolis* and *Chloridia*; Webb's hand is first recognizable in a drawing for *The Triumph of Peace* in 1633. For these masques of the 30's Jones certainly had a freer hand than in the works undertaken with Jonson, and there is some reason to believe that he interpreted this freedom as to some degree an emancipation from the tyranny of the antique. Jonson himself, in his expostulation, implies as much in the lines:

Attire the persons as no thought can teach
Sense what they are: which by a specious fine
Term of the architect's, is called design

and it had indeed been said more explicitly as early as 1610 from the other point of view in the preamble to *Tethy's Festival* by Daniel.

This opposition of the authority of antiquity on the one hand and modern freedom on the other is a form in which the impact of the Baroque on the world outside Italy often presented itself. The north European nations, for all their strong medieval tradition, were too recent converts to the strictness of antique precedent to welcome the freedom of their contemporaries in Italy. Moreover to the North the written word, and, as far as architecture was concerned, Vitruvius, and after him Serlio and Palladio, had no rivals in England and few in France, whereas in Italy the varied remains of imperial architecture could furnish a warrant for innumerable licences.

It has been observed by critics that in the later woodland and

landscape scenes among Jones's drawings for masques, the influence of Rubens appears as supplementing that of Titian and the Carracci, and it has been shown that Inigo Jones, in 1638, was deriving ideas for landscape scenery from Adam Elsheimer;¹ there is more than a possibility that Jones and Rubens were moving along the same lines. It is unlikely that they were personally in touch after Rubens's departure from England in 1630, but Jones was intimate with Lord Arundel and Balthazzar Gerbier, and presumably with van Dyck, and the ideas and enthusiasms of Rubens's circle were apparently shared by the *cognoscenti* in London. It should also be borne in mind that throughout the thirties this close touch with Antwerp was maintained, first with the delivery of the Banqueting House ceiling in 1635, and later with the choosing of Jordans as the decorator of the queen's cabinet at the newly finished house at Greenwich in 1639 and 1640. But it is unnecessary to labour the point. Suffice it to say that Webb was brought up in close touch with one of the most important men of the circle, whose greatest achievement was the collection of pictures of Charles I, and that we have evidence of his copying the theatrical designs of his master at a period when that master was in the closest touch with all that was most advanced in the early baroque period. Ben Jonson's successor as Poet Laureate was Sir William Davenant, the author of the last great Court Masques of the years 1635-40. With Davenant Webb was to be again associated in 1656, in the production of the *Siege of Rhodes*—that curious attempt to introduce the new art of opera in the darkest days of the Commonwealth. This association with Davenant, which had certainly originated in the years before the Civil War, has, I think, a great importance, for that strange, adventurous, shall we say racketsy, character was the close friend and associate of Thomas Hobbes, and from their association springs the first statement of an aesthetic theory in England, and one which has, I think, a peculiar significance in relation to our subject. The *Aesthetic* of Hobbes as expounded in the letter prefixed to Davenant's poem *Gondibert* has attracted considerable attention, but like all the best English aesthetic speculation before Reynolds, and indeed after him, it is primarily concerned with literature. But that fact, though making our task of assessing the importance of these speculations as evidence of the attitude of artists in

¹ It is worth noting that, in addition to the Elsheimer in the Royal Collection, there were two in the collection of Lord Arundel, in addition to a Paul Brill.

another medium immensely more difficult, does not mean that we can afford to neglect them. In the important matter of the attitude of artists to the authority of antiquity, the evidence of the literary theorists and aestheticians has a real validity, especially in the case of such a man as Webb who was, as we have seen, brought up in an architect's office where literary preoccupations were continually present, and who was in close personal touch with the leaders of such literary aesthetic speculation.

The fact that Webb's contact with the world of letters was through the theatre in no way lessens its significance, but rather heightens it. The seventeenth century is the great age of the theatre in every European country, and the theatre in the seventeenth century touched the life of the time at more points than we realize; for in addition to the theatre proper and its plays, the printed editions of which stand to modern prose fiction in something of the same relationship that the sermon stands to the leading articles of our more responsible modern newspapers, there were all manner of hybrid theatrical presentations in which the theatre proper merged with religion, and, more to our purpose, with civil or even domestic ceremony. Moreover, it is with the most sophisticated manifestation of this last form of theatrical art that Webb, from his earlier years, was intimately associated. The court masque is the most elaborate and spectacular development of it. We need, I think, to remind ourselves continually of this all-pervading spirit and this quality of the spectacular presentation in the social life of the seventeenth century. The use in French houses of a railing across the rooms beyond which children and servants were not permitted to approach the master and mistress without permission is an example, and the use of the word 'state' in its meaning 'appearance of grandeur', or even more concretely as a seat of dignity or even a canopy over such a seat are further cases in point:¹ in this connexion it is worth observing that Sir John Vanbrugh puts state before beauty and convenience as the effect he is aiming at in his alterations to Lumley Castle in the 1720's. All this, which implies a much closer union between everyday life and formal spectacular presentation than, say, anyone of our generation has experienced outside the armed forces of the Crown, was a commonplace from the later Middle Ages to the middle of the eighteenth century; and from it in the seventeenth century flowered a special growth of the visual elements

¹ The throne of James I from which he watched the masques was technically known as the 'state'.

of the theatre including the Italian Opera, an aspect of the matter to which we shall have to return.

Hobbes's *Aesthetic*, as set out in the letter prefaced to *Gondibert*, 'Time and Education beget Experience; Experience begets Memory; Memory begets Judgement and Fancy; Judgement begets the strength and structure and Fancy begets the ornaments of a Poem', can be amplified beyond this brief and popular summary by reference to his other more important works, in which such problems as the nature of fancy or imagination (a word which he occasionally employed as an equivalent of fancy) are elaborated as part of his more general philosophical scheme.¹ The outstanding contribution of Hobbes to aesthetic speculation from such an examination of his writings has been summed up by Professor Spingarn as 'The first attempt to deal accurately with the relationship between the creative mind and the work of art; the beginning to analyse the content of such terms as "wit, fancy and taste"'. Hobbes is here a pioneer. He left his impression on critical terminology, and his psychology became the groundwork of Restoration criticism. The relationship of Descartes to French Classicism suggests the position of Hobbes in Stewart England', and again: 'Hobbes' *Aesthetic* is consistent and logical throughout.'

Whether all scholars would agree with the last of these statements is doubtful, but there can be little question of the anti-authoritarian character of this approach to aesthetics, with its stress on strength of judgement and nimbleness of fancy, qualities deriving from the mental history of the artist, rather than on any recourse to models, however venerable and exalted. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this change of emphasis from the antique or other classic exemplar to qualities in the artist himself. The influence of Hobbes was profound, especially on Waller and Cowley, and to a considerable degree on Dryden; and he has been claimed as the founder of that tradition of the psychological approach to aesthetics which persisted in England through the eighteenth century and culminated in Coleridge. The importance of Hobbes for our purpose consists in the influence of his psychology on the whole attitude of the later seventeenth century and beyond to aesthetics; and, more immediately, his influence on those circles with which Webb was certainly associated in the early years of his independent career; and, moreover, in the nature of that influence as a liberating agent

¹ Cf. C. W. Thorpe, *The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes*, Michigan University Press, 1940.

from its strict dependence on antique authority. There are, however, other points about the psychology and aesthetic of Hobbes which suggest very interesting speculations relative to the critical background of Baroque art. Such are his connexion of pleasure with a progress and movement of the mind rather than with repose, as when he says of 'to know well, and to know much', two essentials of poetry—'a sign of the latter is novelty of expression and pleaseth by excitation of the mind; for novelty causeth admiration, and admiration curiosity which is a delightful appetite of knowledge'—or, 'in fancy consisteth the sublimity of a poet'—and again, in his blank denial of the classic doctrine and that of Aristotle in the words 'felicity consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied'. This is coming near to an explicit contemporary statement of the German concept of Baroque art as a style of 'becoming' as opposed to a style of 'being', and is the more interesting as coming from a rationalist thinker such as Hobbes, whereas the German concept has been founded primarily on a study of the monuments of the Catholic reaction. It may be that Hobbes's ideas are symptomatic rather than causal, but that would lead our speculations too far.

The second moment I have chosen is the remodelling of Windsor Castle carried out in the 1670's by Hugh May, the Controller of the Royal Works. Of May's antecedents we know little. He had been an official of the Office of Works since the Restoration, and had considerable claims apparently both on the Duke of York and the Duke of Buckingham, and his work at Windsor Castle was probably in some sort an offset to his disappointment at the promotion of Wren over his head to be Surveyor. Beyond that we know only that he had been with Lely to Holland during the Commonwealth, and had designed two important private houses, Eltham Lodge and Cassiobury, before the work at Windsor was begun. May's work at Windsor has been so mutilated and so abused that it is a matter of some difficulty to reconstruct it sufficiently to make any critical estimate of its quality. It consisted almost entirely of the reconstitution and remodelling both inside and out of the Upper Ward of the Castle, and on the north side this involved the contrivance of what amounted to a major palace building, the largest enterprise of that kind in England to be undertaken since the introduction of the advanced Italianate architecture by Inigo Jones. Of May's alterations to the outside very little remains, but fortunately the Henry III tower retains examples of his treatment of the windows, and it is clear from the drawings and engravings

which are our sole authority for the general appearance externally of the buildings that, apart from the silhouette of the towers, it was mainly on the character of his window treatment that May relied for his effect. It is permissible therefore to venture on at any rate a partial critical estimate. The drawings and engravings certainly convey an impression which is dreary enough, and I would say that without the examples of the windows in the Henry III tower the treatment would be quite impossible to appreciate; but it seems clear that May was endeavouring to exploit the thickness of the wall he was adapting, to produce an effect of movement in depth into the solid wall of the building by the use of a very bold arched window dressing, which seems to be related to a Gothic casement mould. The effect of modelling so produced is completely lost in the drawings and engravings.¹ May used this dressing in two types of window, one round headed, and one square with a segmental head; and the use of these two main motifs with the varied silhouette of the long ranges interspersed with towers made his effects. Other devices are used, as circular windows and string courses, and the coupling of pairs of large windows with iron balconies; but they are of very little importance in the total effect, which depends on the boldness of the masses of the towers and blocks, and the scale and character of the window dressings.

To understand this treatment it is necessary to look into the question of the attitude of these late-seventeenth-century artists to the monuments of the Middle Ages. It is a commonplace of art history that Baroque art is essentially a pictorial style; painting was the dominant art, and both sculpture and architecture, to adapt a phrase of Walter Pater's, aspire towards the principle of painting—that is they are greatly concerned with effects of light and shade, and the resultant dissolution of the hard outlines of forms, which had been the most important development in late-sixteenth-century painting in Italy and of early-seventeenth-century painting all over Europe. This tendency to look at architecture with the painter's eye was eventually to lead in England to the picturesque movement of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; as yet for the Baroque period we are only at the beginning; but there is abundant evidence that such men as Vanbrugh and Hawksmoor looked at the architecture of the Middle Ages from this painter's point of view. Moreover, to

¹ A probable derivation from this window treatment of May's is the main garden front of the hall and chapel at Kilmainham Hospital, Dublin.

a seventeenth-century painter, the essentials were the effects of movement and shadow, and on that very point we have some curious pieces of evidence: one is a drawing of St. Mary's, Warwick, done in Wren's circle in the early eighteenth century, in which the building is most consciously arranged into a composition of vertical shadows; and another is a remark in a letter of Hawksmoor's on the subject of All Souls, Oxford, in which he lays great stress on the importance of preserving the quality of the deep splays of the window openings of medieval buildings because of 'the beauty it gives the Overture by Receding'. There is also ample evidence from a study of Hawksmoor's gothic and Vanbrugh's medieval buildings. In connexion with the last mentioned, it is interesting to recall Vanbrugh's own comment on the Windsor of Hugh May:

This method was practic'd in Windsor in King Charles' time, And has been universally Approved, So I hope your L^dship won't be discourag'd if any Italians you may shew it to should find fault that it is not Roman for to have built a Front with Pillasters or what the Orders require cou'd never have been borne with the Rest of the Castle; I'm sure this will make a very Noble and Masculine Show; and is of as Warrantable kind of building as Any. . . . As to the Outside, I thought 'twas absolutely best, to give it Something of the Castle Air, tho' at the Same time to make it regular, and by this means to see the Old Stone is serviceable again; which to have had new wou'd have run to a very great Expence; . . .

Vanbrugh at Kimbolton did not, however, attempt to emulate the Windsor treatment of his predecessor and hardly went farther than battlements in that building. It will be necessary to return to the question of the attitude of the English Baroque designers to the Middle Ages, but in the meanwhile something must be said of the interiors of Hugh May's Windsor. These have only survived in the decorations of a number of the state rooms adorned by Verrio and Grinling Gibbons, and though these have a real significance the most interesting features of the design for our purposes, the chapel and St. George's Hall, the entrance, and the two state staircases, have vanished. Of the chapel and hall we have pictures in Pine's *Royal Residences*, but for the entrance and staircases our only sources are the mid-eighteenth-century plans, and some tantalizing descriptions. The first significant point about these interiors is the conjunction of these three names, May, Verrio, and Gibbons, and certainly Charles II's Windsor may be considered as a collaboration between the three. May was the first architect to exploit the

talents of the two other men; first of all, as the late Mr. Tipping pointed out, in the house he built for Lord Essex at Cassiobury; and very shortly after, if not contemporaneously, in this work at Windsor. Here we have that concerted effect of architecture, sculpture, and painting, which is one of the characteristics of Baroque, and here was anticipated that collaboration of the Arts—Wren, Gibbons, and Verrio at Whitehall and Hampton Court; Wren, Gibbons, and Thornhill at St. Paul's; and Wren and Thornhill at Greenwich. The intimate union of the three Arts at Windsor was most markedly displayed in the chapel, where Gibbons's decoration of the stalls was extraordinarily elaborate (and of the royal gallery, which we know only from descriptions—it was supported on gilded wooden caryatids); this sculptural work was surmounted by a scheme of painting by Verrio, including a painted order of twisted columns, and an altar-piece representing the Last Supper, wherein the figures were enclosed in an apsidal recess, painted in *trompe l'œil*. The wall on which the semi-dome of this recess was painted was pierced structurally to disclose the organ pipes beyond—a curious *tour de force* combining architectural space with the spacial effect of painting in a spirit truly Baroque. Similar combined effects were contrived in the upper niches and either side of the altar-piece. The entry and staircases, to judge from the plans and descriptions, were still more striking examples of the Baroque character of May's work at Windsor than even the chapel itself. It has long been recognized by German scholars that the staircase afforded to the Baroque designer what was, perhaps, his supreme opportunity, involving, as it does, a design for movement through all the three dimensions of the allotted space. A precocious beginning in early-seventeenth-century England does not develop its full possibilities until the early neo-classic period of Paine, Adam, and Wyatt. The first of May's Windsor staircases, the queen's stair, was of the type which ascends round all three sides of a rectangular space, and was covered by a dome and lantern. The rail was of wrought iron, possibly the first use of that material for such a purpose in England since Inigo Jones's circular staircase at the Queen's House, Greenwich. The walls of the staircase space were painted by Verrio, and the scheme of decoration included *trompe l'œil* niches with statues, in addition to other major compositions. This stair was approached by a vaulted and colonnaded entry from the Upper Ward, the nature of which we can only guess at from the plans. The second, or king's stair, was reached

from the queen's stair entry through a colonnaded court, and consisted of a second flight leading from the courtyard to the internal ground-floor level, and there dividing left and right to return from half landings to a central door on the first floor leading into the king's guard-chamber. This stair was also elaborately decorated by Verrio. It is worth remarking that an earlier building by May, Eltham Lodge, built in the early 1660's, is also distinguished for the elaboration and the ingenuity of its staircase design. Enough has been said to make the point, I hope, of the Baroque character of this work for Charles II at Windsor. It is a great misfortune to our understanding of English art in the later seventeenth century that so little of it should have survived; indeed, only in the state dining-room is the quality of the varied planning, in combination with the painted and sculptured decoration, intact enough to explain the claim of this work to our attention. Apart, I believe, from the influence of the foreign painters, especially Rubens and van Dyck, and the work of such precursors as Webb and May, Baroque art in England has generally been considered to have flourished for the last ten years of the seventeenth century and the first thirty years of the eighteenth. This is the period of the International Baroque and the great flourishing of that art in Germany, Spain, south Italy, and Savoy. It is the period of the school of the late Wren and his *entourage*, Talman, Vanbrugh, Hawksmoor, and Sir James Thornhill; and in its early part of the major work of Grinling Gibbons. The origins of this school have been sought in a great variety of quarters—in the greater knowledge of continental examples, generally through increased familiarity with engravings, both French and Italian, and in Wren's case this is probably the most important single factor; in the greater knowledge of up-to-date French examples from Vanbrugh's acquaintance with that country; and in the influence of Vanbrugh himself on the Office of Works of which he was a prominent member—an influence conditioned by his literary and, above all, his theatrical associations, especially his interest in Italian opera—the heir, from the point of view of spectacular presentation, to that tradition of the heroic drama and of the masque that we have discussed in connexion with John Webb.

The greatest achievement of the English Baroque School, greater than Blenheim Palace and the churches of Hawksmoor, is Greenwich Hospital. In this building Wren, Hawksmoor, and Thornhill are all engaged, and in it all the points we have been

considering are involved. The scale, and in a large measure the character of the building, was determined by the block built to John Webb's design as one wing of a palace for Charles II; but the most important feature of the scheme, and the one which represents the larger contribution of this later Baroque School, is the Painted Hall. In this building we can detect the influence of Hugh May's work at Windsor. In the Painted Hall the window treatment, especially for the interior effect, is similar to that in the chapel at Windsor in that the design is largely dependent on the scheme of large round-headed windows, surmounted by smaller square windows with segmental heads. Moreover, the order of pilasters between the windows is painted in *grisaille*. It is further notable that the external treatment of the windows of the Painted Hall, though more delicate in profile, seems to have a resemblance to May's external window mouldings at Windsor. Wren and Thornhill's Painted Hall seems to be a far more subtly proportioned space than the Windsor chapel as far as we can judge, and certainly it is a more complex and ambitious sequence of spaces with its domed vestibule and rectangular high-table space; but the relation of the one to the other is, I think, certain. A possible link between Windsor and Greenwich was the splendid chapel built by Wren and decorated by Verrio and Gibbons at Whitehall for James II in 1685. From the accounts and from the few fragments of Gibbons's altar-piece still preserved at Burnham in Somerset, and above all from Evelyn's description, it is clear that this was a piece of the most advanced Baroque.

I went to hear the music of the Italians in the new chapel, now first opened publicly at Whitehall for the Popish Service. Nothing can be finer than the magnificent marble work and architecture at the end, where are four statues, representing St John, St Peter, St Paul, and the Church, in white marble, the work of Mr Gibbons, with all the carving and pillars of exquisite art and great cost. The altarpiece is the Salutation; the volto in fresco, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, according to their tradition, with our Blessed Saviour, and a world of figures painted by Verrio. The throne where the King and Queen sit is very glorious, in a closet above, just opposite to the altar.

And he proceeds to describe the ceremonies which profoundly shocked his Protestant feelings. Unhappily I know of no other evidence of the appearance of this *tour de force*.

Greenwich is the supreme effect of what may be called, to use a comprehensive phrase, the new manner of the Office of Works which includes the works of Wren, Vanbrugh, and Hawksmoor,

and it is a matter of extreme difficulty to distinguish the contributions of each of the three men. The dome, lantern, and west towers of St. Paul's we can accept as Wren's, though the last of these with their reminiscence of Boromini have been questioned; and I believe the Painted Hall, with its dome and colonnades, is also his (though not necessarily all the details of the central pavilions in the colonnades). Moreover there are motives which we are apt to consider as typically Vanbrugh-Hawksmoor which can be traced back to Chelsea Hospital, and suggest very strongly that this new manner was to a considerable degree the later manner of Wren himself and not only a contribution of his younger colleagues. To distinguish the personal contributions of each of the two younger men is even more difficult; it would, I think, be a fair statement that Hawksmoor's personal contribution is more often concerned with what I may describe as the geometry of architectural forms while Vanbrugh's has a romantic and picturesque quality, though that is only a very rough approximation, for the two men collaborated so closely and influenced each other's buildings so profoundly that there is much of Hawksmoor's geometry in Vanbrugh's independent designs, and much of Vanbrugh's picturesque in Hawksmoor's most abstract conceptions. The contrast works also, I think, in their respective attitude to the architecture of the Middle Ages; Vanbrugh, at Castle Howard and Claremont, produced buildings in imitation of medieval fortifications which recall the kind of romantic towers that can be found in the background of seventeenth-century Italian landscapes and in such engravings as those of Sylvestre and Perelle, and even more markedly in the backcloths of the scene designs for the operas and heroic plays. Hawksmoor's borrowings from the Middle Ages, especially where he is making no attempt to recapture the detailed resemblance, is more subtle, and seems to depend on an analysis of certain medieval motives into their essential elements. Notable examples are the hall and screens at All Souls, in which the spatial ideas of the medieval hall in its relation to the screens has been translated into the Baroque idiom, and the motif of the octagonal lantern, derived possibly from Ely, which is to be found at St. George's in the East.¹

In approaching this later Baroque art in England, the problems of the critical background of the artists are complicated and elusive. Wren, as one of the foremost men of science of his day,

¹ Possibly also at All Souls, Oxford, and St. Anne's, Limehouse, though in these cases the derivation is not so direct.

might reasonably be expected to take an extreme rationalist point of view, and so he does in the only important theoretical pronouncement of his that has come down to us. 'There are two causes of Beauty, natural and customary. Natural is from Geometry, consisting in Uniformity (that is Equality), and Proportion. Customary Beauty is begotten by the use of our senses to those objects which are usually pleasing to us from other causes, as Familiarity or particular Inclination breeds a Love to Things not in Themselves lovely. Here lies the great Occasion of Errors; here is tried the architect's Judgment: but always the true test is Natural or geometrical Beauty.' These observations take on a special interest when we think of them in connexion with Hawksmoor's work with its strange combination of 'solid geometrics' with an heroic-romantic attitude to antiquity which together seem curiously apt illustrations of the last two phrases of Wren's pronouncement. Wren's rationalist attitude to aesthetics is, I think, not unrelated to Hobbes's, though certainly Descartes is the more immediately obvious source of such ideas, if we need to look for an ulterior source when dealing with such an eminent natural philosopher as Wren. Wren's connexion with Hobbes is a question of Hobbes's influence on the Royal Society circle, where Cowley was certainly his advocate. Aubrey says: 'In his . . . Dialogi, he hath a noble elogie of Sir Christopher Wren, Then a young scholar in Oxon, but I thinke they were not acquainted', but certainly the group of which Wren was a leading member was, despite the mathematical controversy with Wallis, very favourably inclined to Hobbes; and his influence on Boyle and Locke is admittedly profound. The 'associational doctrine of the second half of Wren's pronouncement may, indeed, link directly with Hobbes. A more direct link, and one of great significance, is to be found in a letter of Hawksmoor to Lord Carlisle in which he says, apropos of a design by Vanbrugh, 'What Sir John proposes is very well, and founded upon ye Books of ye Antients, I mean upon strong reason and good fancy, joyn'd with experience and tryals, so that we are assured of the good effect of it, and thats what we mean by following ye Antients, if we contrive or invent other ways we doe but dress things in Masquerade which only please the foolish part of mankind for a short time.' Here is surely more than an echo of Hobbes from within the very inmost circle of English Baroque masters. It has a particular interest for the alliance of rationalism and a strict regard for the systems of antiquity which was coming in with Burlington at the

time Hawksmoor wrote these words (1725), and which had been anticipated in France in the mid-seventeenth century; this was far from complete in the age of Dryden, and it is to that age that Wren, Vanbrugh, and Hawksmoor belong. To the men of that age the greatness of the English drama of the opening years of the century was still too apparent for them to accept without question the authority of the classic rules in literature, and their attitude to the doctrinaires in one art may reasonably be expected to imply some latitude in their approach to antique authority in other arts. Moreover Vanbrugh, the friend of Jonson and Congreve, though he can hardly have known Dryden very well, may be considered almost a member of his circle. It has already been suggested that the chief among the influences on Vanbrugh himself were those of landscape-painters and engraved landscapes. Two casual remarks in letters bear this out:

That part of the Park [at Blenheim] which is seen from the North Front of the new building, has little variety of objects nor does the country beyond it afford any of Vallue, it therefore stands in need of all the helps that can be given, which are only five; buildings and plantations; these rightly dispos'd will indeed supply all the wants of nature in that place, and the most agreeable disposition is to mix them: in which this Old Manour (the remains of Mediaeval Woodstock) gives so happy an occasion for: that were the inclosure filled with trees (principally fine Yews and Hollies) promiscuously set to grow up in a wild thicket: so that all the building left (which is only the habitable part and the Chappel) might appear in two risings amongst 'em it would make one of the most agreeable objects that the best of landscape painters can invent,

and that it may have been rather the landscape of Salvator than of Claude that appealed to him is, perhaps, suggested by this remark on a journey to the north of England—Durham and Northumberland: 'If I had had good weather in this expedition, I should have been well enough diverted in it: there being many more valuable and agreeable things and Places to be seen than in the tame and sneaking South of England.' There is a curious smack of the early nineteenth century in all this—such sentiments would not come amiss in 1820 after the full flood of Romanticism and the picturesque.

This close connexion between painting, the theatre, and architecture and decoration, which is clear in the work of Inigo Jones and John Webb, which is probable in the case of Hugh May, though we know of no theatrical connexion in his case, and is

implied as a determining factor in Vanbrugh's letter to the Duchess of Marlborough, can be traced in the work of Streeter, the Sergeant Painter, who seems to have succeeded to Jones's and Webb's position as theatrical designer to the Court in the later 1660's. A further example of this connexion is that little-known artist, Robinson, who is only known at present as the author of the painted decorations in the Sir John Cass Institute, of a number of mezzotint plates, and as the designer of scenery for the opera in the late 1690's. A less obscure example is Thornhill himself, who is known to have designed scenery for the opera, and whose connexion with architecture seems to have gone somewhat further than matters of internal finish even as magnificent as the Painted Hall: the evidence of the lawsuit between Sir James and Mr. Styles, the owner of Moor Park, shows that the painter was regarded as an *arbiter elegantiarum* with some degree of authority over Leoni the architect as well as over the subordinate painters and the *stuccatori*. The sepia landscapes in the hall painted by Thornhill at Stoke Edith, and the landscape overdoors in the earlier works of Vanbrugh have a significance disproportionate to their merits as individual works of art as examples of that romantic-heroic landscape which so much affected the taste and outlook of these men.

The connexion of painting and architecture, indeed the dominance of architecture in the seventeenth century by a taste founded on painting, has long been a commonplace of art historians, but the connexion with the theatre has perhaps been less explored. Its persistence in England has been traced this afternoon; of its general importance I am not competent to speak. There are very strong traces of it in south Germany where the great baroque figure-compositions in the form of altar-pieces are said to derive from religious plays, encouraged by the Jesuits and others of the Counter-Reformation Orders, and in Austria the share of the theatrical decorator in the design of the Abbey of Melk is well attested. The late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the great age of the theatre all over Europe. In Italy that general movement seems to have developed in the direction of music and spectacle, and the opera is the great theatrical gift of the Italian seventeenth century to Europe. The connexion with the other arts was close—Parigi, the designer of the court entertainments at Florence from whom Inigo Jones derived so much, was also the designer of the gardens and fountains of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and Bernini him-

self is said to have written plays. Returning to England, the names of Wren, Vanbrugh, and Hawksmoor are subscribed to a letter of commendation of the English edition of Pozzo's *Perspective*, a work founded largely on theatrical practice, and addressed to scene-designers and ceiling-painters: a work the importance of which to the study of Baroque art is now appreciated. The preoccupation of the painters and architects of the early fifteenth century with the problems of perspective and its significance in regard to their work has long been appreciated: the seventeenth-century preoccupation with the same subject has been less emphasized and explained. It is a preoccupation with a strong theatrical element in it. We have some evidence of the importation of Italian theatrical designers into England who also did interior decoration such as Brunetti, who assisted Amiconi, according to Walpole, and Joli, who worked for Heydegger. Amiconi's friendship with Farinelli, and Peligrini's arrival with Nicolini in the train of the Duke of Manchester are also suggestive. Vanbrugh, who had lately built the Opera House in the Haymarket, and was concerned with Congreve in promoting the new form of art, had been in correspondence with the Duke about both singers for the Opera and the new painter whom he was afterwards to employ so extensively at Castle Howard.

On the other factor affecting the appearance of Baroque art in England that we have discussed to-day, the influence of the attitude of the literary critics to the authority of the antique and especially of the critical position of Hobbes, there is little time to enlarge here. If we accept the suggestion of the importance of Hobbes in this connexion, there is one further observation to be made. Though Hobbes seems to be as far as may very well be from the world of the Catholic Reaction, with which Baroque art has so largely, and so reasonably, been identified in the eyes not only of art historians but of Englishmen who were its contemporaries—Vanbrugh's Opera House in the Haymarket was criticized as being like a French church—there is another aspect of Baroque art with which Hobbes might well be more in sympathy. Baroque has rightly been considered as the style more especially associated with political Absolutism. This might fit well enough with Hobbes, but at first sight might make the position of Vanbrugh, an out-and-out Whig if ever there was one, seem somewhat paradoxical. This paradox is, I think, capable of resolution. Vanbrugh, in writing to one of his colleagues—a Whig official and protégé of the Duke of Newcastle—

remarks apropos of Hawksmoor being passed over for promotion in 1721:


Poor Hawksmoor, what a Barbarous Age have his fine ingenious Parts fallen into. What would Monsr Colbert in France have given for such a man? I dont speak as to his Architecture alone, but the Aids he could have given him, in almost all his brave Designs for the Police. A thing I never expect to hear talked of in England, where the Parts of most of the Great men I have seen or read of, have rarely turned to any farther Account, than getting a Great Deal of Money, and turning it through their Guts into a House of Office; and now I think of eating Pray do me the favour to get a Warrant for another Buck.

This admiration for the achievements of the minister of Louis XIV is, I think, significant in the correspondence of two men who belong to that younger progressive soldier class of Whig whose importance Professor Trevelyan has made clear.¹ For it was surely of the essence of their creed that Absolutism is not the only means to the end of a strong and effective State. To the mind of Vanbrugh as I understand it Greenwich Hospital was the rival of the Invalides in splendour, but built by freemen, and all the resources of Baroque eloquence were only fitting to celebrate at Blenheim the victory of their faith that freedom is as consistent with an effective state as any absolutism, however imposing.


¹ *Blenheim*, p. 192.




INIGO JONES: NIGHT PIECE FOR LUMINALIA. 1638
(By permission of The Chatsworth Estates Company)



JOHN WEBB: ELEVATION FOR WHITEHALL, c. 1660
Burlington-Deconshire Collection R.I.B.L.




HENRY III'S TOWER, WINDSOR CASTLE
(By permission of the Proprietors of 'Country Life')



PAUL SANDBY: THE NORTH TERRACE, WINDSOR CASTLE

By gracious permission of H.M. The King.



THE CHAPEL, WINDSOR CASTLE



THE STAIRCASE, ELTHAM LODGE
(By permission of the Proprietors of 'Country Life')



FORTIFIED WALL, CASTLE HOWARD
By permission of the Proprietors of "Country Life"

WARTON LECTURE ON ENGLISH POETRY

'THE FAERIE QUEENE'

By W. L. RENWICK

Fellow of the Academy

Read 16 July 1947

SPEAKING in this room earlier in the year, Mr. T. S. Eliot drew the distinction between historical criticism and present criticism—the study of what the work of art meant at the time and what it means now. It is a rough distinction, for no line can be drawn between 'history' and 'the present', but it is a valid distinction, and in these revolutionary times it seems more cogent than ever. Revaluation is in the air, and that is all to the good, so long as we do not set up our own present notions as absolute standards but remember that we also are 'history', and let our new experience help us to understand, not just to feel superior. But I do not propose to 'revalue' *The Faerie Queene*: my purpose is the simpler and humbler one of recalling it to your minds.

I

Our world is in full revolution, and we cannot see the outcome. When we look back to the few brief periods of what is called 'stability', we are inclined to envy those of our ancestors who seem to us to have enjoyed a relative freedom from the more pressing forms of anxiety; but we have this advantage over them, that whereas they were apt to imagine they were walking in the light, we know that we are walking in darkness. It is always a painful and bewildering discovery, and it is not surprising that in our instinctive return to those few gifted men who have left some record of their own difficult pilgrimage, attention has been concentrated first on John Donne, since he expressed so clearly and forcibly the pain and bewilderment of a distracted time.

Bewilderment and pain are inevitable, but they can be dwelt on too long. It is time to attend also to those who have recorded some bearings and soundings for themselves and their generation. Not that we need—or can—take them for infallible guides over our own misty tracks, but that we may assure ourselves that men have at least tried to find and show a way in their time,

that it is possible to walk in the dark, and even to find some satisfaction in the exercise. Among such men we may reckon Edmund Spenser.

Historical study is useful to present criticism when it saves us from praising men of the past for adventitious pleasures or censuring them for irrelevant faults—two errors into which some modern critics, in the imagination of their hearts, too readily fall—when it prepares us, that is, for our first duty of seeing them candidly and directly, which is all I hope to do with *The Faerie Queene* to-day.

Even a slight acquaintance with Tudor society can remove one difficulty, obvious especially to eager young minds to-day: Spenser's insistence on 'the gentle blood' and the apparent exclusiveness of his 'general end . . . to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline'. Three subsequent revolutions, each bringing its new access of arrogance and snobbery, have obscured the terms. Harrison's definition, in the *Description of England* which he wrote for Holinshed and which Spenser knew well, will cover the audience to which *The Faerie Queene* is addressed: 'Gentlemen be those whom their race and bloud, or at least their vertues doo make noble and knowne.'¹ The slight hesitation in that definition suggests the difficulty of defining 'classes' in England; it reappears in the Sixth Book of *The Faerie Queene*, and if Harrison's exposition is restated in terms of modern social and political organization, *The Faerie Queene* is addressed to members of the professions and the services, of both Houses of Parliament, to civil servants, trade union officials, directors of public corporations, and the like, since each of these would claim to give 'good counsell . . . at home, whereby his commonwealth is benefited'—in brief, to all who have, or feel, any responsibility for the general good. Historical study, then, enables us to disregard the apparent limitations and consider the poem as applied to the general interest.

II

There are two main ways in which a man may project his view of the world: let us call them the way of logic and the way of literature, the logician constructing some coherent pattern of abstract thought in one or more of the traditional divisions—politics, ethics, natural philosophy, economics, theology, aesthetics—according as nature and circumstances lead him; the man of letters working in modes and towards ends less defined,

¹ Holinshed, ed. of 1587, vol. ii, p. 162.

prescribed, and separated, somewhere between the poles of story-telling and incantation, setting down examples of 'the goings-on of the universe' as he sees them, intoning the rhythms by which he excites and controls himself in his own goings-on. The two main ways are not exclusive, still less opposed, but let us for the moment range on one side the great constructive artists such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Sir Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, and on the other, the great expressive artists for whom Caxton wrote the prologue once and for all: 'Herin may be seen noble chiuallrye, Curtoysye, Humanyte, frendlynnesse, hardynesse, loue, frendshyppe, Cowardyse, Murdre, hate, vertue, and synne. Doo after the good and leue the euyll, and it shal brynge you to good fame and renomnee. And for to passe the tyme thys book shal be plesaunte to rede in, but, for to gyue fayth and beleue that al is trewe that is conteyned herin, ye be at your liberte but al is wryten for our doctryne.'¹ We can plot out some landmarks that lie on or near the frontiers: *Summa Theologiae*, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, *Morte Darthur*, *Prometheus Unbound*—you may work out others for yourselves. Somewhere within those points lies each record written down by those men who, by virtue of their mysterious art, have left the testimony of their travel. It is by its free range between formal philosophy, story-telling, and incantation that *The Faerie Queene* is distinguished.

In trying to estimate its range we have been greatly helped of late years by a whole dynasty of American scholars whose work has culminated in the Johns Hopkins variorum edition of Spenser's works in which Dr. Edwin Greenlaw, Dr. C. G. Osgood, and Dr. F. M. Padelford garnered and extended the results of the serious detailed study of Spenser as an object of scholarship begun by Hughes in 1715, Jortin in 1734, and the patron of this Lecture in 1754. We have to thank them, with Mr. B. E. C. Davis, Miss Josephine Bennett, and others there is no time to name here, for this great advantage, that however we may question or debate or add points, the conspectus is there, the ground is laid, and we can study Spenser with more security. Their work is, of course, historical. Miss Janet Spens helps us in the present by her sensitive analysis, and above all Mr. C. S. Lewis has recalled us, in *The Allegory of Love*, to the task to which our scholarship is really directed, the task of making direct contact with the poet's view of the universe and its goings-on. Mr. Lewis limited himself to one line in Spenser's thought, the

¹ Prologue to *Morte Darthur*.

question of sexual relations, and he could not have done better, since it is a question to which Spenser was especially attracted by temperament, and in which the originality of his thought is first apparent. There is much more in *The Faerie Queene* to be gathered for the same end, the elucidation of an historical problem which is at the same time the addition of Spenser's experience to our own philosophy.

III

That word 'philosophy' may seem at once too rigid and too grandiose. It suggests the placing of *The Faerie Queene* too near that formidable range of constructions and too far from storytelling and incantation. Yet the term is justified. Spenser is best described as a philosophical poet, being one primarily concerned with the universe and human kind, their nature and their affairs, and not, like Donne, primarily with their effect on himself and his own feelings. For where both men suffered from the uncertainty of worldly things and the uncertainties of knowledge and opinion, Donne made poetry out of his distress, Spenser out of the distress of the universe. I make no question here of relative values, but only observe the difference between the self-dramatic poet and the philosophical poet who can withdraw so curiously to contemplate the appalling results of his own reasoning:

When I bethinke me of that speech whyleare,
Of *Mutability*, and well it way . . .

Then gin I thinke on that which Nature said¹

Spenser was not a philosophical poet in the same sense as Lucretius and Dante, one who comprehended and transformed into the matter of poetry the complete constructions of artists of the other, the systematic, kind. We must not expect the formal elegance of *de Rerum Natura* or the *Divina Commedia*, nor the intensity which belief both engendered and, by saving effort, allowed time and space to develop. On the other hand, we need not fear the half-comprehension and uneven transformation of the *Essay on Man*. Spenser was well read in the schools, but the very variety, not to say the contradictions, of his borrowings of phrase and idea—not always clearly differentiated by his commentators—proves him a free mind and an original thinker. We must not assume, again, that an original philosophical poet must have contrived a complete schematic construction of his

¹ Book VII, canto viii, st. 1-2.

own, which he then proceeds to turn into a poem. *The Faerie Queene* is the working out of a man's mind, of one discovering his own thought as he goes, by the light and with the help of those earlier thinkers he so eagerly consulted, but applying his own mind to his own universe as he sees it around him. If, as I believe is true, he began with imagined certainties and the difficulties and uncertainties and possible alternatives grew upon him as he elaborated his poem in isolation, that is normal experience and the point is all the stronger. Spenser is a philosophical poet in the same sense that Shakespeare and Wordsworth and Blake and Keats are philosophical poets. We must be suspicious of any too regular schematic constructions that critics profess to extract from the whole body of their works and exhibit as their 'philosophies'; and *The Faerie Queene* improves as Spenser moves away from the control of his logical teachers.

In his explanatory letter to Raleigh, Spenser states his philosophic purpose in the didactic terms usual in his time. We are reminded of Sidney's too precise phrase 'to delight and teach', and feel a trifle uncomfortable, until we ask 'to teach what?' Spenser had not, any more than Elyot or Ascham or Lambarde, any foolish notion that 'the gentle blood' was the sole equipment the gentleman required for his many functions in state and society. In the same way, a modern poet might point out, if he dared, that votes alone do not endue the modern gentleman with all knowledge and all wisdom. With that boldness which Drayton so rightly noted as the distinguishing mark of 'grave morall *Spencer*'—a boldness not in his personal character but which grew from his strong sense of the worthiness and responsibility of his poetic function—Spenser attempted the most comprehensive statement of the principles of what, till the other day, we could call our Western European civilization. Since the tradition of gentility exacted from its claimant certain traditional qualities, this philosophic discipline is moral and spiritual in the first place, a compendium of the aristocratic principles of conduct that rest on a high valuation of the self.¹ But the concrete mind of the artist demanded that it should not be stated in abstract terms. It exists in the world and must be exhibited in the world, in the imagery of story and description and informed by the power of incantation. And in any comprehensive

¹ The Duchess of Newcastle was the last pure aristocrat, a quaint survival for Samuel Pepys to stare at. The code is represented in modern Britain in the truncated form of sportsmanship. International relations are complicated by its absence from Marxism and its omnipresence in Confucianism.

view of civilization the things imaged are valuable in themselves: in Gautier's famous phrase, the artist is one for whom the external world has real existence. It is disconcerting then to observe that its appearances, so exciting and so satisfying, are so transitory. In this way the metaphysical problem of Mutability obtrudes itself among the simpler problems of ethics, to be embodied in its turn in brilliant images but never to be solved on its own terms.

IV

To read *The Faerie Queene* holding throughout the proper relation of philosophic argument and artistic intuition, is not so easy after all the philosophic and artistic revolutions. The eighteenth-century critics could not always approve of the imagery, but they appreciated the morality, because they also were building a society and enough of the aristocratic tradition remained to give value to Spenser's concepts. They could understand his anxieties and they approved of his doctrine, while the metaphysical problems that haunted him could pass unnoticed, since they were not the problems which haunted Newton and Locke; for interest in philosophical problems varies even more than belief in their solutions. The nineteenth-century critics could pass lightly over both morality and metaphysics, since the eighteenth-century systems they inherited were still secure; but they appreciated the imagery, the story-telling, and the incantation. Wordsworth knew better, but Hazlitt and Leigh Hunt fixed Spenser in men's minds as the master of pure irresponsible decoration. So, in an age all too ready to assume that art is a luxury, *The Faerie Queene* was reduced to a mere indulgence; and since the novelists were attracting serious attention to story-telling and Spenser's story-telling is obviously desultory, and since technical study of Gothic architecture discounted the apologetics of Hurd, there remained only the incantation, the pervading charm which occasionally concentrates into a lyrical exaltation.

In our own time the attempt to see the thing as a whole again, candidly and directly, is hindered by new obstacles. For some years now, critical fashion has been narrowing its attention to dramatic values—the true drama of Shakespeare and the self-drama of Donne—and absorbing itself in the emotional intensity of situations. Interest in Mr. Thomas Hardy, for instance, has shifted from his story-telling to the dramatic situations isolated in his poems. Mr. Eliot, the leader of our poets, finds a medium

suitable to his brooding genius in something analogous to still life, arranging and rearranging groups of objects to which symbolic value is somewhat arbitrarily attached. Still life can be a very beautiful mode of art. It is not surprising that Miss Sitwell, and many lesser poets, are following Mr. Eliot's lead. But when one has dwelt on situation and still life for a while the return to free movement in a poem like *The Faerie Queene* requires a sharp adjustment of our faculties, and since its freely moving imagery embodies free-ranging thought, a certain nimbleness of wit must accompany aesthetic appreciation. It is a long time since we were called on for such activity. For fear of attracting attention away from his thought, Wordsworth—one of Spenser's most convinced disciples—renounced the pleasures of language; Tennyson's public so appreciated the pleasures of his language that they refused him permission to think; Mr. Eliot has followed Wordsworth in his renunciation. We are out of training for *The Faerie Queene*.

V

It may be argued that we need less agility since Hazlitt freed us from the labour of following the allegory, and indeed it has long been clearly understood that allegory is a crude medieval device which Spenser should never have adopted. I am not concerned—I would not presume—to defend Spenser. But we cannot have *The Faerie Queene* without the allegory, which is not only the key to the 'general end', but the principle on which the stories are built up and from which the incantation receives its urgency.

In any case the process of following Spenser's allegory is not so very different from the process of working out the relations of Mr. Eliot's symbolic allusions, and it even has certain advantages, in that the imagery is closer to the thought, and that Spenser never restricted himself to, nor was bemused by, any one form of allegory, but used in turn, very freely and deliberately, every formula of significant invention from symbol and myth to example and cautionary tale, whence both refreshment to the reader and fitness to the particular matter in hand and to the degree of importance of that matter. As for allegory being an outworn device, I would only observe that it is the principal instrument in the technique of the most popular modern schools of psychology.

The real difficulty of the allegory lies, once more, in the freedom, variety, and breadth of Spenser's thought. The usual

procedure of allegorists is to refer heterogeneous appearances to one dominant concept—Heaven, the Church, Salvation, sex, fear, according as they claim the authority of mystical vision or of scientific training. Spenser, on the other hand, projects the appearances traditional in one well-understood kind of narrative and refers them to many concepts, ethical, psychological, religious, political, metaphysical, and so on, in his desperate effort to cover the broadest conception of human civilization and universal being.

VI

I do not wish to suggest that Spenser's use of allegory is legitimized by the procedure of any psychological practitioner. I am rather inclined to the opinion that if psychological technique and literary criticism are to be brought together as some would have them, there is more to be gained by subjecting some popular psychological treatises to the scrutiny of experienced literary critics than from subjecting literary masterpieces to that of formal psychologists. Any thinker of our day is hampered, consciously or unconsciously, by 'scientific' habits which concentrate on unreason. Our young men may dream dreams, but they must not use their brains, or even their eyes. Ever since 1914, when the leaders of Germany deliberately broke the bounds of European civilization, we have been depressed, first by those writers who, having taken no part in the victory of their time, set themselves to deny the virtues by which honourable victory is won and to denigrate the men who possessed them; and then by those—with whom we can have more sympathy—whom the fatigue of war betrayed into accepting from the enemy the moods of his defeat. Out of the decadence of Vienna, the disgust of Berlin's shattered self-deception, and the fear that grows from the broken self-confidence of both, have been constructed certain idols of the crowd which are such as Spenser would recognize as images devoid of power or such as he set himself to destroy.

The entrance to their temple is called 'Disillusion'; the temple itself, with borrowed dignity, 'the Tragic Sense of Life'. But as Byron saw—another poet who knew his Spenser—a man is responsible for his own illusions; if they are lost he should not put all the blame on the universe, and for a man of sense disillusion may be the entrance to a healthier life. The oracles of the temple resemble too often the persuasions of Despair, from which the Red Cross Knight was saved by Una's reminder that

he still had work to do, just as Hamlet, in a true tragedy, kept reminding himself, so that he could not die till he had freed Denmark from the dragon of murderous usurpation. The ritual of the temple abounds in incantations of fear, which, as wireless drama abundantly proves, are easier and cheaper to produce than those of beauty and strength.

Spenser knew the moods of men; he did not confuse mood and principle. Let me exemplify by one of the idols.

Strokes, wounds, wards, weapons, all they did despise,
 Ne either car'd to ward, or peril shonne,
 Desirous both to haue the battell donne;
 Ne either cared life to saue or spill,
 Ne which of them did winne, nor which were wonne.
 So wearie both of fighting had their fill,
 That life itself seemd loathsome, and long safetie ill.¹

That is the 'death-wish', but understood, certainly by actual experience, as a mood of physical and nervous exhaustion. As an idea it is one of the temptations of Despair, only to be condemned by the true warfaring Christian. There are many more to be found in their proper places as we follow the stories into which he transformed his reading and his experience and his urgent thought. Spenser knew the moods, and he knew that a dominant mood has to be fought, lest it hinder a man on the dark way through the forest, or weaken him so that he cannot preserve the conquering mind that alone can win through to the end and play its part in the achievement of the common end, the end of civilization to which the gentleman is dedicated.

VII

The danger of confusing mood and principle has been, indeed, felt in our day, but obscurely—so obscurely as to deny virtue to the one quality of *The Faerie Queene* that survived all the relays of critics from *The Returne from Parnassus* to Mr. W. B. Yeats, the quality of incantation. It is easy to share the impatience of Mr. Auden and the other poets of the 1920s and '30s with the self-indulgence of their elders from Tennyson to (say) Mr. Drinkwater; and I cannot approve the critical mysticism of *la poésie pure* which would deny virtue to everything except incantation. But unlike some of his critics, Spenser was never the victim of his own enchantments. As he used allegory without being dominated by any one allegorical formula, so he used this miraculous

¹ Book IV, canto iii, st. 36.

gift. He gave some of his loveliest lines to the powers of evil, to Despair, to Acrasia, and some to the powers of good. He never recited incantations against life.

There is no question of escape or flight or retirement to an ivory tower. Beauty was necessary to his temperament and to his thought. He promulgated with all his power the great discovery of his time, that beauty is a necessary part of the good life. Plato helped in the discovery, and still more in its defence, but it was not just a matter of metaphysical argument any more than of self-indulgence. The brilliant images he conjured up, the subtle rhythms by which he enticed attention and induced the appropriate moods, have value as symbols and rituals and also the absolute value of their beauty. For some time now artists and critics have been afraid of beauty. They have renounced the enchantment of appearances as Wordsworth renounced the enchantment of language. Historical criticism can give good reasons which we may accept so long as we recognize the renunciation as temporary and expedient; we must be more wary when the native asceticism of Señor Picasso is turned by a horde of imitators into a monkish cult. Sans Joy is brother to Sans Foy and Sans Loy.¹ Spenser was a puritan, but he hated professional or forced asceticism. The puritan sense of responsibility demanded that delight in beauty should be justified by its spiritual value, but the needs of civilized life demanded beauty, for beauty is one of the best, as it is the most natural, of our guides in the darkness. The Graces appear in the rapturous vision vouchsafed to Colin Clout in his hour of happiness, and they are the patronesses of 'the skill men call Civility', that humanity of will and feeling by which men can live well in the company of their fellows.

Spenser might be forgiven if he took refuge in his imagination from the loneliness and danger of his circumstances. In fact he never did, in spite of the assertions of Hazlitt: 'Spenser, as well as Chaucer, was engaged in active life; but the genius of his poetry was not active: it is inspired by the love of ease, and relaxation from all the cares and business of life.' The famous

¹ If we wish to verify the accuracy of Spenser's observations, we can find that brotherhood exemplified in some sermons and rituals of the Nazis; and if we wish to measure its depth, we can look to Russia, where the authorities, however careful to confine their poets within the logical construction of Marx and therefore very careful about their imagery and incantations, do cultivate the less dangerous arts of music and dance, for they know that though beauty and joy have no place in the Marxian scheme there is no civilization without them.

opening of the Sixth Book certainly suggests absorption in poetry:

The waies, through which my weary steps I guyde,
 In this delightfull land of Faery,
 Are so exceeding spacious and wide,
 And sprinkled with such sweet variety
 Of all that pleasant is to eare and eye,
 That I nigh rauisht with rare thoughts delight,
 My tedious travell doe forget thereby;
 And when I gin to feele decay of might,
 It strength to me supplies, and cheers my dulled spright.

But the tedious travail is the labour of composition (of which he complains also in *Amoretti*, xxxiii and lxxx), not the labours of his active life. He goes on to pray the muses to

Revele to me the sacred noursery
 Of vertue,

and virtue has no meaning except in active life.

The cares and business of exacting and dangerous official duty possibly saved him from absorption in scholarly dreaming, as the Civil War saved Milton, and as the troubles of 1916 saved Mr. Yeats from the hypnotism of symbols and ceremonies that was absorbing him so completely that he attributed power to the symbols themselves, a form of idolatry worse than any technical addiction to allegory. There is ugliness in *The Faerie Queene*, and harshness, for Spenser saw them also in the world. Beauty and harmony he cultivated and preached as ideals, his contribution to the content and the end of civilization, not a flight from reality. The deliberate renunciation of beauty by our artists is argued theoretically as necessary in a world of discord; but if beauty and harmony have any value, then our artists have abdicated their function. It is they who are in flight from the severe duty of leading men when they have gone astray and showing them the grace they might have if they put forth the effort. That is the right use of the artist's mysterious power to enchant men's souls.

VIII

If, then, Spenser was not divorced from his world, the historical study of *The Faerie Queene* is not irrelevant. When we have accepted his challenge to trace his 'fine footing' and discover Elizabeth's England in Faerieland, we may gather only personal gossip. That is not important, but if like Sir Walter Scott we

enjoy the personal contact that gossip gives us, what harm? Nor are historical considerations irrelevant to present criticism. *The Faerie Queene* is not a perfect poem, even apart from its incompleteness. There are passages by which we can be bored. The chronicle of British kings has lost the interest it had for Spenser and Shakespeare and Milton, and we have seen science better assimilated into poetry by Thomson and Tennyson than it is in the *Castle of Alma*. What is less serious, there are passages in the First Book, for instance, and still more in the Fifth, of which some people may disapprove, as Keats¹ did, and Mr. Lewis does, on political grounds.

The important question is whether those passages render the whole poem suspect, and here history may help us—the history of critical theories, of public events, and of ideas. The first explains the presence of those dull passages and saves us from a distorted opinion of Spenser's critical judgement which might distort our reading of other passages. The explanation of much of Book V is to be found in *A View of the Present State of Ireland*, the most misrepresented, because the least read, treatise ever written by a major poet. As to ideas, much has been done by Dr. A. O. Lovejoy² and Dr. Tillyard³ to establish the idea of Order which Shakespeare and Spenser held in common with most men of their time. The central historical fact is that though Spenser was a major poet he was a minor official, and could no more transcend his worldly connexions than Dante could. We do not suspect the *Paradiso* because Dante proves himself a violent partisan in the *Inferno*; and Dante had more freedom than Spenser. If questions of right and wrong are to be argued in general terms apart from history, we can only quote Shelley, and observe that if poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world, Spenser sits with Shakespeare and Dryden and Wordsworth on the opposite bench from him. But the discussion is so general that individuals disappear in it, and here we are concerned with an individual, an expressive artist, and not an artificer in logical construction.

We must try to disengage ourselves from the hindrances of the past and the hindrances of the present in order that we may

¹ The stanza which Keats wrote in his copy is an historical document, a verse-rendering of a woodcut which adorned the popular political tracts of William Hone and his copyists; and a pathetic monument of optimism. Keats disapproved of Talus: so may those who hold that the United Nations should not have an international police force.

² *The Great Chain of Being*.

³ *The Elizabethan World-View*.

see philosophy and imagery in proportion and enjoy the enchantments without obsession. Historical examination enables us to restate the situations in more general terms, to protect present criticism from temporal and circumstantial limitations—our author's and our own. *The Waste Land* is an extremely interesting historical study, all the more because the history is recent history; *Back to Methuselah* is another. So long as history does not pretend to be criticism, and so long as we include ourselves and our own times in our historical triangulation, we may keep the direct and candid outlook that alone can discern the cairns and landmarks erected by our elders in their wanderings.

IX

For all is written for our doctrine. If we will take *The Faerie Queene* for what it is, not a fossil or a meteorite but the book of one man's journey through the darkness, we shall see Edmund Spenser as a positive and responsible gentleman who ranged freely and boldly through a universe of hardship and bewilderment and delight, and left us some bearings, not unintelligible if we will apply a little intelligence to his conventional signs, to direct us in some ways in which we may travel in company with our fellows, if not in complete security at least with some dignity and decency.

And for to pass the time his book shall be pleasant to read in.

ANNUAL ITALIAN LECTURE

THE ITALIAN ELEMENT IN LATE ROMAN AND EARLY MEDIEVAL ARCHITECTURE

By J. B. WARD-PERKINS

Read 26 November 1947

IN choosing as the subject of my lecture this afternoon the contribution of Rome and of Italy to the architecture of Byzantium and of the medieval Latin West, I am painfully aware that I am treading in the path of one of the most heated controversies of modern scholarship. It is now nearly fifty years since Strzygowski published his *Orient oder Rom*¹ and set the learned world by the ears; and yet, although, with the passing of the protagonists and the establishment of some at least of the disputed elements upon a basis of unimpassioned fact, the fiercest of the heat has now died away, the smoke from the embers is still, it seems, sufficient to irritate and to confuse. It is high time that the ashes were raked out. A controversy of this sort can at the outset be intensely stimulating; but after a time its terms are often such as to sanction certain limited modes of thought and expression, which tend long to outlive their sphere of usefulness.

It is not my purpose to trace in any detail the history of this learned dispute. But it is probably well that I should, at the outset, remind my audience of some at least of the salient points at issue. Such a summary must of necessity err on the side of oversimplification. But where black has often been so very black and white so very white, it is perhaps pardonable to sacrifice some of the finer shades in the interest of brevity.

The history of the architecture of late antiquity and of the earliest Middle Ages is inevitably the history of the architecture of the Church. This is not to say that there was not also a rich secular architecture which the chances of history, in preserving mainly the ecclesiastical remains, tend often to make us overlook. But in architecture, as in every other aspect of late classical art, it was the triumph of organized Christianity which marked the essential turning-point and determined the lines upon which it was henceforth to develop. The architecture to which this event gave rise is properly described as Christian; and once it had been recognized that its forms were not merely

those of Greco-Roman art in degradation, it was inevitable that scholars should have sought to isolate and to define the elements from which these new forms were derived and developed.

The great merit of Strzygowski, and one from which no amount of disagreement in detail can detract, is that he was the first to see the problem clearly and to face up to it in detail. He recognized that, historically speaking, the doctrines of Christianity represented a revolt against classical modes of thought and belief in favour of a personal and mystical relation of the individual to God, an attitude that is wholly oriental in conception; and he was led therefrom to the notion that, in art also, the stimulus which transformed and regenerated the conventions of an outworn classicism was to be sought in the impact on the Mediterranean world of new and vital ideas coming from the ancient East. This theory he propounded with an enthusiasm that often outran discretion. Specifically he believed that the centre from which these new ideas radiated could be located in central Asia, to the east of the Caspian, and in northern Iran; and that it was the outcome of the settlement in this region in the late pre-Christian era of certain Mongoloid and Indo-Germanic, nomadic, tribal groups. The ideas generated by the resultant civilization found their way westward through a variety of channels. One of these ran through the Caucasus to the Black Sea and thence to northern and western Europe, and gave birth, at first through peaceful influence and later through actual tribal movement, to the decorative art which we associate with the great migrations that eventually overwhelmed the Western Roman Empire. Farther to the south a related body of decorative motives and conventions found its way down into the Levant and Arabia and into Coptic Egypt: in the nomadic Arabs, above all, the new ideas found congenial ground; and the triumph of Islam in the seventh century set the final seal upon centuries of previous penetration. In the field of architecture, on the other hand, it was Armenia that supplied the link between these north Iranian peoples and the West, and revolutionized the architecture of the Christian world by the introduction of the dome over the square bay.

All of this was of course highly controversial, and the discussion which it provoked was not rendered the less lively by the racial theories with which much of it was so closely linked. With the latter, and with Strzygowski's views on the diffusion of decorative styles and motives, we are not here directly concerned. His architectural theories, on the other hand, provoked two

points of criticism that are still very relevant. These carry the more conviction inasmuch as they were accepted and advanced by those who, like Dalton,² felt to the full the stimulus of the enlarged horizons and, for all their criticism of detail, may fairly be considered the inheritors and rationalizers of Strzygowski's point of view.

The first and fundamental point of criticism was that Strzygowski did not take into account the strength and tenacity of Hellenism. For all the new forms and ideas by which it was invaded and at times transmuted, Hellenism remained a powerful and enduring force. The process of 'orientalization' has been brilliantly demonstrated within recent years in the great series of mosaic pavements excavated at Antioch.³ There we can see, spread before us, an evolutionary series running from the late first to the early sixth centuries. At the outset the floors are mere patterned frames for the display of balanced, three-dimensional figured panels—copies of Hellenistic masterpieces which would not be out of place on the walls of Pompeii. From this purely classical beginning the history of the succeeding centuries is one of the steady infiltration of new motives and, more significant, of new artistic principles. The rational three-dimensionalism of classic taste gives way to two-dimensional pattern; and as a principle of composition, rhythm, and repetitive accent take the place of balanced, classical grouping. The magnificent 'Phoenix' pavement, now in the Louvre,⁴ illustrates how far this aesthetic revolution had gone by the end of the fifth century. At the same time it is vital to recall that the forms and technique through which these new ideas were expressed were still those traditional to the Hellenistic world; and so, as far as we can judge, were the houses which they adorned. The process was not one of piecemeal substitution but of gradual infiltration within an established framework. It was made easier by the persistence of Hellenistic influence in the very lands beyond the eastern frontiers from which the new orientalizing ideas were spreading; and we have to remember that, not only was the incidence of these ideas certainly very different within the different arts, but that in other centres, more remote than Antioch from direct contact with the ancient East, Hellenism must have remained a positive and living influence until a far later date. In this important respect later research has, I think, fully borne out the criticism of those contemporary students who maintained that the calculations of Strzygowski achieved simplicity at the expense of omitting an essential factor.

The second point of criticism lay in the selection of Armenia as the medium for the transmission to the West of the revolutionary ideas inherent in the use of the dome over a square bay. Whether or not one believes in Strzygowski's alleged north Iranian prototype, it remains obstinately true that there is no evidence whatever for the existence of this architecture in Armenia before the sixth century. At best it may represent a parallel development to the domed churches of Byzantium; at worst it is derivative from an already-established Byzantine tradition. This point also is, I think, so generally accepted that it needs no further discussion. If in fact there be a creative oriental element in Early Christian architecture, we must look for it elsewhere.

In all this, you will have noted, there has been no word of Rome. Neither Strzygowski nor his moderate critics were prepared to concede any serious element of originality to the architecture of the imperial capital. The most that Dalton, for example, would admit was that, by its very size and grandeur, the architecture of Rome reacted upon that of western Asia: its origins, and very probably the craftsmen who built it, were alike Greek.⁵ It is hardly surprising that so radical a view should have provoked a reaction. The first volume of Rivoira's *Origini della Architettura Lombarda* appeared in the same year as *Orient oder Rom*: and from then until the posthumous publication of his *Architettura Romana* in 1921⁶ Rivoira not only championed the originality and continuity of an Italian tradition of imperial and medieval architecture, but in his *Architettura Musulmana* he carried the war roundly into the enemy's camp. He must have got particular pleasure in deriving from what he termed a 'Romano-Byzantine' source all of Strzygowski's favourite Armenian churches. The great merit of Rivoira's work lay in the independence of his judgements and in his first-hand knowledge of the buildings about which he wrote. Its faults of overstatement can be traced to the fact that, throughout his life, he found himself in opposition to the views accepted by most contemporary scholars.

The last fifteen years have seen a vigorous counter-attack by Italian scholars.⁷ Much of their more recent work will inevitably be unfamiliar to an English audience. Even before the war the attention of students of Late Classical and of Early Christian art was engaged by the flood of fresh discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean. In Rome and Italy lack of adequate publication prevented, and still prevents, a proper appraisal of

the results of two decades of unparalleled archaeological activity; while the historical pretensions of the late régime inevitably cast suspicion on the work of any scholar, however serious, who asserted the claims of what might seem to be a nationalistic view of Roman achievement.

It is my purpose this afternoon to summarize some of the results of this research in so far as it has thrown fresh light upon the contribution of Roman Italy to the architecture of Constantinople and of Ravenna, and hence to so much of the architecture of the later Middle Ages. It will make for clarity if I state at the outset my belief that these results have in too many cases suffered from a somewhat partisan presentation, to the detriment of their true stature and perspective. This attitude can be attributed directly to the modes of thought and argument established by the Strzygowskian controversy; and for this reason alone I believe it to be most necessary that we should re-examine our terms and eliminate those which can be seen to be misleading.

Right at the outset we find ourselves up against just such a potential source of confusion. The notion of an independent Roman art, existing in its own right, no longer requires either apology or defence. Its acceptance, however, has not always been accompanied, either explicitly or implicitly, by agreement as to what exactly, in any particular context, we mean by the word 'Roman'.⁸ Within the field of the Strzygowskian controversy, for example, we find it used of at least four very different things—of the art of the capital city; of that of Roman Italy; of that of the Roman Empire, as distinct from the lands beyond its borders; or, more subtly, of a quality which distinguishes certain works of art within the Empire from others that are not in the same sense 'Roman'. All these usages may be defended; but only if they are kept clearly and rigidly distinct.

When we turn to the architecture of the city of Rome under the early Empire we find that it still belongs in a very real sense to the great Hellenistic tradition. It is true that the tendency of recent research has been to dwell upon those aspects which betoken a native Italian origin: and it is equally true to say that the enormous building programme of Augustus, which established the classical imperial tradition, was not only an enlargement and translation into marble of an architecture that was already firmly established in Italy in the late Republic, but that it incorporated many specified forms, such as the Italic forum, which can in detail be contrasted with the equivalent

elements of an eastern Mediterranean town such as Priene or Miletus. But whatever the differences of detail, there has been no fundamental change either of technical or of aesthetic approach. The Italic elements are in this sense no more than the well-marked *differentia* which distinguish the Roman branch of the great Hellenistic family from that of, say, Ephesus, of Petra, or of Cyrene.⁹

It is not until the middle of the first century that we find ourselves faced with an architecture that is new in the sense not only that it employs new and revolutionary technical methods, but also that it is experimenting with fresh principles of architectural expression. Characteristically enough it makes its first significant appearance under Nero. The Golden House shocked contemporary opinion less by its architectural pretensions than by the displacement of a crowded urban quarter to make way for a country estate in the heart of Rome. The type of the palace was in fact that of the traditional Roman *porticus villa*.¹⁰ But it incorporated at least two novel elements of great significance for the future. It was one of the first great palaces to be built of concrete and faced with brick; and it is the earliest example that we possess of the large-scale use of elaborately shaped polygonal halls and smaller rooms to vary the geometrical simplicity of the traditional plan (Plate I, 1).¹¹ It is no accident that these two elements make their appearance together. The new elaboration of room-forms is, it is true, a part only of a general baroque tendency visible throughout the art of the times. But we only need to compare it with the treatment of more traditional architectural forms in the contemporary baroque painting of the fourth Pompeian style to realize how intimately the new forms were connected with the practical possibilities opened up by the elaboration of a vaulted concrete architecture.

The most strikingly novel characteristic of the new architecture is the exploitation of the new medium to achieve unusual and elusive spatial effects at the expense of the simplicity and clarity of traditional classical architecture. The notion of an interior as a finite space bounded by four walls and a roof, each in simple, logical relation to the other, gives place to a studied evasiveness. Walls were dissolved into a fretwork of doors and windows, niches and *exhedrae*. Flat wooden ceilings are replaced by elaborately variegated vaults. Architectural problems which formerly were openly stated are now disguised in a complicated balance of thrust and counter-thrust. In the 'Domus Augustana',

the domestic wing of Domitian's great palace on the Palatine, we see these ideas freely applied to the treatment of individual rooms; but these are still contained within an orderly complex, grouped about a rectangular peristyle with all the symmetry of traditional classical planning (Plate I, 2).¹² It is not until we reach Hadrian's Villa that the surviving architecture of the capital allows us to measure the full disruptive effect of the new forces. Here, in the Lesser Baths in particular (Plate II, 4), in place of the tidy unity of a traditional classical exterior we find a bewildering play of vaults and domes and half-domes, which mirror the studied disorder of the rooms within.¹³ It is in the second century that we meet for the first time the modern attitude to architecture as the organization of space rather than the composition of masonry-masses. The Pantheon is perhaps the first major monument to be composed entirely as an interior.¹⁴ We may, I think, summarize this tendency by remarking that, however large or elaborate a traditional classical interior may be—as, let us say, in one of the great basilicas—one is always aware that it is conditioned by the proprieties of a unified, coherent exterior. In the new architecture the position is reversed. Here it is the exterior that is conditioned by, and conforms to, the needs and aspirations of what lies within.

I have dwelt at some length upon this new attitude to spatial problems because it provides one of the connecting threads to the progress of architectural ideas in the succeeding centuries. There was not, of course, a uniform development. Tradition died hard, particularly where it was sanctioned by centuries of use and association. The Hellenistic wooden-roofed basilica, for example, survived long enough to become one of the standard forms of Christian architecture. Nor was the attention of Roman architects by any means restricted to developing the more elaborately monumental implications of the new medium. Its utilitarian possibilities appealed strongly to the practical engineering streak in the Roman architectural genius. The excavations at Ostia have long familiarized us with the massive apartment-houses, so reminiscent both in plan and elevation of post-classical Italian practice.¹⁵ They form an essential complement and corrective to the established notions of classical urban planning instilled by Pompeii and Herculaneum; and while it is with Ostia that we naturally associate them, it is becoming increasingly clear that in fact they represent the urban tradition of the capital itself (Plate VI, 17) throughout the Middle and Later Empires.¹⁶ The type was already in process

of evolution under the late Republic and Early Empire; but it was the Neronian reconstruction of the city after the disastrous fire of 64 that afforded the opportunity for its application on a large scale in accordance with a deliberately formulated town-planning scheme and with the wholesale employment of brick-faced concrete as the normal building-material.¹⁷ Thus, in one important respect at any rate, these apartment-houses too fall into place as yet another mid-first-century product of the new architectural medium.

The long-term contribution of this practical architecture to that of later ages is a subject which deserves more detailed study than it has hitherto received. Its immediate effect was to introduce a strong note of functionalism, almost of austerity, into the exterior appearance of certain classes of building; and it has recently been suggested by Boëthius that this was one of the formative elements deliberately adopted from classical antiquity by the Christian architects of the fourth century.¹⁸ I think this notion of conscious austerity can be overstressed. The architectural forms were simple enough; but the bare brick surfaces, which we now see, were certainly in many cases quite elaborately finished in stucco.¹⁹ However, one has only to compare the basilica at Trier (Plate VI, 16) with, for example, the church of Santa Sabina in Rome (Plate VI, 15) to recognize the source of this element in fourth-century Christian architecture; and the result, whether deliberately chosen or not, was to produce an exterior architecture of broad surfaces relying for its effect on the simple juxtaposition of contrasting planes.

It is, however, with the less severely practical aspect of the new architecture that we are more immediately concerned. This found readiest expression in the great series of imperial baths.²⁰ The earliest of these, begun probably in A.D. 62 by Nero and since almost totally destroyed, is known to us only from the plans of Palladio and from the notices of his contemporaries (Plate II, 3).²¹ These suffice, however, to show that in all essentials it established the type that was followed, with increasing size and elaboration, by Titus, by Domitian and Trajan, by Caracalla, by Diocletian, and finally by Constantine. It was not confined to Rome. Trier and Lepcis Magna provide us with two outstanding examples from the Western Provinces; and the baths of Antoninus Pius at Ephesus and those at Alexandria Troas illustrate its impact on the Hellenistic East. But it was in Rome itself, under direct imperial patronage, that the type was first evolved and that it enjoyed the longest and most

elaborate development. If any branch of imperial architecture may properly be called Roman, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is surely this.

Two aspects of this bath-architecture are of particular interest to us in the present context. The one of these is the increasing span and assurance of the concrete vaults, notably exemplified right from the beginning of the series by the great central *frigidarium*, with its lofty nave of three bays with intersecting barrel-vaults, buttressed along either side by lower, subsidiary chambers.²² The other feature of interest is that, while these baths observe a somewhat formal symmetry of layout and in detail avoid the more elaborately fanciful spatial effects, the exterior illustrates to the full the new tendencies which we have already described. The exterior forms do not stand in their own right but are conditioned by those within. But the result is not, as is sometimes suggested, entirely negative. I would not like to suggest that the architect was ever entirely successful in integrating the whole sprawling bulk of one of these imperial baths into an organic unity; but it is, I think, equally misleading to deny a very fair measure of progress toward the creation of a new and vital exterior aesthetic. In place of the rhythmic two-dimensionalism of the traditional classical façade, we see a three-dimensional play of thrust and counter-thrust which looks, not backward, but forward to a long history of experiment and refinement in the Middle Ages.²³

The last of the imperial baths of Rome was built by Constantine; and it was he who finished the other great monument of the closing years of pagan Rome, the Basilica of Maxentius.²⁴ In sheer technical achievement this was a remarkable building, with a central span of over 70 feet, and 120 feet from the pavement to the crown of the concrete vault. Quite apart, however, from its intrinsic quality, it is a building of quite exceptional importance in the history of the development of late-classical architecture. We have already remarked that the wooden-roofed basilica of classical tradition survived long enough, and with a vitality sufficient, to shape the earliest Christian architecture of Rome. The Basilica of Maxentius, on the other hand, is, as Rivoira long ago observed, architecturally nothing more nor less than the great, central, concrete-vaulted *frigidarium* of one of the imperial baths, detached and composed into a free-standing building (Plate III, 6). The adoption of such a type within a field hitherto reserved to traditionalism represented a resounding triumph for the new architecture; and, although

in the capital itself historical events shortly afterwards put a halt to further development on these lines, in a wider field it was, as we shall see, an event of great significance.

With the transfer of the capital of the Empire to Constantinople, Rome soon ceased to be an active, creative centre of living architecture. The great Constantinian church-foundations established once and for all the supremacy of the wooden-roofed basilica as the conventional form of ecclesiastical architecture. It was a tremendous legacy, and a constant source of inspiration to the architects of the West.²⁵ In Rome itself it remained the norm throughout the whole medieval period. But its roots were in the past. The active centres of architectural experiment had moved elsewhere.

This does not, of course, mean that the Roman concrete-vaulted architecture which we have been discussing came also to an end.²⁶ There are indeed many recent scholars who hold that, on the contrary, it was the principal source of inspiration for the great Justinian architecture of Constantinople and of Ravenna. The most thorough recent statement of this thesis is that of Zaloziecky, published by the Pontifical Institute of Christian Archaeology in 1936.²⁷ It has since been restated and elaborated by a number of well-known scholars, and has won a wide measure of acceptance, particularly in Italy, where the doctrines of Rivoira have always commanded a sympathetic hearing.²⁸

Zaloziecky starts his study with a detailed analysis of the principles of design embodied in that supreme monument of early Byzantine architecture, Justinian's great church of Haghia Sophia. The analysis follows the familiar lines of abstract German art-criticism; and while much of it is necessarily somewhat subjective, and the sceptical reader may be inclined to feel that it is all over-subtle, it contains many acute and stimulating observations. The method is dangerous only when it is used, not as an analysis of the principles embodied in an objectively established series of facts, but as itself the criterion by which the facts are to be established. In other words, while it is permissible and instructive to analyse, for example, the evolution of a particular architectural conception of space in a series of dated buildings, it may well prove imprudent to reverse the process and to use, as Zaloziecky does, such very generalized ideas to argue details of relative attribution and chronology.

Haghia Sophia is, in the view of Zaloziecky, the direct descendant of the concrete-vaulted architecture of imperial Rome.

The latter was, he maintains, the principal formative element in the architecture of the *Urbs Constantinopolitana Nova Roma*, as the Theodosian catalogue describes it, which was built in conscious imitation, and with all the accumulated experience, of Western architecture. Indeed it was in Constantinople, rather than in Italy and the West, that the monumental forms of Roman secular architecture maintained themselves most strongly; and it is this environment of traditional secular design which explains the dominance of earlier imperial principles in the construction of Haghia Sophia. But it was not only in Constantinople that the tradition survived. In Italy itself, and particularly in the north, we must recognize that similar forces were at work, and that these gave rise at first to such monuments as San Lorenzo in Milan, and through them to the other great Justinian church of San Vitale in Ravenna. Thus the Ravennate architecture appears as the product of a development, related and parallel to that of Constantinople, but in no sense derivative from it. Indeed in some respects it is in advance. By contrast, the architecture of the Eastern provinces is held to have been wrapt in a traditionalism that was ill-equipped to make any significant contribution to the vital currents flowing in Constantinople and the West.

There is much in the detailed presentation of this thesis that will not bear critical examination, particularly in those passages when Zaloziacky is seeking to exclude the possibility of influence other than from Rome. It would be tedious and unprofitable, however, to dwell upon these purely negative defects, for there is much also that is stimulating; and if we turn to the structural analysis of Haghia Sophia, there is one feature at any rate that I find wholly convincing (Plate III, 7). If we abstract from Haghia Sophia the element introduced by the great central dome and its resolution along the longitudinal axis through the buttressing half-domes and smaller *exhedrae*, the remaining structure bears a resemblance to the Basilica of Maxentius so close that it must derive from the same building tradition.²⁹ Despite the manifest refinements of the later building, and the fresh problems, not at first fully understood, which the raising of a dome over the central bay imposed, the essential functional elements of the plan and notably the scheme for the lateral distribution of thrust remained the same. What is new is, first and foremost, the dome over the central bay; secondly, the treatment of the central nave as an oval space; and thirdly, the use of open columnar *exhedrae* at once to buttress, and to break up the

outline of, the walls enclosing this space. All these features too ZALOZIECKY derives from the architectural tradition of imperial Rome. But before we examine this claim we should glance first briefly at the contemporary architecture of northern Italy.

One of the most useful and illuminating results of modern Italian research in this field has been to show how much that has often in the past been ascribed to outside, usually to (so-called) 'oriental', influence is in fact part of a continuous and developing tradition, centred in Italy itself and in particular in the north. Without necessarily subscribing to all the implications that are at times drawn from this result, it becomes nevertheless increasingly clear that the architecture of Ravenna can no longer be regarded as the wholly alien intruder which the Strygowski School would have had us believe. On the contrary, it is evident that, with the transference of the Western court from Rome to Milan, the latter inherited also Rome's position as a centre of imperial patronage and of active experiment in the arts. In the minor arts this has been the subject of several interesting recent studies in America, which go to show the substantial community of ideas and of technique at this time over an area comprising Provence, northern Italy, and Dalmatia.³⁰ In architecture too De Angelis d'Ossat, in a series of carefully documented structural studies, has established beyond question the native Italian parentage of the rich Provençal and north Italian series of early medieval octagonal baptistries, which were once considered to be intruders from the Near East.³¹ The outstanding result, however, in this field has been in Milan itself. Here, a detailed examination of the structure of the church of San Lorenzo (Plates IV, 10, and V, 12) has shown that, so far from it being substantially a new building of the sixteenth century, the renaissance architects who modernized this ancient church in fact incorporated and preserved a very large part of the earlier structure. Quite sufficient remains to attest, not only the original plan, but in almost every important detail the original elevation.³²

The foundation of the church can be assigned, on good historical grounds, to the third quarter of the fifth century. It consisted of a centrally planned memorial church with a series of attached, subsidiary memorial-chapels (two of them, it will be noted, of the same octagonal plan as the baptistries already referred to). The body of the church consisted of a square central space, covered almost certainly by an intersecting barrel-vault contained within a low square tower.³³ The vault

was elaborately buttressed: at the angles by four massive towers; and along the four sides by four columnar, half-domed *exhedrae*, each of two stories, and each in turn buttressed by a concrete-vaulted ambulatory. It was an ingenious and competent building, which at one and the same time represents a considerable advance on anything surviving from imperial Rome, and yet is perfectly credible as the developed product of an architecture which a hundred years before had produced the last of the great imperial baths or the circular ambulatory-church of Santa Costanza.³⁴ It looks forward equally clearly to San Vitale; and yet the comparison I think serves to underline how closely San Lorenzo, with its horizontal lines and comfortable, workman-like solidity of structure, is related to the earlier Roman tradition. It falls short, perhaps, of being great architecture; but it is certainly an historical document of the first importance.

San Vitale, on the other hand, is the product of genius, and for that reason alone it tends to escape the net of the comparative researcher. It is not that the individual elements of which it is composed are particularly novel. In Constantinople we have the contemporary church of SS. Sergius and Bacchus, while in the West we can now point to San Lorenzo at Milan. But, with the inevitable exception of Haghia Sophia, there is no other building of late antiquity, either in Constantinople or in the West, which achieves anything of the same magical, soaring quality (Plate IV, 11).

It is characteristic of Zaloziecky's approach that he should base his demonstration of the Italian character of San Vitale on a highly subjective analysis of its principles of design, and should relegate to a footnote the historical facts which support his thesis.³⁵ We are unusually well informed about the building history of San Vitale. The mosaics of the presbytery and the text of a lost foundation-inscription recorded in the ninth-century *Liber Pontificalis*³⁶ agree that it was founded under Ecclesius, Bishop of Ravenna from 522 to 532 (or 534), that is to say, before the Byzantine reconquest and during the closing years of Gothic rule in Italy. It was completed in 547. Ecclesius visited Constantinople between 524 and 526, and it is usually assumed that it was on this occasion that he observed the models for his own church. It is customary indeed to quote the church of SS. Sergius and Bacchus in this connexion (Plate III, 9). But this church can hardly even have been begun until the year after Ecclesius' visit, for the monograms on the capitals are throughout those of Justinian and Theodora.³⁷ The direct historical grounds

for regarding San Vitale as a Byzantine building are in fact extremely tenuous. Arguments from style are hardly more conclusive; for the re-evaluation of San Lorenzo has shown us how many familiar *a priori* judgements in this respect require re-examination. It would be premature to exclude the possibility of influence, even of direct derivation, from the contemporary architecture of Constantinople. At the same time there is nothing in San Vitale that could not equally well be explained as the culmination of a long tradition of concrete-vaulted architecture, established first in Rome and later centred in northern Italy.

With this possibility in mind, let us glance once more at those structural features of Haghia Sophia which differentiate it from the Basilica of Maxentius, and inquire whether these too can reasonably be regarded as derivative from the same tradition of Roman architecture.

The oval space, consisting of a square or rectangle ending in opposed *exhedrae*, need not detain us long. As Zaloziecky is able to show, this is, in one form or another, a familiar feature of the Roman bath- and palace-architecture from the first century onwards.³⁸

The open columnar *exhedra* presents a more complex problem. As early as the second century, in the Piazza d'Oro of Hadrian's Villa, the recessed apsidal niches which break up the wall-surfaces of the Flavian Palace have become fully fledged apses, projecting from the outer face; and in the so-called temple of Minerva Medica we have a unique, but seemingly well-substantiated, early fourth-century example of the replacement of these closed apses by open columnar *exhedrae*.³⁹ It is not until the middle of the fifth century that we meet it again in Italy, in San Lorenzo at Milan; and these are the only two certainly attested examples in the West before San Vitale.

The majority of the columnar *exhedrae* recorded from the Near East are of the sixth century or later. It is, however, interesting to note that, quite apart from the use of this device in a rather different context in two Egyptian churches of the first half of the fifth century, at Abu Mîna and at Sohag,⁴⁰ there are at least two well-attested fifth-century examples of its use very much in the same way as it is used in San Lorenzo. The one is the early fifth-century church in the Stoa of Hadrian at Athens (Plate v, 13);⁴¹ the other is the recently excavated martyrion at Seleucia-Pieria, near Antioch, dated by the excavators probably to the latter part of the century (Plate v, 14).⁴² The interest of these is

twofold. In the first place, it is clear from the proportions and character of the masonry that, by contrast with San Lorenzo, both must have been timber-roofed. On the other hand, it would be perverse to maintain that so markedly specialized a type arose spontaneously and independently both in Italy and in the eastern Mediterranean. One is very much tempted to wonder whether the Italian tradition is in detail quite as independent as some of its supporters would suggest.

The same doubt arises when we turn to the third and crowning novelty of Haghia Sophia, the dome over the square central bay. Ever since Strzygowski first threw his glove into the ring, this element has been the subject of heated argument. A great deal of nonsense has been talked on both sides, much of it provoked by the careless use of terms, or the use of the same term by two scholars to mean two quite different things. And yet, if we define our terms with care and agree to omit such egregious irrelevancies as Babylonian mud-huts or vaulted Etruscan tombs, the problem can be quite simply stated.

In the first place we have to note that the wider issue of the use of the dome as such, irrespective of the shape of the space which it covered, is relevant only if it can be shown that either in Rome itself or in the Roman East the dome is, before the sixth century, a rare and sporadic intruder. Now it is perfectly evident that in Rome and in Italy at any rate the concrete dome, as a covering for a circular or polygonal space, had a long and varied currency from the first century onwards. The Pantheon is sufficient illustration of the technical mastery achieved already by the early second century. There are, however, many who maintain that, by contrast, in the Roman East domes in any form were rare, or even unknown, before the diffusion of Byzantine types in and after the sixth century.⁴³ This view represents an extreme reaction to the claims of Strzygowski. It can best be answered by glancing at two recent discoveries in Syria.

The first of these is a bath-building excavated in 1932 at Antioch (Plate VII, 19).⁴⁴ It dates from the second century, and it illustrates very well the pitfalls of an over-simplified approach to the problems of comparative architecture within the Roman Empire. Not only do we see precisely the same octagonal room with apsidal recesses at the angles, which in the East as well as in Italy was later to become a standard baptistry type. But if we compare the plan with that of the late third- or early fourth-century baths at Lepcis Magna (Plate VII, 20 and 21),⁴⁵ we can

hardly doubt that in elevation too it presented the same sort of answers.

The other discovery concerns Kal'at Sim'ân, the great late fifth-century pilgrimage-church in the hills above Antioch. Here excavation, coupled with a minute study of the surviving remains, has solved the long-disputed problem of the central octagon built around the column of St. Simeon Stylites. This was not, as often maintained, an open courtyard. It was roofed with a double wooden cupola.⁴⁶

This result, I believe, provides a clue to much that is otherwise puzzling. Like so many simple answers, it surprises by its very simplicity. There is after all a wooden cupola of just this form over the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.⁴⁷ It dates in its present form from the eleventh century; but there seems no very clear reason to suggest that it differs materially from its seventh-century predecessor. It would take too long to review all the evidence on a controversial and much-discussed subject. I will content myself by reminding you of two passages from the literary record that, read without prejudice, I think tell their own story.

The first is from Evagrius, writing as an eyewitness of Constantine's great octagonal church in Antioch, the so-called 'Domus Aurea', and of its miraculous preservation in the earthquake of 589. All the city, he tells us, was destroyed, including the zone around the church. 'Only the cupola—ἡμισφαίριον—remained standing. This had been damaged in the earthquake under Justin and had been restored by Ephraim with timbers from Daphne.'⁴⁸ As most commentators have remarked, this can hardly have been a dome of masonry. But in the face of the explicit phraseology of Evagrius, an eyewitness, it is surely wrong-headed to argue *a priori* that he must have meant, not a dome, but a conical timber roof.⁴⁹

The second passage is from the well-known letter in which Gregory of Nyssa describes the new octagonal-cruciform church which he is building and begs his correspondent to send workmen capable of building a dome of masonry without centring. It is, he states, the scarcity of local timber for roofing which necessitates this device.⁵⁰ The implications are clear: firstly, that domes of masonry were certainly not unknown; but that secondly, in certain parts at any rate, timber was still the normal roofing medium. In other words, it is almost certainly right to argue that such well-known centrally planned buildings as the Hadrianic Marneion at Gaza or Constantine's church of the

Holy Sepulchre were timber-roofed; and that in many cases these were probably conical roofs of the traditional Hellenistic form. But the evidence certainly does not warrant us in disregarding the possibility of domes of timber, in certain circumstances even of masonry.⁵¹

When we turn to the dome over a square bay, a word of definition is necessary. The simplest form is not really a dome at all but a vault of which the uniformly curved surface reaches down without a break into the angles. This is the 'domical vault' (*volta a vela*, *Hängerkuppel*), and it is a form capable of only a very limited development inasmuch as the low curvature limits both the height to which it can rise and the space which it can span.

The dome proper, rising sufficiently high to form an external as well as an internal feature, can be imposed on a square bay with the aid of one of two devices. The one is the squinch (*pennacchio a tromba* or *a mezzo padiglione*, *Ecktrompe*). This is a small arch set transversely across each of the four upper angles (Plate VIII, 22; in this case, as in San Vitale at Ravenna, employed in an octagon). This converts the square into an octagon, and on this, in turn, is set the dome. The other device is the 'spherical triangular pendentive' (Plate VIII, 23 and 24). This is as if the whole crown of a domical vault were sliced off horizontally, like an egg with a knife, and a dome raised over the resulting circular aperture. By contrast with the simple pendentive of the domical vault, the spherical triangular pendentives follow a curvature quite different from that of the dome proper, which gives them a distinct triangular outline. As between the squinch and the spherical triangular pendentive, the latter is architecturally the more perfect solution; for the squinch simplifies but does not wholly resolve the transition from a rectilinear bay to a curvilinear vault.

The first of these forms, the relatively rudimentary domical vault, need not detain us. Already by the third century at latest it was in general currency both in the eastern and in the western Mediterranean.⁵² The only distinction of importance is that, broadly speaking, in the West it is usually of concrete, in the East of masonry or brick.

Of the other two forms the squinch was certainly employed in the fifth century both in Italy and in the eastern Mediterranean. In Italy pride of place goes to the baptistry at Naples, built by Bishop Soter between 465 and 481.⁵³ Fifty years later we find it used in the octagon of San Vitale. In the East a date

as early as the third century has been claimed for the palace of Firūzābād; but this is disputed.⁵⁴ The earliest securely dated examples are in the crypt of Abu Mīna, the great pilgrimage-church near Alexandria.⁵⁵ These belong to the restoration undertaken by Archbishop Theophilus in the first decade of the fifth century. In the next chapel at Abu Mīna are what I believe to be the earliest examples surviving in the Near East of the fully developed spherical triangular pendentives (Plate VIII, 23).⁵⁶ Both are of very modest dimensions. Their importance lies in the evidence that they afford of contemporary practice in Alexandria itself. The rich Early Christian architecture of Athanasius and his successors has vanished for ever. But the remains of Abu Mīna tell us something at least of what has gone.

By contrast it must be admitted that the evidence for the dome over a square bay in Italy prior to the sixth century, despite a great deal of special pleading, remains far from convincing.⁵⁷ Apart from the modest domical vault, the whole evolution of the large concrete dome is without exception related to circular or polygonal plans. Throughout the history of monumental Roman architecture the characteristic vault for a large square bay remains the intersecting barrel-vault. We may in fact summarize a rather lengthy argument by admitting that the dome of Haghia Sophia may perfectly well be, as it is claimed, a development of the Roman architectural tradition; but that the evidence, both for this and against the possibility of eastern Mediterranean influence, is by no means as clear as some of the recent supporters of this view would have us believe.⁵⁸

I said at the outset of this lecture that I believed the terms of the Strzygowkian controversy to have outlived their usefulness, indeed to have become a positive source of confusion and misinterpretation. I was thinking, not so much of the atmosphere of petty bickering which it still seems able to provoke, as of the glaring fallacy of over-simplification inherent in so much of the later discussion. Strzygowski's north Iranian nomads entitled him to pose the simple alternative: the East or Rome? As soon, however, as by the first of these terms you come to mean an East Roman element within the Roman Empire, you are asking a question which neither logic nor the facts can justify. The Roman East or Rome? The question bristles with perplexities. Can we really treat the architecture of the Roman East as a unit, and contrast it with that of Rome? Conversely, what do we mean by Rome? The Roman West? Or do we mean Roman Italy? Or simply the imperial capital?

It is perhaps easier for us, who look at such problems through eyes accustomed to Romano-British studies, to appreciate the diversity within unity that characterizes Roman achievement in so many fields. In architecture we see the introduction into the provinces of such purely classical forms as the forum or the classical temple. Sometimes we see the process reversed, as when in the third century the Aurelian Walls brought to Rome the military architecture of the northern frontiers. But all roads did not lead to and from Rome. Besides these centrifugal and centripetal currents, there were others upon the periphery. In this country we detect them in a certain community of religious, domestic, and civil architectural forms between Roman Britain and the neighbouring provinces of the north-west. On a larger canvas we see them at work, for example, in Tripolitania, where the whole great Severan building programme of Lepcis Magna, architecture and sculpture alike, can be shown to be the work of craftsmen imported from the Aegean and Asia Minor: it has very little to do with contemporary work in Rome.⁵⁹ This last is a particularly vivid and well-documented example of the sort of cross-currents with which we have to reckon: an East Roman architecture transplanted to a province of the Latin West; and an architecture under direct imperial patronage which nevertheless by-passes the imperial capital.

There were certainly reciprocal currents also flowing from West to East and notably from Rome itself. Their precise evaluation is one of the most interesting fields which await the student of comparative architecture.⁶⁰ But how far we are entitled to regard the Roman East in this context as anything more than a convenient term to express a geographical fact is another matter. The Greek language provided a common bond; and in general Hellenistic roots struck deeper here than in the West. But Ephesus, Antioch, and Alexandria were as different one from another as Lyons, Milan, and Carthage. The author of the 'Peutinger Table' did not divide the Roman world neatly into two. He depicted three centres of special importance, Rome, Constantinople, and Antioch.⁶¹ Similarly the artist of the Esquiline treasure symbolized the Empire, not by two cities but by four: Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria.⁶² The accidents of history have deprived us for ever of the great monuments of two of these cities; but every fresh discovery confirms the individuality of them and of the other great provincial centres, and warns us that to treat of the art or architecture of the Empire as the product of two contrasting elements—

whether it be Rome and the Orient, the Eastern and Western Empires, Rome and Constantinople, or Romanism and Hellenism—any such antithesis is to invite trouble. A story so complex cannot without distortion be pressed into such a simple mould.

The concrete-vaulted architecture which we have been discussing this afternoon affords us, at the outset at any rate, one of the less tangled threads within a complex pattern. It was, in origin, Roman in the narrower sense of the word; and for the first two centuries, at any rate, of its development, the centre also of interest and of development lay in Rome. It is only when we try to describe in similar restricted terms its later phases, whether in Italy or in the new capital of Constantinople, that we begin to create difficulties for ourselves. The transfer of the capital from Rome to Byzantium was a dramatic step that changed history and fired men's imagination then, as it does now. We are apt to forget how ably the stage had been set a quarter of a century before by the establishment of the Tetrarchy.⁶³ Morey has done well to remind us⁶⁴ that while the two great monuments of Diocletian which survive, and for which we remember him, are the baths in Rome and the palace at Spalato, at Antioch he built no less than two palaces, one in Antioch itself and one in Daphne, four baths, a stadium, and two temples, as well as arsenals and granaries. At Nicomedia he began to do what Constantine later did at Constantinople: *Nicomediam studens urbi Romae coaequare*.⁶⁵ The position is, I think, aptly summarized by the remains of the two imperial palaces of Spalato and of Salonica. The East Roman, and specifically the Syrian, elements in Diocletian's Dalmatian palace are familiar to all.⁶⁶ Less familiar perhaps is the circular, domed church of St. George at Salonica, a typically West Roman building which Dyggve's recent excavations have shown to be, almost certainly, in origin the tomb of Galerius adjacent to the imperial palace and converted, perhaps by Theodosius the First, into a palace church.⁶⁷ The architecture of the provinces had always had a vigorous life of its own. The establishment of imperial courts in a number of provincial capitals now set the seal on a long process of decentralization. Relative to this the transfer of the capital from Rome to Constantinople is an episode of secondary importance which distracts attention from the central fact that over a large part of the Mediterranean world there had been established, or was in process of establishment, a certain *koine* of architectural thought and usage.

It would be a mistake to over-estimate this common element in

late classical architecture, as it would be a mistake to minimize the tenacity of local traditions. But while we can still distinguish elements of traditionalism and of modernism, elements derived from Hellenism, from Rome, or from the East, these are no longer simple melodies but the themes of a great contrapuntal fugue. We should no more be surprised that the martyrion of Seleucia-Pieria and San Lorenzo at Milan adopt a common plan than that, in working out this plan, each follow long-established local traditions of vaulting and roofing. We may stress the unity of the great imperial Constantinian foundations or the infinite variety of current and counter-current which meets us whenever we turn in detail to the Early Christian architecture of any single region: in either case we are made aware that we have crossed a divide and that the regional or traditional preconceptions of this Christian architecture are very different from those of the earlier, classical world. To apply the connotations of the one to the other is to invite confusion.

Specifically, then, I believe that it is true to regard Haghia Sophia and San Vitale as the expression of architectural principles which were first evolved in Rome five centuries before. But I believe it to be profoundly misleading to insist upon a too narrow localization, in Constantinople or in Italy, of the stages which immediately preceded either building. Already by the fourth century this Roman tradition had become a part of the wider heritage of late classical architecture, a heritage that had incorporated many other elements. What all these other elements were we cannot yet say. If there is one lesson to be drawn from the discoveries of the past twenty years, it is how much we still have to learn. The old easy generalizations have been shattered by the results of methodical exploration and excavation; and we need a great deal more of this, particularly in the Near East, before we can hope to rebuild them.

Meanwhile we do well to remember that it was Strzygowski who first enlarged our horizons. We do well also to remember that Rivoira first championed the Roman element in Late Classical and Byzantine architecture. We shall do better still if, while remembering their contributions, we can forget once and for all the terms in which they were offered.

NOTES

1. J. Strzygowski, *Orient oder Rom: Beiträge zur Geschichte der spätantiken und frühchristlichen Kunst*, Leipzig, 1901. Of his numerous subsequent publications on this general theme the following are the most directly relevant to the present study: *Kleinasien, ein Neuland der Kunstgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1903; *Altai-Iran und Völkerwanderung*, Leipzig, 1917; *Die Baukunst der Armenier und Europa*, Leipzig, 1919; *Ursprung der christlichen Kirchenkunst*, Leipzig, 1919 (English translation, *Origin of Christian Church Art*, Oxford, 1923). A good summary of Strzygowski's contribution to knowledge and of the progress of his thought will be found in *Speculum*, xvii, 1942, pp. 460-1.
2. O. M. Dalton, *East Christian Art*, Oxford, 1925, a mature statement of the views expressed in greater detail in his *Byzantine Art and Archaeology*, Oxford, 1911.
3. Doro Levi, *Antioch Mosaic Pavements*, Princeton, 1947. The lessons to be drawn from these mosaics are brilliantly summarized by C. R. Morey, *The Mosaics of Antioch*, London, New York, and Toronto, 1938.
4. Levi, op. cit., i, pp. 351-5; ii, pls. 83, 134; Morey, op. cit., pl. xxiv; J. Lassus, *Monuments et Mémoires, Fondation Piot*, xxxvi, 1938, pp. 81 ff., pl. v.
5. *East Christian Art*, pp. 14, 78-9. In this he follows closely the views of Strzygowski (notably in *Baukunst der Armenier*), who held that the great vaulted monuments of imperial Rome were the work of foreign craftsmen working under imperial patronage. With the transfer of the capital to Constantinople these craftsmen too were transferred, and the Christian architecture of Rome reverted to traditional wooden-roofed forms.
6. G. T. Rivoira, *Le Origini della Architettura Lombarda e delle sue principali derivazioni nei Paesi d'oltr'Alpe*, 2 vols., Rome, 1901; *Architettura Musulmana: sue origini e suo sviluppo*, Milan, 1914; *Architettura Romana: costruzione e statica nell'età imperiale*, Milan, 1921. All three appeared in English, translated by G. McN. Rushforth: *Lombardic Architecture: its Origin, Development and Derivatives*, 2 vols., 2nd edn., Oxford, 1933; *Moslem Architecture: its Origins and Development*, Oxford, 1918; *Roman Architecture and its Principles of Construction under the Empire*, Oxford, 1925.
7. For a select Bibliography since 1936, see pp. 193-4.
8. The late Mrs. Arthur Strong, in one of her last published works ('Romanità throughout the Ages', *Journal of Roman Studies*, xxix, 1939, pp. 137-66), lamented that English usage does not encourage the use of 'Romanity' to translate the Italian *Romanità*. The English language is properly distrustful of such words, which encourage mysticism at the expense of precise scholarship.
9. The literature of the last two decades on this topic is large and varied. It will suffice in the present context to cite three useful and well-documented articles by Boëthius: 'Das Stadtbild im spätrepublikanischen Rom', *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, iv, 1935, pp. 164-95; 'Vitruvius and the Roman Architecture of his Age', *Dragma Martino P. Nilsson dedicatum*, Lund, 1939, pp. 114-43; and 'Roman Architecture from its Classicist to its Late Imperial Phase', *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, vol. xlvii, 1941.

10. Tacitus, *Annals*, xv. 42. See Axel Boëthius, 'Nero's Golden House', *Eranos*, xlv, 1946 (*Serta Rudbergiana*), pp. 442-59. Another suggestive recent study is that of H. P. L'Orange, 'Domus Aurea der Sonnenpalast', *Symbolae Osloenses*, 1942 (*Serta Eitremiana*), pp. 68 ff., in which he discusses the circular revolving *cenatio* (Suetonius, *Nero*, 31). He connects it with the circular throne-room, ornamented upon the domed vault with figures of the sun, moon, and stars, in the palace of Chosroes II (d. 624), and argues therefrom an elaborate symbolism for the 'Domus Aurea' as a sacred, cosmic palace. Boëthius is, I think, right in rejecting these wider conclusions while accepting the possibility that the rotunda itself was an element derived from the contemporary, hellenized Parthian practice. Compare Philostratos' description of the judicial hall in Babylon (*Life of Apollonios of Tyana*, i. 25): φασί γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἐντυχεῖν οὐ τὸν δροφον ἐξ θόλου ἀνῆχθαι σχῆμα οὐρανῶ τινι εἰκασμένον σαπφειρίνη γὰρ αὐτὸν κατηρέφθαι λίθῳ—κυανωτάτῃ γὰρ ἡ λίθος καὶ οὐρανία λεῖν—καὶ θεῶν ἀγάλματα οὓς νομίζουσιν Ἴδρυται ἄνω καὶ χρυσᾶ φαίνεται, καθάπερ ἐξ αἰθέρος (gold-on-blue mosaics?). Δικάζει μὲν γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐνταῦθα. . . . The rotunda is an element, intrusive to the general plan, which was not followed up. The significant novelty of the 'Domus Aurea' lay elsewhere. For the rotunda, see also K. Lehmann, *Art Bulletin*, xxvii, 1945, pp. 21-5.
11. The Palace of Tiberius on the Palatine remains almost entirely unexplored. As Dr. E. Sjöqvist, however, points out to me, the scanty remains of the original building, particularly towards the north, suggest that brick-faced concrete may have played a considerable part in its construction. The main wing of the Golden House beneath the baths of Trajan on the Oppian, known in part since the Renaissance, is still not completely excavated. The plan here reproduced (Plate 1, 1) is that given by G. Lugli, *Roma antica: il centro monumentale*, Rome, 1946, figs. 104-5. For the octagonal, domed chamber see G. Giovannoni, 'La Cupola della Domus Aurea neroniana in Roma', *Atti del I Congresso Nazionale di Storia dell' Architettura*, 1936, Firenze, 1938, pp. 3-6.
12. This important monument was completely excavated before the war by Bartoli. No adequate account of the excavations has been published, and the best available plan remains that published in 1785 by Guattani, here reproduced Plate 1, 2; see also G. Lugli, *op. cit.*, pp. 509-14. The elaborate chambers of the north-east wing have long been familiar (Rivoira, *Architettura Romana*, figs. 122-3; *Roman Architecture*, figs. 121-2). That the central chamber of this wing had a domical vault was claimed by Rivoira and has since been repeated by the majority of Italian scholars. In fact, as Ashby remarked (Platner-Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, 1929, p. 162), the surviving remains could equally well be those of an intersecting barrel-vault.
13. For the Lesser Baths at Hadrian's Villa, see *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, iii, 1919, pl. 77, from which the plan reproduced on Plate II, 4 is taken; D. Krencker and E. Krüger, *Die Trierer Kaiserthermen*, Augsburg, 1929, pp. 260-2, fig. 391 a. Cf. also the Greater Baths, *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, xi, 1933, pp. 119-26; Krencker and Krüger, *op. cit.*, fig. 391 b.
14. See C. R. Morey, *Medieval Art*, New York, 1942, pp. 259 ff.

15. Conveniently illustrated by M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, Oxford, 1926, pl. xix, after G. Calza, 'Le Origini latine dell' abitazione moderna', *Architettura ed arti decorative*, iii, 1923, fig. 8. The fundamental publication remains that of Calza, 'La preminenza dell' *insula* nella edilizia romana', *Monumenti antichi*, xxiii, 1914, pp. 541-608. For the subsequent development of the type at Ostia, see his 'Contributi alla storia della edilizia imperiale romana', *Palladio*, v, 1941, pp. 1 ff.; and G. Lugli, 'Nuove forme dell' architettura romana nell' età dei Flavi', *Atti del III Convegno Nazionale di Storia dell' Architettura, Roma, 1938*, Rome, 1940, pp. 95-102, and especially fig. 99, which illustrates a model in the Mostra della Romanità. The characteristics which distinguish this typically urban architecture from the Pompeian forms may be summarized as a closely knit vertical development in place of a loose horizontal layout about the *atrium*; the incorporation within the *insula* of rows of self-contained shops, opening either directly on to the street or on to a portico flanking the street; the development of the interior as a series of independent apartments; and the lighting of individual rooms from without, by means of windows opening on to the street, in place of the traditional lighting from the *atrium* or peristyle. Instead of the old blind façades, we now have balconies and rows of symmetrically spaced windows which, by contrast with the dead conventions of the Campanian cities, strike a significant note of modernity.
16. The *insulae* depicted on the *Forma Urbis*, the Severan marble plan of the city, are typically of this form. A surviving example in Rome is the five-story house exposed below the Capitoline at the foot of the Aracoeli steps (Plate vi, 17) during the construction of the modern Via del Mare (A. Munoz, *Campidoglio*, Rome, 1930, p. 52, pls. xvi, xvii; Lugli, *Atti del III Convegno, &c.*, fig. on p. 98). The façade is typical, with a range of *tabernae* opening off the street and above them a balcony corbelled out on shallow brick arches. It dates from the later first century. The portico in front is a third-century addition.
17. Tacitus, *Annals*, xv. 43: 'Ceterum urbis quae domui supererant non, ut post Gallica incendia, nulla distinctione nec passim erecta, sed dimensis vicorum ordinibus et latis viarum spatiis cohabitatae aedificiorum altitudine ac patefactis areis additisque porticibus, quae frontem insularum protegerent . . . aedificiaque ipsa certa sui parte sine trabibus saxo Gabino Albanoque solidarentur, quod is lapis ignibus impervius est . . . nec communione parietum, sed propriis quaeque muris ambirentur.' Suetonius, *Nero*, xvi: 'Formam aedificiorum urbis novam excogitavit, et ut ante insulas ac domus porticus essent, de quarum solariis incendia arcerentur'; cf. *ibid.*, xxxviii.

Boëthius, commenting on these passages ('The Neronian Nova Urbs', see Bibliography, p. 194), remarks with justice that the distinction between the Pompeian and the Ostian house is not one of geography and historical environment alone but also of period. We know from the Palatine excavations that the upper-class Roman of the Augustan age lived in a house of essentially Pompeian type; and that Pompeii, which in 79 was still in the course of rebuilding after the disastrous earthquake of 63, was then in full, if belated, flood of evolution towards the building practices of second-century Ostia (see also A. Maiuri, *L'ultima fase*

edilizia di Pompei, Rome, Istituto di Studi Romani, 1942). The point is sound, but it must not be overstressed. Pompeii in 79 was still busy absorbing, and modifying its own traditional practice to accord with, lessons that had already been mastered elsewhere; and the literary evidence shows conclusively that in Rome the novelty of the Neronian city lay rather in planning and orderly layout and in the use of materials, than in the introduction of new house-types. The late first- or second-century *insula* at Rome or Ostia represents a rationalization and a translation into durable materials of the lofty timber-framed tenement-house long established as a familiar feature of late Republican and Augustan Rome. This is not to say that the diffusion of standard architectural forms and practices, which resulted from the Neronian rebuilding of the capital, was not an event of the profoundest significance for the future of domestic architecture in western Europe.

18. A. Boëthius, *Roman Architecture*, &c., pp. 20-1. Since repeated in 'Three Roman Contributions to World Architecture', *Festschrift tillägnad J. Arvid Hedvall*, 1948, pp. 59-74.
19. This stucco veneer can still be seen, for example, on the upper part of the façade of the Diocletianic *Curia* in the Forum Romanum. Similarly the reorientation by Constantine of the axis of the Basilica of Maxentius would seem to be an attempt to organize decoratively an unsatisfactory exterior. The need was evidently still felt.
20. Krencker and Krüger, *Die Trierer Kaiserthermen*, Augsburg, 1929. Save where otherwise noted, all the succeeding examples are thoroughly illustrated in this fundamental work.
21. Plate II, 3 reproduces Palladio's plan. A full bibliography is given in Platner-Ashby, *A Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, London, 1929, s.v. *Thermae Neronianae*; see also Krencker and Krüger, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-5. In 227 these baths were restored by Alexander Severus, but there seems no valid reason to regard this as an 'almost total reconstruction' (as stated by Lugli, in *Atti del III Convegno Nazionale di Storia dell' Architettura*, Rome, 1940, p. 99). The surviving concrete, wherever visible, is that of the Neronian foundation (E. Van Deman, *American Journal of Archaeology*, xvi, 1912, p. 406), and contemporary opinion was much impressed by the scale and quality of Nero's work. See Martial, vii. 34, 4: 'Quid Nerone peius, thermis quid melius neronianis?' We may surely accept the main lines as those of the Neronian foundation. The sources are divided between A.D. 62 and 64 as the date of construction: in either case the genesis of the baths must antedate the 'Domus Aurea'.
22. A standard feature throughout the series from the Baths of Nero (Plate II, 3) to the Baths of Constantine (Krencker and Krüger, *op. cit.*, fig. 422 a, after Palladio). The outstanding surviving example is the *frigidarium* of the Baths of Diocletian (Plate II, 5) incorporated bodily on the designs of Michelangelo into the church of Santa Maria degli Angeli. Better perhaps than any other Roman monument this church gives an idea of the aesthetic intention of the interior of one of these great imperial buildings.
23. See Plate VII, 18 after Krencker and Krüger, *op. cit.*, fig. 92 a, from a reconstructed model of the baths at Trier. The *calidarium*, with its swelling curves and spiral stairs giving access to the roof, represents a thoroughly successful

- attempt at an organic exterior in the new style. By contrast the *frigidarium* remains a self-contained unit, unabsorbed in the general scheme.
24. A. Minoprio, 'A Restoration of the Basilica of Constantine, Rome', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, xii, 1932, pp. 1-25.
 25. A recent and most illuminating study of one aspect of this legacy is that of R. Krautheimer, 'The Carolingian Revival of Early Christian Architecture', in *Art Bulletin*, 1942, pp. 1-38. Krautheimer is concerned with the great single-apsed, transeptal basilica, represented in Rome by old St. Peter's, by St. Paul's, and by St. John Lateran. He is able to show that this particular type exercised little influence on subsequent architecture until it was revived in the eighth century, as a part of the self-conscious Carolingian *renovatio* of the Rome of Constantine, to become a powerful formative influence in later medieval architecture.
 26. 'Concrete-vaulted architecture' in this context may be taken to include the brick-vaulted architecture of Constantinople. Several of the recent Italian studies quoted in the Bibliography (pp. 193-4) are concerned with the technical ingenuity displayed by the Roman architect in producing the lightest possible vaulting-substance. In Constantinople the lightest material available was brick (see E. H. Swift, *Hagia Sophia*, p. 65), and this accordingly replaced the concrete of Italian practice.
 27. See Bibliography, p. 194.
 28. Notably by S. Bettini, *L'Architettura di San Marco*, Padova, 1946, a work of encyclopaedic documentation but faulty judgement, the positive merits of which are further obscured by the tone of violent polemic in which it is written. A full summary in English of Zaloziecky's thesis will be found in Swift, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-49. Zaloziecky's views are quoted with approval by most recent Italian scholars, e.g. by De Angelis d'Ossat, and by Verzone (see Bibliography, pp. 193-4).
 29. The derivation was not, of course, direct, but through the medium of West Roman architectural forms transplanted to, and established in, Constantinople. It is notorious that the lateral buttressing provided by the transverse walls of the flanking chapels proved insufficient to sustain the weight of the central dome and that the supporting arches subsided outwards even during construction. This in itself suggests that the architectural conception was untried, and strengthens the suspicion that it represents the union of two distinct traditions.
 30. A. C. Soper, 'The Italo-Gallic School of Early Christian Art', *Art Bulletin*, xx, 1938, pp. 145-92. Also M. Lawrence, 'City-gate sarcophagi', *ibid.*, x, 1928, pp. 1 ff.; 'Columnar sarcophagi in the Latin West', *ibid.*, xiv, 1932, pp. 103 ff.; and A. C. Soper, 'The Latin style in fourth-century Christian sarcophagi', *ibid.*, xix, 1937, pp. 148-202. The results are reviewed and summarized in C. R. Morey, *Early Christian Art*, Princeton, 1942, chapters vii and viii.
 31. See Bibliography, p. 193.
 32. In default of an adequate publication of the results of the restoration undertaken before the war by the Superintendency of Monuments for Lombardy, by far the best account of San Lorenzo will be found in P. Verzone, *L'Architettura religiosa dell' alto medioevo nell' Italia settentrionale*, Milan, 1942, pp. 79-91, with plans and bibliography. A date in the third

quarter of the fifth century appears to be well founded. The church is certainly a structural unity with the three subsidiary chapels of San Sisto and Sant' Ippolito and of Sant' Aquilino (all rest upon a common, specially prepared raft-foundation of reused classical masonry). San Sisto and San Ippolito are the burial-places of a known series of late fifth-century bishops of Milan, while the mid-fifth-century Bishop Eusebius was buried in San Lorenzo itself. About San Aquilino we are less well informed, but it was probably the burial-place of some branch of the imperial family. The surviving mosaics of San Sisto are undoubtedly of the fifth century. San Lorenzo and its associated chapels were therefore certainly in use in the latter part of the fifth century. On the other hand, the attempt to date them earlier, even as early as the fourth century, rests upon no solid evidence; and, as Verzone points out, the fifth-century ecclesiastical burials suggest a recent foundation.

33. Verzone, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-3. It was certainly vaulted. See Arnulphus, *Gesta archiepiscoporum Mediolanensium* (M.G.H. Script. viii, pp. 24-5: 'Relatu difficile videatur quae fuerint lignorum lapidumque sculpturae eorumque altrinsecus compaginatae iuncturae quae suis columnae cum basibus, tribunalia (the *exhedrae*) quoque per gymum ad desuper tegens universa musivum' (i.e. a mosaic over the central area). There is no evidence whatever of a dome (assumed without comment by Zaloziacky, *Die Sophienkirche*, &c., p. 93) and, as Verzone remarks, an intersecting barrel-vault would accord with the obvious concentration of thrust at the four corner towers, and would at the same time supply a ready answer to the problem of lighting the body of the church. The masonry of the corner towers shows that externally the vault was masked by a low, square, central tower.
34. The plan is in effect a combination of the ambulatory-principle embodied in Santa Costanza and of the open columnar *exhedrae* buttressing a circular structure which we meet, already at the beginning of the fourth century, in the so-called Temple of Minerva Medica in Rome (see p. 176 and note 39).
35. Zaloziacky, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-16. The historical evidence is well summarized on pp. 108-9, footnote 2. There is no definitive modern monograph on San Vitale.
36. L. A. Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, vol. ii, part 1, Milan, 1723, p. 97.
37. H. Swainson, 'Monograms on the Capitals of S. Sergius at Constantinople', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, iv, 1895, pp. 106-8.
38. Zaloziacky, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-8.
39. A brief recent study of the 'Temple of Minerva Medica' is that of G. Caraffa, *La Cupola della sala decagona degli Horti Liciniani: restauri 1942*, Rome, 1944. Circumstances have delayed the publication of the results of Dr. F. W. Deichmann's survey and excavations of this important monument, and I am much indebted to him for permission to anticipate his publication in this note. The construction of the building, a formal garden-pavilion, is securely dated by brick-stamps to the decade 310-20. To this first building belong the two eastern columnar *exhedrae*. It was several times modified, and the *narthex*-like porch shown in Caraffa's plan belongs to a third period, at some date later in the fourth century. For a recent model and plan, see *Palladio*, I, 1937, p. 231.

40. At Abu Mīna the *narthex* ends in two opposed columnar *exhedrae*; at Sohag there is a similar *exhedra* at one end of the *narthex*. For Abu Mīna (in the Maryūt, south-west of Alexandria) see J. B. Ward-Perkins, 'The Shrine of St. Menas in the Maryūt', forthcoming in *Papers of the British School at Rome*, vol. xvii. For the White Monastery at Sohag see U. Monneret de Villard, *Les Couvents près de Sohag*, Milan, 1925, vol. i, figs. 3 and 18.
41. M. A. Sisson, 'The Stoa of Hadrian at Athens', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, xi, 1929, pp. 50-72, and particularly pp. 66-72, pls. xvii and xxv. G. A. Sotiriou, Αἱ παλαιοχριστιανικαὶ βασιλικαὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (reprint from Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς, 1929), pp. 173-4, dates this church to the fourth century; Sisson, on the evidence of the mosaics, to c. 400. Zaloziecky (op. cit., p. 132, footnote 1) argues a sixth-century date on *a priori* stylistic grounds. But the mosaics can hardly be later than the mid fifth century, if indeed as late. This fact, coupled with the subsequent discovery of the martyrion at Seleucia-Pieria, makes nonsense of one important passage (pp. 130-5) of Zaloziecky's argument.
42. W. A. Campbell, 'The Martyrion at Seleucia Pieria', in *Antioch-on-the-Orontes*, vol. iii, *The Excavations 1937-1939*, Princeton, 1941, pp. 35-44.
43. A recent and elaborately documented statement of this point of view will be found in S. Bettini, *L'Architettura di San Marco*, Padova, 1946. The book is written in a tone of violent polemic, which obscures its real merits and leads the author into some disconcertingly sweeping judgements.
44. C. S. Fisher, 'Bath C', in *Antioch-on-the-Orontes*, vol. i, *Excavations of 1932*, Princeton, 1934, pp. 19-31, plan, pl. v; reproduced by C. R. Morey, *The Mosaics of Antioch*, 1938, p. 12. The surviving superstructures are of the fourth century, but in all essentials they follow the lines of a second-century predecessor, built probably after the earthquake of 115.
45. These baths are unpublished. They lie outside the fourth-century walls, to the west of the city.
46. D. Krencker and R. Naumann, 'Die Wallfahrtskirche des Simeon Stylites in Kal'at Sim'ân', *Abhandl. der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1938, *Phil.-hist. Klasse*, no. 4. The traces of a change of plan in the central octagon, already noted by M. Écochard ('Le Sanctuaire de Qalat Sem'an', *Bulletin d'études orientales de l'Institut de Damas*, vi, 1936, pp. 61 ff.), are shown to arise, not from a reconstruction of an existing building, but from a change of plan during construction. Note the squinches at the angles (Plate VIII, 22, after Krencker and Naumann, op. cit., pl. 16).
47. M. de Vogüé, *Le Temple à Jérusalem*, Paris, 1864, pl. 19 (reproduced by Krencker and Naumann, op. cit., pl. 27).
48. Evagrius, *Hist. Eccles.* vi. 8 (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, lxxxvi, cols. 2853-6): ὥστε πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀγιωτάτην ἐκκλησίαν ἐς ἔλαφος ἐνεχθῆναι, μόνου τοῦ ἡμισφαιρίου περισωθέντος, ἐκ τῶν Δάφνης ξύλων πρὸς Ἐφραιμίου διασκευασθέντος, ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ Ἰουστίνου σεισμῶν παθόντος. Ὅπερ ἐκλήθη ἐκ τῶν ἐφεξῆς κλώνων κατὰ τὸ βόρειον μέρος, ὥστε καὶ ἀντρεψίδοντα ξύλα βολεῖν, ἃ καὶ πεπτῶκασι τῷ σφοδρῷ κλώνῳ ὑπονοστήσαντος τοῦ ἡμισφαιρίου, καὶ ὡς ἐκ τινος κανόνος ἐς τὸν ἴδιον ἀποκαταστάνας χώρον.
49. As does Bettini, op. cit., pp. 111-12.

50. Gregory of Nyssa, Letter to Amphilocheus, Migne, *Patr. Graec.* xlvi, cols. 1093-1100, and especially the following passage: Τούτου δὲ μάλιστα παρακληθῆτι πολλὴν ποιήσασθαι τὴν φροντίδα, ὡς εἶναι τινας ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόσκειον ἐιλησιν ἐπισταμένους. Ἔμαθον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτο γινόμενον μονιμώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐπαναπαυομένου τοῖς ὑπερείδουσιν. Ἡ γὰρ τῶν ξύλων σπάνις εἰς ταύτην ἔχει ἡμᾶς τὴν ἐπίνοιαν, ὥστε λίθους ἐρέψαι τὸ οἰκοδόμημα ὄλον· διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι τοῖς τόποις ἐρέψιμον ὕλην.
- See reconstruction by S. Guyer, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xxxiii, 1933, pp. 89-90. Gregory's dome is to be conical; but it is specifically distinguished from others built with wooden centring with which the writer and the recipient of the letter were evidently quite familiar.
51. To the literary evidence here cited one may add the passage from Philostratos already quoted (note 10). The so-called cupola-church at Meriamlik (E. Herzfeld and S. Guyer, *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua*, vol. ii, *Meriamlik und Korykos*, Manchester, 1930) is better left out of consideration. Even if this, rather than the church of St. Thekla, be the μέγιστον τέμενος founded by the Emperor Zeno (Evagrius, *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 8, Migne, *Patr. Graec.* lxxxvi, cols. 2611-12), there is no clear proof that the square bay, which occupies the eastern part of the nave immediately in front of the apse, carried a dome, still less a dome of masonry. It is hard to believe that the slender corner-piers (Herzfeld and Guyer, *op. cit.*, fig. 64, illustrate the spring of one of these) carried anything heavier than a timber roof. The plan is of interest as illustrating, probably before the close of the sixth century, the modification of a basilical plan by the introduction of a centralizing feature. Whether or not it illustrates a stage in the development of later Byzantine use of the dome in structural conjunction with the basilical plan, is another matter.
52. Recent summaries, from two diametrically opposed points of view, will be found in K. A. C. Creswell, *Early Muslim Architecture*, Oxford, vol. i, 1932, chapter vii, and in Bettini, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-47. In neither case is the distinction between the simple domical vault and the true dome on spherical triangular pendentives rigidly observed.
53. E. Bertaux, *L'Art dans l'Italie méridionale*, Paris, 1901, p. 40. It should be noted that the rectangular form of this baptistry, familiar in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa, is not found elsewhere in the Early Christian series of Italy (E. Sjöqvist, 'Studi intorno alla piazza del Collegio Romano', *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, xii, 1946, p. 138).
54. See O. M. Dalton, *East Christian Art*, Oxford, 1925, p. 78, footnote 1, and p. 82, footnote 1; and Creswell, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, chapter iv. Illustrated by Rivoira (*Lombardic Architecture*, 2nd edn., 1933, vol. i, fig. 290).
55. J. B. Ward-Perkins, 'The Shrine of St. Menas in the Maryût', forthcoming in *Papers of the British School at Rome*, vol. xvii.
56. J. B. Ward-Perkins, *op. cit.* Plate VIII, 23, is drawn from K. M. Kaufmann, *Die Menasstadt und das Nationalheiligtum der altchristlichen Aegypten in der westalexandrinischen Wüste*, Leipzig, 1910, pl. vi, taken before restoration.
57. The only certain example in classical Italy of a dome on spherical triangular pendentives is a second-century tomb on the Via Nomentana, just outside Rome near the 'Casale dei Pazzi'. It was clearly defined

internally but concealed externally beneath a pitched tile-roof. A second tomb on the same road, the so-called 'Sedia del Diavolo', is possibly but not certainly of the same form (Rivoira, *Architettura Romana*, figs. 178-82; L. Crema, 'Due monumenti sepolcrali sulla via Nomentana', in *Serta Hoffleriana*, Zagreb, 1939). It is less a matter for surprise that the versatile and experimentally minded Roman architects of the second century should have hit upon this device than that there should be no evidence either of its continued employment into post-classical times or of its contemporary application to more ambitious structures.


58. G. De Angelis d'Ossat (*Romanità delle cupole paleocristiane*, p. 26) seeks to perpetuate an old fallacy in stating that the original dome of Haghia Sophia, as built by Anthemius, was not in fact a true dome at all, but a domical vault; and that it was only after the disaster of 558 that Isodorus the Younger rebuilt it as a true dome on spherical triangular pendentives (cf. Traquair, 'The Origin of the Pendentive', *Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects*, xxxv, 1927-8, pp. 185-7, 227). This assertion is based on a strange misreading of the views of Conant (see Bibliography, p. 193). What Conant in fact is seeking to demonstrate, on the base of a very precise survey, is that the original dome of Anthemius was a true dome, but of an extremely (and as the event proved dangerously) shallow, saucer-like form.
59. J. B. Ward-Perkins, 'Severan Art and Architecture at Lepcis Magna', forthcoming in *Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. xxxviii, 1948.
60. A clear example is the reorganization of Greek theatres in Asia Minor during the Early Empire to conform with Roman practice.
61. C. R. Morey (*The Mosaics of Antioch*, 1938, p. 14) remarks that in this medieval copy of a fourth-century map, these three cities are singled out and shown as walled towns, each presided over by its Tyche, the personification of its 'fortune'.
62. O. M. Dalton, *Catalogue of Early Christian Antiquities: British Museum*, 1901, pp. 74-5, nos. 332-5, the terminals probably of the poles of a litter.
63. As Alföldi has recently pointed out ('On the Foundation of Constantinople: a few Notes', *Journal of Roman Studies*, xxxvii, 1947, pp. 10-16) the coin-types show that Constantine's original intention in 324 followed the pattern already set by Diocletian. His new city was to be no more than a central administrative capital, similar to Nicomedia except that it was to serve for the whole empire. He did not at this stage intend to deprive Rome of its time-honoured privileges. That occurred only later, in 330, in circumstances which Alföldi discusses.
64. Morey, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
65. Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*, 7.
66. J. Strzygowski, 'Spalato ein Markstein der romanischen Kunst', *Festschrift F. Schneider*, pp. 325 ff.
67. E. Dyggve, 'Kurzer, vorläufiger Bericht über die Ausgrabungen im Palastviertel von Thessaloniki, Frühjahr 1939', *Laureae Aquincenses memoriae Valentini Kuzsinsky dicatae (Dissertationes Pannonicae, series 2, no. 11)*, Budapest, 1941 *Archäologischer Anzeiger*, 1941, 254-60. See also Ch. Diehl, M. le Tourneau, H. Saladin, *Les Monuments chrétiens de Salonique*, Paris, 1918; and E. Hébrard, 'Les travaux du service archéologique de l'armée

d'Orient à l'arc de triomphe "de Galère" et à l'église Saint-Georges de Salonique', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, xlv, 1920, pp. 5-40.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RELEVANT RECENT PUBLICATIONS.


- S. Bettini, *L'Architettura di San Marco*, Padova, 1946.
- A. Boëthius, 'The Neronian Nova Urbs', *Acta Instituti Romani Regni Sueciae*, ii, 1932 (*Corolla Archaeologica Principi Hereditario Regni Sueciae Gustavo Adolpho dedicata*), pp. 84 ff.
- A. Boëthius, 'Remarks on the Development of Domestic Architecture in Rome', *American Journal of Archaeology*, xxxviii, 1934, pp. 158-70.
- A. Boëthius, 'Appunti sul carattere razionale e sull'importanza dell'architettura domestica di Roma imperiale', *Scritti in onore di Bartolomeo Nogara*, Vatican City, 1937, pp. 21-32.
- A. Boëthius, 'Roman Architecture from its Classicistic to its Late Imperial Phase', *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, vol. xlvii, 1941.
- K. J. Conant, 'The First Dome of St. Sophia, and its Rebuilding', *American Journal of Archaeology*, xliii, 1939, pp. 589-91.
- K. J. Conant, 'The First Dome of St. Sophia, and its Rebuilding', *The Bulletin of the Byzantine Institute*, i, 1946, pp. 71-8.
- L. Crema, 'Due monumenti sepolcrali sulla via Nomentana', in *Serta Hoffiliana*, Zagreb, 1939.
- G. De Angelis d'Ossat, 'L'Importanza architettonica del battistero di Fréjus', *Bollettino del Museo dell' Impero Romano*, 1935 (appendix to *Bull. della Commissione Archeologica Comunale di Roma*, lxiii, 1935), pp. 39-51.
- G. De Angelis d'Ossat, 'I Battisteri di Albenga e Ventimiglia', *Bollettino della R. Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, Sezione Ingauna ed Intemelina*, 1936, pp. 207-50.
- G. De Angelis d'Ossat, 'Sugli edifici ottagonali a cupola nell' antichità e nel medioevo', *Atti del I Congresso Nazionale di Storia dell'Architettura*, Firenze, 1936, Florence, 1938, pp. 13-24.
- G. De Angelis d'Ossat, 'La Forma e la costruzione delle cupole nell' architettura romana', *Atti del III Convegno Nazionale di Storia dell'Architettura*, Roma, 1938 (otherwise entitled *Saggi sull' Architettura Etrusca e Romana*), Rome, 1940, pp. 223-50.
- G. De Angelis d'Ossat, 'Architettura romana a volta, 1935-40', *Bollettino della Commissione Archeologica del Governatorato di Roma*, lxix, 1941, pp. 132-6.
- G. De Angelis d'Ossat, 'Romanità delle cupole paleocristiane' (*Istituto di Studi Romani: Le cupole di Roma*, no. 5), Rome, 1946.
- E. Dyggve, 'Die altchristlichen Kultbauten an der Westküste der Balkanhalbinsel', *Atti del IV Congresso Internazionale di Archeologia Cristiana*, Rome, 1940, pp. 391-414.
- E. Dyggve, *Ravennatum Palatium Sacrum: la basilica ipetrale per cerimonie* (*Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab: Arch.-kunsthist. Meddelelser*, iii. 2), Copenhagen, 1941.
- W. Emerson and R. L. Van Nice, 'Haghia Sophia, Istanbul: preliminary report of the recent examination of the structure', *American Journal of Archaeology*, xlvii, 1943, pp. 403-6, distinguishing those surviving parts

- of the dome attributable to Isidorus the Younger, to Trdat (986-94), and to the fourteenth-century architects.
- G. Giovannoni, *Tecnica della costruzione presso i Romani*, Rome, 1925.
- G. Giovannoni, 'La cupola di Santa Costanza e le volte romane a struttura leggera', *Atti del IV Congresso Nazionale di Studi Romani*, Rome, 1938, II, pp. 211-16.
- G. Giovannoni, 'L'organismo a volta dalla architettura romana alla bizantina', *Felix Ravenna*, 1939, pp. 5-30.
- G. Giovannoni, 'Volte romane e volte bizantine', *Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Studi Bizantini*, ii, Rome, 1940, pp. 133-8.
- G. Giovannoni, 'La Cupola della *domus aurea* neroniana in Roma', *Atti del I Congresso Nazionale di Storia dell'Architettura*, Firenze, 1938, pp. 3-6.
- S. Guyer, 'Die Bedeutung der christlichen Baukunst des inneren Kleinasiens für die allgemeine Kunstgeschichte', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xxxiii, 1933, pp. 78-104, 313-30.
- S. Guyer, 'Rom und die altbyzantinischen Architekturformen', *Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Studi Bizantini*, Rome, 1940, ii, pp. 155-61.
- S. Guyer, 'Beiträge zur Frage nach dem Ursprung des kreuzförmig-basilikalischen Kirchenbaus des Abendlandes', *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Archäologie und Kunstgeschichte*, vii, 1945, pp. 73-104.
- S. Guyer, 'Antike-Mittelalter', *Phoebus*, i, Basel, 1946, pp. 97-104.
- R. Krautheimer, 'S. Pietro in Vincoli and the Tripartite Transept in the Early Christian Basilica', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, lxxxiv, 1941, pp. 353-429.
- R. Krautheimer, 'The Carolingian Revival of Early Christian Architecture', *Art Bulletin*, xxiv, 1942, pp. 1-38.
- G. Lugli, 'Nuove forme dell'architettura romana', *Atti del III Convegno Nazionale di Storia dell'Architettura, Roma, 1938* (otherwise entitled *Saggi sull'Architettura Etrusca e Romana*), Rome, 1940, pp. 95-102.
- A. M. Schneider, 'Das Architektursystem der Hagia Sophia zu Konstantinopel', *Oriens Christianus*, xxxvi, 1939, pp. 1-13. A criticism of Sedlmayr's theories and a vigorous reaffirmation of the oriental element in sixth-century Byzantine architecture.
- A. M. Schneider, *Die Grabung im Westhof der Sophienkirche zu Istanbul (Istanbuler Forschungen, no. 12)*, Berlin, 1941.
- A. M. Schneider, review of Zaloziecky, *Die Sophienkirche*, in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xxxviii, 1938, pp. 182-6.
- A. M. Schneider, *Die Hagia Sophia zu Konstantinopel (Bilderhefte antiker Kunst herausgegeben vom arch. Inst. d. deutschen Reiches, no. vi)*. Berlin, no date (1938 or 1939).
- H. Sedlmayr, 'Zur Geschichte des justinianischen Architektursystems', *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, xxxv, 1935, pp. 38-69.
- E. H. Swift, *Hagia Sophia*, New York, 1940. This book contains excellent summaries in English of the works, cited in this Bibliography, of Conant and Zaloziecky, and in part that of Sedlmayr also.
- P. Verzone, *L'Architettura religiosa dell' alto medioevo nell' Italia settentrionale*, Milan, 1942, a most valuable and well-documented summary.
- W. R. Zaloziecky, *Die Sophienkirche in Konstantinopel und ihre Stellung in der Geschichte der abendländischen Architektur (Pontificio Istituto di Archeologia Cristiana: Studi di Antichità Cristiana, no. xii)*, Rome-Freiburg, 1936.




(after Lugli)

1. Nero's Golden House: The Main Wing. The oblique walls are the later foundations of Trajan's Baths




(after Guattani)

2. The Domestic Wing of Domitian's Palace on the Palatine




3. Baths of Nero

(after Palladio)






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 13 15 m.

4. Hadrian's Villa, Smaller Baths






0 5 10 20 30 40 50 m.

5. Baths of Diocletian, Frigidarium




6. Rome, Basilica of Maxentius

7. Constantinople, Hagia Sophia



8. Ravenna, S. Vitale


9. Constantinople, SS. Sergius and Bacchus



10. Milan, S. Lorenzo




11. Ravenna, S. Vitale



0 2 4 6 8 10 20 m.


12. Milan, S. Lorenzo



0 2 4 6 8 10 20 m.

13. Athens, Church in the Stoa of Hadrian

14. Seleucia Pieria, Martyrion




(Photo: Ministry of Public Instruction)

15. Rome, Santa Sabina



(Photo: Museo di Roma)

16. Trier, The Constantinian Basilica




(after a model in the Museo di Roma)

17. Rome, House at the Foot of the Aracoeli Steps




(after Krencker and Krüger)

18. Trier, The Imperial Baths: Reconstructed Model



0 5 10 20 30 M.

19. Antioch, Bath 'C'




0 1 2 3 4 5 10 M.

20. Lepcis Magna, The Extramural, or Hunters', Baths



21. Lepcis Magna, The Extramural, or Hunters', Baths



(after Krenker)

22. Kal'at Sim'an: Restored Squinch from the Octagon



23 (above). Abu Mina, near Alexandria:
Chapel in the crypt with spherical
triangular pendentives



24 (right). Constantinople, Haghia
Sophia: Pendentive

SOME ATTIC VASES IN THE CYPRUS MUSEUM

By J. D. BEAZLEY

Fellow of the Academy

Communicated 5 December 1947

SOME of these vases are unpublished, and my thanks are due to Mr. A. H. S. Megaw, Director of Antiquities in Cyprus, and Mr. P. Dikaios, Curator of the Cyprus Museum, Nicosia, for their kind permission to figure them. Others have been published already, but the new photographs supplement the earlier publications. Something is said too about a few vases figured elsewhere but not here.

Most of the photographs are by Mr. Kakouli Georghiou. I am much indebted to him and to the other members of the staff of the Cyprus Museum for their ready help.

C 438 (Myres 1556), bf. cup, from Marion. Dm. ·159, ht. ·114. A, Pl. 1, 1-2.

Many Little-master cups (*JHS.* 52 pp. 167-204) have been found at Marion, and evidently the inhabitants had a special liking for them. This is a lip-cup. On each side, a small picture of a swan on the offset lip; below, in the handle-zone, the inscription +ΑΙΡΕΚΑΙΠΙΕΙΕΥ (χαίρει καὶ πίει εὔ) between the palmettes that spring from the handles. On the side not figured the first alpha is Α not Α. The palmettes have black petals and a red heart. The middle band of the swan's wings is white, thickly set with upright incised lines; it is flanked by a pair of red bands, the nether of which is edged below by white dots. A line of dots, larger red alternating with smaller white, runs down the neck and breast.

The date is about 550-530 B.C., and the drawing is by the Tleson Painter, who is known from many vases; nearly all lip-cups, which bear the signature of the potter Tleson, son of Nearchos. Tleson may have painted the vases as well as fashioned them, but this is uncertain: so we speak of 'the Tleson Painter'. Both in fabric and in drawing the Tleson cups are central and classic examples of the Little-master style. A signed replica of the Nicosia cup was found at Orvieto and is in the Museum there (Hoppin *Bf.* p. 396). On a third swan-cup by the Tleson Painter, in the collection of Prince Czartoryski at Castle Golucho (de Witte *Vases à l'Hôtel Lambert* pl. 2, whence Hoppin *Bf.*

p. 397; *CV*. pl. 13, 4), the bird faces the other way and is not quite so like ours. A fourth swan lip-cup by Tleson was found in the Torlonia excavations at Vulci, but is known only from the bare description by Helbig in *Bullettino* 1880 p. 144: 'a swan preening itself'.

Most of the Tleson Painter's works bear the signature, but others, unsigned, can be ascribed to him on grounds of style. A distinction should be made between those that were certainly not signed, and those fragmentary cups that may have had a signature on a part now missing.

The following were not signed. In three of them, the lip-cups in New York and London, and the lost cup from Marion, as in the Nicosia cup, the signature is replaced by the popular greeting $\chi\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \pi\iota\epsilon\iota\ \epsilon\upsilon$. In the two other lip-cups the space between the palmettes is blank.

Lip-cups

1. New York 18.74.2, from Rhodes. A, *Bull. Metr. Mus.* 14 (1919) p. 10 fig. 3. I, siren.
2. London B 416, from Camiros. *CV*. pl. 11, 6. I, bird flying.
3. Once Brussels, van Branteghem (no. 18 in the sale catalogue), from Marion. A, Ohnefalsch-Richter *Kypros, the Bible and Homer* pl. 109, 11-12. A, siren and sphinx; B, the like.
4. Würzburg 409. Langlotz pl. 113. A, siren; B, siren.
5. Compiègne 1091, from Vulci. *CV*. pl. 5, 4 and 6. A, siren; B, siren.

Band-cups

The first and third are assigned to the Tleson Painter in *JHS*. 52 p. 196, the second in *Memoirs of the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society* 85, 39.

6. Cab. Méd. 317. Part, de Ridder pl. 8 and p. 211; *CV*. pl. 47, 5-8. A, cocks between hens; B, stag between sirens.
7. Manchester III. H 51. Part, *Mem. Manch.* 85 p. 42, pl. 1, a-b. A, cocks between hens; B, stag between sirens.
8. Munich (ex Loeb), from Taranto. Sieveking *BTV*. pl. 43, 1 and p. 55; *JHS*. 52 pl. 9. A, cocks between hens; B, goats between sirens.
9. New York GR 542. A, two sphinxes; B, siren and panther.

Pyxis (cylindrical)

10. Athens 502 (CC. 686), from Eleusis. Siren between cocks; siren between sphinxes. The lid is missing. Eleusis 884 is

a pyxis of the same type: on the lid, women dancing, and animals: I did not think of the Tleson Painter.

The following fragments by the Tleson Painter may be from signed works for all one can tell:

Lip-cups

1. Athens Acr. 1768, fr., from Athens. I, wounded stag (antlers, spear, ear, remain: replica, so far as preserved, of the Tleson cup in Boston, 98.920, Hoppin *Bf.* 371).
2. Leipsic T 446, fr. I, cock.
3. Athens, North Slope, R 151, fr., from Athens. *Hesp.* 9, 191, 151. I, cock and hen.
4. Villa Giulia, fr. (ex Castellani). A, hen (to left). Attributed to the painter in *JHS.* 52 p. 196.
5. Athens Acr. 1567, fr., from Athens. A, two cocks.
6. Oxford G 137.35, fr., from Naucratis. A, two cocks (heads down). In the handle-zone (part of a hound, it seems).
7. Athens Acr. 613, fr., from Athens. Graef pl. 24. A, siren. This was part of a huge lip-cup. Boston F. 357.9 (N 202), from Naucratis (Fairbanks pl. 39) is a fragment of another very large lip-cup: all that remains is, in the handle-zone, the tail of a feline—whether by the Tleson Painter or another one cannot say.
8. Munich, two fr. A, siren; B, siren. Part of the inscription in the handle-zone of A remains: it is [+A]ΠΡΕΚ[ΑΙΓΙΕΙΕΥ], and the cup was probably unsigned.

Very close to the Tleson Painter, and perhaps by himself, is a small fragment of a lip-cup in Oxford, from Naucratis (A, lion and goat: the head of the lion remains, and the forepart of the goat).

On Tleson and the Tleson Painter see *JHS.* 52 pp. 195–6, 172–3, 176, 180–2, 184, 191, 193; *RG.* pp. 55–6; also Hambridge *The Diagonal* i pp. 104–9; *Mem. Manch.* 85 pp. 39–40 (Webster); *Bull. Metr.* 33 pp. 52–4 (Richter); *AJA.* 1945 p. 467 (H. R. W. Smith).

Greifenhagen points out, in the *Brunswick Corpus*, that of the cup-fragments in Brunswick mentioned in *JHS.* 52 p. 184, the fragment of a lip-cup with the inscription ΤΛΕΣΟ[Ν . . .], Brunswick 485 (*CV.* pl. 10, 3) is not from the same as the fragment of a Little-master cup Brunswick 489, with . . . ΕΡΓΟ]ΙΕΣΕΝ (*CV.* pl. 10, 2), which is not Tlesonian.

In *JHS.* 52 p. 196 I hazarded that a cup of different type, Boston 99.518, with Circe and Polyphemos (*AJA.* 1913 pp. 2 and 4; *AJA.* 1923 p. 427), might be by the Tleson Painter, but I should not maintain this now.

C 440 (Myres 1542), bf. amphora, from Tamassos. A, Rumpf *Sakonides* pl. 27, b and pl. 26, a; A, *Dikaios Guide* pl. 14, 2; Pl. 2. Height .320, with the lid about .370. A, erastes and eromenos: a man courting a boy; B, the like. About 540-530 B.C., by Lydos: the attribution first made, it seems, by Jenkins. This is one of the finest black-figure vases found in Cyprus.

The handles stand well away from the body; the mouth flares little. A pair of red lines on the neck, another pair below the pictures; a red line above the base-rays, another below them, a third half-way along the foot. Three red lines, spaced out, inside the mouth. The knob of the lid is complete: it is not the usual 'pomegranate' knob. On the top of it, a tiny red circle within a larger; on the body of the lid, three red lines; the upright edge of the lid is red.

A (Pl. 2, 2): a man stands to right with bent knees, chin slightly raised, his left forearm raised with the hand touching the chin of a boy who stands facing him, and his right arm extended downwards towards the boy's middle. The boy grasps the man's left wrist with his right hand, while his left hand protects his middle. On each side, a man dances. The three left-hand figures have a garland hanging from one forearm: it is red, with two rows of white dots. Hair and beards are red, and a red circle surrounds each nipple. The picture on B (Pl. 2, 1) is the same, with some variations. The boy has long hair, tied near the end, instead of short; he holds a wreath in his right hand instead of grasping the man's arm, and the action of his left hand is less marked. The dancer on the left faces outwards, and the position of his right arm is different.

This is a popular scene in Attic black-figure vase-painting; and the chief group recurs, with comparatively slight variations, on many vases. The bent knees of the wooer, and the 'up and down' position, as I shall call it, of his arms, are regular. The boy stands still, and not infrequently grasps one of the man's arms, usually the raised one. The protective gesture of the left hand occurs only here. The boy sometimes holds a wreath; and larger garlands are often held, hang from the arms, are worn round the neck, or are slung bandolier-wise across the body. The flanking figures often dance, contributing to the

general tone of the scene by adding an aura of excitement to the concentration of the principal group.

Lydos repeats the two chief figures on one side of his amphora from Vulci in the Cabinet des Médailles (206: de Ridder p. 116 and pl. 5; *CV.* pl. 34, 1-2 and 8; A, *BSA.* 32 pl. 10; B, Rumpf *Sakonides* pl. 5, 12; B, Hofkes-Brukker *Frühgriechische Gruppenbildung* pl. 5, 12). The man's chin is raised higher; the youth grasps the wrist as on A of the Nicosia vase, but his hair is long as on B; in his left hand he holds a garland. The secondary figures are different: on the left, two youths, on the right, two men, one naked, the other well wrapped up, stand still and look on somewhat phlegmatically.

I have said something about these courting-scenes in *CV.* Oxford p. 97, text to pl. 3, 23, and in *JHS.* 49 pp. 260 and 267; see also Salis *Theseus und Ariadne* pp. 9-11 and Friis Johansen in *From the Collections of the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek* 3 pp. 129-32 and 136. I distinguish three types, α , β , γ , and give lists. The direction is usually rightward as on the Nicosia vase—that is, the wooer faces right; when it is leftward, I say so. I say also if the man's arms are some distance away from the boy. The figures are naked, unless stated to be clothed.

In this section I am much indebted to Miss Lucy Talcott, Dr. Dietrich von Bothmer, and Mr. François Villard: to Miss Talcott for information about the two cups from the Agora, to Dr. von Bothmer for supplementing my notes on the vases in Boston and New York, to Mr. Villard for sending me photographs and descriptions of the black-figured cups in the Louvre: he has also given me references to his forthcoming fascicule of the Louvre *Corpus Vasorum*.

Type α

α 1. Athens Acr. 1783, fragment of a bf. cup. Graef pl. 87. Inside, leftward: a boy stands to right, holding three crocuses in his left hand; facing him is a man with arms 'up and down'. The right hand is not very near the chin. Both wear cloaks. Still the second quarter of the sixth century.

α 2. Boston 08.291, bf. lekythos of Deianeira shape (Haspels *ABL.* p. 27). Part, Haspels *ABL.* pl. 8, 2; the shape, Caskey *G.* p. 209. Three zones: in the second, youths riding, alternately naked and wearing a chitoniskos; in the third, cock-fight, and hounds after hare; no hunter, but a flying lagobolon supposes one. The courting scene is in the uppermost zone. In the middle, man and boy: the man, with his dog beside him,

hastens forward, arms 'up and down', the left hand taking the boy's chin; the boy raises his right forearm, but does not grasp the arm of the man. On the left and right, men and youths arrive with gifts, most of them in haste: on the left, a youth with an aryballos, a man with a dog and a ball, a youth with a cock; on the right, a youth with a hare and a man with a hen. Under the handle, a cock, to right. The date must be a little before the middle of the sixth century. For the style, compare a panathenaic amphoriskos at Athens in the Vlasto collection (cavalcade: youths galloping, preceded by a youth running; on the shoulder, each side, two lions attacking a bull).

α 3. London B 600.28, fragment of a bf. cup, Siana type, from Naucratis. Petrie *Naucratis* i pl. 13, 4; *JHS.* 49 pl. 16, 5. Inside, a man touches the chin of a youth who takes him by the beard. This gesture, taking by the beard, occurs in other of our pictures: on the amphora London W 39 (β 8), the Berlin tripod (α 4), the Boston alabastron (α 17), and one of Hartwig's cup-fragments (α 30). The man's legs must have been bent at the knee. On the right, part of a garment. Rather before the middle of the sixth century; related to the Siana cups Athens 529 (Ross *Arch. Aufsätze* ii pl. 2, whence, I, Baur *Centaur's* p. 14; the side, Jacobsthal *O.* pl. 67, c) and Louvre F 67 (*CV.* pl. 78, 1-2 and 4), which are closely connected with the Heidelberg Painter.

α 4. Berlin 1728, bf. tripod pyxis. Gerhard *ECV.* pl. 13, 4-7. Leftward. A boy, to right, his left hand touching the beard of a man who faces him with bent knees, his left hand in the down position. For the touching of the beard see α 3. On the left, a youth arrives, holding out a wreath in his left hand; on the right, a youth rushes away, looking back. Middle of the sixth century. Another vase of the same shape and period may be mentioned here, although the subject does not exactly fall under any of our headings: Munich 2290 (J. 1255: Lau pl. 14, 2): a man walks up holding out a wreath and leading his dog; a boy stands facing him, his right hand raised in greeting, a wreath in his left.

α 5. Yale 122, bf. tripod pyxis. Baur pl. 3, above, pl. 4, and p. 82, whence (our scene) Hofkes-Brukker pl. 5, 11. A man with bent knees, arms 'up and down', touches with his left hand the chin of the boy, who holds an aryballos by the thong. (Baur speaks of a purple strigil held by him, but this is really the gar-

land hanging from the man's right forearm). To left and right, a man dancing; two onlookers, fully dressed, complete the picture. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century.

α 6. Louvre F 187, bf. tumbler. There are two scenes. (1) The chief group is leftward: a youth stands to right, a man approaches him, arms 'up and down'; on the left, four figures: a clothed youth, standing to right, a naked youth running to right, looking round, a clothed youth standing to right, a naked youth running to right. (2) Two youths and a woman. Middle or third quarter of the sixth century, old-fashioned style, rough and worthless. Some of the figures described as youths may be men.

α 7. Louvre F 51, bf. hydria. *CV.* pl. 67, 3-6; detail, *BSA.* 32, pl. 5, 2. There is a courting scene in a panel on each side of the chief picture. In the left panel the direction is leftward: a youth standing to right grasps both wrists of a man who approaches him with arms 'up and down'. A pair of small incised arcs on the youth's cheek are perhaps the earliest representation of a dimple. On the right, a youth (a rival? of which?) retires (hurt?), looking back. In the other panel the direction is rightward: a man embraces a boy, who sinks his head and responds timidly. The man lays his right hand on the boy's left forearm. His left hand passes beyond the boy's back, the beginning of an embrace: compare the amphora London W 39 (β 8), the Boston alabastron (α 17), and a cup in the Louvre (α 28). The third person is a man, who makes off, looking back, with his right hand in front of him and his left arm raised as if he were dancing. The panels are vivid and have some unusual features. Middle of the sixth century, by the artist named, after this vase, the Painter of Louvre F 51 (*BSA.* 32 p. 12 no. 2). See also below, β 9.

α 8 and 9. Nicosia and Cabinet des Médailles 206, two amphorae by Lydos: see above, pp. 198-9.

α 10. Würzburg 241, bf. amphora. Langlotz pll. 64-5, whence (A) *From the Coll.* 3 p. 131; B, *JHS.* 52 p. 198; A, Hofkes-Brukker pl. 5, 10. This is perhaps the finest of these vases. There are no supporting figures, and hardly any patterns. The same picture, with small differences, on both sides of the vase. The man moves forward with arms 'up and down', and takes the chin of the boy, who holds a wreath in his left hand. Between the two figures is an upright spear: it is not

obvious whether the boy is holding it with his right hand, or grasping the raised forearm of the man. On A (Langlotz pl. 65) one would say that he was holding the spear; on B (Langlotz pl. 66), that he was grasping the arm (and, if so, the spear might be thought of as stuck in the ground): against this, that the lower line of the man's forearm is not indicated where the palm meets it: I think therefore that in B as in A the boy holds the spear. So also on the cup by the Amasis Painter in the Louvre (β 3), on a neck-amphora in New York (α 12), on a cup in Berlin (α 26); in a London cup-fragment there is the same question as here (α 11). Spears were often used as staves in the sixth century, and do not imply anything warlike. On B, the boy's left hand looks, in the photograph, as if it were empty. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century, by the Phrynos Painter (*JHS.* 52 p. 199).

α 11. London 1916. 2-16. 2, fragments of a bf. cup (lip-cup or the like), from Egypt. *JHS.* 49 pl. 16, 3 (and p. 267 no. 47). Only the middle of the picture inside is preserved. The wooer's arms are 'up and down'. The boy holds a wreath in his left hand. As to his right, there is the same question as in the Würzburg amphora (α 10): is he holding the spear, or grasping the man's forearm? The answer is the same: holding the spear. Not all the details show in the photograph: elbow and fingernails are indicated, and a pair of arcs give the hollow of the thigh. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century. For the style I compared another fine cup-fragment in London (*JHS.* 49 pl. 16, 4 and p. 267 no. 48: from a Siana cup). I now compare the Würzburg amphora (α 10): the drawing is so like, that our fragment, too, must be by the Phrynos Painter.

α 12. New York 41. 162.32, small bf. neck-amphora of unique shape. *CV.* Gallatin pl. 2, 9 and 11; A, Richter and Milne fig. 35. On B, a man prances forward, arms 'up and down', his left hand touching the boy's chin, the right not yet very near him. The boy holds a wand (see α 10) and a fillet in his left hand. On the right a man stands fully clothed holding a wand. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century.

α 13. Vatican 352, bf. amphora. *Mus. Greg.* ii pl. 44, 1; Albizzati pl. 45. A man stands with bent knees, arms 'up and down', a dog beside him; the boy grasps the man's 'down' forearm with his left hand, and probably the 'up' forearm with his right: this part is roughly drawn, but compare the neck-

amphora Munich 1468 (α 14). On the left, three persons come up: a man with a dog behind him, a boy holding a pair of cocks (or a cock and a hen), and a man with an uncertain object; on the right, a man holding a fillet, a man turned to right, but looking back, with knees slightly bent, holding a cock, and two men, one holding a garland, the other dressed in a cloak. The attitude of the man holding the cock and looking back recalls a later vase, London B 262 (α 23), and one might have expected that the cock was intended for the person facing him: but this is a man. It is not plain who holds the leashes of the dogs, and possibly these are thought of as tied to the wall. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century, near Group E, though not mentioned in my account of it (*BSA*. 32 pp. 3-8).

α 14. Munich 1468 (J. 1336), bf. neck-amphora of special type. A (our side), Vorberg *Gloss[arium eroticum]* p. 420; the shoulder-picture on B, *JHS*. 25 pl. 12, a-b. The man stands with bent knees, chin lifted, arms 'up and down'; the youth holds a wreath in his left hand, and grasps the man's raised wrist with his right. On each side, a man dances; the right-hand dancer holds a fawn over his shoulder (see α 18). Middle to third quarter of the sixth century, by the Painter of Cambridge 47 (*BSA*. 32 p. 10, above, no. 3; *RG*. p. 28).

α 15. Leningrad 1440, bf. lekythos of sub-Deianeira shape. Vorberg *Gloss*. p. 416. My knowledge of the vase is derived from the defective illustration in Vorberg. There may be some restoration. A man stands to right, bending somewhat; with his left hand he touches the chin of a boy who stands facing him, while his right hand is in the 'down' position though some distance from the boy. The boy grasps the man's left wrist with his right hand. A rare feature is the man's himation, which not only covers his upper part, but is spread out and hangs over the boy's shoulders, forming a background for both figures from shoulders to knees. This use of the himation recalls one of the red-figure pictures (γ 17), but, even more, the groups of two women sharing a himation on black-figured lekythoi of the same type as ours (Haspels *ABL*. pl. 8 and pp. 25-6); see also p. 218. Third quarter of the sixth century: see Haspels *ABL*. pp. 25-6.

α 16. Villa Giulia 50653 (M. 556), bf. lekythos. Mingazzini *Vasi Cast.* pl. 86, 1 and 8, pl. 87, 6, and pl. 88, 3. The chief picture will be described later (γ 4). In the secondary picture, on the shoulder (Mingazzini pl. 86, 8), a youth approaches a boy.

with arms 'up and down', but the lower one some distance off. The boy holds a wreath in his right hand (not, as Mingazzini, a strigil). On each side, a youth dancing. This is the earliest picture in which the wooer is a youth, not a man. On the style see γ 4: by the Taleides Painter.

α 17. Boston, small bf. alabastron of unique, 'deflated' shape. A man moves quickly towards a boy: his right arm is in the 'down' position, but his left is stretched out with the hand concealed by the boy's chest—embracing then (see α 7). The boy raises his right hand and touches the man's beard (see α 3). On the right, a dog, standing to left, head raised. On each side of the pair, a youth hastens up with a cock. On the extreme left, a youth runs or dances up to right, looking round. Third quarter of the sixth century.

α 18. Boston, fragment of a thin stand-like bf. object, perhaps, as Dr. von Bothmer suggests, a thurible. Only the upper half of the picture is preserved. There are two groups. (1) In the first, the man's arms are 'up and down', the left hand almost touching the boy's chin; the boy grasps the fingers of the man's right hand with his own right. On the left, a youth arrives carrying a fox tied to a stick over his shoulder: compare the hunter carrying a fox on the Kerameikos lekythos (β 1), and the man with the fawn on the neck-amphora in Munich (α 14). (2) The second group repeats the first, but man and boy only; the hand touches the chin. Third quarter of the sixth century. For the style compare the Berlin cup 1774 (α 26).

α 19. Boston 13.105, bf. aryballos in the form of an aidoion. Purchased from Lambros of Athens, so probably found in Greece. *Mü. Jb.* 1919 (= Buschor *Krokodil*) p. 10; Hoppin *Bf.* p. 316; Vorberg *Über das Geschlechtsleben im Altertum* pl. 27, 2. On the back of the handle a tiny group of man and boy: the man's knees are bent, his arms 'up and down'; the boy holds a wreath. Third quarter of the sixth century, signed by the potter Priapos (see *BSA.* 29 pp. 203-4; *JHS.* 52 p. 201).

α 20. Boston 13.106 (F. 537), bf. aryballos. Fairbanks pl. 51. Bought of Rhousopoulos, so probably from Greece. On each of the two handles a tiny picture. On one handle, man and boy. The man's knees are much bent, and his chin lifted; both arms are down; the boy's left hand is at his hip and his right raised to the man's chin. On the other handle, youth and boy. The youth's right hand is down, but his left arm is on the boy's

shoulder, embracing; the boy's left hand is at his hip and his right laid on the youth's right wrist. Third quarter of the sixth century: see *BSA*. 29 pp. 200-1.

α 21. Oxford 215, bf. neck-amphora of Nicosthenic shape. Gardner pl. 4 and p. 11 figs. 17-18, whence Hoppin *Bf.* pp. 214-15. A, the man approaches with arms 'up and down'. Between the two figures, what looks more like the trunk of a shrub or a vine-stock than anything else—the upper part is missing—; also a small vessel, partly repainted. A youth dances or trips forward on the left, and another makes off on the right, looking back. B is similar, but the hands are some way from the boy. On each side a youth dancing. Third quarter of the sixth century; abominable style, even for Painter N, as I call the man who decorated the neck-amphorae signed by the potter Nikosthenes.

α 22. Toronto 344, bf. skyphos. Robinson and Harcum pl. 52. A man trips forward to a boy, arms 'up and down'. The boy has a himation round his waist, which he holds up with his right hand; he is bare from the waist up: compare the skyphos in the Basle market (α 43) and a cup in the Louvre (α 22). Second half of the sixth century: Ure's Class A 1 (*Sixth* p. 58).

α 23. London B 262, bf. neck-amphora. *CV*. pl. 68, 2. For the chief group see β 16. The secondary group, to right of the other, consists of a man walking towards a boy, but looking back towards the chief pair as in the Vatican amphora (α 13). His arms are 'up and down'. The boy wears a cloak. On the style see β 16.

α 24. Munich 2133, bf. lip-cup. Licht iii p. 208; Vorberg *Gloss.* p. 751. Inside: the man's knees are bent and his chin lifted. The boy holds a wreath in his left hand and grasps the man's left wrist with his right. On the left, a garment hangs from a peg; a hare hangs from another peg on the right. There is some repainting. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century.

α 25. Athens, North Slope, fragment of a bf. lip-cup. *Hesp.* 4 p. 262, 105. Inside, the heads of a man and a youth remain, with part of the man's raised hand. Third quarter of the sixth century. In *Hesp.* 4 p. 268 Miss Pease records my guess that 105 might come from the same cup as 103 (γ 10): but while the heads and hands on 105 must come from a group of Type α, the legs on 103 must come from a group of Type γ.

α 26. Berlin 1774, bf. lip-cup. Salis *Theseus und Ariadne* p. 7. Inside: the man stands with bent knees and arms 'up and down'. The boy holds a garland in his left hand and a spear in his right (see α 10). On the left a man, on the right a youth, both dancing. The artist has found himself forced to dwarf the dancers. Third quarter of the sixth century. For the style compare the Boston thurible-fragment (α 18).

α 27. Heidelberg 1903, phiale with decoration in silhouette, said to be from the Cabirion. Salis *Theseus und Ariadne* p. 8. The same group is given four times: a man, arms 'up and down', approaches a youth; on each side of the couple a male onlooker, clothed, sits on a camp-stool, holding a staff. In one of the groups there is a fifth figure on the left, a naked youth hastening up. Third quarter of the sixth century. The clay is said to be yellowish and the vase to be Boeotian: but it is very like a silhouette phiale, from Syracuse, in Syracuse (*NSc.* 1893 p. 479, below), which must be Attic. The Heidelberg phiale is mentioned among Boeotian vases by Ure in his *Classification of Boeotian Pottery* (p. 21, middle), but he tells me that he hesitated to insert it and much doubts if he was right.

The next thirteen vases (α 28-40) are rough cups, of type A, from the last quarter of the sixth century or the later part of the third quarter: hackwork of little interest.

α 28. Louvre CA 3096, bf. cup of type A. *CV.* pl. 94, 3-4 and 12. Outside: on A, three groups of man and boy: in the middle, a man with bent knees, arms 'up and down'; the gesture of the boy's right hand is uncertain, the drawing being blurred at this place. In the group to left of this, the man's right hand is 'down', but the left is concealed by the boy's chest—the beginning of an embrace: see α 7. The boy's right forearm is extended, but the hand does not appear to grasp the forearm of the man. The group on the right resembles the middle one, but here the boy is certainly grasping the man's arm. On B, one group of three: the man is in the same position as in the middle group on A, but his left hand does not touch the chin; the boy's right forearm is extended with the hand open; on the right, a man dances to right, looking back. At the handle, palmettes of the same type as in the Toronto skyphos (α 22): see Ure *Sixth* p. 58.

α 29. Once Rome, Hartwig, fragment of a bf. cup, type A. Outside, between eyes, part of the group remains: head and

shoulders of a man to right, upper half of a youth to left, his right hand raised with the hand concealed by the man's head.

α 30. Once Rome, Hartwig, fragment of a bf. cup, type A. Outside, between eyes, a man moving to right, arms 'up and down', but the hand not touching the boy's chin; the boy holds a wreath in his left hand, and takes hold of the man's beard with his right: see α 3.

α 31. Louvre Cp. 10363, fragmentary bf. cup of type A. *CV.* pl. 105, 1, 3, and 5. I, gorgoneion. A-B, between eyes: the direction is leftward: on A, the boy stands to right, raising his left hand, the man to left, his right arm in the 'down' position. On B, the boy raises his left forearm, but does not grasp the arm of the wooer, who raises his right arm with the fingers touching the boy's nose. At each handle, a flower.

α 32. Philadelphia 2697, bf. cup of type A. Outside, between eyes: A, a youth approaches a boy, arms 'up and down', but some distance off. Suspended, a small garment or sash, and a small garment. B, sphinx and boy. At each handle a flower.

α 33. Louvre F 139, bf. cup of type A. *CV.* pl. 105, 4 and 6. Outside, between eyes: the youth's knees are bent, his arms 'up and down', but well away from the boy, and the right hand is closed. B, the like. At each handle a flower.

α 34. Toronto 291, bf. cup of type A. Robinson and Harcum pl. 30. I, gorgoneion. Outside, between eyes: A, a youth approaching a boy, arms 'up and down'; B, the like. At each handle, a flower. Compared by Robinson and Harcum with Philadelphia 2697 and Louvre F 139 (α 32 and 33).

α 35. Geneva MF 240, bf. cup of type A. A, phot. Giraudon, whence Vorberg *Gloss.* p. 419. A, a man, with bent knees, faces a boy, touching the boy's chin with one hand and the thigh with the other. B, the like. At each handle, a flower. On the shape of the cup, see Bloesch *F.A.S.* p. 5 no. 14.

α 36. Compiègne 1095, bf. cup of type A. *CV.* pl. 11, 16, and 18. Outside, between eyes: A, a youth and a boy: the youth bends, with arms 'up and down', but the lowered one is some way from the boy. B is similar, but much restored. At each handle a flower.

α 37. Barcelona, bf. cup of type A, from Emporion. Bosch Gimpera *L'art grec a Catalunya* fig. 30, whence Almagro *Ampurias: Guía de las excavaciones* p. 75 and Bosch Gimpera *La formación de los*

pueblos de España pl. 32, 1. Outside: A, between eyes, a youth approaches a boy, arms 'up and down' but some distance off; the boy extends his right forearm with the hand open. Some restoration. At each handle a flower.

α 38. Louvre Cp. 10352. *CV*. pl. 96, 7 and 10. Outside, between eyes: B, a youth approaches a boy, with arms 'up and down', but well away. Only the lower part of the boy remains: he wears a himation like the boy on the Toronto skyphos (α 22), held up with one hand: it does not seem possible to say whether the upper part of the body was bare. A: the shanks and feet of the couple remain; the boy wears a himation as on B: on the left, a youth hastens up, looking back. At each handle a flower.

α 39. Vatican G 67, bf. cup of type A. *RG*. pll. 22-3. I, gorgoneion. Outside, between eyes: leftward: A, the boy stands to right, a cloak over his left arm; the man approaches him, arms 'up and down' but not very near the boy; on the left, a man dances to left, looking round. On B, the couple is similar, but the dancer is a youth.

α 40. Vatican G 66, bf. cup of type A. *RG*. pll. 22-3. I, gorgoneion. Outside, between eyes: A, man and boy: the man's right arm is down, but some way off; the left forearm is extended almost horizontal. Beyond the eyes, on the left a man, on the right a woman, both dancing. B is similar, but the head of the left-hand dancer was probably turned to right. On the presence of women, see β 12. For style I compared the Hamburg cup 1922.119 (*Anz.* 1928 p. 306).

α 41. Boston 08.292, bf. kantharos of special shape, (a two-handled tumbler), probably from Greece. Vorberg *Gloss.* p. 421; the shape only, Caskey *G.* p. 154. Two unusual groups. The man's knees are not bent. On A, his right hand is in the 'down' position, but his left passes behind the boy's head with the fingers showing to right of the nape; the boy, who is small, raises his right hand towards the man's beard. On B, the man is in much the same attitude as on A, but his right hand is not seen, and he has caused the boy to leap from the ground with his arms round the man's neck. Vine to left and right of both groups. On A, ΚΑΛΟΣ, on B, ΚΑ[ΛΟΣ]. Pretty style, about 520 B.C.

Friis Johansen has observed that a picture on a Clazomenian sarcophagus in Berlin (inv. 30.030: *Acta Arch.* 6 p. 186; *From the*

Coll. 3 pp. 125, 127, and 129) is connected in subject with vases like those in our list. There are five groups, each of two youths facing each other; one of the groups shows the motive of the 'restraining hand'.

I have left one or two uncommon Attic pictures to the end:

α 42. Rome, Marchesa Isabella Guglielmi, and Civitavecchia: five fragments of a bf. amphora, from Vulci. In the Marchesa's fragment the lower parts of three figures are preserved. Leftward: a boy stands to right, a man faces him with knees bent. The man's right arm is missing; his left is extended downwards, but not in the 'down' position: it lies against the boy's thigh: this is the position of the hand in pictures of type γ (p. 216): and our group is intermediate between types α and γ. Behind, a dog to left, looking up. On the right, the legs of another boy, standing to right. One of the fragments in the Museum of Civitavecchia gives part of the left-hand figures in one of the pictures: on the left, the border-line; then the middle of a male figure moving to right, a wreath in the left hand; then the middle of two males facing, a man and a youth. For a third fragment see β 11. The other two are unimportant. Affected work from early in the third quarter of the sixth century.

α 43. Basle market, bf. skyphos. For the picture on A see β 15. On B, the chief group is a man and a boy: the man is wrapped in his himation; his head is bent, but he makes no gesture; the boy facing him also wears a himation, which covers his lower part down to the ankles; his breast is missing, but the upper part of his body was probably bare as in the Toronto skyphos (α 22). On the left, a youth and a clothed woman, both dancing, on the right, a similar pair. See β 15.

α 44. Athens Acr. 693, fragments of a bf. pot. Graef pl. 36, whence (part: by mistake) Hoppin *Bf.* p. 173. A man, dressed in a himation, leans on his stick and holds a boy's head with both hands. The boy, too, wears a himation. The date is early fifth century, and the design goes with red-figure pictures, not black-figure: see p. 219.

On a bf. lekythos in Berlin, 1947, the chief group bears a distinct resemblance to type α, but the person wooed is a girl, not a boy: the man trips towards her with knees bent, his right arm in the 'down' position, a wreath in his left hand; the girl, naked, stands facing him with a flower in her right hand and a

wreath in her left. On each side, a woman fluting; to left and right, two men, and a woman dressed in a peplos, all dancing. The picture runs round the vase. The date is the third quarter of the sixth century; see Haspels *ABL.* p. 21.

The picture on a fragmentary bf. oinochoe, of shape III, in the Louvre may be either of Type α or of Type β . Only the legs of the two chief figures remain: a male moves towards a youth. On the left, a naked male approaches to right, shouldering a pole with a fox hanging from it; on the right, a youth runs up to left, with a hare hanging from the pole over his shoulder. The date is the middle of the sixth century.

A small fragment of a covered cup in Oxford (see p. 236, 3) has what I take to be part of a dancer from a courting scene: but there is no saying of which type.

Type β

There are black-figured pictures of a man presenting a cock to a boy, and a good many of a boy holding the cock which he has been given by the man. In most of them it is made plain that the wooer hopes for a prompt recompense. The groups vary, but many of them closely resemble those of our type α .

A: the cock is held by the man.

(i) Most of these pictures have not much in common with type α : in the Taranto cup the bent knees, the fox and hare; and so on:

(ii) but the group on London W 39 is closely connected with type α .

A. i

β 1. Athens, Kerameikos Museum, bf. lekythos. Haspels *ABL.* pl. 4, 1. Leftward. A youth walks to right, wearing a cloak, his left hand cheerily raised to greet a man who stands facing him in a respectful attitude, holding a cock on his right arm. The man's left arm is in the 'down' position, but is not near the youth and has no very pointed significance. On the right a man comes up, carrying a hare on a stick (his lagobolon) over his shoulder (cf. α 18); another hare is suspended in front of him. A youth, wearing a cloak, follows. On the left, a man and a youth approach, both fully dressed in chitoniskos and cloak. All four raise their hands in greeting. This seems to be our earliest picture of the subject: the date should be about 570-560 B.C. Miss Haspels has placed the lekythos next to one in Orvieto (296: *ABL.* pl. 4, 2), which she saw to be closely con-

nected with the C Painter. The two vases are in fact by one hand, 'the Companion, or Shadow, of the C Painter' as I call him; a third lekythos by him is in Oberlin (*Hesp.* 11 pp. 350-1). This is the 'drier man' mentioned several times in my article on 'the Troilos Cup' (*Metr. Mus. St.* 5).

β 2. Taranto, bf. cup of Siana type, from Taranto. Inside, a man stands with bent knees, holding a cock on his right arm; a youth faces him; one of them (the man according to my note, but the youth according to my sketch, and this is more likely) holds an aryballos by the thong. A hare hangs on the left, a fox on the right. Outside: on the lip, floral; on the body, A, symposium, B, komos. About 560-550 B.C., by the Heidelberg Painter.

β 3. Louvre A 479, bf. deep cup (resembling a band-skyphos). Pottier pll. 17-18; *CV.* pl. 92. Boys and girls receiving presents. There are gifts galore, not only a cock, but a panther-cub, a hare, a hen, a young stag, a cygnet, and another hen. The cock-group is on the left of A: the man holds the bird out with both arms towards the boy, who has an aryballos and a spear in one hand (see α 10), and a fillet in the other. About 550 B.C., by the Amasis Painter (*A.B.S.* p. 35 no. 36).

β 4. London B 253, bf. neck-amphora. *CV.* pl. 62, 3. A man with a cock under his left arm approaches a boy who holds a small fillet. The man's right hand is in the 'down' position, but (as in the Kerameikos lekythos, β 1) well away from the boy. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century; by the Swing Painter (*BSA.* 32 p. 15 no. 45).

β 5. Bologna PU. 89, bf. amphora. Pellegrini *VPV.* p. 22; *CV.* pl. 1. A man walks holding a cock with both arms; a youth precedes him, looking round, with a gesture of the right hand which Greek friends interpret as expressing admiration—'Perfect!' On the left a man follows, and a third man, holding a spear, hastens up from the right. All four have cloaks. There are also two dogs. On the right, a small garment hangs on a peg, and other garments and sashes or girdles hang in the field. Third quarter of the sixth century, by the Affecter. This is not certainly a courting-scene: compare, however, the left-hand groups on the London amphora W 39 (β 8 and γ 1).

A. ii

β 6. London W 39, bf. amphora. In the right-hand group on A the direction is leftward: the boy stands to right, very straight,

a wreath in his right hand, his left arm stretched out behind the man who faces him; the man holds a cock on his left arm and makes the full 'down' gesture with his right hand; he lifts his chin, and his nose touches the nose of the boy. For the other groups on the vase, and the style, see β 8 and γ 1.

B: the cock is held by the boy.

The Louvre hydria F 43, and the neck-amphora in Providence, bear little resemblance to type α .

β 7. Louvre F 43, bf. hydria. *CV.* pl. 65, 2. The figure in the middle, walking to right, looking round and holding a pair of cocks, is restored as a man, but is really a youth: the beard is modern. On the left two men approach; one holds a garland in his right hand and raises his left towards the shoulder of the person with the cocks; he is followed by a man bringing a hare. Two other men approach on the right, one with a piece of cloth, and something else, in his left hand, the other bringing a hare. The whole group is flanked by two onlookers, youths dressed in chiton and himation and holding spears. Middle of the sixth century.

β 8. London W 39, bf. amphora. In the right-hand group on B (pendant to the corresponding group on A, see β 6), the direction is again leftward. The boy stands to right, holding a cock on his right arm, raising his left hand and taking hold of the man's beard (see α 3); the man stands to left, with bent knees, a fillet in his left hand, his right arm extended behind the boy's waist (see α 7). In the left-hand group on B, a man and a boy walk to the right, the man extending his left hand and holding a fillet in the other, the boy looking round and holding a cock: this is a pendant to the left-hand group on A (γ 1). For the other groups, and the style, see β 6 and γ 1.

β 9. Providence 13.1479, bf. neck-amphora. Jacobsthal *O.* pl. 19, a-b; *CV.* 9, 1. A is leftward, B rightward. A, a youth holding a cock and a hen, and a man with a dog on a leash. B, a man with a young stag beside him, his arms 'up and down', with the left hand near the forehead of the boy who faces him holding a cock and a hen; the right hand is not near the boy. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century, by the Painter of Louvre F 51 (*B.S.A.* 32 p. 11 no. 1; see above, α 7).

β 10. Boston, bf. standlet of Sosian type. Ex van Branteghem 25. Leftward. A boy stands to right holding a cock in both

arms. A man faces him with bent knees; his right forearm is extended, his left arm is in the full 'down' position. Two small garments hang in the field. At the margin, on the left, a fox; on the right, a hare. Unmeaning inscriptions. Artless work, middle or third quarter of the sixth century.

β 11. Rome, Marchesa Isabella Guglielmi; and Civita-vecchia: fragments of a bf. amphora. Two of them are described above (α 42): a third is from the right-hand part of one of the pictures: it shows a cock, held by a male (the boy), to right; then the middle of a male (the wooer), with bent knees, to left, the left arm in the 'down' position. The direction of the group was therefore leftward. On the right, part of the side-border. For the style see α 42.

β 12. Tarquinia RC. 8217, bf. amphora. A, Herakles and Pholos. B, a man moves to right, his left hand touching the chin of a boy who stands facing him holding a cock; on each side stands a woman clothed, with a branch in her hand. Third quarter of the sixth century. The presence of women in such scenes may seem surprising, but there are other examples: on the Taleides lekythos in the Villa Giulia (γ 4), on a skyphos in the Basle market (α 43 and β 15), on a lekythos in Leningrad (γ 5), on skyphoi of the CHC Group (p. 215), and on a cup in the Vatican (α 40). It will not be forgotten that long after, late in the fifth century, the curious episode on the bell-krater by the Dinos painter in the British Museum is watched by a woman (F 65: *ARV.* p. 791 no. 23; Passeri pl. 201-2; Hancarville 2 pl. 32; Vorberg *Gloss.* p. 460).

β 13. Orvieto, bf. amphora. Phots. Armoni. A, Dionysos and Ariadne between dancing satyrs. B, a man, dressed in a himation, leans on his stick; a boy stands facing him with a cock in his arms; behind him, a dog, head raised. On each side a youth, holding a wand or acontion, makes off, looking back. Third quarter of the sixth century. The coarse style recalls Painter N (see α 21). The easy attitude of the wooer, leaning on his stick, is much more common in red-figure than in black-figure; another black-figure example is the man addressing a woman on a neck-amphora in the Hearst collection at San Simeon (*AJA.* 1945 p. 471, 5 and p. 472, 1, H. R. W. Smith).

β 14. Rhodes 1350, bf. oinochoe (olpe). *Annuario* 6-7 p. 278, below; *CV.* pl. 13, 5, whence *From the Coll.* 3 p. 136. A man approaches with knees somewhat bent, arms in the 'up and

down' position, but not near the boy who stands facing him with a cock in his arms. Between, a dog. About 530 B.C.

β 15. Basle market, bf. skyphos. On A, a man moves to right, head bent, arms 'up and down', but not touching the youth who stands facing him with a cock in his arms. On the right, two youths, and a woman in a peplos, all dancing; on the left, a male dancer is seen in the photograph, and there must have been other figures. For the presence of women, see β 12; for B, α 43. Third quarter of the sixth century.

β 16. London B 262, bf. neck-amphora. *CV*. pl. 68, 2. A man dressed in a short himation has his arms in the 'up and down' position, but not very close to the boy who stands facing him with a cock in his arms; one finger of the left hand, however, touches the pit of the neck. On the left a man approaches. On the right there is a second group, described above (α 23). About 520 B.C., in the same style as the Munich neck-amphora 1490 (J. 641: A, Hermes and the Nymphs; B, maenad and satyrs dancing); see also H. R. W. Smith in *AJA*. 1945 p. 473.

β 17. Rome, Marchesa Isabella Guglielmi, bf. cup, of type A, from Vulci. I, a lion and a panther attacking a bull. Outside, between eyes; A, a man chucking the chin of a boy who holds a cock in his arms; then a naked youth walking away, looking back; B, the like.

β 18. Berlin 2058, bf. cup of type A. Outside, between eyes: A, a man, and a boy facing him with a cock in his arms; the man's left hand is in the 'down' position. B, the like.

β 19. Verona, small bf. neck-amphora. *Boll. d'Arte* 1925 pp. 547 and 549. A, Amazonomachy. B, a youth, arms in the 'up and down' position, approaches a boy who holds a cock; on each side a youth dances, looking round at the couple. Late sixth century B.C.: compare the neck-amphora Toronto 313 (Robinson and Harcum pl. 47 and p. 135), and another, by the same hand as the Toronto, in New York (GR 545); see also *RG*. p. 25 on Vatican G 26.

β 20-39. CHC skyphoi. A very large group of late bf. skyphoi may be so called because of the favourite subjects, a ch[ariot wheeling round, with an Amazon in front], and a c[ourting scene]. Many of them have been put together by Ure (*Sixth* pp. 64-6). A youth stands to right, bending, and a

boy faces him with a cock in his arms; the left arm of the youth is sometimes seen to be in the 'down' position. The group is nearly always flanked by youths dancing, youths seated, or both; once or twice by women (see β 12).

Thebes R.80.260 (Ure *Sixth* pl. 19); Ferrara (Aurigemma¹ p. 55, 3 = ² p. 57, 3); Salonica inv. 8.8 (R. 41: Robinson *Olynthus* 5 pl. 53); Cab. Méd. 340 (de Ridder p. 234; *CV.* pl. 70, 3 and 5); three in Taranto, one in Palermo; Rhodes 13214 (*Cl. Rh.* 4 p. 193, 2); Athens, fr., from Perachora; Odessa, fr., from Theodosia (Stern *Theodosia* pl. 2, 7); Corinth 1077 b, fr. (*Hesp.* 7 p. 573, 13); Thebes R. 112.69 (Ure *Sixth* pl. 20); Salerno 1123; Syracuse, from Syracuse (sep. 74: with women dancing); Thebes R. 102.87 (Ure *Sixth* pl. 18: the wooer is a man: rather unusual style); Providence 11.025 (*CV.* pl. 12, 4: rather unusual style); Thebes R.18.88 (Ure *Sixth* pl. 20); Baden, Dr. Roš; Rhodes 12471 (*Cl. Rh.* 4 p. 249, fig. 269 middle and fig. 270; *CV.* pl. 20, 2-3).

β 40. Related to the CHC Group: Thebes R. 18.76 (Ure *Sixth* pl. 17: silhouette).

β 41. Bonn 52, cup (of type A?) with decoration in silhouette, known to me from the descriptions by Hoernes (*AEM.* 2 p. 31 no. 41), Loeschke (*Anz.* 1890 p. 11, 41) and Greifenhagen (*Anz.* 1936 p. 483, 49). Outside, on each half, a man or youth, 'with extended hands', approaches a youth who holds a cock; on the left a man retires with a gesture of astonishment. At the handles, sphinxes. According to Greifenhagen the cup is from the same workshop as a skyphos in Salonica (Robinson *Olynthus* 5 pl. 33, 41). The skyphos belongs to the CHC Group (see above); and the cup may therefore belong to the same.

A word should be said here about an unusual courting-picture:

Copenhagen inv. 5180, bf. cup of Siana type. *CV.* pl. 114, 1. Inside, the direction is leftward. Both figures kneel, or almost, as if to get into the picture-round; somewhat as the youth and man on the Amasis cup (β 3) kneel 'to clear the handle'. The boy holds a bird with both hands. The man puts his right arm round the boy's neck; part of his left hand is missing, and the motive uncertain. Johansen calls the bird a dove, but may it not be a cock, or a hen? The date is about 560 and the artist the Painter of the Boston cup with Circe and Acheloo (99.519: *AJA.* 1923 pp. 426 and 428).

Friis Johansen recalls (*From the Coll.* 3 p. 136) that a fragment of a Clazomenian vase in London (*BSA.* 5 pl. 8, 1) is from a cock-scene. Part of the right-hand figure in the picture remains, but whether it is a boy or a girl is, as often in Eastern Greek, hard to decide. The right hand holds out a cock; the remains below the arm are probably from another cock (held in the left hand?), but I do not make them exactly out.

Type γ

The moment depicted is later than in Types α and β , and the two figures are interlocked. Type γ is stable: there is little variation from one picture to another.

γ 1. London W 39, bf. amphora, from Vulci. Ex Durand 665 and Witt. On both sides the direction of the chief group is leftward. A: the boy holds up a fillet in his right hand, and the man has a garland in his left. On the right, a man dressed in a cloak, dances to right, looking back. To left of him, a hare hangs from a loop. The whole picture consists of three groups. In the group on the left a man stands to right, with bent knees, holding a garland in his right hand and with his left touching the chin of a boy who walks to the right, looking back, with a young stag in his arms. The group on the right has been described already (β 6). On the extreme right of the picture a fox is suspended.

B: in the middle the same group as on A, but the boy raises his left arm, and his right hand with the wreath is not raised; on the right, a man runs off. The groups to left and right of this are described already (β 8). There is some repainting on B.

The date is the middle of the sixth century. The style somewhat recalls the Painter of Berlin 1686 (*BSA.* 32 pp. 10-11), but the hand is not his. The pot is of fine make, and the underside of the foot is fully finished off—levigated, and the sloping surface covered with good black glaze. This treatment of the underside is rare in amphorae: it recurs in Louvre F 12 (*CV.* pl. 10, 9 and pl. 11, 3) and in two amphorae in the collection of Captain E. G. Spencer-Churchill at Northwick Park: one is the Cassandra vase figured by Gerhard (*A.V.* pl. 228, 3-4), the other has Herakles and Kyknos on both sides. In Louvre F 12 only the resting-surface is reserved. The four vases are about contemporary, but no two are by the same painter.

γ 2. Florence (ex Vagnonville), bf. cup of the 'patch band-cup' type (*JHS.* 52 pp. 187 and 191). Outside: the youth holds

up a wreath in his right hand; on the left another youth makes off with a wreath in each hand. Mock inscriptions. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century.

γ 3. Berlin 1773, bf. lip-cup. The courting-scene is inside. The youth holds a garland in one hand. On each side of the couple a man dances outwards. Mock inscriptions. Middle to third quarter of the sixth century, fine work. The dancers recall those on the amphora in Nicosia.

γ 4. Villa Giulia 50653 (M. 556), bf. lekythos. Mingazzini *Vasi Cast.* pl. 86, 1, pl. 88, 3, pl. 87, 6. On the left of the couple, a youth dances to right, looking back, his right arm akimbo, a large aryballos held by a thong in his left hand; then a woman, dressed in peplos and pelt, and wreathed with ivy, standing to right, raising her left hand; then a man dancing to right. On the right of the couple, a youth moving to right, playing the lyre, and a youth to left holding a cock. For the presence of women, see β 12; on the shoulder-picture, α 16; on the shape of the vase, Haspels *ABL.* p. 34 no. 3. Third quarter of the sixth century, by the Taleides Painter.

γ 5. Leningrad, bf. lekythos from Olbia. *Anz.* 1913 p. 205 fig. 51. A youth stands to the left of the couple in an impatient attitude which recalls the wooers in Type α: his right hand is in the 'down' position and his left seems to be raised towards the boy's face. To left and right of this trio, quite a crowd of youths, and women dressed and wreathed like the woman on the Taleides lekythos (γ 4). They are all earthbound, although some of them gesticulate as if dancing. For the presence of women see β 12. The lekythos is of the same shape as the Taleides, but the style of drawing is very different. Third quarter of the sixth century: see Haspels *ABL.* pp. 37 and 67.

γ 5 bis. Villa Giulia 1932, bf. lekythos. *CV.* pl. 50, 13. On each side of the group, a youth dancing. The boy holds a wreath. Near the Cock Class. Late sixth century.

γ 6. Athens Acr. 2242, fragment of a bf. pot. Graef pl. 95. I cannot be sure whether the remains to left and right are of arms or what. Third quarter of the sixth century.

γ 7. Cambridge, Trinity College, T2, bf. amphora. Ex Sotheby 7th June 1888. On each side of the couple, two on-lookers, both youths, one naked and one clothed. Dr. von Bothmer has kindly supplemented my note by a tracing of the chief group. B, fight. Third quarter of the sixth century.

γ 8. Sèvres 6405, bf. amphora. *CV*. pl. 15, 4 and 7. On each side of the couple, a man dancing to right, looking round. 'Scène de palestre, deux coureurs et deux lutteurs', according to the *Corpus*. On A, Achilles and Ajax playing. Third quarter of the sixth century; recalling, perhaps, the Euphiletos Painter (*AJA*. 1943 pp. 442-3).

γ 9. Louvre F 85 bis, fragment of a bf. lip-cup. Our picture is inside. On the left, a large hound; on the right, a hare, not, it seems, suspended. Dogs are frequent in these scenes: but here hound and hare, at large, have taken the place of the more usual fox and hare, both hanging on the wall. Two small garments hang in the field. Third quarter of the sixth century.

γ 10. Athens, North Slope, fragment of a bf. lip-cup. *Hesp.* p. 262, 103. Our picture is inside. On the right of the couple, the lower part of a male figure, dancing or withdrawing. There was doubtless a similar figure on the left. Third quarter of the sixth century. See α 25.

γ 11. Athens Acr. 1761, fragment of a bf. lip-cup. Graef pl. 86. Our picture is inside. On the right of the couple a youth dancing to right; there was doubtless another such figure on the left. Third quarter of the sixth century.

γ 12. Once Rome, Hartwig, bf. band-cup, band-skyphos, or the like, from Saturnia. Outside, the pictures are between eyes: on each side of the couple, two youths dancing or at least gesticulating. Palmettes at the handles. Third quarter of the sixth century.

γ 13. Berlin 1798, bf. band-cup. A, Licht iii pp. 74-5. A, ten couples in a vineyard. Nine of them are man and woman, but the tenth, on the extreme left, is of our type γ. Furtwängler thought that the artist had forgotten to paint one of the figures white, but the explanation is different.

γ 14. Oxford, fragment of a bf. cup, type A, from Naucratis. Outside, the upper part of the couple is preserved. Later part of the sixth century.

Before leaving these black-figure courting-scenes we may perhaps mention one or two groups in which the two figures are wrapped in a single himation. This occurred already in the group on a lekythos in Leningrad (α 15), but that was easy to place, it belonged to Type α. The two groups that follow do not belong to any of our types.

Bologna PU 239, bf. plate. Pellegrini *VP*. p. 34; *CV*. pl. 44, 3. Pellegrini and Laurenzi both take this to be the lid of the low bowl *CV*. pl. 44, 2, but I suppose that the connexion is not original. A youth and a boy embrace, wrapped closely in a single himation. The right-hand figure has always been called female, but it is probably a boy. To the left, a youth, clothed, accompanied by a dog, looks on; and to the right, a man, wearing a cloak. Behind the youth is a small person, apparently a dwarf, in a himation: the head is frontal. Rough drawing, third quarter of the sixth century.

Athens 1121 (CC. 739), bf. lekythos. Two youths face one another, wrapped in a single himation, but some distance apart. On the left, a man approaches carrying a cock; on the right, a youth retires, looking back, also carrying a cock. Later part of the sixth century. For the shape, Miss Haspels compares (*ABL*. p. 25 note 1), a lekythos in Jena, 50, with dancing youths; the lekythos Athens 459 (*CV*. pl. 5, 3), may also be compared.

Hitherto we have spoken of black-figured vases only. Type γ occurs, unchanged in all essentials, on one or two red-figured vases; and there are a few red-figure versions of Type α .

Type α

Friis Johansen has noted some of the differences between the red-figured pictures of this kind and the black-figured (*From the Coll.* 3 pp. 131-2). In the red-figured the erastes is more often a youth, not a man (but so already in later black-figure); both parties are draped, whereas in black-figure they are usually naked; and the eromenos is usually younger than in black-figure. Add that the kiss replaces the chucking of the chin; that the composition of the group is denser—little of the background shows through; and that the wooer is curiously unwilling to relinquish his walking-stick; perhaps this indicates that he has just arrived. Some at least of the red-figured scenes take place in the palaestra; but so may some of the black-figured, if the numerous aryballoi point to this.

(i)

α 45. Louvre G 45, rf. amphora, type A. Pottier pll. 92-3; *CV*. pl. 30, 2-5, pl. 31, 1, pl. 29, 5; A, phot. Giraudon 27033. The scene is laid in the palaestra. In the middle a youth has passed his left arm round the boy's neck and takes the boy's throat with his right hand. Boy raises his face. Both are fully dressed in himatia. The youth retains his stick. Part of his left hand is

restored. The two side-groups are not erotic: a youth crowns a boy athlete who holds a discus; a youth, leaning on his stick, watches a boy athlete exercising. About 520 B.C., by the Dikaios Painter (*ARV.* p. 28 no. 4).

α 46. Gotha, cup, the inside rf., the outside white-ground. *Mon.* 10 pl. 37a, whence *FR.* iii p. 19 and *Hoppin Rf.* ii p. 329. Inside: a youth, the right leg frontal, and the left crossed behind it, has his left arm round the neck of a boy and his right hand at the throat; his stick is in his left hand. The boy raises his face, so that noses and chins touch, and holds a lyre at his side in his left hand; the right hand is seen protruding from his himation at the neck. On the left, a dog leaps up towards a hare in a cage; on the right, aryballos, sponge, and strigil hang on the wall, which may point to the scene being laid in the palaestra, but is not conclusive. The group is evidently akin to that on the amphora in the Louvre (α 45); and in both vases the boy wears his himation close up to the neck in the manner prescribed for the young. Late sixth century, showing the influence of artists like Euphronios and the Sosias Painter (*ARV.* p. 20).

α 47. Louvre G 278 and Florence, rf. cup. I, *Rev. arch.* 8 (1851-2) ii pl. 168; I, Pottier pl. 133 (retouched); I, Vorberg *Gloss.* p. 453. Inside, a man, leaning on his stick, takes hold of a boy by the head and embraces him. The boy raises his face and lays his right hand on the head of the man, as in α 51. He wears a himation, the man a long chiton, a himation, and shoes, with hair done up in a krobylos. A column indicates a building; the cushioned chair suggests that the scene is not in the palaestra. It may be that these are persons of the past. About 480 B.C., by the Briseis Painter (*ARV.* p. 267 no. 9). Hartwig's charge that the man has been given three hands is baseless.

(ii): the Peithinos Cup

α 48. Berlin 2279, rf. cup. Hartwig pl. 24, 1 and pl. 25, whence *Hoppin Rf.* ii p. 335. On one half of the exterior (A), youths and boys, on the other (B), youths and girls. On A, four groups and a singleton. The two outer groups (2-3, 8-9, numbering from the left) are tamer than the two inner (4-5, 6-7), and are less closely related to the bf. pictures of Type α. The group 4-5 is akin to those on the Louvre amphora and the cup in Gotha, but the action of the right hand is as in the Naples cup and many bf. pictures of Type α. The boy holds an aryballos in his left hand, and with his right grasps the youth's right

arm. Both wear the himation, shawl-wise. The group 6-7, in the bent knees, and in other respects, is closer to Type α . In group 2-3, the curious passage above the boy's left hand is due to repainting. On the left, a youth, by himself, leans pensively on his stick. Even the youths of the inner groups retain their sticks.

Aryballoi, strigils, sponges hanging on the wall suggest that the scene may be laid in the palaestra. Late sixth century, signed by the painter Peithinos (*ARV.* p. 81).

(iii)

α 49. Naples 2614, rf. cup. *Mus. Borb.* pl. 29. Inside, a man leans on his stick, his right hand making the full 'down' gesture: this part is misrendered in *Museo Borbonico*. The painter has forgotten to draw the lower end of the stick. The boy raises his face. Both wear the himation; the boy holds his apart with both hands. Late sixth century, manner of Epiktetos (*ARV.* p. 53, iii no. 10; Bloesch *F.A.S.* p. 57 no. 1).

α 50. Boston, fragment of a rf. cup. *Vorberg Gloss.* p. 450. The middle of the picture inside remains. The left-hand figure bends, with the right leg apparently frontal, and makes the full 'down' gesture with his right hand. A thumb seems to show at the right edge of the sherd: uncertain to which figure it belongs. Both figures wear cloaks. The date is 490-480 B.C., and the painter almost certainly Makron.

α 51. Formerly in the Durand collection (no. 666), then in the Pourtalès, later in the possession of Baron Roger: rf. cup, from Vulci. The cup is of Cone-foot type (see Bloesch *F.A.S.* pp. 128-9). Inside, the man's knees are much bent; his left hand is in the full 'down' position, his right arm is akimbo; he wears shoes, and a himation which forms a background to the figure. The boy stands very straight, his right arm extended with the hand holding the man's head (compare α 47), his left arm down behind him with a net-bag, full of balls, in the hand. Sponge, strigil, and aryballos hang on the left. $\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\varsigma$. Late work of the Brygos Painter, about 480-470 B.C.

Type γ

γ 15. Athens, Agora, P 7901, fragmentary rf. cup. Inside, the feet of the two figures remain: enough to show that the group was of type γ . Aryballos, strigil, and sponge hang on the right. Near the edge of the interior, in large letters, $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\varsigma\iota\kappa\alpha\tau[\epsilon\varsigma]$:

ΚΑΛ[Ο]Σ. The name is Agasik(r)ates. Late sixth century, near Euphronios and perhaps by him (*ARV.* p. 19 no. 7).

γ 16. Athens, Agora, P 7690, fragment of a rf. cup. Apart from the medallion inside, and the picture-zone outside, the cup, so far as preserved, is covered with 'coral-red'. The lower part of the group inside remains: the legs of a youth (or man) to right and of a boy to left; much as in γ 15; both wear cloaks. Incised, on the left, the last letter of an inscription, . . . Α; on the right, the end of another, [ΦΙΛ]ΟΤΕΣΙΟΝ. There may have been something before the word, one cannot tell. Outside, the end of a stick, on which someone was probably leaning to right; the feet of a male figure facing him; the feet of another male figure running to right; between the legs, a camp-stool; on the right, a pair of acontia, indicating the palaestra; then the handle-palmettes; the left-hand part of the picture is missing. This may have been a picture of type α or something like it: but it may not. The date must be about 500 B.C., or even a little earlier. The style reminds one of the Boston Athenodotos cup 10.193 (Hartwig pl. 26), which recalls the early work of Douris (*ARV.* p. 917 no. 19).

γ 17. Munich 2631, fragmentary rf. cup. Vorberg *Gloss.* p. 462. Inside, man and boy: almost type γ, but the moment chosen is a little earlier than there, and one of the Guglielmi-Civitavecchia fragments may be compared. The boy bends his head, and the lower half of his face is concealed by shoulders and neck of the man: this is a regular trait in leftward pictures of type γ, though not in rightward ones like ours. The himation spread out behind both figures is the boy's or at least is held out by him. On the left, a Maltese dog to left, looking round; on the right, the man's stick, discarded this time, with sponge and aryballos tied to the crook. Inscription . . . Κ]ΑΛΟΣ. About 490-480 B.C., by Douris (*ARV.* p. 291 no. 175 bis).

γ 18. Mykonos, rf. pelike from Rheneia (and, eventually, Delos). The moment here is the normal. The attitude of the man is the same as in the cup by Douris, but the youth's head is not bent and his face not concealed. He holds a hare out by the ears in his right hand; his left hand holds the leash of a dog which sits quietly, to left, in the right-hand corner of the picture. Both man and boy wear cloaks. On the left, a fluted pillar indicates the palaestra; the man has laid his stick against the pillar. By the Triptolemos Painter (*ARV.* p. 240 no. 18). A

date somewhat after 480 is suggested by the reverse of the vase, which is not by the Triptolemos Painter, but by the Flying-Angel Painter in his later period (*ARV.* p. 183 no. 21). Parts are wanting, but I satisfied myself that the two pictures were from the same vase.

Here we should mention another red-figure subject: the group of a winged youth lifting a boy into the air: Zephyros and Hyakinthos according to conjecture. There are three examples, all on cup-interiors:

1. Boston 13.94, fragment of a rf. cup. The boy wears a himation and holds a lyre at his side. The action is more pointed than in the other two pictures. Inscription [+ΑΙΠΕ-ΣΤΡΑ]ΤΟΣΚΑΛΟΣ. About 500-490 B.C., related to early Douris (*ARV.* p. 918 no. 27).

2. Boston 95.31, rf. cup. Hartwig pl. 22, 1, whence Hoppin *Rf.* i p. 225. About 490-480 B.C., signed by Douris (*ARV.* p. 290 no. 172). Inscription +ΑΙΠΕ[ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣΚΑΛΟΣ].

3. Berlin 2305, from Nola. Hartwig pl. 72, 1; Licht ii p. 153. The boy again holds a lyre. About 470 B.C., late manner of Douris (*ARV.* p. 297, ii no 31). Furtwängler gives no provenience, and none is given in *ARV.*, but this must be the cup mentioned in *Bull.* 1842 p. 13 as 'recently excavated at Nola and now acquired by Cav. Gerhard'.

C 658 (Myres 1568), bf. cup, from Marion. Ohnefalsch-Richter pl. 184, 2; A, Pl. 1, 3. Dm. .1915, ht. .070, breadth of foot .082.

Date about 530 B.C. This is a unique cup. Our figure gives the shape for the first time—a variety of cup C (Bloesch *F.A.S.* pp. 113-44). There is no offset lip. The bowl is separated from the foot by a thick torus, coloured red. The lower part of the bowl curves in, so that the whole bowl has an S-curve. The side of the foot, reserved, is not a stout torus, as in the canonical form of cup C, but concave, flaring, and not very thick. Underneath, there is a large flat resting-surface, reserved; the inside of the stem is convex and black; the lower surface of the bowl within the foot-cavity is decorated with a black dot and pair of circles. The cup inside is black, except for a reserved disc with a dot and ring in black. Outside, the decoration is quadripartite. In the middle of each side stands Dionysos, dressed in a long white chiton with a himation over both shoulders, wreathed with ivy, and holding long trails of ivy in either hand.

At each handle, a version of the ancient decorative motive of two animals with a plant between: under the handle, a design of tendrils, palmettes, and buds; on each side of this, a lion rampant regardant, forelegs as if resting on the roots of the handle. Above all these figures an ivy-wreath encircles the vase at the edge. There is no ground-line below the figures: they stand on nothing. Relief-lines are used for the stalks of the ivy-branches and for the tendrils at the handles. Dry style of about 530 B.C. I do not know any other works by the same hand.

The design of the exterior finds a parallel on a fragmentary bf. cup in the Louvre, known to me from photographs kindly sent me by Mr. François Villard. In the middle of each half stands a female figure—Ariadne, Semele, or maenad—holding in her left hand a big branch of ivy which spreads out on both sides of her. Each handle is flanked by two rampant felines, fragmentary, panthers or lions. Between them, under the handle, instead of the plant, a hare walking. There is a black band above the figures instead of an ivy-wreath; and the figures rest on the usual ground-line. The foot is missing, but the stump shows that it was thin-stemmed, say a Little-master foot. Inside the cup, a gorgoneion. Same period as our cup; the character of the style not unlike.

The lack of a ground-line is uncommon in cups. Other examples in cups by Amasis (*JHS.* 51 pp. 266–72), a cup in Providence (22.214: *CV.* pl. 11, 2), the cup by Psiax in Odessa (*AJA* 1934 p. 551 fig. 8, Richter: here with meaning). The concave, flaring side of the foot is regular in other types of cup (Little-master, Cup A), rare in Cup C. Other cups C that have it are one from Granmichele in Syracuse (A, an Amazon crouching, between palmettes), the Providence cup already mentioned (which is a very unusual example of the type), the Florence cup Bloesch p. 131 no. 3 (still more unusual), the red-figured cup with ὦ παίδων κάλλιστε in Athens (1357: *CV.* pl. 3, 1 and 3: see Bloesch p. 120 no. 18), the fragment (foot of a cup) Athens Acr. a 435 (I, gorgoneion), and lastly the Eleusis cup-fragment with decoration in added colours (*AM.* 31 pl. 17, 1 and p. 195; the drawing of the foot not quite exact); this is Attic in technique, but un-Attic in the style of the figures, which recall the Chalcidian Phineus Painter. For the ivy-wreath above the pictures in the Nicosia cup, Louvre F 133 may be compared (Pottier pl. 74). To sum up, while the several elements of our cup are not without analogy, the cup as a whole stands alone.

C 433 (Myres 1603), bf. oinochoe, from Marion. Pl. 3, 2. Height .243. Achilles and Ajax playing. About 530 B.C.

The vase was mentioned by Ohnefalsch-Richter in 1893 (*Kypros, the Bible and Homer* p. 497). He did not figure it, but figured two other oinochoai of the same rare variety, also found at Marion. A fourth was found at Amathus in 1899. The list is therefore as follows:

1. London 94.11-1.476, from Amathus. Murray, A. H. Smith, and Walters *Excavations in Cyprus* p. 105 fig. 152, 4; Jacobsthal *O.* pl. 17, 2. Uncertain subject: man seated with woman and youths.
2. Nicosia C. 433, from Marion.
3. Paris market, from Marion. Ohnefalsch-Richter *Kypros*, frontispiece, 8. Herakles and the Lion.
4. Paris market, from Marion. Ohnefalsch-Richter *Kypros*, frontispiece, 7. Dionysos with satyrs and maenad.

Nos. 3 and 4, so far as can be judged from the reproductions, appear to be of the same model, and might be by one potter. As to the pictures, there is not much to compare, but nothing to exclude their being by one painter. Our vase is of a different model, and the picture in a different style: it seems somewhat earlier than Ohnefalsch-Richter's pair. Earlier still, hardly later than the middle of the sixth century, is the vase in the British Museum: the model is again different, and the drawing recalls the Painter of Vatican 365 (*BSA.* 32 p. 9).

The Nicosia vase has an offset 'collar', like many Attic oinochoai, especially black-figure ones. Two rotelle, painted red, may be seen in the photograph. The handle is double, with a metallizing reel at the lower end, and below that a black palmette.

The heroes sit on blocks, fully armed. Achilles wears a bronze corslet, Ajax a corslet of leather. Both have cloaks, ornamented with curvilinear fylfots. Achilles moves his piece. Five other pieces are shown on the block that serves as table, and Ajax is ready to make his move. On each side of the main group, a warrior moves away, or past, looking back. The subject is best known from the Exekias amphora in the Vatican, but is a great favourite in the later archaic period (see Hauser in *FR.* ii pp. 65-72, Lippold in *Münchener archäologische Studien* pp. 426-8, Robert *Heldensage* p. 1127, Schefold in *Jb.* 52 pp. 30-3 and 68-71, Chase in *Bull. MFA.* 44 pp. 45-50). The style of the Nicosia picture recalls the Euphiletos Painter (*AJA.* 1943 pp. 442-3).

1938. ii-16.1, bf. fragment from Agrokipia (about twenty miles SW. of Nicosia). Given by Mr C. P. Manglis. Pl. 3, 1. Mentioned briefly by Dikaios in the *Guide*, p. 52 no. 292.

The fragment is almost certainly part of a column-krater. Gigantomachy. One sees part of the chariot-team of Zeus; the left hand of Herakles drawing his bow; Athena attacking, with spear and shield; a fallen giant; and on the right, a giant attacking—the toes of the right foot can still be seen. The device on Athena's shield is a tripod. I am ashamed to say that I cannot explain the remains to right of her spear. The date is about 530, the time of the Andokides Painter or the Antimenes Painter.

The same composition recurs in other vases of this period and earlier: (1) Zeus to right, his right foot on the ground, his left on the floor of the chariot-car, his left hand holding the reins, his right arm raised with the thunderbolt; (2) Herakles to right, with his right foot on the floor of the car and his left on the chariot-pole, drawing his bow; (3) on the far side of the horses, Athena on foot, striding forward to right, attacking with the spear; (4) under the horses' bellies, a wounded or dying giant; (5) at the horses' heads, a giant, or two side by side, attacking to left. Most of the vases in the list that follows and in the succeeding one, have been discussed by Maximilian Mayer (*Die Giganten und Titanen* pp. 292-302): but some of them have been republished since he wrote; his arrangement is different; and so is his interpretation of the second type.

Tarquinia 623, bf. neck-amphora. Phots. Moscioni 9090-1 (8662-3), whence Technau *Exekias* pl. 28. Manner of Exekias (*BSA.* 32 p. 7 no. 41).

London B 208, bf. amphora of Panathenaic shape. Overbeck *KM.* pl. 4, 3; Walters *B.M. Cat.* ii p. 9; *CV.* He pl. 48. Manner of the Andokides Painter (*ARV.* p. 5 no. 10).

Munich 1485 (J 719), bf. neck-amphora. Overbeck *KM.* pl. 4, 6. Athena moves to *left*, attacking a giant. Akin to the last in style.

Florence 3804, bf. amphora. Gerhard *AV.* pl. 5, whence Overbeck *KM.* pl. 4, 9. Herakles is not in the chariot.

Vatican 365, bf. amphora. *Mus. Greg.* ii pl. 50, 1; Albizzati pl. 50. Athena is accompanied by Ares; Zeus holds the reins with both hands and has no thunderbolt. By the Painter of Vatican 365 (*BSA.* 32 p. 9 no. 1).

Vatican 422, bf. hydria. *Mus. Greg.* ii pl. 7, 1; Albizzati pl. 64. A giant turns tail before Athena. Leagros Group (*ABS.* p. 45 no. 38).

The composition is older than these vases: for it occurs already on the kantharos Acropolis 2134 (Graef pl. 94), which is earlier than the middle of the sixth century. Zeus, Herakles, Athena, fallen giant, attacking giant (his toes remain)—all are there. But there is an important addition: Ge, mother of the Giants, faces Zeus, and touches his beard and forehead, imploring him to spare her sons. Two other fine vases of the same period as the kantharos are so fragmentary that it is uncertain whether all the elements were present: the amphora Acropolis 2211 (Graef pl. 94) has the Zeus, perhaps also the Athena; the dinos by Lydos, Acropolis 607 (Graef pl. 33; Rumpf *Sakonides* pl. 19), the Athena, and Herakles in the chariot, but his left foot, though advanced, is not on the pole. Both vases have Ge, and so has the somewhat later band-cup Acropolis 1632 (Graef pl. 84), which gives the Zeus, and the Herakles stepping on the chariot-pole.

A tripod-pyxis in Berlin, 3988 (Furtwängler *Coll. Sabouroff* pl. 49), is complete, and might almost have found place in our first list: but Herakles, instead of stepping on the pole, repeats the attitude of Zeus with one foot in the chariot and the other on the ground; and Athena stands instead of striding forward.

Another scene from the Gigantomachy is popular in the generation of Exekias and a little later, forming a kind of pendant or sister-scene to ours. Chariot, Athena, fallen giant; sometimes a giant, or two of them, attacking; and again a warrior sets one foot on the floor of the car and the other on the pole: but this warrior is Ares, not Herakles; and the place of Zeus is taken by a charioteer, dressed in the usual long robe, standing in the car. The identification of the warrior as Ares was made by Overbeck (*KM.* p. 346): it is opposed by Mayer (*Giganten* p. 298, middle, and p. 299, middle), who regards the pictures as nothing more than 'misunderstood Gigantomachies'. The name of Ares's charioteer is given by Lydos in his picture of Herakles and Kyknos on the oinochoe signed by the potter Kolchos in Berlin (*WV.* 1889 pl. 1, 2; Hoppin *Bf.* p. 157): it is Phobos.

London B 145, bf. neck-amphora. *CV.* pl. 5, 1. This and the two next belong to the Group of London B 145 (*BSA.* 32 p. 9). No attacking Giant.

London B 251, bf. neck-amphora. *CV.* pl. 62, 1. No attacking Giant.

Munich 1553 (J. 718), bf. neck-amphora. No attacking Giant.

Philadelphia, bf. column-krater. *Mus. Journal* 11 p. 60.

Geneva, bf. column-krater. Schrader *Die archaischen Marmor-bildwerke der Akropolis* p. 375. Some extra figures.

Cambridge 99.N 190-1, fr. of a bf. column-krater. *CV*. ii pl. 20, 29 and 33. The right-hand part lost.

In the neck-amphora Vatican 360 (Albizzati pl. 47) Ares has both feet in the chariot; in the column-krater New York 24.97.95 he has dismounted, and attacks to left; in the column-krater Chiusi 270 (phot. Alinari 37495) there is no parabates, and it is not certain that the warrior on the left of the picture is Ares.

This composition is also used for ordinary heroic battles, for instance on the amphora Vatican 347 (Albizzati pl. 43).

1934. iv-4. 4, fragmentary bf. amphora (type A), from the Acropolis of Dali. *Cyprus Report* (1934), pl. 8.

The handles are flanged, with ivy-pattern on the sides: which shows that the amphora was of type A. In addition to the lower border given in the illustrations, the side-borders are preserved—a relief-line—and part of the upper border on the obverse, double palmette-and-lotus. On the obverse, a chariot at the gallop, to left, is shown in three-quarter view; the heads of the pole-horses are frontal. There are two occupants: the shield and spear of the parabates remain, and the shield of the charioteer. The first shield is round and emblazoned with a wreath of ivy; the charioteer's shield is of Boeotian type, with a white roundel on it. A warrior precedes the chariot, running, and looking back. The scene on the reverse is a warrior leaving home: he stands face to face with his aged father; there is a woman on each side of the pair; on the right, a herald moves away, looking round. The shield-device is a seated hound. The date of this handsome vase is about 520, and the drawing is in the manner of the Antimenes Painter (*JHS*. 47 pp. 63-92; *ABS*. p. 41; *Raccolta Guglielmi* p. 46): compare, for example, his neck-amphora in Würzburg, 187 (Langlotz pll. 46 and 56; A, *JHS*. 47 p. 73 fig. 9), and one side of his neck-amphorae in the Villa Giulia (15731: *CV*. pl. 18, 4) and in Edinburgh (1887. 211).

C 431, bf. stemless cup, from Marion. *Cyprus Report* 2 (1934) pl. 9, 1. I, Dionysos, between eyes. Dm. .148, ht. .042 (not .145 as in the Report). Later part of the sixth century B.C.

The illustration omits the red and white details, and the ground-line is really straight, not curved. The foot is a torus, the edge of it black, the fillet above it reserved.

This belongs to the Segment Class, as Bloesch has called it

(although the interior is not always divided into segments): a large class of stemless cups, 'full inside'—the picture covering the whole interior. On these see Graef *Akr.* pp. 160–1, *Eph.* 1915 p. 127 (Ure), Mingazzini *Cast.* pp. 345–6, *Hesp.* 4 pp. 261–3 (Pease), *Hesp.* 9 p. 192 (Roebuck), Bloesch *Formen attischer Schalen* pp. 118–19. Another is Nicosia C 653, from Tamassos (I, satyr and maenad). The decoration is always ragged, slovenly, and some of the pictures, with their stiff, thick-legged figures, make one think of Painter N (see p. 213). The exergue is often charged with a pair of drinking-horns, but often with other designs, and once or twice it bears a simple row of dots, as here (London B 461, from Marion, *JHS.* 11 p. 45; Thebes R. 12.42, *Eph.* 1915 p. 127 and 1916 pl. 4).

C 428, bf. oinochoe (olpe), from Marion. Said to have been found in the same tomb as C 431 (p. 36). *Cyprus Report* 2 (1934) pl. 9, 2. Warrior. Ht. 207. Late sixth century B.C.

Low handle; round mouth, decorated with ivy. A man with a long beard, wearing a himation and a helmet, tiptoes forward, holding up his himation in front of his face with one hand, or both hands; the hands are concealed under the garment. The folds of the himation are alternately red, and black with a pattern of white dots in groups of four: this is not indicated in the reproduction. Two other Attic vases, both from the later part of the sixth century, have similar subjects:

1. Würzburg 344, bf. oinochoe (shape I). Langlotz pl. 103. Three warriors run forward, the leader looking back. They wear a helmet, a long chiton, and a himation which is lifted in front of the face with the left hand. On the style see *RG.* p. 47; Group of Vatican G 48.

2. Brooklyn 09.35, small bf. amphora, from Thebes. On A, four men run to right, wearing helmets, and holding up their cloaks as if to hide their faces; on B, two others.

Langlotz describes the Würzburg men as dancing, which does not seem certain, and calls them 'a dramatic chorus'. They do indeed recall the dolphin-riders, wearing helmets and cloaks, on a black-figured skyphos of the Heron Class in Boston (R 372: *Bull. Nap.* new series 5 pl. 7, 1; E. Robinson p. 136; Bieber *History of the Greek and Roman Theater* p. 67): these, like the ostrich-riders on the other side of the vases, are shown to be a chorus by the presence of a flute-player; but whether a dramatic chorus in the strict sense is doubtful. As to our three pictures,

one cannot help thinking of the poor fellows in the *Ajax* of Sophocles (245):

ὦρα τιν' ἦδη τοι
κρᾶτα καλύμμασι κρυψάμενον
πολοῖν κλοπᾶν ἀρέσθαι.

But this may be misleading, and the explanation is still to seek.

C 654 (Myres 1653), rf. cup, from Marion. Pl. 4, 1 and Pl. 5, 4. Dm. .170, ht. .077. Graffito P.

This is a small cup of type C (Bloesch *Formen attischer Schalen* pp. 113-44), and an excellent piece of pottery. The date is about 520-510 B.C. For the shape compare, to take one example, Boston 00.336 (Caskey *B.* pl. 3, 8 and p. 7; the shape only, Caskey *G.* p. 181 no. 135). Inside, in a sharp, pretty style, a boy, wrapped in his himation, hastening away, as if pursued or alarmed. Inscriptions ΚΑΛΟῚ retrograde, and ΚΑΛΟῚ. Outside, the cup is black; inside, with the exception of the red-figure tondo, it is covered with that 'coral-red' glaze which first appears inside some Klitian works, then on the Exekias cup in Munich and on a string of vases, chiefly cups, down to the third quarter of the fifth century.¹ The figure is contoured with relief lines, except the lips. The outline of the hair is incised except at the forehead. I cannot point to any other works by the same painter, but should place the cup among those connected with the Chelis Group in *ARV.* pp. 82-3, next to no. 2 (London 97.10-28.2: part, *JHS.* 41 p. 121; part, Hoppin *Rf.* i p. 158), no. 6 (Cab. Méd. 519), no. 7 (London E 36: I, Murray no. 21; A-B, C. Smith *Cat. B.M.* iii pl. 2), no. 8 (Athens Acr. 194: Langlotz pl. 9); should compare also two small fragments of a cup, with warriors outside, in Athens, Agora, P 7900.

1938. i-4.1, rf. cup, said to be from Cyprus. Given by Capt. Timins. Pl. 4, 2. Dm. .156. The foot-plate is missing.

The cup is of the same type, C, as the last. Inside, a youth on horseback. He wears a chitoniskos, a short cloak with big black spots or squares, a petasos, and holds a spear. The reins are not indicated. There are more brown inner markings on the horse than come out in the photograph. The artist has forgotten to fill in the background between the horse's tail and the off end of the cloak. The date is once more about 520-510. I do

¹ See most recently Vanderpool and Miss Talcott in *Hesp.* 15 pp. 285-7.

not know the painter, but he belongs to the group of early archaic cup-painters whom I put together in the fourth chapter of *ARV.* pp. 93-116. The horse recalls such animals as those on the Leipsic cup T 3625 in the manner of the Epeleios Painter (*ARV.* p. 111 no. 20: Kirsten *Leipziger Vasen* no. 2), but is not by the same hand. On these figures of mounted youths see Schweitzer in *Jb.* 54 p. 4; add the game-piece and cup-fragment in Munich published by Sieveking (*Bronzen Terrakotten Vasen der Sammlung Loeb* pl. 46).

C 672 (Myres 1654), rf. cup, from Marion. Dm. .146, ht. .075.

This is another Cup C, but of rougher make than the others; hasty incisions, for example, serve to mark the base-fillet. As to the drawing, Myres describes the cup as 'black, except the central medallion, which has been spoiled at an early stage, and contains only some blocking-out, and a few strokes cancelling the representation'. As a matter of fact the picture is complete: a reveller reclining, seen from behind, wearing a tiara; to the right, in black, a drinking-horn. But without knowing the other works of the Pithos Painter (*ARV.* pp. 116-17 and 952) one could scarcely have guessed it. The Nicosia cup is no worse than those from Al Mina (*JHS.* 59 p. 3): or perhaps they are all very fine. Date about 500.

M.K. 50, fragmentary rf. column-krater, from the Temple site at Mines near Kazaphani (between Kyrenia and Ayios Epiktitos). Mentioned by Dikaios in *Cyprus Report* 1934 p. 9 and in *Guide* p. 53, no. 302, but not figured.

Framed pictures, with the usual ornaments. A, symposion. The left-hand portion of the picture is lost, and the upper parts of both figures. A male reclines on a couch to left; beside him, table and block-stool. A youth, naked, with a wrap over his shoulders, runs to left: no doubt a cup-bearer. B, komos: three youths, one lifting a pointed amphora, another holding a horn. About 480 B.C., by Myson (*ARV.* pp. 169-72 and 954).

M 41.11, rf. lekythos, from Marion. *Sw. C. E.* ii pl. 144, 2-3 and pl. 53. Height .38. Goddess (Hera?). About 470 B.C., by the Providence Painter (*ARV.* p. 434 no. 59).

A female figure stands with left leg frontal, head turned to right, holding a phiale in her right hand and a sceptre in her

left. Inscription KALE. She is named Persephone in the Swedish publication (ii pp. 294-5), but one would expect Persephone, if represented alone, to be holding ears of corn. Hera seems more likely: she is frequently shown with phiale and sceptre. The best parallel is on an unpublished lekythos by the Brygos Painter in Providence (*ARV.* p. 255 no. 157 bis), on which the presence of Nike (or Iris) shows that the goddess with phiale and sceptre whom she is serving is Hera; so also on a lost lekythos by the same painter, formerly in the Hamilton collection (*Tischbein* 4 pl. 16, whence *El. cér.* 1 pl. 32: *ARV.* p. 956 no. 157 ter), where the goddess is seated. I quote these two vases first, before the cup by Douris in the Cabinet des Médailles (542: *Mon.* 5 pl. 35: *ARV.* p. 287 no. 113), because there the seated Hera, with name inscribed, holds a flower as well as phiale and sceptre; and before a second lekythos by the Brygos Painter in Providence (25.078: *CV.* pl. 19, 1), because a bird—perhaps, as Mr. J. R. T. Pollard suggests to me, a cuckoo—perches on the back of the throne. Other Heras hold phiale and sceptre, but wear a polos instead of being bare-headed: on the stamnos by the Berlin Painter in Castle Ashby (*BSR.* 11 pl. 8: *ARV.* p. 138 no. 110) and the volute-krater by the Altamura Painter in Cairo (*Edgar* pl. 11; *Jb.* 52 p. 210: *ARV.* p. 412 no. 3). The single figures on two lekythoi in New York are in the same case as the Nicosia: they are very likely Hera, but it needs proving: 28.57.12, by the Brygos Painter (*Richter and Hall* pl. 40 and pl. 175, 40: *ARV.* p. 255 no. 156), and 28.57.11, unpublished, by the Oionokles Painter. So also the standing goddess with phiale and sceptre, polos and throne, on a lekythos in the collection of Francesco Fienga at Nocera de' Pagani.¹

C 739 (Myres 1656), rf. lekythos from Marion. Pl. 5, 3. Height .248. Dionysos dancing.

The date is 480-460 B.C. The drawing is by the Bowdoin Painter (*ARV.* pp. 470-8 and 960), and from the potter's point of view the vase is a typical product of the workshop to which the Bowdoin Painter for the greater part of his career was attached. Some meaningless letters in the field, as usual in his lekythoi.

The dancer is wreathed with ivy. On the left an ivy-bush, on

¹ I have not seen this vase and know it from a photograph kindly given me by Prof. Karl Lehmann. For the style one might perhaps compare the lekythos New York 23.160.15, from Thespiiai (Eros with phiale and fruit, a wrap over his shoulders, standing at an altar).

the right a thyrsus stuck in the ground. The black of the background has scaled off in some places.

Myres speaks of a bearded man, not naming Dionysos: but I do not see that it can be anyone else than the god himself. Shortly after the middle of the sixth century, on vases by the Amasis Painter, Dionysos begins to be represented dancing. Among the finest of the fifth-century representations are those on the cup by the Briseis Painter in the British Museum (E 75: Hartwig pl. 43) and on a stamnos also there (E 439: C. Smith *Cat. B.M.* iii pl. 15; *CV.* pl. 19, 3). In both these Dionysos wears a short chiton, although in the cup it reaches mid-thigh and in the stamnos mid-shank, whereas in the Nicosia vase it barely conceals the buttocks. The same garment—a very short thin chitoniskos with a lappet of thick material attached to it at the neck and covering the breast—is worn by a woman on the red-figured lekythos Syracuse 6310, which is closely akin to the work of the Bowdoin Painter: her hair is in a sakkos; she holds a sword in her right hand, the scabbard in her left, and moves to right. She can hardly be a dancer: more probably, a Thracian woman attacking Orpheus.¹

The dancing Dionysos on a column-krater by the Leningrad Painter in Madrid (11040: *CV.* pl. 15, 3; *ARV.* p. 374 no. 30) wears a somewhat similar lappet, but with a long chiton.

Other Dionysoi with short chitons: oinochoe (shape III) in Tübingen (Watzinger pl. 33); calyx-krater formerly in the Roman market (Depoletti: Berl. Ap. 22, 88: A, Dionysos and maenad; B, man); another, by the Painter of Munich 2335, in Athens (12908: A, phot. A. I. 3116: *ARV.* p. 781 no. 37); column-krater in Bologna (185: Pellegrini *VF.* p. 68; *CV.* pl. 49, 3-4 and pl. 50, 1); much earlier than all these, and even than the Nicosia lekythos, is the Dionysos on a cup by the Delos Painter in Castle Ashby (193: *BSR.* 11 pl. 3, 3-6: *ARV.* p. 58 no. 1).

The attitude of our figure is the same as in a slightly earlier work, a cup by Makron in Munich (2657: Gerhard *AV.* pll. 283-4, 4-7; Brommer *Satyrspiele* p. 13: *ARV.* p. 312 no. 191). There the dancer is not Dionysos, but a satyr; and a satyr wear-

¹ The Thracian women who attack Orpheus sometimes wear short clothes: hydria Paris, Petit Palais, 319 (*CV.* pl. 18, 2-6; *ARV.* p. 388 no. 5, and, below, no. 4, Mannerist Group, Painter of Tarquinia 707); small hydria Cabinet des Médailles 458 (de Ridder p. 348, whence Cook *Zeus* iii p. 849: *ARV.* p. 959, foot, Mannerist Group); calyx-krater Naples 2889 (*Mus. Borb.* 9 pl. 12, whence *Jb.* 29 p. 28: much repainted, but this feature probably antique: period of the Painter of the Louvre Centauromachy and recalling his style).

ing the costume—the drawers—of the satyr-play, the earliest extant representation of the garment. This may well be one of the schemata of the sikinnis. Other dancing satyrs resemble our two in having both arms, or one, akimbo. Both arms: volute-krater, by the Painter of Bologna 279, in Ferrara (*ML.* 33, Guarducci, pl. 3, whence *RM.* 47 p. 124; Aurigemma¹ p. 53: *ARV.* p. 428, middle, no. 1); Italiote bell-krater by the Tarpoley Painter (Trendall *Frühit.* p. 41 no. 73) till recently in the Cowdray collection, now in the Hearst collection at San Simeon (Tischbein 1 pl. 39; Tillyard pl. 30, 210). One arm: stamnos by Polygnotos in Florence (4227: Galli *Marsia* pl. 1; *CV.* pl. 54: *ARV.* p. 678 no. 12); bell-krater, manner of Polygnotos, in the Paris market (Feuardent: Cook *Zeus* pl. 39, 1, whence *FR.* iii p. 139; Tillyard pl. 23, 136: *ARV.* p. 682 no. 2); volute-krater by the Pronomos Painter in Naples (*FR.* pll. 143-4: *ARV.* p. 849, below, no. 1: Nikoleos).

The schema of the Munich satyr and our Dionysos need not have been confined to the satyr-play: but figures of ordinary dancers that at first glance seem similar are found to differ in the position of the hands, the arms not being akimbo but placed in front of the hips with the thumbs showing: for example, on the hydria by the Phiale Painter in the British Museum (E 185: *CV.* pl. 80, 4: *ARV.* p. 656 no. 55). On a skyphos by the Lewis Painter in Brussels (H. R. W. Smith *Der Lewismaler* pl. 12, a: *ARV.* p. 517 no. 20) the arms are akimbo, but the thumbs are in front.

V. 453, fragmentary white lekythos, from the palace of Vouni. *Sw. C. E.* iii pl. 86, 1-2. About 470-460 B.C., by the Vouni Painter (*ARV.* p. 580, above, no. 2), so called after this vase.

There were two figures. Of the woman on the left, only the left hand remains, holding out something. The other woman has a mirror in her right hand, while her left is passed under her himation. Part of the kalos-inscription remains, ΑΛΚ[ΙΜ]ΑΧΟ[Σ].

Only one other vase is attributed to the Vouni Painter in *ARV.*, the white lekythos New York 35.11.5, which is now published (Richter *A.R.V.S.* fig. 83). The subject shows it to have been made for sepulchral use; the Vouni lekythos was found in the same room of the palace as the cup V. 414 (see below), and was not intended for the tomb. The artist is closely connected with certain other painters of white lekythoi, such as the Timocrates Painter: compare, for example, Athens 12771 (Riezler pl. 3; *CV.* Jc pl. 3, 3 and 5: *ARV.* p. 578, foot, no. 1).

V. 414, white and rf. cup, from the palace of Vouni. *Sw. C. E.* iii pl. 84; A-B, Pl. 6, 2. Dm. .289. Foot and one handle are among the missing parts. About 470-460 B.C.

It was plain from the Swedish reproductions that this fine cup belonged to the same period as most cups with white ground, the early classic: but not who painted it. It turns out to be by the Boot Painter (*ARV.* pp. 549-50). Inside, a woman stands with both legs frontal, holding a box. On the left, a couch; on the right, a chair. The design is in brown glaze outlines on the white ground. The himation is bluish purple, with darker lines for the folds, and at the edge a light brown line, with a darker one—red or purple—next it. The cover of the chair and the cushions on the couch are brown and purple. The lower edge of the seat is damaged. Bracelets and studs and knobs on couch and box are in raised brown and were probably gilded. The chair is also in raised brown. The chiton is spotted, a broad band at the lower edge more densely than the rest.

The exterior is red-figure. A, two groups: (1) a male, leaning on his stick, holds out a flute towards a woman who sits facing him, offering him an apple or other fruit; a basket hangs between them; (2) the second group is separated from the first by a Doric column: a male, leaning on his stick, holds a fruit; a woman faces him with a mirror in her hand; behind him is a third figure, fragmentary, uncertain whether male or female, one would guess female, standing frontal and looking round at the couple. B, a male—youth or boy—sits on a stone seat; another male faces him, leaning on his stick, and holding out a lyre; a third male, leaning on his stick, is behind the seat; and a fourth stands with the right leg frontal, his stick in his left hand, holding out a hare in his right. The head must have been turned towards the others. A basket hangs between the third figure and the fourth. Under each handle, an altar—one pertaining to each of the two pictures. The style of the Boot Painter is very like that of the Kleophrades Painter, and one is often inclined to ask whether cups like ours might not be the work of the Kleophrades Painter in his very latest phase.

1936. xi-5.1, fragment of a rf. skyphos, from Sirkatis near Kornos, which is about eighteen miles south of Nicosia. *Cyprus Report* 1936 p. 112 (from a drawing); Pl. 5, 2.

About 470-460 B.C., by the Euaichme Painter, to be added to

my list of his works in *ARV*. pp. 524-5. Relief-lines for the contour; a pair of them edge the hair, except at forehead and nape.

1934. iv-23.1, rf. fragment, probably from Lambousa on the north coast of Cyprus. *Cyprus Report 2* (1934) pl. 9 fig. 3 (from a drawing); Pl. 6, 1.

This fragment was said to be from a lekaniis, but is from something rarer, a 'covered cup'. I gave a list of 'covered cups', all Attic, in *CV*. Oxford p. 97: the present list adds some facts. The mechanism is described by Caskey in *Attic Vase Paintings in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston* p. 33.

1. Louvre CA 1265, from Thebes. Phots. Giraudon 29710-11. Proto-C-cup, with offset lip. Black-figure. I, boxers; round this, centaurs; round this, foot-race; A, foot-race; B, the like. On the lip, ivy. Fat-Runner Group (Haspels *ABL*. p. 17 no. 12).
2. Oxford G 180, four fr., from Naucratis. Black-figure. Part of the outside remains. The offset lip is black; in the handle-zone, love-making (small figures of men and women). The flesh of the women is pink. By Elbows Out. I am almost sure that these small fragments are from a covered cup.
3. Oxford G 137.30 and b and 43, fr., from Naucratis. *CV*. III H pl. 3, 23-4 and 26. Black-figure. I, man courting boy (see text to *CV*.; and above, p. 210). Round this, hunt.
4. Athens 408 (CC. 854), from Tanagra. CC. pl. 36. Cup of type C, but without lip (Bloesch *Formen attischer Schalen* p. 115, below, no. 3). Black-figure on a white ground. I, love-making (man and woman). Round this, Herakles and an Amazon; and fights. A, between eyes, a youth seated, in front of him a woman dancing, behind him another youth; B, the like.
5. Cab. Méd. 182, fr. De Ridder p. 90; *CV*. pl. 81, 6. See *JHS*. 52 p. 141. Black-figure on a white ground. I, gorgoneion. Round this, chariot-race. Related to the last.
6. Boston 95.16. Fröhner *Coll. van Branteghem* pl. 2, 21; the shape, Caskey *B*. p. 34. Cup of type C, but without lip (Bloesch p. 121 no. 32). Black-figure. I, gorgoneion. Round this, victorious athlete: an elderly man places a fillet round the victor, who is followed by a flute-player, and his companions singing. Inscriptions $\text{HOPAI\S KAI}\text{BOS}$,

ΗΕΡΑΙΣ ΚΑΛΕ, ΗΟΡΑΣ ΚΑΛΟΣ, ΗΕΡΑΙΣ ΚΑΛΕ ΝΑΙ, although there are no women present.

7. Athens Acr. 589, fr., from Athens. Langlotz pl. 45. I: that remains of the tondo is a tract of the black background, partly covered by a raised mass, coloured brownish, which I cannot explain. Between this and the line-border, the inscription . . . ΚΥΑΛΟΣ in red. Round the tondo, in outline on a white ground, the Judgement of Paris. By the Splanchnopt Painter (*ARV.* p. 591 no. 46). The underside of the fragment is covered with a rough light brown wash.
8. Villa Giulia, fr. from Veii. Inside, white ground (woman's foot and edge of garment). Outside, rf. (part of the handle-ornament remains).
9. Nicosia, our fragment Red-figure.
10. Boston 00.356, from Vari. Caskey *B.* pl. 15 and p. 33. Cup of type C, but without lip. Inside, outline drawing on a white ground (with rf. border). Outside, red-figure. I, Apollo and a Muse. A, woman running; B, the like. Near the Karlsruhe Painter (*ARV.* p. 515, middle). See the next.
11. Delphi, from Cirrha. A, *BCH.* 1938 pl. 53, c. Inside, outline drawing on a white ground; outside, red-figure. I, woman fluting; round this, symposion. A, Dionysos and a maenad; B, the like. Akin to the last.
12. Bonn 1581 (*JHS.* 52 p. 68) is a covered cup, but of a different type and serving a different purpose: it belongs, as Ure has shown (*JHS.* 52 p. 69 no. 124), to the Droop Group.

The four red-figure and outline cups are a good deal later than the others and are all about 460–450 B.C. Let us return to the Nicosia fragment. There must have been a round picture in the middle, as on the other covered cups. What remains is from the zone outside this.

To left of the orifice a warrior is seen bending and passing his arm through the staple of his shield; then he will pull his spear out of the ground in which it is sticking and be off to the fight. Besides his left arm and right hand his left foot is preserved, his nose, and the front of his helmet. To right of the orifice a young warrior runs to left, looking round, in full armour, with shield—device a bull's head—and spear. Beside his head, remains of an inscription: two letters, . . . ΛΟ, are all that can be made out. Next, an archer bends to string his bow, holding it between his legs with his left hand, and in his right hand the string. He wears corslet and greaves, and has his quiver slung round his

waist. The fourth figure preserved is a warrior running to right, wearing greaves, but a chlamys over his chitoniskos instead of a corslet. His left arm is extended, his right bent up behind him as if holding or hurling a weapon. This warrior seems to be in action; and we may conjecture that the main subject was an engagement, with a few figures forming a secondary group of stragglers on the outskirts of the field—or perhaps at the mouth of the pass?

The artist is the Pistoxenos Painter. Compare especially the figures, larger in scale, on his cups in Berlin (inv. 4982.19: Diepolder *Der Penthesilea-Maler* pl. 3) and Florence (*CV.* pl. 4 B 13), nos. 5 and 14 in my list of his works (*ARV.* pp. 574–6, 944, and 962). A small particular may be worth notice: in all three vases the upper line of the greave tends to stop before joining the contour of the calf. One of the archers on the Florence cup is very like ours, only seen from the other side, without being a repetition in reverse. There are many figures of archers more or less like these: see *CF.* p. 30 on pl. B, B 3, and Technau in *RM.* 46 pp. 189–90. As for the warrior bending and taking his shield on his arm, while his spear is still fixed in the ground beside him, he has a famous ancestor: the left-hand figure in the battle-scene on the Chigi vase (*A.D.* pl. 44, whence Payne *Protokor.* pl. 29). The spear is usually taken in hand before the shield is fastened on the arm: but on the cup by the Hischylos Painter in Munich (2588: Hoppin *Bf.* 465; *FR.* iii pp. 240–1: *ARV.* p. 57 no. 1) one warrior takes shield before spear, the other spear before shield. On the cup in Athens signed by Phintias as potter (1628: Hartwig pl. 17, 3, whence Hoppin *Rf.* ii p. 354 and Pfuhl fig. 386: *CV.* pl. 2, 1, 3, and 5: *ARV.* p. 24, α) the warrior has his shield on his arm, and is putting on his helmet, or drawing it down over his face, while the spear is still fixed upright in the ground.

C 434 and C 808 (Myres 1638 and 1639), head-vases, from Amathus.

These two small sub-archaic oinochoai with the lower part in the form of a female head belong to the most numerous group of Attic head-vases, the Cook Group (*JHS.* 49 pp. 61–5 and 78, and *ARV.* pp. 900–4 and 967), and are among the better members of it.

C 756 (Myres 1662). *Rf.* squat lekythos, from Marion. Pl. 7, 1. Height .132.

The date is about 430 B.C., and I see in the picture a slight work by a fine artist, the Eretria Painter (*ARV.* pp. 724-9 and 964).

Eros stands to right, with knees bent, and arms extended. The hands are missing. Behind him a small pillar on a base indicates the palaestra, and the attitude is the same as in certain figures of athletes, which, as Norman Gardiner has shown (*JHS.* 23 p. 272 and 24 pp. 193-4, *Greek Athletic Sports* p. 308, *Athletics of the Ancient World* pp. 149-51), must be jumpers about to take off for a standing jump without haltères. The artist has depicted Eros as an athlete, which is rare. Wrestling Erotes are known, as on the pyxis by the Washing Painter in Würzburg (Langlotz pll. 200-1: *ARV.* p. 747 no. 95); an Eros as boxer is not really to be inferred from Sophocles *Trachiniae* 441.

Here is a list of figures in the same attitude as the Nicosia Eros:

Once Munich, Arndt, oinochoe (shape III). *Jb.* 31 p. 100. One leg is drawn back a little, but the subject is probably the same as in the rest of our list. The style is not far from the Tarquinia Painter, and the vase is earlier than the others.

London E 101, rf. cup. By the Painter of London E 101 (*ARV.* p. 596 no. 1).

Damascus, rf. pig-head rhyton. *Syria* 1926 pl. 40, whence *Die Antike* 6 p. 167. By the Calliope Painter (*ARV.* p. 735 no. 42).

Greifswald (ex Hartwig), rf. cup. Mentioned in *CV.* Oxford, text to pl. 52, 4.

London, Victoria and Albert Museum, 4806.1901, rf. cup. The left-hand figure on one half of the exterior.

Villa Giulia 27258, cup by the Codrus Painter (*ARV.* 740 no. 18).

London E 629, small rf. lekythos. Hancarville 3 pl. 92, whence Krause *Gymnastik* 2 pl. 9, 23.

Lost, from Marion, rf. pelike. By the Painter of Munich 2335 (*ARV.* p. 780 no. 18). See p. 242.

Narbonne, from Montlaurès, rf. stemless cup. Hélène *Les origines de Narbonne* p. 381.

Munich, rf. stemless cup. *Jb.* 10 p. 186 no. 4, whence *JHS.* 23 p. 272 fig. 4 and Schröder *Der Sport im Altertum* p. 103 fig. 21.

Florence PD 581, stemless cup.

Athens, Agora, P 8440, rf. stemless cup.

Leipsic T 642, small rf. pelike. *Jb.* 10 p. 185, whence *JHS.* 23 p. 272 fig. 3, *Jb.* 31 p. 100, Norman Gardiner *G.A.S.* p. 309 and *Athl.* p. 151.

Villa Giulia, cup-fragment from Veii.

Louvre G 502, small rf. bell-krater. Pottier pl. 153; Daremberg and Saglio s.v. Victoria fig. 745¹, whence Norman Gardiner *Athl.* p. 145; *CV.* d pl. 35, 7-8.

Goluchow, Prince Czartoryski, 82, rf. cup-skyphos. *CV.* pl. 4¹, 7.

Nicosia M 21 Dr. 2.1, rf. oinochoe (shape II). *Sw. C. E.* ii pl. 144, 5. Fat Boy Group (*ARV.* p. 890 no. 58). See p. 241.

London F 28, rf. oinochoe (shape II). Fat Boy Group (*ARV.* p. 890 no. 60).

London (old cat. 1274), rf. skyphos. *CV.* pl. 31, 6.

Still earlier than the Arndt oinochoe is the unpublished cup Vienna 2151, in the manner of the Antiphon Painter (*ARV.* p. 236 no. 51), but the subject may be a runner at the start, as the figure on the other side of the trainer or steward who stands in the middle is a sprinter.

On two cups of the same period as the Nicosia Eros, one in Athens (Acr. 401: Langlotz pl. 31), the other lost and known only from a drawing in the Berlin Apparatus (21.13), one leg is drawn farther back than in the Arndt oinochoe, with the heel off the ground. These lead on to figures in another attitude, with one leg straight or nearly, and the other drawn right back: stemless cup in Oxford, 1943.1; oinochoe (shape II) in Princeton, 43.98; skyphos in Bologna (Zannoni pl. 22, 2-4, whence *Jb.* 10 p. 187); skyphos in Athens (*Jb.* 10 p. 186, 7): on these see Norman Gardiner in *JHS.* 24 p. 194.

Then there are a few figures in the same position as the Nicosia Eros, except that the hands are bent up: oinochoe in Yale, 141 (Baur p. 95); cup in Oxford, 1926. 405 (*CV.* pl. 52, 4; *ARV.* p. 613 no. 8): they have not the physique of athletes, and are probably dancing: on a cup by the Eretria Painter in Taranto, one of the dancing satyrs is in this attitude (*ARV.* p. 728 no. 49).

I take the opportunity of making one or two additions to the list of vases by the Eretria Painter in *ARV.*: a squat lekythos in New York, GR 1218, from Attica (detail, Richter *A.R.V.S.* fig. 110: woman seated and Eros: wrongly attributed to Aison in *ARV.* p. 799 no. 13); an $\delta\omicron\nu\nu$ in the collection of Mrs. Stathatos, Athens, from near Athens (*Mon. Piot* 40 pl. 7 and pp. 70-4 and 86: women playing morra; above, a female head; below, a wheel: attributed by Metzger: late); a cup-fragment in Vilafranca del Panadés (prov. Barcelona), from Vinya del Pau (Vilafranca: I, *Memorias de los museos arqueológicos provinciales* 1944

pl. 52, 1: I, athlete with strigil); a small cup-fragment in London, Victoria and Albert Museum, 452.1918 (I, youth and another; A, shanks and feet of a male, and remnants of two other figures); and a cup in New York (og.221.38: I, two youths; A, men and youths; B, youths). No. 5 in my list is now in New York, 22.139.31; the fragment from La Monédière mentioned on p. 964 is now, as Mr. Villard tells me, in the Coulouma collection at Béziers. My interpretations of two of the inscriptions on no. 7 are wrong: the Amazon's name discussed in *AJA*. 1935 p. 485 no. 16 reads ΜΙΜΝΟΞΑ (= Μίμνουσα), and Dr. von Bothmer has shown me that 'A[λα] λη (in Richter and Hall, p. 176) is impossible, as the letters are A·AN and refer to an Athenian not an Amazon.

C 765, rf. oinochoe (shape II), from Marion. Pl. 7, 2. A boy riding (a jockey). The brand, as it must be, on the horse's rump, is a semicircle.

Hardly any relief-contour; none for the face. About 430-425 B.C.: close to the painter Polion (*ARV*. pp. 797-9) and perhaps a slight work from his hand.

C 430, small rf. calyx-krater, from Cyprus? Formerly in the collection of Eustathios Constantinides. A, *Dikaios Guide* pl. 14, 3; Pl. 8. Ht. .215.

On the front, Dionysos, one foot set on a rock, with thyrsus and kantharos; facing him a maenad with oinochoe and tympanon; behind her, a satyr standing on a rock with outstretched arm; behind Dionysos, a maenad with thyrsus and lyre. On the back, three youths, one holding an aryballos. The date is about 425 B.C., and the drawing is by an obscure artist, the Painter of the Feuardent Marsyas (*ARV*. p. 803), closely related to the Pothos Painter (*ibid.* pp. 801-3).

M 21 Dr. 2.1, rf. oinochoe (of shape II), from Marion. *Sw. C. E.* ii pl. 144, 5.

This is no. 58 in the Fat Boy Group (*ARV*. pp. 888-90), a large group of early-fourth-century oinochoai in a style that almost makes one think kindly of the Pithos Painter. In the middle of our vase, an athlete in the attitude described above (p. 240), between two clothed youths, one of whom holds a strigil, the other a discus.

I figure in conclusion a red-figure vase which I had thought might be in the Cyprus Museum but is not there and must count for the present as lost: a small archaic cup by the Euergides Painter (Pl. 5, 1: *ARV.* p. 65 no. 117). So also a trifling pelike by the Painter of Munich 2335 (*ARV.* p. 780 no. 18: see p. 239). The two vases are known to me from a volume of 'miscellaneous photographs' in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities, the British Museum: this includes photographic reductions of what are evidently the plates prepared for a work by Max Ohnefalsch-Richter which never, so far as I know, saw the light. A few of the plates were used in his *Kypros, the Bible and Homer*. One of the others gives a fine black-figured lip-cup, of an unusual variety, which was bequeathed to the Louvre by Mr. Schlumberger in 1930, was figured by Plaoutine in the *Corpus Vasorum* (He pl. 84, 1-5: CA 2918) and said to 'recall Amasis', and is certainly by the Amasis Painter. Plaoutine could not ascertain the provenience: it is Marion.

Postscript. Add the following to the courting-scenes described on pp. 199-222.

α 5 bis. Vatican, bf. olpe. Leftward. The boy holds a wreath in each hand; his left arm passes behind the head of the man who approaches him, extending his right arm this side of the boy. On the left a man, clothed, standing, and another, naked, approaching the pair, with a wreath in each hand. On the right, a man, clothed, standing, holding a wreath. Third quarter of the sixth century.

α 26 bis. Louvre CA 3062, bf. band-cup. The figures spread out. Leftward. The wooer is a youth. On each side of the chief group, a youth making off, looking back.

α 30 bis. Florence, fragment of a bf. eye-cup.

γ 8 bis. Vatican, bf. lip-cup. Inside, leftward, a youth and a boy. On the left, a youth dances off to left, looking round, holding a wreath. Third quarter of the sixth century.

P. 233: for the lappet compare also the short garment worn by a satyr, together with the drawers of the satyr-play, on a lost cup by Apollodoros (Hartwig 637: *ARV.* p. 87 no. 18).

LIST OF PLATES


- Pl. 1, 1-2. Black-figured cup, C 438: see pp. 195-8.
1, 3. Black-figured cup, C 658: see pp. 223-4.
2. Black-figured amphora, C 440: see pp. 198-223.
3, 1. Black-figured fragment, 1938. xi-16.1: see pp. 225-8.
3, 2. Black-figured oinochoe, C 433: see pp. 224-5.
4, 1. Red-figured cup, C 654: see pl. 5, 4 and p. 230.
4, 2. Red-figured cup, 1938. i-4.1: see pp. 230-1.
5, 1. Red-figured cup, see p. 242.
5, 2. Fragment of red-figured skyphos, 1936. xi-5.1: see pp. 235-6.
5, 3. Red-figured lekythos, C 739: see pp. 232-4.
5, 4. Red-figured cup, C 654: see pl. 4, 1.
6, 1. Fragment of a red-figured covered cup, 1934. iv-23. 1:
see pp. 236-8.
6, 2. White and red-figured cup, V. 414: see p. 235.
7, 1. Red-figured squat lekythos, C 756: see pp. 238-41.
7, 2. Red-figured oinochoe, C 765: see p. 241.
8. Red-figured calyx-krater, C 430: see p. 241.



1




2



3





2



1



1



2



1




2




3




4



1



2





THE SIR JOHN RHÛS MEMORIAL LECTURE
THE ARCHAISM OF IRISH TRADITION

By MYLES DILLON

Read 11 February 1948

AFTER Sir William Jones had given the first impetus to the study of comparative philology by his discovery of the affinity between Sanskrit and the classical languages, scholars extended the field of observation to include Germanic, Baltic, Slavonic, and even Armenian, but Celtic was not yet admitted into the Indo-European family.¹ The Celtic dialects were then known only from late documents in which the forms had undergone such drastic change that their origins were not apparent. It was not until 1838 that Franz Bopp demonstrated the Indo-European character of the Celtic dialects; and he proved it from evidence which at the first glance had seemed to point to the opposite conclusion, namely, the initial mutation of consonants. We now know that these changes (*W. pen* 'head', *fy mhen* 'my head', *ei ben* 'his head', *ei phen* 'her head') are the effect of ancient Indo-European endings which have been lost in Welsh and Irish. In 1853 the immortal Zeuss published his *Grammatica Celtica*, a work which has never been quite superseded, and the early forms of the Celtic languages were made known to the learned world. Great progress has been made since, and we have learned a good deal about the particular relationship of Celtic to Italic and to Germanic, and to other Indo-European dialects much farther afield. Most of this work has been done by foreign scholars, and Sir John RhÛs, whose name we are honouring to-day, was one of the first of the native scholars who have done pioneer work in the field of Celtic philology in its wider sense.² In spite of the fact that these languages have long been recognized as Indo-European, the early notion of their alien character has persisted, partly because they are so difficult that few linguists

¹ In his famous lecture, delivered before the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1786, Jones had indeed suggested that Gothic and Celtic 'though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanskrit'.

² Mention may here be made of the Scotsman, George Buchanan, who showed in his *Rerum Scotticarum Historia* (1582) that the Britons and the Irish were descended from the Celts of the Continent, and of that remarkable linguist, Edward Lhuyd, far ahead of his time, who published his *Archaeologia Britannica* in 1707; but that was before the discovery of Indo-European.

care to learn them, partly because so few native scholars have devoted themselves to the subject. Thus Meillet says:

Although the facts of Celtic, which are repellent at the first approach and always difficult to interpret, have been successfully reduced to order, and although Pedersen's *Vergleichende Grammatik der keltischen Sprachen* has made the Celtic evidence available to experienced linguists who are not themselves Celtists, this evidence remains obscure, awkward and little apt to throw light upon other languages.¹

I have already referred to connexions between Celtic and languages geographically far removed from the area of Celtic speech, and they are a part of my subject. My purpose is to show that certain features of Irish tradition suggest that Ireland, on the margin of the Indo-European area, has preserved Indo-European characteristics that have been lost in most other regions of the west. It will appear that in social organization, in language, and in literature the peculiar character of the Irish evidence is due, not to the influence of a pre-Celtic substratum, as has sometimes been suggested, nor to drastic innovation, but to conservatism. This conservative character is to be expected in Ireland by the linguist, as it is by the anthropologist, for Ireland is a peripheral area. It is apparent in two of the lectures recently delivered here.²

I shall present briefly the evidence that I have collected in terms of society, language, and literary tradition. It was pointed out long ago by Vendryes³ that India, Rome, and Celtic Gaul had one notable tradition in common, namely, the recognition of a privileged caste of priests, brahman, pontiff, and druid; and he so explained certain facts of vocabulary to which I shall return. If we examine more closely what is known of druidic practices in Gaul and what can be gleaned from Irish evidence, it appears that the brahman and the druid alike preserved more than a common ancient vocabulary: they preserved common Indo-European traditions of practice and belief, some of which survived in the Gaelic world down to the eighteenth century and have survived in India to the present day.⁴

We know from Caesar that the druids learned by heart a

¹ *Esquisse d'une histoire de la langue latine*, p. 17.

² D. A. Binchy, 'The Linguistic and Historical Value of the Irish Law Tracts', *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xxix (1943); J. H. Delargy, 'The Gaelic Story-teller', *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xxxii (1946).

³ *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, xx, 275.

⁴ I am indebted to my friend Professor George Bobrinsky of the University of Chicago for advice about Sanskrit sources, but he is not responsible for my use of them.

great number of verses, and that the training sometimes lasted for twenty years. The lessons were not written down but learned by oral transmission and committed to memory, as is still the practice in the brahmanical schools of India. The druids were judges, and part of the training they received must have been in the laws. You have heard in a recent lecture¹ that very ancient Irish law tracts have been preserved which are composed in verse, doubtless for the purpose of being memorized, and there can be little doubt that these tracts are in the druidic tradition, and that the Irish *brithem* was heir to the druid. But Dr. Binchy adds: 'The parallelism between the Irish and the Hindu law books, both of them the work of a privileged professional class, is often surprisingly close: it extends not merely to form and technique but occasionally even to diction.' The laws concerning marriage, the legal degrees of kindred (Skr. *sapinda*: Ir. *fine*), inheritance by a daughter when there are no sons (Skr. *putrikā*: Ir. *banchomarbae*), and the giving of sureties for performance of an obligation are closely similar. I can claim no competence in jurisprudence, but I think it probable that a great deal more could be established by comparison of the texts. However, it may be that some features common to India and Ireland recur in other primitive systems of law, and these would not be cogent evidence for my purpose. Only a specialist in comparative law can decide. There is one remarkable practice which was observed long ago by Stokes, and which is not recorded elsewhere so far as I know, namely, fasting as a means of enforcing legal claims.² And another, which has only recently attracted attention, is the Act of Truth, based upon a belief in the magic power of the truth.³ In both Indian and Irish stories there are episodes in which a person by formal recitation of the truth is able to work miracles. For example, Damayantī in the *Mahābhārata* saves herself from a wicked hunter in the forest by uttering the true statement that she longs only for Nala and praying that the hunter may fall dead. He dies instantly. In an Irish tale a pig is roasted by means of the telling of four true stories, one for each quarter. Or again, when

¹ D. A. Binchy, loc. cit.

² W. Stokes, *Academy*, xxviii (1885), 169; F. Robinson, *Putnam Anniversary Volume* (New York, 1909), p. 567; Maine, *Lectures*, p. 297; Thurneysen, *ZCP*, xv, 260.

³ Burlingame, *JRAS* (1917), p. 429; N. Brown, *Review of Religion*, v (1940), 36; H. Lüders, *ZDMG*, xcvi (1944), 1; M. Dillon, *Modern Philology*, xlv (1947), 137.

Lugaid Mac Con gives a false judgement, the house begins to fall down a slope. Cormac then pronounces the true verdict, and the house stays, and falls no farther.

Lüders formulates the Hindu belief as follows: 'Truth was the highest power, the ultimate cause of all being.'¹ And some of the examples he supplies have striking parallels in Irish documents. It is told, for instance, of a certain king Sibi that, when asked by a blind brahman for one of his eyes, he gladly gave them both. Indra calls on him to speak truths and his eyes will be restored, whereupon the king declares that he has truly granted this request as he always granted the requests of petitioners; and at once his eyes are restored. In the Irish story the poet Athirne asked King Eochaid to give him his one eye (for Eochaid had but one), and the king at once plucked out his eye and gave it into the poet's hand. And God rewarded his generosity by restoring both his eyes.² Here the Act of Truth does not appear in the Irish story, but it may well have dropped out when the miracle came to be attributed to the Christian God. The Act of Truth is found in many other Irish texts, of which some are cited below. An extension of this notion, which Lüders also discusses, is likewise commonplace in Irish tradition. The great Indian epic *Mahābhārata* includes a number of separate episodes, which have been interpolated, most famous among them the beautiful story of Nala and Damayantī. At the end of this and many other interpolated poems, the reward for reciting or hearing the poem is set forth:

And those who will recite this great adventure of Nala, and those who will hear it attentively, misfortune shall not visit them. His affairs shall prosper and he shall attain wealth. Having heard this ancient story whose excellence endures eternal, he shall have sons and grandsons, wealth in cattle and pre-eminence among men. He shall be free from sickness and rich in love most certainly.³

Of the story of Sāvitrī in Book III it is said: 'He who has heard with devotion the glorious story of Sāvitrī, that man is fortunate, his affairs shall prosper, and never shall sorrow visit him.'⁴ Lüders

¹ Lüders, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

² *RC*, viii. 48. O'Rahilly considers this Eochaid to be the sun-god, *Early Irish History*, p. 59.

³ *Mahābhārata* (Poona ed.), 3. 78. 12-13.

⁴ *Ibid.* (Calcutta ed.), 3. 298. 16618; Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, i. 399. So also we read of a reward for hearing the recitation of the *Mahābhārata* (18. 6. 310-11, Calcutta ed.), of the *Harivamśa* (326. 16371-4, Calcutta ed. iv. 1006), of the legend of Sunahṣepa, *Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa*, vii. 18 (A. B. Keith, *Rig-Veda Brahmanas Translated*, Harvard Oriental Series 25, p. 309).

draws attention to the fact that the reward does not consist in aesthetic enjoyment or in the instruction which the poem provides, but in quite other things. And he goes on:

Such beliefs clearly reflect the notions of the earliest period. From the later Vedic period we have by chance a short tale which describes how the eagle Suparna stole the Soma from Indra's heaven as ransom for his mother Vinatā who was held in slavery by the serpents. At the end there is a long *śravanaphala*. Not merely is the believing hearer promised protection from his enemies and from all misfortune, and entry into Indra's heaven: the proffered reward is brought into relation with particular features of the story. The keenness of the eagle's eye shall be granted to a willing listener. Since the eagle, who overcomes his enemies by mere play, is an example of bravery, a pregnant woman who hears the story at new moon or at full moon shall bear a heroic son, and he shall have no rival in combat. The simple story works like a charm, because in the belief of the narrator it tells what has truly happened. That is, no doubt, why in the *Rigveda* we find narrative poems mixed with the ritual hymns.¹

Now this reward for hearing a venerable story is also known in Ireland and in a very similar form. At the end of the curious mythological tale called 'The Fostering of the Houses of Two Methers', which belongs in its extant form to the Middle Irish period, we are told that many rewards are in store for those who recite it or hear it recited—children, safety on a voyage at sea, success in legal disputes and in hunting, peace in the banqueting-hall; if prisoners hear the story, it will be as though their bonds were loosed.² One of the three 'wonders' of *Táin Bó Cualnge* is that he who hears it recited will enjoy a year's protection.³ The author of the satirical *Vision of Mac Con Glinne* has parodied the *motif*:

There are thirty chief virtues attending this tale, and a few of them are enough for an example. The married couple to whom it is related on their first night shall not separate without an heir; they shall not be in dearth of food or raiment. The new house in which it is the first tale told, no corpse shall be taken out of it; it shall not want food or raiment; fire does not burn it. The king to whom it is recited before battle or conflict shall be victorious. On the occasion of bringing out ale, or of feasting a prince, or of taking inheritance or patrimony this tale should be recited.⁴

¹ *ZDMG*, xcvi (1944), 7; cf. *Mahābhārata* (Poona ed.), I. 30. 22.

² *Ériu*, xi, 224. This charm has been preserved in many parts of Ireland by oral tradition in varying degrees of corruption and is believed to be a prayer of great efficacy. It is called *Marainn Phádraig* ('Patrick's Elegy'), see *Béaloidéas*, iv, 264; Flower, *Catalogue of Irish Manuscripts in the British Museum*, ii, p. 136, § 12; *Ériu*, xi, 185.

³ Meyer, *Triads of Ireland*, 62.

⁴ Meyer, *Vision of Mac Conglinne*, pp. 110–12. Professor Thorkild Jacobsen of the University of Chicago has pointed out to me that something similar

But the all-embracing power of truth in Hindu tradition has been traced much more widely by Lüders. The gods of the Veda are fed on truth, born of truth, they act by means of truth. By truth the earth is supported, by means of truth the wind blows and the sun shines, everything is founded upon truth. In a later text the judge reminds a witness of the sacredness of truth: 'By means of truth the sun is warm, by means of truth the moon shines, by means of truth the wind blows, by means of truth the earth is stable',¹ and so on. And Truth was localized in a huge lake at the summit of heaven, the source of the sacred river Ganges. In Ireland, too, this notion of the sacredness of truth pervades the literature. A poem in the Book of Leinster says:

Three things that are best for a prince during his reign are truth, mercy and silence; those that are worst for a king's honour are straying from the truth and adding to the false. . . . Truth in a prince is as bright as the foam cast up by a mighty wave of the sea, as the sheen of a swan's covering in the sun, as the colour of snow on a mountain. . . . A prince's truth is an effort which overpowers armies: it brings milk into the world, it brings corn and mast.²

The idea is expressed more fully in an archaic text, 'The Testament of Morand', which dates perhaps from the eighth century.³ Here the legendary jurist Morand, who was supposed to have lived in the time of King Conchobar (first century B.C.), sends a messenger to Feradach Find Fechnach with his Instructions for a Prince, and the tone is not far removed from that of the Upanishads:

Announce the word to him before all men. Bring the word to him before all men. Tell the word to him before all men. Reveal the word to him before all men.

Let him magnify Truth, it will magnify him.

Let him strengthen Truth, it will strengthen him.

Let him preserve Truth, it will preserve him.

Let him exalt Truth, it will exalt him.

For so long as he preserves Truth, good will not be lacking to him, and his reign will not fail.

For by the Prince's Truth great kingdoms are ruled.

By the Prince's Truth great mortality is warded off from men.

By the Prince's Truth the great armies are driven off into the enemies' country.

is found in the Ira Epic, see Hugo Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte zum alten Testament* (2nd ed.), pp. 229-30.

¹ Cf. the Irish custom of giving the elements as sureties (Joyce, *Social History of Ireland*, i, 292; cf. Meyer, *Cóin Adamndin*, p. 12, § 22).

² *Ériu*, ix, 51, § 8; 52, § 15; 54, § 37.

³ *ZCP*, xi, 80.

By the Prince's Truth every right prevails and every vessel is full in his reign.

This series is continued, eighteen propositions in all, and the seventeenth declares:

By the Prince's Truth fair weather comes in each fitting season, winter fine and frosty, spring dry and windy, summer warm, with showers of rain, autumn with heavy dews, and fruitful. For it is the prince's falsehood that brings perverse weather upon wicked peoples and dries up the fruit of the earth.

In the story of the 'Birth of Cormac' we read:

It was well with Ireland in the time of that king. It was not possible to drink the waters of her rivers on account of the spawn (?) of her fish; it was not possible to travel her forests easily on account of the amount of their fruit; it was not easy to travel her plains on account of the amount of her honey, all of which had been granted him from heaven through the *truth of his principedom*.¹

Beside the Prince's Truth (*firinne flatha*) there is the principle of Men's Truth (*fír fer*) which consists in the right of one who challenges the enemy to single combat (an ancient custom attested of the Celts of Gaul) to be met by a single champion. The reverse of truth (*fír, firinne*) is falsehood (*gó*), and the notion is often expressed in this reversed form: 'Three grades which ruin peoples in their falsehood: the falsehoods of a king, the falsehoods of a historian, the falsehoods of a judge.'²

In Ireland as in India the notion of the magic power of Truth was familiar, and there may even be a survival of the ancient tradition as to the source of Truth in the Irish belief about the 'Nuts of Segais', which gave the seer's gift to those who ate them. For the Well of Segais was located in the Other World, and it was the source of the divine river Boyne and also of the Shannon,³ just as the heavenly pool which was the home of Truth in India was also the source of the Ganges. But I shall not pursue that idea here.

¹ *Modern Philology*, xlv, 140. Examples could be multiplied. Vernam Hull calls my attention to a story in the Book of Leinster in which King Niall Frossach is called on to give judgement by 'prince's truth', and the suppliant swears by 'prince's truth'. The king gives a true judgement, and by this 'prince's truth' a sinful priest is miraculously delivered from demons who have taken him captive, LL facs. 273b16, 18; 274a2. Gerard Murphy supplies an instance from the *Metrical Dindsenchas*: 'Corn and milk in every stead, peace and fair weather for its sake, were granted to the heathen tribes of the Greeks, because they preserved truth' (iv, 152. 76).

² *Triads* 166. Cf. the seven proofs of the falsehood of a king, *AL*, iv, 52.

³ See O'Rahilly, *Early Irish History and Mythology*, p. 322.

There is, however, another concept in Irish tradition which seems to be an extension of the magic power of truth, namely, the *geis*, which is an absolute prohibition from doing certain things.¹ These *gessa* may be quite arbitrary and they vary with individuals. Sometimes they seem to be related to the totem-cult, as when Cú Chulainn ('Culann's Hound') may not eat the flesh of a dog, or Diarmait, whose life-span was united to that of a boar, may not join in a boar-hunt, or Conaire, whose father was a bird, may not kill birds. Sometimes they appear to be motivated by the avoidance of a set of circumstances which had formerly led to disaster. In some cases a *geis* is imposed by one man upon another, often by means of a successful exploit, as when Cú Chulainn lays a *geis* upon the Connachtmen, binding them not to pass the ford until a single warrior has removed the branch which he has thrust into the ground.² In some cases the *geis* seems to be quite accidental, a decree of Fate.³ The basis of *geis* is honour. If a man violates his *geis* he loses honour, but, like the prince's falsehood, violation of a *geis* involves also material ruin. The penalty is not stated, but in the sagas it is often death.

It is told of Fergus and also of Cú Chulainn, two of the heroes of the Ulster Cycle, that it was *geis* for them to refuse an invitation to a feast. And perhaps this *geis* may throw light on one of the chief episodes of the great Indian epic. In the *Mahābhārata*, when Duryodhana invites Yudhiṣṭhira to the dice-game in order to destroy him, Yudhiṣṭhira is reluctant to go, but he yields to the power of Fate (2. 52. 21, Poona ed.). He loses his fortune, his kingdom, his brothers, his own liberty, even his wife. When his kingdom has been restored to him by Dhṛtarāṣṭra, and he is on his way home, a messenger comes from Duryodhana inviting him back for another game, and, bewildered by Fate (2. 67. 3-4, Poona ed.), Yudhiṣṭhira accepts the invitation and loses again. Surely the Irish notion of *geis* supplies here a missing link. Yudhiṣṭhira was not free to refuse (2. 44. 18, Poona ed.). Like Fergus he was under *geis* not to refuse an invitation.⁴ It was a part of Truth to observe one's *gessa*.

¹ The word is etymologically akin to *guidid*, 'prays' (προθεω).

² This form of *geis* is a commonplace of Irish folk-tales, often imposed by the winner of a card game.

³ Some of these *gessa* recall the interdictions governing the conduct of the Roman *flamen dialis*, see Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, vi, 2488.

⁴ Professor Franklin Edgerton (in a letter to me) does not accept this interpretation, and prefers to hold that it was a matter of honour for the king not to refuse such a challenge.

The Academy has already heard a distinguished French scholar discuss the linguistic position of Celtic, and I may be brief in presenting the linguistic evidence that concerns us.¹ M. Vendryes referred to features of morphology and vocabulary which Celtic shares with Sanskrit, and drew the conclusion that they indicate the archaic character of these languages and the survival east and west of ancient religious institutions.² It is the theory which I am here attempting to confirm and to extend; and I would merely add that in the light of other evidence these points of agreement between Sanskrit and Celtic have an importance rather greater than Vendryes would seem to attach to them, for they are part of a much wider measure of common tradition. And there are also features which connect Celtic with Tocharian and even with Hittite, the passive and deponent in *r*, the *ā*-subjunctive (both common to Italic also) and the complicated structure of the verb. Whereas it used to be thought that Irish had diverged from the tradition of Indo-European in the syntax of the verb, it has recently been suggested that some of the characteristic features of the Old Irish verb recur in Hittite and Tocharian.³ The affinity between Celtic and Hittite, the earliest attested form of Indo-European, is a fact of great importance as evidence of the archaism of the Irish language.

Finally there is the literary tradition. The form of Irish epic tradition is a prose narrative with occasional passages of verse, the verse being used for dialogue to mark any heightening of the mood: love, anger, death. This form appears in some of the most ancient Hindu writings, and both Oldenberg and Windisch have maintained that it is the earliest form of Indo-European narrative. Windisch, who was a specialist in both Sanskrit and Irish, drew attention repeatedly to the analogy between the Irish and Indian examples.⁴ The matter is of general importance for the history of the epic, and it is possible to follow the development through all its stages in Sanskrit.

¹ J. Vendryes, 'La Position linguistique du Celtique', *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xxiii (1937), 348-50.

² Italic is here involved. Some of the words are: Skr. *rāj*, Lat. *rēx*, Ir. *rí*; Skr. *rājñī*, Ir. *rígain* 'queen'; Skr. *brahman*, Lat. *flāmen*; O.P. *naiba* 'good', Ir. *nóeb* 'holy'; Skr. *śraddadhāti* 'believes', Lat. *credo*, Ir. *cretid*. Bonfante has examined the vocabulary of Celtic and Latin, *Emerita*, ii (1934), 263.

³ *Trans. Phil. Soc.* (1947), p. 15.

⁴ 'Über die altirische Sage der Táin Bó Cualnge', *Verhandlungen der Philologengesammlng zu Gera* (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 15-32 (= 'L'Ancienne Légende irlandaise et les poésies ossianiques', *RC.* v, 70, see p. 87); *Irische Texte*, iii, 445; *Die altirische Heldensage Táin Bó Cualnge*, p. xlviii; *Geschichte der Sanskritphilologie*, p. 404.

There are in the *Rigveda*, which is the earliest collection of verse in any Indo-European language, a number of poems known as *saṃvāda*-hymns, which consist of dialogues in verse, the context of which is not immediately intelligible. But the missing context is supplied in later Vedic texts, the *brāhmaṇas*, where these same poems appear as the speeches of characters in a prose narrative. One well-known example may be cited here, namely, the story of Purūravas and Urvaśī. Purūravas was a mortal and Urvaśī was a nymph, and they were lovers. But Urvaśī laid upon Purūravas an injunction (in Irish it would be a *geis*) never to appear naked before her. Her supernatural companions, the Gandharvas, longed to have her back again, so they contrived a ruse which forced Purūravas to violate the injunction, and Urvaśī vanished. Later he found her with other nymphs, all in the form of swans, swimming in a pond. She revealed herself to him and he was allowed to become a Gandharva and was reunited with her in heaven.

In the *Rigveda* (x. 95) there is an early hymn in dialogue, in which the speakers are Purūravas and Urvaśī; but it is not clear from the text what the dialogue is about. In the *Śatapatha-Brahmaṇa* (xi. 5. 1) the story is told in prose, and the Vedic verses are quoted there in their context. In the *Harivamśa* (26. 1363, Calcutta ed. iv. 491) the whole story is in verse. This is the fully developed epic form as we find it in Homer and in *Beowulf*.

Another example of this primitive form is the legend of Sunahṣepa in the *Aitareya-Brahmaṇa* (vii. 13-18),¹ but the tale seems to vary from that suggested by references in the *Rigveda* (i. 24).² It appears in epic form in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (i. 62-3).

The *saṃvāda*-hymns of the *Rigveda* are then merely the dialogue in a narrative of which the prose part was not fixed but was added freely by the reciter. This prose part later acquired a fixed tradition and is found in the *brāhmaṇas*. The final stage is reached when narrative and dialogue alike are in verse.³

¹ A. B. Keith, *Harvard Oriental Series* 25, p. 299; cf. H. Oldenberg, *ZDMG*, xxxvii, 79.

² See Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, i, 216.

³ See Windisch, *Geschichte der Sanskritphilologie*, p. 405. The theory of Windisch and Oldenberg has been examined by Jarl Charpentier (*Die Suparṇasage*, Uppsala, 1920), and dismissed as unproven and improbable (pp. 51-70). Charpentier has given the matter careful study, and I am not sufficiently familiar with Vedic literature to pronounce with confidence upon his work; but his argument has not convinced me. Neither has it convinced Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, i (1927), 103; 113, n. 2; nor Caland, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, xxv (1927), 288. Barnett accepted it, *BSOS*, ii (1923), 808.

But in Ireland the form preserved in the *brāhmaṇas* is the common saga-form. Indeed it can be said to have survived in folk-tales down to the present day, for I have heard a Fenian tale recited in Inishmaan with the speech of the hero in verse. The *englynion* attributed to Llywarch Hen are a Welsh example of the earliest stage.¹

Within this ancient form there are specific *motifs* which support the theory that in India and in Ireland a common tradition has survived. The famous legend of Nala and Damayantī has already been mentioned. Nala was a brave, virtuous, and handsome prince and Damayantī was a beautiful princess. They had not met, but each had heard of the other and they were each in love with the unseen one (*adr̥ṣṭakāma*). One day Nala caught a swan, and it promised, if he freed it, to go to Damayantī and tell her of his love. On hearing the swan's message Damayantī bade it return to Nala and say that she loved him too.

Then the king, observing that his daughter was in love, decided to hold a feast at which she could declare her choice, and messengers were sent far and wide, so that princes came from all directions. Even the gods heard the news, and Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, and Yāma decided to appear as suitors. On their way down from heaven they saw Nala and decided to send him to plead their suit. The unhappy prince dared not disobey the gods. He went to Damayantī and announced that the four gods were suitors for her hand. But she was steadfast and answered that she was in love with him alone. Nala returned humbly to the gods and gave them this bad news.

The gods hit upon a plan to outwit Damayantī. On the night of the feast they all took on the appearance of Nala, so that when the time came for Damayantī to choose she was confronted with five Nalas, all alike. She resorted to an Act of Truth. She made four true statements: that upon hearing the swan's message she had chosen Nala; that she sinned neither in thought nor in word; that the gods themselves had appointed Nala to be her husband; that she had made a vow of love in order to win Nala. Each time she added: 'By this truth may the gods show him to me!'² The four gods were so moved by this that they put off

¹ See Ifor Williams, 'The Poems of Llywarch Hen' (*Proc. Brit. Acad.* xviii [1932]); *Lectures on Early Welsh Poetry* (Dublin, 1944), pp. 22 ff., 35 ff. His thesis is that these *englynion* are the verse passages from a cycle of sagas of which the prose has been lost.

² *Mahābhārata* (Poona ed.), 3. 54. 17-19.

their disguises. Their skin became free of sweat, their eyelids ceased to blink, and they no longer cast any shadow; and so Damayantī knew Nala and chose him for her husband.

We shall not follow the story of their many trials and final happiness. In the passage here presented there are three *motifs* to which I would call attention. The first is the Act of Truth, which has been discussed already. The second is the love of the unseen one. It is perhaps not impressive, but no one familiar with Irish literature will fail to recognize it. In *Serglige Con Culainn* Fann loves Cú Chulainn without having seen him. In *Táin Bó Fraech* Findabair loves Fraech by reason of his fame (*ara irscélaib*). In the tale of Cano son of Gartnán both the daughter of Diarmait and Cred daughter of Guaire loved Cano before he came from Scotland. It is a commonplace of Irish tradition known as *grád écmaise*, 'love of one known only by report'. The third *motif* is the incident of the five Nalas, which closely resembles an episode in one of the Irish mythological tales, 'The Wooing of Étaín'. Eochaid Airem, King of Tara, had lost his wife, Étaín, to the fairy king, Midir, at a game of chess, and the men of Ireland decided to dig up every fairy-mound in the country until she should be restored. Midir consented to send her back; but on the following day, when Eochaid and his companions were expecting her, fifty maidens appeared all in the form and raiment of Étaín. Eochaid was not so successful as Damayantī, but the rest of the story does not concern us here.

Beside the tale of Nala and Damayantī, hardly second in fame, certainly not in merit, is the story of Śakuntalā, the foster-child of the hermit Kanva, who was discovered in the forest by King Duṣyanta and became his wife. Of them was born Bharata, ancestor of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas whose enmity is the central theme of the *Mahābhārata*. The story of Śakuntalā is told in the *Mahābhārata* itself (i. 62-9, Poona ed.) and it is the subject of Kalidāsa's most famous play. We have in the Book of Leinster and other early manuscripts a story about King Cormac mac Airt, of which the theme and setting are the same. Buchet has retired into the forest with his foster-child Eithne, and Cormac finds her by chance and makes her his queen.

And in another direction, the famous story of Sohrab and Rustum, Iranian tradition this time, presents the theme of one of the finest tales of the Ulster Cycle, which Yeats has made more widely known by his play, *On Baile's Strand*. Cú Chulainn, like Rustum, killed his own son in single combat.

Dumézil in his *Flamen-Brahman* has examined the Hindu

legend of Sunaṣṣepa and found there the myth governing the original function of the priest-victim. The story, as told in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (vii. 13), is as follows:

King Hariścandra had no sons, and he made a promise to the god Varuṇa that if a son were born to him he would sacrifice the child to Varuṇa. After the birth of his son he obtained various delays; and later the son, Rohita, escaped into the forest. His father was stricken with disease in punishment, and Rohita resolved to return for the sacrifice. But six times the god Indra bade him stay in the forest. At last he purchased for a hundred cows a brahman's son named Sunaṣṣepa, whose father consented to slay him as a substitute victim. At the last moment, the victim invoked the gods and was spared. King Hariścandra was healed of his disease.

Here again there is an Irish analogue which deserves consideration, although the manuscript tradition is late. The Book of Fermoy, written in the fifteenth century, contains a curious tale about Art, son of Conn of the Hundred Battles, of the type known as *echtrae* (Adventure), a visit to the Other World.¹ The traditional date of Art mac Cuinn is the third century A.D.

Eithne of the Long Side, daughter of Brisleinn Binn, king of Lochlann, was the wife of Conn of the Hundred Battles. She died and was buried at Taitiu. Taitiu and Bruig na Bóinne and Cruachain were the three chief burial-places of Ireland. Conn was desolate. He went out alone from Tara one day and came to Benn Étair meic Étgaith. On that same day it happened that the Tuatha Dé Danann were met in council to judge a woman taken in sin. Bé Cuma of the Fair Skin, daughter of Eogan Inbir, the wife of Labraid Swift Hand at Sword, had sinned with Gaidiar son of Manannán. Their counsel was to banish her from the Land of Promise. A message was sent to Oengus of the Bruig by Labraid, whose daughter Nuamaisi was Oengus's wife, that Bé Cuma should be refused hospitality in all the fairy mounds of Ireland. She was sent into Ireland because the Tuatha Dé hated the Irish for driving them out.

Bé Cuma loved Art son of Conn, although she did not know him, except by report. She set out over the sea in a coracle and came to land at Benn Étair. (Her beauty is described in the conventional style. But a banished woman is no mate for the High King of Ireland.) She met Conn and told him that she was Delbchaem, daughter of Morgán, and that she had come in quest of Art. They joined friendship, and she bound

¹ Ed. with translation by R. I. Best, *Ériu*, iii (1907), 149.

him to obey her. She required that Art be banished from Tara for a year. They arrived in Tara as man and wife, and Conn banished Art from Tara and from Ireland. For a year there was neither corn nor milk in Ireland. The druids declared that Conn's wife had brought this curse on the country by her wickedness and her unbelief and that it could be removed only by the sacrifice of the son of a sinless couple, and the mixing of his blood with the soil of Tara.

Conn set out in quest of the sinless boy, leaving the kingdom to Art during his absence. He went to Benn Étair and found there the coracle which Bé Cuma had left hidden. For a month and a fortnight it carried him over the sea from one island to another. Monsters of the sea surrounded the boat. At last he came to a strange island and put in to shore. (The description of the island is according to type—fragrant apple-trees, wells of wine surrounded by hazel-trees, a house thatched with birds' feathers, with doorposts of bronze and doors of crystal.) Within he found the queen, Rígru of the Large Eyes, daughter of Lodan from the Land of Promise, and wife of Dáire the Wonderful, son of Fergus of the Noble Judgement from the Land of Wonders. Her son, Ségda Saerlabraid, sat in a chair of crystal. Conn sat down, and his feet were washed by invisible hands. Soon a flame leaped from the hearth, and a hand guided him towards the fire. Tables laden with food appeared before him, but none had brought them. A drinking-horn appeared, and the dishes were borne away. Then he saw a tub of blue glass with hoops of gold, and Dáire bade him bathe in the tub. He slept and awoke refreshed, and food was again set before him. This time he declared that it was a *geis* for him to eat alone. His hosts were bound to eat alone, but Ségda consented to eat with him. Those two lay in the same bed that night.

Next day Conn declared his quest and asked that Ségda be given up to him for the sacrifice. Dáire would not surrender him. His only intercourse with his wife had been at the conception of Ségda, and both he and his wife were conceived in the same way, their parents having had only one intercourse. But the boy protested that the King of Ireland should not be refused, and insisted on going. His people placed him under the protection of the kings of Ireland, and of Art son of Conn, and Finn son of Cumall, and of the poets, so that he might return safely. Conn agreed to that if it was possible. He returned to Tara, and the druids insisted on the boy's death. As they were about to kill him, a woman entered the assembly, driving a cow. She sat

between Conn and Finn. Then she bade the druids slaughter the cow, mix the blood with the soil of Tara and smear it on the door-posts, and spare the boy. There were two bags on the cow's sides, a bird with one leg in one of them, a bird with twelve legs in the other. She told them to cut open the bags when the cow had been slaughtered, and release the birds. The birds fought, and the one-legged bird prevailed. The woman told them that they were the bird with twelve legs, and Ségda the bird with one leg, for he was in the truth. She then bade Conn put away the sinful woman, but he could not do that. She foretold that their state would grow still worse, and then she departed with her son Ségda.

The rest of the story does not concern us, but it is perhaps not too far-fetched to regard the *motif* of the human victim to be slain in expiation of the king's fault as a survival of ancient Indo-European tradition.

But the most remarkable resemblance between the literatures of India and Ireland is in the matter of bardic poetry. Vendryes discussed the bardic poetry of Ireland and Wales at the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in Paris in 1932,¹ and pointed out that the Welsh and Irish court poets were the inheritors of an ancient Celtic tradition. His account of the art, status, and conduct of these professional poets evoked from Sylvain Lévi, who was present, the comment that it was 'almost a chapter of the history of India under another name'.² Among the Hindus and among the Celts there were poets attached to the household of the kings whose duty it was to praise their patrons. In India literature was apparently for the most part in the hands of the priests, the brahmans.³ The poet (*kavi*) belonged to a privileged caste, notorious for its exactions. The court poetry (*kāvya*) is a highly technical craft, distinguished by elaborate ornament (*alaṃkāra*), and often marked by deliberate obscurity of diction. The earliest panegyrics that have come down to us contain passages emphasizing the merit gained by those who are generous in bestowing gifts upon brahmans, and the doom in store for those who withhold such gifts. The general purport of the poems is praise of the king, a record of his glorious ancestry, and of his military achievements. These earliest praise-poems are preserved in the Gupta inscriptions, first among them the famous Allahabad inscription to Samudragupta, composed during his

¹ J. Vendryes, *La Poésie de cour en Irlande et en Galles*, Paris, 1932.

² See *Revue Celtique*, 1 (1933), 77.

³ See Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, i (Calcutta, 1927), 318.

lifetime (c. A.D. 365) by his court-poet Hariṣeṇa. It is a *praśasti* in *kāvya*-style, consisting of nine quatrains and a prose passage:

Who, being looked at sadly by others of equal birth, while the attendants of the court breathed forth deep sighs, was bidden by his father to protect the whole earth¹ . . . who is skilful in engaging in a hundred battles of various kinds, whose only ally is the prowess of the strength of his own arm, who is noted for bravery, whose lovely body is covered with the beautiful marks of a hundred various wounds caused by battle-axes, arrows, spears, pikes, barbed darts, swords, lances, javelins, iron arrows, *vaitastikas* and many other weapons . . . who is a mortal only in celebrating the rites of the observances of mankind, a god dwelling on earth . . .²

Another good example is the inscription to his great-grandson Skandagupta (A.D. 455) preserved on a pillar at Bhitari. The inscription begins with a prose genealogy in *kāvya*-style, and we are told of Samudragupta that he was 'the exterminator of all kings, who had no antagonist in the world, whose fame was tasted by the waters of the four oceans, who was equal to the gods . . . who was the son of the son's son of the great king the illustrious Ghaṭotkaca, and son of the high king of kings, the glorious Candragupta'. Then we come to Skandagupta, and the text passes into verse:

Skandagupta who possesses great glory . . . whose fame is spread far and wide, who is amply endowed with strength of arm in the world, who is the noblest hero in the line of the Guptas . . . who with his own armies established his line which had been made to totter . . . with his two arms subjugated the earth and showed mercy to conquered peoples in distress, without pride or arrogance although his glory is increasing day by day, whom the bards raise to distinction with songs and hymns of praise, by whose two arms the earth was shaken when he, the creator of a terrible whirlpool, joined in close conflict with the Huns . . .³

Bühler in a well-known study⁴ has shown that in these inscriptions the *kāvya*-style is already fully developed. But there is no reason to doubt that it was developed long before then. There are fragments of *kāvya* quoted by Paṭañjali in the second century B.C.; and 'songs in praise of men' are mentioned in the *Śatapatha-Brahmaṇa* (xi. 5. 6. 8) as pleasing to the gods, so that the pane-

¹ He was therefore chosen as successor by the reigning king. In ancient Ireland the successor (*tdnaise rí*) was chosen from among those eligible by kinship during the lifetime of the king, but perhaps not by the king himself, see Binchy, *Críth Gablach*, p. 108.

² Ed. with translation by J. F. Fleet, *C.I.I.* iii. 1.

³ Ed. with translation by J. F. Fleet, *ibid.* 52.

⁴ 'Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunstpoesie', *Sitzb. der phil.-hist. Cl. der kaiserl. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, cxxii, no. 11 (Vienna, 1890) = *Indian Antiquary*, xlii (1913), 29 ff.

gyric itself is attested many centuries earlier.¹ The *kāvya*-style is important here only as a stage in the parallel development. It is the tradition of court poetry that I am seeking to establish, and it seems to be in evidence at least seven centuries before Christ. It survives in western India to the present day.² But besides this duty of praise, the Indian court poet had another function: he was the official historian and genealogist.

What the Indians lacked was not a sense of history but the sense of criticism and historical truth. And the reason for this is that the historians were, as a rule, court poets or priests. The chief interest of the former was to sing the praise of their princes, to record their heroic exploits and those of their ancestors, and doubtless to invent some where none were available. The priests were chiefly concerned to proclaim and increase the fame of their sects or communities.³

If we turn now to Ireland, the picture is extraordinarily like. In Ireland the poet is called *fili* which originally meant 'seer', and we are told that he had three means of divination by means of which he could foretell the future or discover the truth.⁴ He belonged to a privileged class, divided into several grades of dignity, of which the highest (*ollam*) was equal to a king before the law. His duties were to know and recite the sagas and the genealogies of noble families, and to compose poems in praise of his patrons. The reward for his poems is often reckoned in cattle and horses, and great rewards were exacted, just as in India. The training of the *fili* lasted for many years which were spent with an established master of the craft, and the profession was largely hereditary.

The power of the *fili* rested upon fear of his displeasure, for just as he knew the art of praise, he knew also how to condemn in verse the victim of his anger, and his satire (*aer*) destroyed the honour of a prince and damaged his substance. The poets were notorious for their arrogance and for their extravagant demands, and it is a matter of history that Saint Colmcille had to intercede for them at the Assembly of Druim Cett in 575. In Ireland the bard is distinguished from the *fili* as belonging to an inferior class, but this seems to be a secondary difference. In Wales, where the poet enjoyed similar status, there is no such distinction

¹ Winternitz, *op. cit.*, p. 314. See also G. Dumézil, *Servius et la fortune*, pp. 70 ff., for a discussion of these earliest Vedic *nārāśaṃsyaḥ*.

² Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, iii (Leipzig, 1920), p. 81, n. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁴ The three means of divination are discussed by Nora Chadwick, *Scottish Gaelic Studies*, iv (1937), 97. See also O'Rahilly, *Early Irish History*, p. 323.

and the word commonly used in the medieval period was *bardd*. Probably the Irish *fili*, *bard*, *brithem* (judge), *senchaid* (historian), and *druí* (druid) all belonged originally to the same privileged caste, a caste corresponding to that of the Hindu brahman.¹

The poems of the *fili* were characterized by elaborate ornament. In the earliest examples we find only alliteration and poetic diction, but rhyme, assonance, and consonance are introduced later, and there is a great variety of metres. But there is also a rhetorical style known as *bélre na filed* ('language of the poets') which is marked by deliberate obscurity; and many such passages still defy interpretation. Some of the earliest surviving texts are praise-poems by *fílid*. Here is one written in the sixth century in praise of a legendary king of Leinster, Labraid Móen, supposed to have reigned in the third century B.C.

Móen the only one, since he was a child—not as a high king—slew kings, a splendid throw, Labraid grandson of Lorc.

The warriors of the Gáliáin took lances (*láigne*) into their hands: from that they are called *Laigin* (Leinstermen), the valiant host of the Gáliáin.

They won battles as far as the sea-shores of the lands of Érimón. After his exile Lóchet² the Exile seized the lordship of the warriors of the Gael.

A griffin who overran unknown countries was the grandson of Lóegaire Lorc, higher than all men save only the holy King of Heaven.

Gold brighter than the sun, he became lord of men and gods: the one god is Móen son of Áne the only king.³

This is one of several early examples, and the old metrical tracts contain fragments of others which have been lost. In form and temper, in purpose, in authorship these Irish encomiums resemble those in the Gupta inscriptions, and it is safe to say that they echo the songs of the Gaulish bards described by Posidonius and Diodorus Siculus. In Ireland they were still being written in the seventeenth century, and in Scotland the tradition lasted even longer, for the Red Book of Clanranald contains a bardic poem in honour of Allen of Clanranald, who was killed at Sheriffmuir in 1715,⁴ and we have another elegy in bardic style on one James MacDonald who died in 1738.⁵

The *fili* was also the official historian. He was the custodian of

¹ The *fili* is discussed by Thurneysen, *Heldensage*, p. 66 f.; H. M. and N. K. Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, i, 602 f.

² For *Lóchet* ('lightning') as an epithet of Labraid, see O'Rahilly, *Early Irish History*, p. 111.

³ Meyer, 'Über die älteste irische Dichtung', ii (*APAW*, 1913, phil.-hist. Kl., no. 10), 10-11.

⁴ Cameron, *Reliquiae Celticae*, ii, 248.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

the traditions of the past and recorded them in long historical poems, many of which have been preserved and which are the basis of the native conception of Irish history. Winternitz says of the Indian historical poems:

History in India was always only a branch of poetry: chronicles in which myth and history appear mixed together, or biographical and historical epics and romances, or mere praise-poems about kings, with historical or semi-historical content. For the Indian historian pursues an end quite different from that of the Greek or Roman historian. He does not seek to discover the sequence of events, critically to establish the facts of history and to explain them psychologically, but rather as a poet to entertain and to instruct, especially to give moral instruction by showing with examples the influence of moral conduct on human destiny. . . . It is also a fact that the Indians cannot write history without beginning at the beginning. In order to write the history of the dynasty of their own time, the authors of the *purāṇas* begin with the beginning of the world. . . . Hence comes the mixture of saga with history, greater as the author goes farther back, less as he approaches his own time. Therefore it is quite possible that a historian who can tell nothing but myths and fables for the earliest time may be quite reliable for his own time and the period immediately preceding.¹

This description might fairly be used for the historical poems of the Middle Irish period and some of the later bardic poetry.

We can observe the tradition of court poetry in Ireland for more than a thousand years, and the testimony of ancient writers brings us back seven centuries, so that our earliest evidence is from the first century B.C. In India the tradition is much older. But any date in the first millennium B.C. is still far removed from the time of Indo-European unity. For that we must allow perhaps another 2,000 years. May we then suppose that a common tradition persisted so long in these two peripheral areas? I suggest that we may. I am sure that it is the true explanation. Just as in the domain of language a common vocabulary survived in the names of king and priest and in words proper to the functions they performed, so in the domain of culture the social institution of court poets survived and developed on closely parallel lines.² Indeed I have been anticipated in this conclusion, for it is the thesis of a book by Georges Dumézil, which appeared in France during the war and has only recently come into my hands. In his *Servius et la fortune*

¹ *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, iii, 82.

² A brief presentation of evidence for the archaism of Roman tradition has been made by J. Humbert, *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie et d'histoire générale de la civilisation*, Oct.-Dec. 1946, pp. 309-17.

(Paris, 1943) Georges Dumézil examines the function of the professional encomiast in connexion with the kingship in India, in Rome, and in Ireland, and recognizes the common survival in these three places of a primitive Indo-European custom, according to which the new king was proclaimed, instructed, and in a sense bound by the solemn praise of the professional poet. He was instructed, for he felt obliged to justify the praise bestowed on him (p. 44). He was bound by the magic power of Truth (pp. 65 ff., 241). Moreover, Dumézil has suggested in an earlier book¹ that Roman society was originally divided into three classes, an aristocracy of priests, an upper class of soldiers, and a third estate of farmers, corresponding to the three Hindu castes, *brahman*, *kṣatriya*, and *vaiśya*; and he concludes that this was the ancient Indo-European social order. It is the social order of the Celts of Gaul (*druïdes*, *equites*, and *plebs*), as Dumézil has also pointed out,² and we can recognize it in Ireland (*fili*, *flaith*, *aithech*).

If it is true that India and Ireland have preserved common Indo-European traditions in social organization, and in language and literature, it is perhaps possible to draw a conclusion of more general importance, not entirely novel, but still worth formulating.³ In examining the phenomena of change in language or literature we must allow for a decreasing rate of change as we go back in time. In anthropology and archaeology this is evident. For the history of language it may have some importance. Even if men have had the power of speech for fifty or a hundred thousand years, language may have changed very little during thousands of years in an unchanging environment. We are still very far from a comparative grammar of the languages of the world, if that should ever be achieved. But if and when some common outline has been established for all the known forms of language it will have a fair claim to reflect the earliest speech of man, even though we cannot approach in time the age when men began to speak to one another.

¹ *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus*, Paris, 1941. Cf. *Servius et la fortune* (Paris, 1943), pp. 152 ff. For a discussion of these books by H. J. Rose, see the *Journal of Roman Studies*, xxxvii (1947), 183. Rose emphasizes the frailty of Dumézil's construction so far as the Roman evidence is concerned, but something of Dumézil survives the assault.

² *Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus*, p. 111.

³ Professor Julian Bonfante has pointed out to me that Schrader stated the conclusion for Indo-European, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgeschichte*, i, 144.

OBITUARY NOTICES



Photograph by J. Russell & Sons, London

GEORGE GORDON COULTON

1930

GEORGE GORDON COULTON

1858-1947

I

GEORGE GORDON COULTON was born on 15 October 1858, the son of a solicitor of Lynn in Norfolk. Both his father and mother were possessed of more than average character, and he had the healthy experience of being brought up as one of a family of eight. His schooling was that of the average boy of his class, except that between the Easter of 1866 and September 1867 he was a pupil in the Lycée at St.-Omer, and thus early began to obtain that knowledge of French civilization which was to underlie his later study of medieval culture in western Europe. After some years at Felsted, he went up to St. Catharine's College, Cambridge, in 1877, with a classical scholarship and greatly enjoyed the freedom and society of what was then a small college. He was an enthusiastic member of the Boat Club, and it is no accident that the most vivid incident he records on his return to Cambridge after thirty years' absence is a scene on the river:

Now, the boats began to show round Grassy; and in a few minutes we were following them up the Long Reach. The sun, at that time of year and day, shines almost directly along the Reach; so that they were soon rowing directly into it. There they were in 1911 as I had watched them for three consecutive years in the old days, when my blood was warm within. The two boats plunged into the sun, and onward through that sea of glory. Victor and loser were alike transfigured; it seemed no human struggle; splendid young limbs swung splendidly through the bewildering flash of oars and the dazzle of sun among those quicksilver eddies, while the spray splashed higher and faster as the fight became more desperate, until the final pistol shots divided winner and loser. Here was all the old excitement of sunlight and breathless suspense. Heraclitus was a liar; into this same river these same eyes had plunged again with the same old fascination! And this was only part and token of the one great miracle . . . and I was once more a chartered freeman of this lost Paradise.

He made a number of close friends, and these 'College chums' remained among the dearest associations of his life. He was not a particularly hard-reading man at the University, but in his last year made a real effort to justify his scholarship, and was unfortunate in being prevented by illness from taking the Tripos.

He was forced to take an *aegrotat* degree. This was a severe blow, and he was correspondingly grateful to the Rev. Wilberforce Gedge who offered him a post in his preparatory school at Malvern Wells. When we visited it together for some days in 1922 he recalled a number of incidents of his stay there, and spoke of how much he learned as a beginner in the art of teaching from Gedge's firm but kindly advice.

While at Malvern Wells he decided to read for Holy Orders. 'The motives were certainly mixed: I thought then, as I do still, that I should have more chance of a Rectory than of a House Mastership, and should find preaching more congenial than class-work. But that was not all: the resolve was, on the whole, a step upwards rather than downwards.' In this frame of mind he was fortunate enough to find a place in the household of C. J. Vaughan, then Dean of Llandaff, and gained immensely by his contact with him. While still an ordinand he did not find it easy to subscribe to all the Thirty-nine Articles, and even a number of talks with Vaughan failed to remove all his scruples.

Enough was done, however, for him to be ordained deacon on 21 December 1883, and he accepted a curacy at Offley in the Chilterns, under A. E. Northey, and later moved with him to Rickmansworth. Parish life did not fully absorb him, and his real life seems to have been lived in his own private reading and in walking about the Chiltern country-side revelling in its quiet beauty. His personal contacts were uneasy and self-conscious, and he was only completely at home with a small group of friends.

In the summer of 1885 Coulton found himself at the parting of the ways. The course of reading imposed upon him for the examination for the priesthood forced him to examine his beliefs closely, and in the end he found it impossible to go on with his plans for a life in the Church, so he resigned his curacy and turned again to schoolmastering.

The same autumn saw him as an assistant master at Llandovery, under John Owen, afterwards Bishop of St. David's. He was happier there than he had been at Rickmansworth, for the work and his colleagues were congenial, and the Welsh country-side provided a constant refreshment and stimulus. Near by at Lampeter were Tout and Rashdall, and he was thus brought into touch with two men who were to do much for medieval scholarship, one of whom (Rashdall) was to provide the stimulus necessary to turn Coulton from a dilettante into a scholar.

Yet another turn in his fortunes came in the autumn of 1887 when he was asked to go as chaplain and teacher to a private school at Heidelberg, run by an Englishman, P. A. Armitage. Coulton jumped at the chance, and for the next sixteen months spent some of his happiest days in the lovely setting which Heidelberg provided. 'Nothing', he writes, 'has been to me since, and nothing can ever be to me now, quite the same as those days of wandering feet and wandering brain, among people whose sense of discipline had not yet been so fatally poisoned from above.' It is characteristic of the man that he contracted out of his liability to teach so as to give himself time for his own reading, and was happy enough with £50 per annum and his keep. This post, however, was something of a *pis aller*, and when the chance came of an appointment to teach French and German at Sherborne he took it, despite the difficult conditions that the school then found itself in. These Coulton has described in *Fourscore Years*, and he might have said much more of his own difficulties, for his predecessor had left nothing behind which would guide him, and Coulton had to build a technique and syllabus of modern language teaching from the foundations upward. He threw himself into this work with great energy, so much so that for the only period in his life he found himself with no time for private reading. He enjoyed, however, the companionship of several agreeable colleagues, and only left Sherborne when his serious misgivings about his clerical Orders forced him to abandon his clerical dress and with it his position on the staff.

This was in the spring of 1892, and after a brief stay at Sedbergh, made memorable by his first meeting with H. W. Fowler, he took over the Army Class at Dulwich, where he remained for the next four years. He worked very hard with his classes, and in the syllabus and the examinations for which he prepared his pupils found much which irritated and appalled him. Something of this he later put on record in his *Public Schools and Public Needs* (1901). We have still to reach a time when the study of modern languages is taken seriously in our great public schools, and it was impossible in the nineties for Coulton to do more than blaze a trail. He did so—but to his own physical detriment. This and other private affairs told on him so much that in the autumn of 1895 he was forced to resign, and in due course went to convalesce in the Eastbourne home of his old college friend, H. von E. Scott.

This was the turning-point in Coulton's career. Up to the

autumn of 1895 he had moved from one appointment to another and had pursued the particular interest of the moment without any clear, guiding purpose. Armitage, at Heidelberg, once said to him, 'My dear fellow, you have the biggest collection of perfectly useless knowledge I ever came across.' 'That', says Coulton, 'had tickled me with a pleasant self-conceit at the time', but that time had now come to an end, and as he struggled back to health 'a strange gulf opened between Past and Future'. He writes:

Behind me, lay a sea which had nearly beaten out the swimmer's life; but upon which he can look back as irrelevant and impotent, now that he lies upon the shore. In front, a new land, long glimpsed in imagination, but now at last touched and recognised as his own. In proportion as physical forces returned, I seemed to see for the first time a clear and consistent plan for the conduct of life.

The most important single influence in helping him to plan his new life was Hastings Rashdall's history of *The Universities of Europe in the late Middle Ages* (1895). As he read it, he once told me, he felt that here was a work which rebuked his own casual attitude to his reading. He had for long been more interested in the Middle Ages than in any other period, and from boyhood had loved its architecture and art, but had never made any effort to organize his 'collections of perfectly useless knowledge'. Henceforth, all was done by rule. An elaborate series of categories or rubrics was devised, and everything he read was carefully annotated, and indexed under its proper rubric, important extracts being often made in a series of note-books.¹ All these note-books and indexes are now in the Library of the University of Chicago, and form one of the richest existing compilations of material and reference on medieval social and religious history. But what he called 'bread-work' was necessary if he was to follow his new aspirations with any success, and he was fortunate in finding just the arrangement he wanted in the private coaching establishment of his friend Scott. For thirteen years Scott and Coulton worked together in an harmonious, business-friendly agreement. Scott allowed him to do his work in his own way and at his own hours, and as his teaching rapidly became an easy routine, he was able to work

¹ These note-books were known as 'the B.M.'s'. Each consisted of about 200 sheets of quarto-sized paper, stitched into a stiff paper cover by Coulton. The first dozen or so contained notes mainly made from his reading in the British Museum—hence their title. They finally amounted to over 300 in number.

at full stretch on his own studies for the greater part of each day. In due course, he ventured trial flights as a university extension lecturer, and so began to organize some of his growing stores of knowledge.

On Boxing Day, 1902, he left London for winter sports at Adelboden, a confirmed bachelor of 44. When he returned from the most fortunate journey of his life he was virtually engaged to marry Miss Rose Ilbert, a member of a distinguished Devonshire family, and niece to Sir Courtenay Ilbert, Clerk of the House of Commons. The story of his courtship may be read in his own words in *Fourscore Years*, and as a result they 'found themselves pledged for life, on the last day of the month whose first day had found us not far advanced beyond ordinary pleasant acquaintance'.

Marriage at once brought to an end the easy-going scholar-cum-teacher's life he had adopted after joining Scott. The mere compilation and organizing of knowledge as an end in itself had to cease, and 'the humdrum necessity of earning money, now and without delay' had to be faced. In 1905, therefore, Coulton published the first of his *Medieval Studies*, and also his *From St. Francis to Dante*. This was the beginning of a continuous series of articles and books that were rapidly assembled under the stress of circumstances from his files, and his name as a cogent, well-informed student of medieval affairs began to be known. The rapid way in which he established his position in a few years may best be illustrated by noting that in 1911 he was appointed Birkbeck Lecturer at Trinity College, Cambridge—an appointment of distinction generally awarded to men well known in the academic world. No wonder that he received the news of his election with 'unspeakable delight'. It showed that the dilettante in him was dead, and that the scholar had taken his place.

To return to Cambridge after an absence of thirty years revived in Coulton his old enthusiasm for the University and all that it meant. Scott at Eastbourne was soon to retire, so, characteristically, Coulton burnt his boats, and with his wife and two young daughters came to Cambridge to try his fortunes as a free-lance lecturer, extension lecturer, and teacher. He was just beginning to make headway when war broke out in 1914, and the next few years were very difficult ones for him.

The return of the University to full strength and something over in 1919 brought him work in plenty, for not only was he in demand as a lecturer for the History Tripos, but the newly

formed English Tripos depended entirely on his teaching for the period 1000–1500, so that he was very fully occupied. All this work, however, had nothing of financial security in it, for the lecturer's fees in those days rose and fell according to the number of his pupils. It was a step forward, therefore, when in 1919 he was appointed to the one official Lecturership in English, left vacant by the death of G. C. Macaulay.

Thus at the age of 61, for the first time in his career, he could look forward to an assured annual income and to the reasonable expectation of finding congenial work in the University, sufficient for his financial needs. Any doubts about this were put at rest in May 1919, when, to his great astonishment and pleasure, he was offered a fellowship by St. John's College. This was undoubtedly the greatest moment in his academic life, and he never ceased to recall the 'singular generosity' of the College in electing a man whose claims on them were nil, and whose reputation was chequered by the dislike which many felt for some of his activities as a controversial historian, and still more for his unceasing and vigorous propaganda in favour of National Service.

The rest of his life (save for a brief interval) was passed in Cambridge, first as a very busy university lecturer and teacher, and then after his retirement from his lecturership in 1934 mainly in writing the numerous series of books and articles that flowed unceasingly from his pen until the day of his death.

In the late summer of 1940 he was prevailed on to accept an invitation to go as guest lecturer in the University of Toronto, and there he passed some years, until his anxiety to be back in England overcame everything else, and in May 1944 he returned. He soon settled down again to his old routine, in which he continued, so far as a growing inability to get about would allow him to do so, until his death on 4 March 1947.

II

To record the main facts in Coulton's life is sufficient to indicate that here was a man outside the usual run of academic figures; but to leave it at that would be to leave untold much that made him so outstanding to those with whom he came into contact.¹ It was impossible to be in his presence without being aware that here was a most unusual man. He was something above the average in height, which his slender figure

¹ Coulton died in his ninetieth year. I knew him for the last thirty years of his life.

emphasized; this, and his bright blue eyes, and the old-world courtesy of his manner, compelled attention. He received old and young with complete sincerity, and his readiness to learn, particularly from the youngest, was one of his most engaging characteristics. As soon as he felt that his visitor was a serious student there were no bounds to his generosity—his time, his learning, and his files were at their disposal. One of these student-friends, the late Professor Eileen Power, often recalled the way in which she was treated while still a Tripos student at Girton, when, in response to a question after a lecture, she was asked to call on him. She did so, and instead of being given a few references or a vague direction, she was treated to a penetrating analysis of her problem, furnished with advice for further reading, and then sat down for the rest of the afternoon to make free of his collections of extracts and references. That was the beginning for her of a practice, also followed by many other of his pupils, which towards the end of her life she acknowledged in a public lecture, by saying, 'I borrow this reference from Dr. Coulton, from whom, indeed, I have been borrowing all my life.'

Coulton was equally generous in the way he would lavish time and thought on the problems put to him by his pupils. He would listen carefully, put his finger at once on careless thinking or inaccurate statement, and then give his own views, adding a wealth of suggestions and advice for further reading which often kept his inquirer actively engaged for some time. The range of his knowledge, and the ready way in which he could produce just what seemed to be wanted, was astonishing. This made him formidable as an opponent, and an unwary antagonist would often find himself hopelessly out-ranged in fact and driven inescapably to admit what he had set out to deny. This massive erudition was the result of incessant toil. Once he had begun his 'new life' in 1895-6 his energies were continually directed towards the orderly acquisition and arrangement of material. Formidable works such as Dugdale's *Monasticon* were read and noted page by page, and in this way stores of material were garnered and indexed in a highly elaborate fashion. This enabled him to put his hand on a series of references at a moment's notice, and to turn up in his note-books the many passages that had been copied *in extenso*. The raw material being thus available, he could arrange and synthesize it without being hampered by constant search for references.

In the course of time his command over his material became so complete that he could trust himself over considerable areas

without immediate recourse to his files. He always astonished me on holiday by the number of words he had written at odd times on our travels while the idle apprentice just stood by and gaped about him. 'Give me ten minutes warning before the train comes in, my dear fellow,' he would say, and without further ado, on platform, or in dreary waiting-room, would put on his spectacles, and his pen would begin to fly over the paper. The main outline was clear in his mind: so that when he got home only a few names and dates, and perhaps an additional supporting reference or two, would have to be added.

It was this power of working at any time, knowing that his well-stocked mind would easily respond, that enabled him to produce the tremendous output which stands to his name. Reading for recreation interested him but little: as a method of relaxation he would consent to be read to, but even then it was works of biography, or memoirs, rather than fiction which held his attention, though Trollope and, to a lesser extent, Thackeray were exceptions. For recreation he liked nothing better than a walk 'betwixt wood and water', where his acute sense of form and colour could have full play. The purples of a hill-side, the bright-coloured pear-leaf in early autumn, or the bronze touched with gold of the spring poplars—all gave him exquisite pleasure, as did the yearly wonder of the spring flowers in the Backs at Cambridge, or still more the wild beauty of the Fellows' garden at St. John's.

If these things could be connected with some historic or literary association, so much the better. To go to Dijon and not to walk out to St. Bernard's birthplace of Fontaine-les-Dijon, three miles distant, or to fail to look out for a glimpse of St. Julien-du-Sault as the train rushed by—these were things inexplicable to him. He drank the wine of Arbois the more happily remembering that it was a certain 'petit vin d'Arbois' that Rousseau was accustomed to 'convey' from his host's cellar, and slept the more soundly to the lullaby of the stream beneath his window at Poligny because Ruskin (one of his heroes) might also have heard its murmuring as he and his parents paused there in their journeys on the old Geneva road.

These moments of piety (or sentiment) were, of course, not mere indulgences, but part of his complete acceptance of the past and absorption in it. For him it lived, perhaps more vividly than the present, although his interest and concern over 'our present discontents' was always acute and well informed. As he came to each town or building hitherto unknown to him his

whole resources of knowledge and imagination were brought to bear upon what he saw. After a few hours of poking about, pressing his way through unsavoury alleys or climbing the church tower to get a better view, he was usually able to discern what constituted the old town and where its wall or confines ran. These powers were perhaps shown to their fullest in his understanding of medieval architecture. On entering a medieval building he rapidly comprehended the peculiar problems its builders had tried to solve, and was soon able to explain in detail how they had succeeded or failed. It was an education to work one's way with him up some valley of Burgundy or Provence, and to follow his explanations of how a failure at a church lower down the valley had been turned to success in a later effort—by the same masons for the most part. His chapter entitled 'Wander-years' in *Art and the Reformation* is an imaginative piece of writing based on such investigations. The hours happily passed him by while he worked out the problems presented by an unusual piece of architecture—sometimes to the annoyance of those custodians who felt it their duty to follow him round. To placate one such, at the end of a long survey, he said in apology that the place presented certain peculiarities. 'Indeed,' he added, 'I don't remember such an unusual construction anywhere else.' The custodian looked him straight in the eye. 'Peut-être, Monsieur,' she replied.

It was on holiday when he was moving from place to place that he was at his happiest and fullest. In a long lifetime of travel he had acquired a technique of providing for his various needs which was as complete as it was sometimes embarrassing. Fellow travellers would watch with fascinated interest the brewing of some witch's potion (fondly believed by Coulton to have remarkable restorative powers), but would recoil violently when offered a draught of the fluid, despite the aluminium mug of venerable appearance and the completely unselfconscious manner in which it was offered to them. The passer-by would be stopped to ask the way to the nearest antiquarian bookshop (and Coulton never ceased to regret the natives' ignorance of the resources of their own towns), or more often would be requested to say where a *bon repas bourgeois* could be obtained. Time stood still for him in some ways, so that he would seek vainly for an hotel where he had stayed forty years before, or would lament that things had changed in a restaurant, which on enquiry it would turn out he had last visited in 1889.

Completely sincere, completely unselfconscious, he was once

described by a Parisian journalist, who saw him at the Congress Loisy in 1928, as follows:

Imaginez-vous l'apparition la plus cocasse, la plus saugrenue! La figure écarlate; la taille démesurément élongée; les vêtements trop courts et trop étroits; le geste embarrassé; un col et une cravate à faire mourir de rire! — et vous avez l'honorable Coulton.

An exaggeration, of course, but this pen-portrait gives something of the externals as he must have appeared when on his travels to the passer-by. A more valuable vignette is given by Dr. H. F. Stewart, who tells how Coulton was once met by M. Paul Desjardins, owner of the Abbaye de Pontigny, who, recognizing or divining a kindred spirit, for he too was a humanist of no mean order, carried Coulton off to the Abbaye where luncheon was about to be served in the eleventh-century refectory. One of the famous Pontigny *Décades* was in full swing, and the participants, a goodly company, were already seated at the horse-shoe table round the central pillar which rose out of a pool where, upon occasion, fish for the evening meal might be seen swimming, unconscious of their doom.

'Veuillez aller, cher Monsieur, prendre place là-bas', said Desjardins, indicating a vacant chair across the floor, and Coulton plunged straight into the pool. Not otherwise damped, he enjoyed the refreshment of the meal and subsequent discussion; and, that over, took his leave, and incidentally someone else's hat. His visit was long remembered, and Desjardins never failed to enquire after 'ce savant Mr. Coulton, au visage couleur de brique, aux yeux bleu céleste', epithets appropriate to the good health that goes with holiday and a conscience void of offence.

Back in Cambridge after his vacation he would rapidly settle down to his university routine. He put a great deal into his lectures, so that the abler men found that they were getting not only facts and ideas, but stimulating comparisons between past and present, and pregnant asides and reflections on events, which had a vigour and sweep all his own. Naturally, much that he had to say was open to argument, and it was in part to give an opportunity for healthy discussion that he held his 'At Homes' most weeks of the term in his rooms at St. John's. These 'squashes' lived up to their name, for although he had generous quarters, these overflowed with books, papers, and all the impedimenta of an active scholar and controversialist, and additional floor space was not easy to come by. Few minded

the discomfort, for the intellectual fare provided was generous and stimulating. At times Coulton would open a discussion, but he preferred to let others make the running at first and only to intervene later. No one present at any such meetings will forget the scene: the packed room, the eager give and take of discussion, with Coulton, sitting on a hard chair, with his 'good ear' towards his guests, and his tall emaciated figure bowed with head in hands while he talked or debated. The remarkably apposite flow of ideas, his overwhelming resourcefulness in debate, his unusual power of illustrating the past from the present, his unexpected flashes of humour, and his boyish delight in telling some racy anecdote—these things made a deep impression which inspired many with something of his own passion for honest thinking and for the appeal by reasoned argument.

III

'Honest thinking' and 'the appeal by reasoned argument' were of the essence of Coulton's intellectual creed, and he wearied some and alienated others by his 'damnable iteration' on these points. Not only those opposed to him on theological or conscientious grounds, but many who shared his views in the main, deplored his controversial zeal and (as they thought) his lack of sense of proportion. It would be idle to deny that he loved a good fight, but apart from that, he was driven by a profound conviction that it was by facing facts, by contradicting false statements, and by helping the ordinary reader to appreciate the nature of the evidence put before him that the cause of Truth would best be served. If that meant reproach, scorn, obloquy, and much hard labour and financial sacrifice, he was prepared to shoulder the burden.

His general position is summed up in the words of the seventeenth-century monk, Jean Mabillon, who declared it his aim 'to proclaim certainties as certain, falsehoods as false and uncertainties as dubious'. This Coulton took for his literary profession of faith when he founded the 'Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought'. His first historical study had been entitled *The Monastic Legend*, and from then onward his object was to set out in an orderly, readable, and documented fashion the truth as he saw it. He always tried to write for the non-specialist, for he was much concerned by the modern 'separation of Academic History from daily life', although it may be doubted whether his ideal audience 'of professional men, or of the

better-educated artisans who read for instruction in their leisure moments', was ever as numerous as he supposed, or so well able to come to a decision on difficult historical matters as he was inclined to believe.

In this spirit he patiently amassed his facts and references and presented them in his own beautifully clear and pointed style, which was made the more effective by his personal interaction with his material. The idea that 'the historian's business is not to judge but to understand' was meaningless to him. With Acton, he held that it was a man's business 'to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives', and was never afraid to draw his own conclusions from his evidences. This, not unnaturally, laid him open to attack, both from those whose religious outlook differed widely from his own, and also from his colleagues whose view of history was more austere than his. T. F. Tout, for instance, denied that vol. i of *Five Centuries of Religion* was history at all, but only 'an able and eloquent anti-clerical pamphlet on a colossal scale'. Since Professor Tout had little to say against the matter as opposed to the manner in which it was presented Coulton remained unmoved, saying, 'I am not greatly concerned whether . . . what I write is not, strictly speaking, history, so long as the stuff is reasonably true, and conveys to the public a reasonably clear impression of what men did and thought in the past.' This was characteristic of the man. A life-time spent in 'knocking about the world', as he often termed it, had left him unconcerned by matters which often seemed important to more orthodox minds. In fact he felt that university teachers of history had much to answer for because of their 'pedantic emphasis on "historical method"', and he impenitently held his way when criticized for his strong expressions of opinion and for his uncompromising judgements. The cult of impartiality he abhorred, and felt that it was responsible for much false history. To him it often denoted the undecided mind which burked discussion of difficult points and shirked coming to a conclusion. No one could accuse him of these defects. Indeed, his enthusiasm for controversy made him the *enfant terrible* of historians, and caused many to combine a love for the man with a strong dislike for his controversial zeal.

Controversy is not a normal academic method of pursuing Truth, and Coulton had to pay for his unorthodoxy. He refused to see 'any *essential* difference between the partial and the so-called impartial man—between history and controversy', and stated his case in full in the Raleigh Lecture on History

which he delivered before the Academy in 1932 after his election as a Fellow. He was then 74, and what he said was the deeply felt conviction of many years, and he rejoiced at the opportunity of stating his case. His disappointment was therefore very great when, at the conclusion of his lecture 'the acting chairman . . . rose to say, "I cannot feel that controversy can *ever* be respectable", and left the chair'. It was a blow to his hopes which he never forgot, for although it only expressed publicly what private correspondence and friends had often enjoined upon him, his sanguine temperament had encouraged him to hope at least for a discussion of his views in the serene atmosphere of the Academy.

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Coulton's controversial activities did no harm, not only to his reputation as historian, but also to his actual output. The latter is so remarkable in bulk and quality that it seems ungracious to wish it had been larger, but in fact a very great deal of his last 40 years of life was taken up by long and, at times, acrimonious disputes with opponents. Many of these were really not worth a tithe of the time and energy he devoted to them; but here he was adamant. He would freely admit to errors of judgement, taste, psychology, and the like in dealing with his opponents, but would admit nothing more. On the contrary, with advancing years he felt that his general policy had been right and that others ought to have joined him in speaking out.

His reputation as a historian will be judged in the main by his *Five Centuries of Religion*. Of this, three volumes have been published, and the materials for Volume IV will it is hoped be edited by his pupil and friend Professor G. R. Potter. When it became clear that Coulton was unlikely to conclude the whole of his work I urged him to set down his account of the conditions of monasticism in western Europe in the years preceding the Dissolution. This fortunately he did, and had passed most of the proofs before his death. It is hoped that the Cambridge University Press will be able to issue this (Vol. V) in the near future.

In this great work his merits and defects are clearly seen. Some of the finest passages he ever wrote are here, and portraits such as that of St. Bernard or St. Benedict are not likely to be bettered in our day. An overwhelming *catena* of evidence is produced to support every point (perhaps, as Rashdall told him, he 'expatiated too much'), and suggestive parallels and stimulating asides are constantly to be found. The accusations

that he failed to sort his evidences closely enough, or that he omitted evidence unfavourable to himself he was easily able to answer. He was on weaker ground when he had to defend his numerous onslaughts on historians and apologists, many of whom had remained unknown from the day of their death until he wantonly disinterred them. He also certainly erred from a psychological point of view in insufficiently emphasizing the good in the monastic system. Not that he ignored it; but a few pages of white have small chance of survival among hundreds of black pages.

Preliminary, and ancillary to this work, Coulton wrote many shorter 'Medieval Studies' which did much to clarify and often to re-state the topics with which they dealt. Larger works, such as *Chaucer and his England*, *The Medieval Village*, or *Art and the Reformation*, illustrate other sides of his encyclopedic knowledge of medieval life and thought.

A word must also be said on another side of Coulton's controversial activities—his advocacy of National Service. From some time in the last decade of the nineteenth century onwards, Coulton was unceasing in his advocacy of compulsory military service. He believed that it was a logical function of a democracy and that it rendered a useful educational service to the community in bringing men of all ranks of life together. Once he was convinced of these things he spent much time and energy in collecting evidence abroad, especially in Switzerland, as to the working of the compulsory system. He was a devoted member of the National Service League, and for some time the right-hand man of Lord Roberts, its president. Year in, year out, he lectured and disputed with all comers, and during the First World War and after gave much attention and criticism to pacifist organizations and peace-pledge movements. The drawing on the jacket of his autobiography, *Fourscore Years*, shows him at one of the happiest moments of his life with his articles on National Service in his hand, and the knowledge that the Militia Act of 1938 was only a few days distant from its passage into law.

IV


Let the last words about him include those of our greatest English medievalist, Sir Maurice Powicke.

'There is no one else like Dr. Coulton,' he wrote. 'The mould is broken. For its fellow we have to go back to the days of Roger Bacon and the *Romance of the Rose*, and it was not so common then as we are apt

to think. There is something lovable about this mixture of combativeness and shrewd, matter-of-fact, even tender, regard for common things—something lovable, but also something cruel, for the foe may be outside the pale, with no claim to regard.'

To this I would only add that such foes were few, since it was seldom that a meeting or controversy with him did not end with respect or even regard on both sides, so that he could (and often did) write to those with whom he was most in disagreement: 'Dominus custodiat introitum tuum et exitum tuum, ex hoc, nunc et usque in saeculum.'

H. S. BENNETT



W. W. BUCKLAND

WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND

1859-1946

WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, who became a Fellow of the Academy in 1920 and died on 16 January 1946, was born on 11 June 1859 at a house called 'Moor Park' in Aller near Newton Abbot in Devonshire; he was a twin, the other, a boy, dying early. His father, Frank Buckland, was the owner or manager of an estate there. His mother, whose surname was Mortimer, died when he was aged three. He was one of ten children. His father met with some financial reverse and moved to Edmonton, Middlesex, and later to Thornton Heath, Surrey, and practised as a Surveyor. He married again, and William's life as a child is said to have been an unhappy one. At an early age he was sent to school at Guines near Calais. It is believed that he spent only eighteen months there, but this experience probably laid the foundation of the good French that he spoke and of his love of France. He spent the years 1874-6 at St. John's College, Hurstpierpoint, and then, intending to become an engineer, went to the Crystal Palace School of Engineering for a time, was top of his year, and later went for a year to some engineering works. About this time he met with an accident which turned his thoughts in a different direction, and in October 1881, at the age of twenty-two, he was admitted to Gonville and Caius College.¹ So far he had, to a large extent, educated himself by means of scholarships, but he was too old to compete for an entrance scholarship.

He was placed first in the First Class in the then undivided Law Tripos in 1884 and received the Chancellor's Medal for Legal Studies in 1885. He became a scholar of his college in 1884, a fellow in 1889, and a college lecturer in 1895. He was called to the Bar by the Inner Temple in 1889. Soon after completing the Tripos he had begun to teach law in his own and other colleges and to coach, but at that time very few fellowships and lectureships were available for law, and money was earned ubiquitously and earned hard. Nevertheless, in 1890, after a very long engagement, he married Eva, the daughter of Christopher M. Taylor of Exeter, and began a perfect married life which ended with her death in 1934. There was one child, a daughter, Mrs. Heigham. Few realize what

¹ His college owns an excellent portrait by James Gunn, R.A.

his wife meant to him in the troubles that lay ahead. The first crisis arose from the failure of a bank in New Zealand which involved him in serious loss; whether or not the shares carried unlimited liability it has not been possible to ascertain. His college helped him financially at this time. It is believed also that he was engaged in liquidating some family debts which in his judgement imposed a moral obligation upon him. Then in 1900 he was attacked by tuberculosis and compelled to spend a year or more in South Africa and the Canary Islands with his wife and daughter. At this time he underwent an operation, and in 1905 there was another operation and another visit to the Canaries. Then, after a long spell of precarious health, a change took place, and, though he could never be called robust, he had very little further trouble and attained the age of eighty-six, somewhat deaf but with mind alert and memory excellent, and working until four days before the end. This transformation in health should be a lesson and an encouragement to many. When one of the writers of this notice made inquiries in 1906 as to the best teacher of law in Cambridge the answer was that 'if you are prepared to gamble on Buckland's precarious state of health you can't do better than go to Caius'.

Thus the first forty to fifty years of his life were marked by bad health, *res angusta domi*, worries, and incessant labour. Though these years made their mark in a shortness of temper, which disappeared as the pressure upon him was reduced, there was no ill will or bitterness or meanness, though for a long time his friends had to handle him tenderly. It was only his great spirit and tenacity and the devotion of his wife that enabled him to emerge from these early struggles undamaged in spirit.

In 1903 he became a tutor of the college (in the Cambridge or 'guardian' sense of the term) and he was senior tutor from 1912 to 1914, when he was appointed by the Crown to succeed Dr. E. C. Clark as Regius Professor of Civil Law. His services to the college in teaching and administration and as a life member of its Council, can only be fully realized by Caius men of the generations covered by his period. In 1923 the Master and Fellows elected him President of the College, an office which made a strong appeal to him and enabled him to show his affection for the college and his interest in every aspect of its welfare. He was at his best in his relations with the younger members of the Combination Room and in his reception of their guests. During the First World War he served for a time in the controlled establishments division of the Ministry of Munitions.

We must now attempt an estimate of his work. As tutor he was rarely demonstrative in his solicitude for his pupils, perhaps concealing it overmuch, but his men all knew that they could not have a more vigilant and unsparing custodian of their interests. The fact that he had interests of his own, and great gifts to devote to them, might have been for a smaller man an excuse, if not a justification, for taking his administrative duties more lightly. As a Tripos lecturer he was more noted for the matter than for the manner. His lectures were as full of meat as an egg, not a word was wasted, and in the years which preceded the publication of his text-books every word was worth its weight in gold to the Tripos candidate. In a small class of advanced students where he could provoke discussion he was at his very best, and those who were able to appreciate the quality of his mind were tremendously stimulated. As a college supervisor, not merely in Roman law, he was excellent for the better men; he never professed to know all the latest decisions of the English courts, but he could teach two things pre-eminently well: the underlying principles of law, which he knew both historically and scientifically, and the legal habit of mind or mental approach to a problem, which he had acquired from long saturation in the *Digest*. It has been erroneously asserted that in legal approach the Roman lawyer and the English lawyer are at opposite poles—the former deducing his conclusions from principles and the latter inducing them from a mass of decisions. Buckland insisted that there was a remarkable kinship between the Roman lawyer of the classical period of law and his English colleague, and that, if they had found themselves together in the same chambers writing and discussing opinions, though their materials were different, their methods of handling them would have had much in common. Buckland had such a good legal mind that almost any lawyer would benefit from stating to him a set of facts and the rules of law which appeared to govern them. He would not always know the rules of law, but he would detect a flaw in your argument or point out some inconsistency with legal principle, which would make you think again. His was an *anima naturaliter legalis*.

He had a wide appreciation of the English classics, profound in the case of Dickens, but we at any rate never heard him express interest in any Roman lay writer except for any light that he might throw on Roman law. Though he had spent the greater part of his life amongst Roman institutions, he had none of St. Paul's desire to see Rome and never visited it until, late

in life, he was invited to Palermo by Riccobono. He hardly ever referred in conversation to Rome or Roman life. He had no interest in music nor in theology, though a regular attendant in the college chapel, and keen on the maintenance of a proper standard in its services. He had read a considerable amount of philosophy but it seemed to be for him mainly an opportunity for sharpening his wits and exposing fallacies. He was not what he once described as a 'Jurisprudence-addict', but he had read widely in the literature and was astute in the detection of verbiage and sloppy thinking, while esteeming highly a book like Dr. C. K. Allen's *Law in the Making*.

His was the rare case of a legal scholar whose early education had not been predominantly classical or historical, and this fact was reflected in his style, which was not always conducive to clarity. His very quick mind sometimes made him elliptical both in speech and in writing. In short, he had a rational rather than a literary mind and his main interest lay in the application of logic to legal material. Anyone who described the law to him as one of the 'social sciences' would meet with a chilly response. This rather severe and restrained outlook was confined to things of the mind, for he was a warm-hearted man without a trace of meanness in his character, and with a great capacity for affection, an observing eye, and a sense of humour which made him a delightful companion, especially when travelling abroad.

In politics he was more a Liberal than anything else, but he was too much of an individualist to make a good party man. Few politicians won his respect and he could say some hard things about them, while as a scholar he was extraordinarily fair in argument, written or spoken, and always ready to modify his views. In that world he was a different man; there 'to him all facts were free and equal' and he had no cranks or hobby-horses. If he had practised at the Chancery Bar and risen to the Bench, he would have made a great Equity judge and he would have been at his best as a member of the Judicial Committee, but as an advocate he would have been too quick and rather intolerant of slower minds, either on the Bench or below it.

Before turning to his published work something must be said of his friendship with F. W. Maitland, who was a man after his own heart. Maitland was nine years older than Buckland and had enjoyed a more generous youth. There was a common friend in W. J. Whittaker of Trinity and Lincoln's Inn, a

robust and rather picturesque figure unlike either of them, who made a strong appeal to Buckland. Whittaker had been a pupil of Maitland and edited some of Maitland's posthumous work. Whether he played a part in bringing Maitland and Buckland together, is not known to us, but they nourished a common affection and reverence for Maitland. The struggle for health, much of it contemporaneous, Maitland's a failure, Buckland's a success, was a link between them, and Buckland was certainly influenced by Maitland's uncomplaining courage and by his unrelenting pursuit of the scholar's aim in the too short time that lay ahead. His death at the age of fifty-six was a serious blow to Buckland. One of the most charming and illuminating descriptions of Maitland ever spoken or written is to be found in a paper read by Buckland, partly to the Society of Public Teachers of Law and partly to the Cambridge University Law Society, and published in volume 1, pages 279-301, of the *Cambridge Law Journal*. It is partly based upon a visit of some months' duration to the Canaries in search of health when they and their wives were close neighbours and companions. Buckland once remarked that he thought he would have become a historian of English law if he had known Maitland earlier.

As an authority on Roman law, Buckland was the greatest that England has produced. Of his predecessors in office, Sir Henry Maine was more famous and Sir Thomas Smith was more versatile; but they both vacated the Civil Law chair before they were thirty-five years old, and Maine's fame rests on his work in historical jurisprudence, Smith's on his *De Republica Anglorum*. Buckland's earlier writings were recognized abroad, as in England, to be the work of a thorough scholar, but did not arouse a great deal of comment. *Slavery* was more respected than read; but this respect ensured a welcome for the *Text-Book* from those best qualified to judge it. In his later decades he produced a number of articles which threw light from new angles on some burning problems of the day; and these articles brought his name more prominently into the limelight, and caused him to be acclaimed generally as one of the great masters of the time.

Buckland wrote two big books and five smaller, and collaborated in three others, besides writing a chapter of the Cambridge Ancient History and a number of articles. During the nineties he was contributing to legal periodicals, and in 1896 he collaborated with R. T. Wright of Christ's College in a second edition of Finch's *Cases on Contract*. But his first book, which placed him at one bound in the front rank of civilians, was *The*

Roman Law of Slavery (1908). The subject had been neglected in those lands where other parts of Roman law were still of practical importance, though it could not be ignored, since, as Buckland says, 'there are few branches of the law in which the slave does not prominently appear'. He describes his work as 'an attempt to state, in systematic form, the most characteristic part of the most characteristic intellectual product of Rome'; and in 723 large pages of close print he sets out all that is known about the law affecting and affected by slaves, and discusses patiently, acutely, and authoritatively, the diverging views of modern scholars. It was already clear that, while recognizing the presence of many 'interpolations' in the *Digest*, he was not in sympathy with the radical critics who at that time maintained that most of the doctrines in the *Digest* were invented by Justinian's compilers. A sentence on the last page might have stood as his motto throughout life: 'After all there is a presumption in favour of the genuineness of a text even in the *Digest*.' In 1908, that was heresy; by 1946 it was widely recognized; it will soon be a commonplace, unless the pendulum swings again.

Slavery was followed in quick succession by *Equity in Roman Law* (1911) and *Elementary Principles of the Roman Private Law* (1912), both packed full of legal intelligence, both most stimulating and instructive to a fit reader, and both too close packed to make easy reading. What Buckland said about the jurist Paul is true of himself: 'for some he is lucid, for others obscure, but only from compression, for others, simply obscure.' When he allowed himself enough space, he could be as clear as anyone, and he was pleased when an Italian reviewer called him 'limpido'; but it cannot be denied that many readers find him obscure, if only from compression. *Equity in Roman Law* is not about Roman ideas of what was just and fair in general, but about the Roman equivalents or analogies of the rules and remedies introduced into our law by the Chancellor and the Court of Chancery. It contains the substance of three lectures delivered at University College, London, under the auspices of the Faculty of Laws of the University of London, and presupposes a knowledge in its readers of English law and not of Roman. The professed object is 'to show the essential kinship, not of the Roman and the English law, but rather of the Roman and the English lawyer'. At the end are 'appended some remarks on the study of Roman law, which will probably not meet with general acceptance'. These remarks make

explicit what the choice of Slavery as a subject had suggested, that, in Buckland's opinion, for teaching, 'those subjects will be the best in which the Roman lawyers were most active'. He was more interested in the arguments of the greatest Romans than in the rules they discussed or the influence of those rules on later systems.

The *Elementary Principles* is not a book for beginners. When a pupil once complained of being misled by the title, Buckland explained that the principles discussed were elementary, though the treatment was not. It is 'designed for students who have read their Institutes but little more'—i.e. for those who have studied Roman law for a year and a half and are likely to get a place in the First Class. Its object is 'to suggest and stimulate rather than to inform', and to demonstrate that 'our knowledge of the Roman law is but the knowledge of a track in the wilderness'. What is known and straightforward is passed over lightly and all the emphasis is on questions which, though obviously important, are yet unanswerable, or have not yet been answered. It is a bewildering maze to the unwary, but a chain of beacons to lead on the alert inquirer. On one of the 'topics which give students special difficulty', concession is made to human weakness; and the twenty-five pages on *bonorum possessio* are probably the clearest account of it in any language.

'Information' was to come in 1921. *A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian* is Buckland's greatest book, and the amount contained between its covers is quite astonishing. There are excellent books covering much the same field in other languages; but when a student seeks to know what was the Roman rule on any point, it is rare indeed for another book to give a better answer than Buckland's. Often and often you may read pages and pages of French, German, or Italian, and then find Buckland has all and more than all in a ten-line footnote. The compression is extreme, but controlled by genius; and though its bulk is formidable, the *Text-Book* is the easiest to read of all Buckland's books. It was soon crowned by the Harvard Law School by the award of the Ames prize, and it is named with respect today by all who write on Roman law in any language; although it is charitable to suppose that not all who name it have read it through, since they so often produce as new and original ideas that Buckland discussed and accepted or rejected. The Second Edition, in 1932, was thoroughly revised and brought up to date, though the increase in size was only from 739 pages to 744.

The *Text-Book* was too big for most undergraduates, and in 1925 Buckland published his *Manual of Roman Private Law* (Second Edition, 1939), the most read and least interesting of his books. It is a workmanlike statement, on a convenient scale, of the main rules; but discussion of problems and disputes is kept to a minimum, and Buckland was never quite at ease when confined to following the 'track through the wilderness' in blinkers. It is a very useful book, especially for the Law Tripos, and, of course, it is authoritative; but some undergraduates find it hard to follow, and it does not fire the imagination. A jurisprudential introduction is of great interest to jurists, but bewildering to freshmen.

Much more characteristic is *The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law* (1931). This was 'intended to replace' the *Elementary Principles* and was similar in scope and purpose; but the raids into the wilderness are not made at the same points as before, and the demonstration of pioneering and woodcraft is more attractive and exhilarating than ever. In the preface he avows again the belief, which has since won many adherents, even from the ranks of Tuscany, that 'the period from A.D. 180 to A.D. 250 was far more constructive, and the "Byzantine" age far less constructive, in private law, than is commonly supposed, that most of what it is now the fashion to call Byzantine is Western, and that much of this is not post-classical, but late classical'.

In the Michaelmas Term of the same year, Buckland gave a most interesting course of lectures to a small audience, largely of his colleagues, on *Roman Law and Common Law*; and this developed into a book with the same title by Buckland and his former pupil A. D. McNair. It is described as 'a comparison of some of the leading rules and institutions of the two systems' and as 'examining the independent approach of the two peoples and their lawyers to the same facts of human life, sometimes with widely different, sometimes with substantially identical, results'. A second edition is being prepared by Professor F. H. Lawson.

Buckland also collaborated, but for once in a subordinate role, in a stately volume entitled *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law: newly discovered writings of the Twelfth Century, edited and explained by Hermann Kantorowicz, with the collaboration of W. W. Buckland* (1938). This was a long way off his usual beat, but he kindled to the enthusiasm of Kantorowicz and astonished him by his knowledge and understanding of twelfth- and thirteenth-century lawyers.

About two months before his death he published *Some Reflections on Jurisprudence*, a short and characteristic book full of common sense and realism, which has caused many to think again upon dogmas which had long slept tranquilly in their minds, and continues to be in strong demand. A volume containing a selection of his contributions to periodicals is under consideration.

From the nature of his work it was more widely and more accurately appreciated on the Continent of Europe than in England. He received honorary degrees from Oxford, Edinburgh, Harvard, Lyons, Louvain, and Paris, and he was a member of many foreign learned Societies. At the same time his merits were fully recognized in the United States of America, where he had some warm friends and many admirers. He spent the Lent and Easter terms of 1925 lecturing at the Harvard Law School.

As a man he was devoted to his family and his friends; simple in his tastes, and intensely human; courageous in the face of many obstacles; tenacious of his object and on lawful occasion pugnacious; mercilessly intolerant of cant and sham and sloppiness; and while he had a fine intellect and knew how to use it, he was entirely modest, hardly ever mentioned his own work and had not the faintest trace of priggishness.

Dr. Johnson remarks in his essay on Sir Thomas Browne that: 'A scholastick and academical life is very uniform; and has indeed more safety than pleasure. A traveller has greater opportunities of adventure. . . .' Buckland had a hard struggle before he won any degree of academic safety, but he had great pleasure in his home, his college, and his work. He did not seek adventure in the material sense, and the law does not invite to intellectual adventure in the manner of the physical sciences. But he had an original, powerful, and fearless mind; he was one of those who give 'counsel by their understanding', he opened up new paths, and he made an outstanding contribution to the knowledge of one of the greatest intellectual products of our civilization—the Civil Law.

ARNOLD D. McNAIR
P. W. DUFF



ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

1861-1947

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD was one of that small number of thinkers whose influence is felt far beyond the bounds of their fellow specialists. He was never a popular thinker; but his work was shot through with passages of human and non-technical wisdom, so that the non-specialist reader could feel that great questions were being faced with intellectual courage, often illuminated by a vivid phrase. Whitehead's thought was generous and many sided, and this is one reason why it is difficult to appraise. He was constantly casting his ideas into fresh contexts, sometimes giving them a fresh terminology, and seeking to see how analogies drawn from one range of experience might throw light on another. He was convinced that philosophers should assume the obligation of trying to construct synoptic schemes in which all our main interests, scientific, religious, aesthetic, and social, should find an interpretation. At the same time he did not believe that any such scheme could be finally adequate to the rich complexity of the universe.

The many sidedness of Whitehead's interests, scientific and humane, was no doubt helped by his family background. He was born in 1861 in the Isle of Thanet, an East Kent man of generations of Kentish men, brought up in an environment in which it was possible to feel a strong sense of derivation from the past. His grandfather and father had been schoolmasters; his father later took orders in the Church of England, and was vicar of St. Peter's in Thanet.

My father [he writes] was not intellectual, but he possessed personality. Archbishop Tait had his summer residence in the parish, and he and his family were close friends of my parents. He and my father illustrated the survival of the better (and recessive) side of the eighteenth century throughout its successor. Thus, at the time unconsciously, I watched the history of England by my vision of grandfather, father, Archbishop Tait, Sir Moses Montefiore, the Pugin family, and others. When the Baptist minister in the parish was dying, it was my father who read the Bible to him. Such was England in those days, guided by local men with strong mutual antagonisms and intimate community of feeling. This vision was one source of my interest in history and education.¹

¹ *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, p. 4 (Philosophical Library, New York).

Of his father he further tells us

He was an equal mixture of a High Churchman and a Broad Churchman. His favourite history was Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*. I do not think that any of Gibbon's chapters shocked him; for his robust common sense told him that the people of East Kent, with whom he was quite content, were really very unlike the early Christians. His favourite Biblical character was Abraham, who exhibits many features to endear him to the East Kent mentality.¹

Whitehead went to school at Sherborne, and has written of education at a small public school in the 1870's in his essay *The Education of an Englishman*. Here again was an environment in which it was easy to feel a sense of the heritage of the past. The connexion of King Alfred with the school was mythical, but undoubted. The school had been a monastic foundation, and Whitehead himself in his last year had his study in what was said to have been the Abbot's cell.

At Sherborne he had the traditional classical education, taught mainly by schoolmasters 'who had read the classics with sufficient zeal to convert them to the principles of Athenian democracy and Roman tyrannicide'.² History and classics alike seem to have been taught strictly in the Whig tradition, conveying lessons in contemporary analogies and liberal principles. 'When the Bible said, "All these things happened unto them for ensamples", we did not need a higher critic to tell us what was meant or how it came to be written. It was just how we felt.'³ The historical reflections in Whitehead's own work show that he preserved something of this spirit throughout life. His interest in history was not that of the scientific historian, as he was the first to admit; he was continually bringing forward illustrations from the past by way of comparison or contrast with contemporary ideas and ways of life. His interest was in the kind of history which has been called the 'practical past', the traditions which sustain ways of living and thinking. Historians reading his books should therefore accept his reflections and his suggested analogies in the spirit in which they are offered.

He was alive to the limitations of the classical education of the day.

We had no interest in foreign languages. It was Latin and Greek that we had to know. They were not foreign languages; they were just Latin and Greek; nothing of importance in the way of ideas could be presented in any other way. Thus we read the New Testament in

¹ *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, p. 48.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

Greek. At school—except in chapel, which did not count—I never heard any one reading it in English. It would suggest an uncultivated religious state of mind. We were very religious, but with that moderation natural to people who take their religion in Greek.¹

Nevertheless, for all its limitations, Whitehead commends this education for its combination of imaginative appeal and precise knowledge. In particular he thought it a training in political imagination, and in several of the addresses later collected and published under the title of *The Aims of Education* he shows how important it is to hold together these two aspects of education—the imaginative and the intellectual.

Besides classics, he was taught a good deal of mathematics, and when he went up to Trinity College, Cambridge, as a scholar in 1880 it was to read mathematics. He gained a first class in Part III of the Mathematical Tripos in 1884, and was elected to a fellowship and subsequently to a university lectureship in mathematics. His period at Cambridge from 1880 till he went to London in 1910 was one in which it was possible to enjoy leisurely and brilliant conversation. The 'Apostles Society', of which he was a member, counted among its senior members at this time Maitland, Verrall, Henry Jackson, Sidgwick, and men in positions of public life. Conversation was an art which Whitehead practised all through his life, and an art in which he was to find the perfect partner.

In December 1890 he married Evelyn Willoughby Wade, daughter of Captain A. Wade of the Seaforth Highlanders. He was greatly devoted to his wife, and in the autobiographical notes which he contributed to the volume *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* in 'The Library of Living Philosophers'² he spoke of her lifelong influence on his thought. 'Her vivid life has taught me that beauty, moral and aesthetic, is the aim of existence; and that kindness, and love, and artistic satisfaction are among its modes of attainment. Logic and Science are the disclosure of relevant patterns.'³ Throughout their Cambridge time, in London, and in their later years in America, the Whiteheads kept open house, and must have delighted successive generations of pupils, colleagues, and visitors with their gracious hospitality and the wit and charm of their conversation.

They had three children, T. North Whitehead, now professor

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-7.

² Northern University, Evanston, and Chicago, 1941. This volume contains in an appendix a complete bibliography of Whitehead's works.

³ *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, p. 8.

in the Harvard School of Business Administration, Jessie Marie Whitehead, now a librarian in the Widener Library of Harvard, and Eric Alfred Whitehead, who was shot down and killed on active service in the Royal Flying Corps on 13 March 1918. Whitehead's book *The Principles of Natural Knowledge* has a beautiful dedication to the memory of his younger son. Mathematical ability has been carried on into the next generation of the family. J. H. C. Whitehead, the present Waynflete Professor of Pure Mathematics in Oxford, is the son of Whitehead's elder brother, the late Bishop of Madras.

During the first decade of the century Whitehead collaborated with Mr. Bertrand (now Earl) Russell on the logical foundations of mathematics, leading to the publication of the first three volumes of *Principia Mathematica*. (The fourth volume, which was to have been by Whitehead alone on the foundations of geometry, has never appeared.) Lord Russell has written about this collaboration in a note in *Mind* (April 1948), describing the way in which he and Whitehead divided the great labour of the *Principia Mathematica* between them. There is a fuller description of the work by Professor W. V. Quine in the volume in 'The Library of Living Philosophers'.

At this early period Whitehead was absorbed in the technical reconstruction of the foundations of logic and mathematics, following on the pioneer work of Peano and Frege. But his work in this period reveals certain general ideas which were to be developed in different terminologies in the philosophy of science and the metaphysics of his later periods. Such was, for instance, the view that mathematics is not a science of quantity or even of number, but of formal logical relationships. These formal schemes supply as it were blank cheques of possible modes of relationship, some of which may have 'values' assigned to them in empirical applications. From this is developed the conception of the possibility of a comprehensive formal scheme of complete generality underlying other formal schemes. The continuity of Whitehead's later philosophical with his earlier mathematical work has been traced by Dr. Lowe in his paper 'Whitehead's Philosophical Development' in the volume in 'The Library of Living Philosophers'. The close resemblance between Whitehead's view of schemes of mathematical postulates and the view he was later to come to hold of metaphysical schemes has been shown by Dr. Mays in a paper on Whitehead's account of speculative philosophy.¹ The first results of his researches were

¹ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1945-6.

published in the *Treatise on Universal Algebra*, in which he indicated the possibilities of a logic of algebra and of an algebraic method in logic. In the same year (1903) he was elected to the Royal Society.

In a paper called 'Mathematical Concepts of the Material World', submitted to the Royal Society in 1905, he suggested a unification of the fundamental concepts of Space and Matter. This suggestion was made independently of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity, which was not published until 1916. The classical conception employs three exclusive classes of entities, points of space, instants of time, and particles of matter. Hence there are held to be particles occupying a point of space at an instant of time. But how is the transition made from nature as spatially disposed at one instant to nature as spatially disposed at another? This problem is as old as Zeno's paradox of the moving arrow, and Whitehead held that it could not be solved in the classical concepts. Moreover, to postulate three mutually exclusive ultimate concepts is an example of what Whitehead was later to call 'incoherence'. So he suggests that the physical ultimates should be thought of as lines of forces with a direction, vector and not scalar or punctual. He also suggests that the one fundamental relation between them was the 'whole and part' relation which he was later to develop in terms of his theory of Extensive Connexion.

Dr. Lowe says that the three fundamental ideas derived from new developments in physics which were influencing Whitehead's thought at this stage were the development of vector physics, the development of theories of molecular and sub-molecular energetic vibration, and the notion of the energetic field. Whitehead speaks of the excitement with which as a young graduate he first heard the theory of the flux of energy expounded by Sir J. J. Thompson; that 'Energy has recognizable paths through space and time. Energy passes from particular occasion to particular occasion. At each point there is a flux with a quantitative flow and a definite direction'.¹ These were doctrines which were to appear many years later in new guises in his metaphysics.

In 1910 Whitehead moved to London, where he first lectured at University College, and subsequently held the chair of Applied Mathematics at the Imperial College of Science. His *Introduction to Mathematics*, published in 1911 for the Home University Library, shows his maturing concern for fundamental general

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 238 (C.U.P., 1933).

ideas. During part of his period in London (which lasted to 1924) he was Chairman of the Academic Council, and during the whole of it he was deeply concerned in the administrative and more widely educational work of the University of London, as well as in working out a philosophy of physical science which would embody the new logical and physical concepts. The philosophy of physical science was developed in a number of papers given to the Aristotelian Society during these years; and in three books, *The Principles of Natural Knowledge* (1919), *The Concept of Nature* (1920), *The Principle of Relativity* (1922). Professor Broad has written of the contribution made by these books, which may be called the '1920 books', in his commemorative notice of Whitehead in *Mind* (April 1948). They are also discussed in the essays by Professor Northrop and Professor McGilvary in the volume in 'The Library of Living Philosophers'.

The main general philosophical interest of these books lies in their concern with the relation between two sides of scientific and philosophical thought: the framing of deductive systems of precise concepts, and the proper relating of these to the crude data of experience. 'The question', Whitehead wrote, 'which I am inviting you to consider is this: How does exact thought apply to the fragmentary vague *continua* of experience? I am not saying that it does not apply: quite the contrary. But I want to know how it applies.'¹ The difficulty, he held, had been concealed by the influence of language, which foists exact concepts upon us as though they represented the immediate deliverances of experience; and by the 'sense data' type of empiricism which starts from too sophisticated a level, analysing experience into clearly defined visual and auditory data, neglecting the vaguer deliverances of organic sensation. We cannot, he says, insist too strongly on the unempirical character of the school which derives from Hume.

There is a conventional view of experience . . . as a clear-cut knowledge of clear-cut items with clear-cut connections with each other . . . No notion could be further from the truth . . . In our own lives, and at any one moment, there is a focus of attention, a few items in clarity of awareness, but interconnected vaguely and yet insistently with other items in dim apprehension, and this dimness shading off imperceptibly into undiscriminated feeling. Further, the clarity cannot be segregated from the vagueness.²

¹ 'The Organization of Thought', *Aims of Education*, p. 158 (London, 1932).

² *The Function of Reason*, p. 62 (Princeton, 1929).

Whitehead's philosophy is throughout an attempt to hold together and relate these two sides: an interest in logical schemes, and an awareness of the massiveness and complexity of the concrete flow of experience. Our general principles need not be vague; intelligence in fact consists in the ability to form precise concepts which will enable us to organize thought concerning some interrelated aspects of the world. But wisdom consists in being conscious of what we have thereby omitted; of the vague background which is not penetrated and which limits the application of our principles. This double awareness made him both a constructor of theories and the critic of abstractions. In particular he was on his guard against what he called 'The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness', by which a theoretical concept is regarded as a thing in its own right, a fallacy of which he held popular scientific materialism to be an instance. Our basic experience is not the tidy world of scientific concepts, but a sense of *something going on*, with a qualitative character and spatio-temporal spread. Whitehead's Method of Extensive Abstraction was a device for extracting certain mathematical elements, such as points and lines, from perceptible relationships of sets of overlapping volumes. This relation of overlapping is one application of his general relation of Extensive Connexion. The world of which we are aware in perception can be described as a world made up of events, and events can be distinguished as extending over other events; for instance the event which consists in the reader's life history extends over the event of his reading this memoir, which extends over the event of his reading this sentence. In this way we can describe events of shorter and shorter duration as being common to a whole series of overlapping events; and the whole of 'nature at an instant' can thus be defined by such a series. This is an example from extension in time. Whitehead's notion of Extensive Connexion was also probably influenced by his interpretation of the field theory and what he called 'the denial of simple location'. According to this interpretation, the field of each electronic event extends throughout space-time, and each other event has its character affected by its relation to that event. Thus the constituents of nature can be looked on as fields superimposed on each other, and forming certain structures by their overlapping. In the three '1920 books' Whitehead was considering the general fact of relatedness in nature in terms of the relation of Extensive Connexion. This theory of the integration of perspectives from a standpoint formed a natural basis for a theory

of perception. In the earlier books perception is thought of almost entirely in terms of sense perception, and of the perspectives of nature thus disclosed. With *Science and the Modern World* (1926) and *Symbolism* (1928) he begins to consider perception also from the point of view of the activity of perceiving, and to give it an interpretation wider than conscious sense perception. Under the theory of 'prehensions', it covers any unification of aspects of the rest of nature from a given centre, and this unification is considered as a process which is itself a procedure of organization.

In a sense, *Science and the Modern World* marks the Rubicon. From now on Whitehead's books become overtly metaphysical in their intention; and he begins to call his work 'The Philosophy of Organism'. A reviewer of *Science and the Modern World* remarked that it seemed to have been written by Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and when one of them began a chapter, it was never possible to be sure that the other would not finish it. In *Science and the Modern World*, and the books of Whitehead's last period which follow it, passages of non-technical human wisdom, containing reflections on the history of ideas and on civilization, are interleaved with passages where a logical and metaphysical idea is being expounded in a technical and often new phraseology. But the common reader will find in the non-technical passages the fruits of inspiration as well as of ripe wisdom. If he is sometimes tempted to skip Mr. Hyde's contributions, he may find comfort in the thought that Whitehead is reported to have said that he thought he himself was the only person who had really read the chapter on Abstraction in *Science and the Modern World*. (There are a few others who have done so, but they must be very few.) Throughout Whitehead's writings, the reader will find himself delighted by the vivid and often happy use of a biblical or poetic phrase to emphasize a point. Here are a few examples from many:

A system of dogmas may be the ark within which the Church floats safely down the flood-tide of history. But the Church will perish unless it opens its windows and lets out the dove to search for an olive branch. Sometimes even it will do well to disembark on Mount Ararat and build a new altar to the divine Spirit—an altar neither in Mount Gerizim nor in Jerusalem.¹

The major advances in civilization are processes which all but wreck the societies in which they occur:—like unto an arrow in the hand of a child.²

¹ *Religion in the Making*, pp. 130-1 (C.U.P., 1927).

² *Symbolism*, p. 104 (C.U.P., 1928).

I will not go so far as to say that to construct a history of thought without profound study of the mathematical ideas of successive epochs is like omitting Hamlet from the play which is named after him. That would be claiming too much. But it is certainly analogous to cutting out the part of Ophelia. The simile is singularly exact. For Ophelia is quite essential to the play, she is very charming,—and a little mad.¹

If men cannot live on bread alone, still less can they do so on disinfectants. [Of the concentration on purely critical philosophy.]²

Encouragement to develop his interests in a comprehensive philosophy came in 1924, when Whitehead, near his retirement in the University of London, received an invitation to join the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University. He remained at Harvard for the rest of his life, as professor until 1937 and as professor emeritus from 1937 till his death on 30 December 1947. He returned to England for visits during the early part of this period; but during his last years, failing health and the Second World War prevented him from travelling. He maintained a keen interest in what was going on in his own country, and the English visitor who would talk to him about political, social, and academic developments at home was sure of welcome. But he gave himself with wholehearted affection to the country of his adoption. He found encouragement in the kindness and intellectual eagerness happily so widespread in America, and he believed strongly in the future of the great American universities. The graduate school of philosophy at Harvard in these years normally numbered some fifty members, drawn from colleges in all parts of the American Union, and indeed from all parts of the world. Whitehead and his wife were unfailing in their kindness to these students, being at home for one and often two evenings in every week, and charming them with conversation which ranged over reminiscences of Victorian England, descriptions of Liberal Party meetings in villages at the turn of the century, comparisons of English and American civilization, and reflections on literature, history, and religion, seen through a general philosophical interest.

An invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures in the University of Edinburgh during the session of 1927–8 gave Whitehead the opportunity to present the comprehensive system of philosophy which was by then taking shape in his mind. *Process and Reality* is a very difficult book; and the audience at the Gifford Lectures,

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 30 (C.U.P., 1926).

² *Ibid.*, p. 84.

confronted at the outset by its eight Categories of Existence, twenty-seven Categories of Explanation, and nine Categorical Obligations, may well have found their powers of concentration stretched to the utmost. Most of Whitehead's books were originally given as lectures on special foundations: all of them need several readings, and presuppose some knowledge of previous discussions of similar themes in earlier books. But an audience at such a lecture would without doubt have felt that it was witnessing an adventure of intellectual exploration. 'A professor', Whitehead said, 'is an ignorant man thinking.' His own background of knowledge in mathematics, science, and the humanities was massive. But he was always able to convey his deep consciousness of the infinitude and complexity of the world, and of how little man's mind has as yet penetrated. Whitehead himself was not interested in trying to explain or defend his work to critics; his interest was, like that of an artist, concentrated on the productive work in which he was immediately engaged. What his audience or his critics might make of it was their concern.

In *Process and Reality* Whitehead brings together in a comprehensive system his two lifelong interests: his interest in theory-construction and his interest in describing the concrete flow of experience. The general design is thus a continuation of his earlier work, in which he had been concerned with the logical methods by which abstract schemes of precise scientific concepts could be derived from the fragmentary and vague, but at the same time qualitative and emotionally tinged, world of actual experience. In the earlier work he had been concerned to avoid the 'bifurcation of nature'; the cleavage between physical nature described in quantitative and mathematical terms on the one side, and man's mind, with its purposes, feelings, evaluations, and perhaps also the 'secondary qualities', on the other side. In *Process and Reality* we find a gigantic attempt to overcome the gaps, both between actual experience and cosmological theory and between man and nature, by deriving a general cosmological theory by generalization from the kind of structure he believes we find in our actual experience. He also carries further the criticism indicated in his earlier books of the type of empiricism derived from Hume. This empiricism, Whitehead held, had disregarded 'the superficiality of sense perception'. It had proceeded as though the primary deliverances of experience were sense data, in the form of colour patches or sounds, and had not seen that these were comparatively sophisticated simplifications

of more deep-seated organic sensations. 'Philosophers', he said, 'have disdained the information about the universe obtained through their visceral feelings, and have concentrated on visual feelings.'¹ An analysis of experience undertaken primarily in terms of organic sensations would, he thought; reveal as inescapable data the feeling of the causal efficacy of the environment in the development of the subject; the feeling of the subject's derivation of its present from its past and its anticipation of the future; and the fact that there is no experience devoid of qualitative and affective tone. By starting from these feelings as primitive data, Whitehead thought that a new approach could be made to some of the problems of empirical philosophy. From this analysis of experience he also thought that certain generalizations could be made as to its basic structure. These are summarized in his account of the Self in *Modes of Thought*.

I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions—all of them subjective reactions to the environment as active in my nature. My unity—which is Descartes' 'I am'—is my process of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of feelings. The individual enjoyment is what I am in my role of a natural activity, as I shape the activities of the environment into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and yet, as being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world. If we stress the role of my immediate pattern of active enjoyment, this process is self-creation. If we stress the role of the conceptual anticipation of the future, whose existence is a necessity in the nature of the present, this process is the teleological aim at some ideal in the future.²

As an account of what we find ourselves to be, this could win wide acceptance. But when Whitehead stretched categories derived by generalization from what we find ourselves to be, and used them to describe the structure of whatever is actual throughout nature, many felt that he was avoiding 'bifurcation' between man and nature at too great a cost. Not only was he giving a Philosophy of Organism in which biology was becoming the science of the larger, and physics of the smaller organisms, but one in which a certain psychology of sentient experience seemed to be swallowing up biology and physics alike. Whitehead constantly insisted that consciousness is a late and rare factor in experience: that consciousness arises within experience and not experience within consciousness. But in spite of these *caveats*, it

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 169 (C.U.P., 1929).

² *Modes of Thought*, p. 228 (C.U.P., 1938).

was hard not to feel that categories derived from sentient experience were being given a wider meaning than they would bear.

We have seen that Whitehead held that speculative metaphysics should start from the elements disclosed in immediate experience, should generalize them, and then frame a scheme showing how the different elements so generalized are related to one another. It should then be possible to approximate to a scheme of utmost generality exhibiting the logical structure of any possible process of becoming. His philosophy was in the last resort based on an analysis of experience as *process*. He has been claimed as a Platonist; indeed as 'the last and greatest of the Cambridge Platonists'.¹ Plato's thought, particularly in his later dialogues, held a fascination for Whitehead, and in a broad sense, as an attempt to 'find the forms in the facts', his work has a Platonic ring. But he gave no superior status to abstract forms, or 'eternal objects', over and above the concrete processes of becoming.

He did, however, seek to relate his interest in general formal schemes to what he held to be the religious intuition of 'permanence amid change'. This is the source of one aspect of that interest in natural theology which is so strong a feature of his later books. Another aspect of it lies in the way in which he spoke of an aim towards intensification of experience, as realized in finite individuals within the general conditions of the logical scheme. This tendency towards the intensification of experience runs counter to the general tendency in physical nature for any form of order to run down into a more disorganized and trivial state. To sustain the aim towards the realization of 'importance', as distinct from triviality, in experience, Whitehead saw as the main function of the religious spirit. This is the context within which the saying, so often quoted and so often misquoted, that 'Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness'² should be understood. This saying has been taken to indicate an excessive individualism in Whitehead's views on religion. But in its context it is clear that he is saying that, while religion has to do with the realization of the worth of the individual for itself, this must be harmonized with the realization of the worth of other individuals, in loyalty to aims which transcend any merely personal satisfaction.

Whitehead wrote of religion in this sense in the closing chapters of his *Adventures of Ideas*. *Adventures of Ideas* (published in

¹ *The Times*, 31 Dec. 1947.

² *Religion in the Making*, p. 6 (C.U.P., 1927).

1933) is in some ways his happiest book. In *Process and Reality* he had discharged the obligation which he felt to produce a comprehensive scheme, and he could now reflect on the efficacy of certain general ideas in the making of civilization. The title itself is significant. Whitehead's enemy throughout his life was what he called 'inert ideas': ideas not tinged with any feeling for their interest or relevance. A polemic against 'inert ideas' occupies a considerable part of his essays in the *Aims of Education*. He himself could speak of ideas almost as though they were living things, seeking embodiment in the actual processes of the world. *Adventures of Ideas* contains much to interest the thoughtful non-specialist reader concerned with the fate of civilization in a time of transition and instability. Civilization is described as the attempt to embody the values described under the words 'Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace', against the odds of 'senseless agencies'. By the latter Whitehead means such forces as the tendency in physical nature towards the dissipation of energy and degeneration ('Life is an offensive against the repetitious mechanism of the universe'); economic processes imperfectly understood; and our own unruly passions.

Whitehead's last book, *Modes of Thought*, was published in 1938. There was yet to appear *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, published in 1947, but this latter was a collection of essays written over a long period of years. *Modes of Thought* does not add to the fundamental ideas of the former work, but it brings out the strong aesthetic interest which is a factor throughout. It also shows the interdependence of the two notions of 'Matter of fact' and of 'Importance' in all our thinking about the world. It contains passages of fine writing and some of those flashes of inspiration and wit with which Whitehead could delight his readers.

Whitehead's greatness was readily recognized and he received high honours during his lifetime. He became F.R.S. in 1903 and F.B.A. in 1931. In 1945 he was awarded the Order of Merit. The universities of Manchester, St. Andrews, Harvard, Wisconsin, Yale, and Montreal gave him honorary doctorates. In his person he possessed a quality which might be described by one of his own terms—*massive simplicity*. His concentration on important themes gave him depth, and his sense of the greatness of the world gave him humility. He was modest, affectionate, and wise in his conversation. A definitive appraisal of his real contribution to philosophy has not been made, and may not be made in our generation. But perhaps (with some qualifications

concerning our intellectual tradition) we may say of him what he himself once said of Plato, that people will turn to him not for 'the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings', but 'for the wealth of general ideas scattered through them. His personal endowments, his wide opportunities for experience at a great period of civilization, his inheritance of an intellectual tradition not yet stiffened by excessive systematization, have made his writing an inexhaustible mine of suggestion.'¹

DOROTHY EMMET

THE writer has been greatly helped by the comments of Professor T. North Whitehead and Dr. Karl Britton, who read the manuscript of this memoir.

¹ *Process and Reality*, p. 53.



Oxford Mail photograph

HECTOR MUNRO CHADWICK

HECTOR MUNRO CHADWICK

1870-1947

BY a singular and appropriate coincidence the birthplace of this great Anglo-Saxon scholar is situated in a parish adjoining that of Thornhill, Yorkshire, where are preserved no less than four of the relatively few runic inscriptions found in this country, not to mention a number of sculptured stones dating from Anglo-Saxon times. Son of the Reverend Edward Chadwick, he saw the light on 22 October 1870 in the vicarage of Thornhill Lees.

His father belonged to a family which traced its descent from John Chadwick of Chadwick Hall, Rochdale, who flourished in the later years of Queen Elizabeth's reign, a family related by marriage to the Chadwicks of Healey Hall. James, the father of Edward, was one of a number of sons of John Chadwick (1756-1837), all of whom were members of the firm of John Chadwick & Sons, flannel manufacturers, Rochdale. There was a branch of this concern in Edinburgh and it was there that James was in business during the earlier part of his life and where he married Sarah Murray, daughter of George Murray and Margaret Munro. There is a tradition in the family that Margaret Munro was a sister of General Sir Hector Munro, hero of Buxar and Pondicherry, whose names were borne by the eminently unsoldierly subject of these pages. Actually the relationship of Margaret to the General is not clear. But she had a daughter, Christian, a somewhat uncommon name, borne also by Sir Hector's sister. The occurrence of the double pairs of names, Christian Munro and Hector Munro, in two families from the same region is hardly likely to be fortuitous, and the fact that the name Hector Munro appears more than once in the Chadwick's family tree shows it to have been a traditional one and suggests that the story of his relationship with the General is not ill-founded.

After spending a number of years in Edinburgh, James Chadwick moved south with his large family to the main office of the firm in Rochdale.

Edward, father of the Professor and the seventh of James Chadwick's eight sons, was not in the family business, though he had an interest in it. He came up to St. John's College, Cambridge, and eventually took orders. Not long after he was

appointed curate of St. George's, Hulme, Manchester, where he met his future wife, Sarah Bates. Both her father's and her mother's family were business people of some consideration in Oldham. Her cousin, Captain Chadwick,¹ took part in the charge of the Light Brigade and, on his return from the Crimea in 1855, was given a public banquet in Oldham. Sarah's father retired early from business, apparently for reasons of health, and went to Manchester where he took to farming at Old Trafford, a locality which has somewhat changed its character since those days. His wife died young and a sister of Captain Chadwick came to take care of the eight children. Sarah Anne was the only daughter. Her father died on the day fixed for her marriage with Edward Chadwick—it was said of a broken heart at the thought of losing her—and the wedding was postponed. Edward and Sarah spent the first years of their married life at Bluepits, where he was then curate in charge and where Edward, their eldest son, was born.

Not long after his birth they moved to Thornhill Lees, Yorkshire, where Edward Chadwick senior became a close friend of one of the Bibbys, of the Bibby Line of steamships, who built him a church in the growing suburb of which he became Vicar. It was here that their three remaining children were born: Dora, Murray, and last of all Hector Munro. Their father ended his career as Rural Dean of Dewsbury. Both his elder sons, Edward and Murray, took orders. Edward, who had been a mathematical scholar of Jesus College, Cambridge, eventually became Rector of the chief church at St. Albans. Murray was at Trinity College, Cambridge. His interests were not academic, but he was very musical and had a gift for painting. He ended his career as Vicar of Athelney—another family link with Anglo-Saxon England. The only sister, Dora, seems to have been educated at home, probably by the curates.

Hector was by far the youngest of the family and the link between him and his sister was very close. 'She brought me up', he used to say, 'and taught me letters and Latin.' Their father was not a scholar but he was constantly urging his children to work at their books. He used to tell Hector that if he did not learn his Latin, a bear would come and carry him off. One of Chadwick's earliest memories was peering for the bear through a window by the vicarage's front door.

In 1882-3 Hector attended Bradford Grammar School. Although even at that age he enjoyed his work, he did not like

¹ Unrelated to the Chadwicks of Rochdale.

school life and made a daily practice of feigning sickness in order to stay at home. The year 1884 he spent at his father's house, where he was taught by his sister and the curates. But next year he went as a day-boy to Wakefield Grammar School, where the great Bentley had been educated, and he continued to attend there until the summer of 1889. A. H. Webster, a contemporary of his at Wakefield, writes of him:¹

I only knew him for a few terms when I sat next to him in the 6th Classical. . . . He arrived just as school opened and left to catch his train as soon as afternoon school closed. Consequently he took no part in games and indeed showed little interest in them. He was very shy, but always approachable and willing to help any of us ordinary boys with any difficulty in our Latin; and often he could make clear some point that the best dictionary left obscure. His answer would always be given with a smile and without the least sign of condescension. . . . Of his personal appearance I well remember his hair was distinctly red, a colour usually associated with high temper. Chadwick was the mildest and quietest tempered boy imaginable. He might have been a passive resister and would have died at the stake with a smile on his face.

On reading this account of him as a boy, those who knew him in later life will realize that in many of its essential features Chadwick's character was already formed: the shyness, gentle manner, quiet tenacity, lack of condescension yet eagerness to help others in matters of learning. His lack of interest in games may be exaggerated. In his early graduate days he was so keen a player of lawn-tennis that the Fellows of his college used to tease him, warning him that he was in danger of becoming a man of one idea. Moreover, an account book, written in his hand and found among his papers, suggests that he was the treasurer of the school cricket club. Against this may be set the story of the visit to the vicarage of two young Harrovians. A discussion arose on the best way of spending a half-holiday. After the rival merits of different games had been duly weighed, the young Hector, who had hitherto abstained from comment, gravely observed, 'My favourite way of spending a half-holiday is fettling my sister's hen-coop.' Sub-ironic self-depreciation, so integral a part of his humour, was clearly manifest in his boyhood!

On leaving school in 1889 he obtained a Cave Exhibition at Clare College, Cambridge, which was destined to become his

¹ *The Savilian* (The Wakefield Grammar School Magazine), Easter Term, 1947, p. 7 f.

home for many years. During that summer vacation he made a short trip to Scotland, Ulster, North Wales, and the Isle of Man, where he visited Tynwald Hill. That autumn he took his Little-Go and entered upon his life at Cambridge.

It was in his undergraduate days that he first visited the Continent, in company with his brother, Edward. They stayed at a pension in Innsbrück, the scene of one of his favourite stories: how he first came to visit Italy. He was sitting next to a young lady at dinner. Suddenly she addressed him, just as he was being proffered a pink blancmange. (Chadwick, on principle, always pronounced foreign languages as if they were English—'a pink blank mänge'.)

I was startled by her speaking to me and the spoon slipped from my hand and the blank mange fell on to her lap. She was very nice about it. [Then, in darker tones] But she did not see the extent of the damage: we were sitting too close. It slid down the folds of her black silk dress like a glacier. I rushed to the smoking room where my brother and I had a council of war. There was only one thing for it: flight! And there was a train leaving for Verona early next morning.

His adventures on arriving there—his first glass of wine and subsequent attempts at counting the number of windows of the amphitheatre in an effort to steady himself—formed the close of a saga which loses much of its flavour to those who were not lucky enough to hear him tell it.

In 1890 he was elected to a scholarship at Clare and two years later he was placed in Class I, Division 3 in the first part of the Classical Tripos and took his B.A. Next year (1893) he obtained a First Class with distinction in Part II, Section E (Philology) of the same Tripos and was elected Fellow of his college. During the next year his first publication, 'The Origin of the Latin Perfect Formation in *-ui*', appeared in Bezzenger's *Beiträge zur Kunde der indo-germanischen Sprachen*.

It was about this time, when visiting his brother, Murray, that he chanced upon Paul Du Chaillu's *Viking Age*. It was this book which first quickened in him an interest in northern studies. Although Du Chaillu was an amateur and his book, published in 1889, is in many respects out of date, the width of its scope may well have helped to inspire Chadwick with that breadth of outlook which so characterized his work both as a writer and a teacher—for Du Chaillu was concerned with early northern civilization as a whole, though he lacked Chadwick's training in philology.

In the summer of 1895, Chadwick attended Streitberg's

lectures at the University of Fribourg. On his return to Cambridge he began teaching for what was then Section B of the old Medieval and Modern Languages Tripos and devoted the rest of his time to research in northern studies. In 1899 three works of his were published: 'Ablaut problems in the Indo-Germanic Verb' in *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, xi, 'Studies in Old English' in *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, iv, and his first book, *The Cult of Othin*, published by the Cambridge University Press. His 'Studies in Old English' was an important monograph which threw light upon 'the distinctive . . . dialects and the chronological sequence of the sound-changes which marked the early history of the language'.

In *The Cult of Othin* he examined the evidence for that cult in the north and among the Teutonic peoples of the Continent and reached the conclusion that, in both regions it was, in all essential features, the same. The final chapter is devoted to the date of the introduction of the cult and to this end the evidence of literary sources, philology, inscriptions, and archaeology was brought to bear. On reading *The Cult of Othin*, the student of his works cannot fail to recognize how here, in his first book, Chadwick's method of dealing with evidence, the all-embracing nature of his approach, is already fully manifest. In the year which saw the publication of these three contributions he became an M.A. and his Fellowship at Clare was renewed. From 1899 until 1919 he undertook the whole teaching of Section B of the Medieval and Modern Languages Tripos. In 1900 his two important papers, 'The Oak and the Thunder-God' and 'The Ancient Teutonic Priesthood', appeared in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute* and in *Folk-Lore*. Three years later he was appointed Librarian to his college, a position which he held until 1911. He used to tell with much relish how the library was once visited by a man with his wife, who, after they had been shown its treasures, thrust a surreptitious sixpence into Chadwick's hand with the words, 'Do a bit of reading myself: I am the trainer of the Norwich City Football Club.'

Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions appeared in 1905. Two years later he contributed chapter III, on 'Early National Poetry', to the first volume of the *Cambridge History of English Literature*, published by the Cambridge University Press. The same year (1907) also witnessed the publication of his book, *The Origins of the English Nation*. The writer wishes to thank Miss Dorothy Whitelock, Fellow of St. Hilda's College, Oxford, a distinguished authority on Anglo-Saxon history and a former pupil of

Chadwick's, for the following appreciation of the two books just mentioned.

In rather rapid succession, in 1905 and 1907, Professor Chadwick's two main contributions to Anglo-Saxon history appeared, and it may be of interest to recall what W. H. Stevenson said of the first of them, in a review that even in its detailed comment anticipated the verdict of later times. He writes: 'He shows full acquaintance with the materials, exact philological knowledge, great powers of combination, ingenuity in suggestion, and critical power, and he has in consequence placed many old problems in a new light.'¹ A considerable amount of *Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions* has become regarded as accepted fact, and underlies the work of subsequent scholars. His account of the social classes of Anglo-Saxon society has in all its main features held the day ever since, based as it is on a careful study of the monetary systems of the Anglo-Saxons, without which the full meaning could not be drawn from references to *wergeld*, *mund*, *borg* and other compensations. Not all the conclusions were new and revolutionary in 1905, but it seems fair to say that the various elements had never been fitted into so comprehensive a system, nor presented so as to win general acceptance. Authoritative, also, are the chapters on Anglo-Saxon officials, the earl, the sheriff and other reeves, and additions to previous knowledge occur in sections on the origin of our shires. His view that the hundred was not a primitive institution has been accepted, and his suggestion that there was a connection between the smallest jurisdictional area and the royal manors has received corroboration from later research. He was least happy with the borough, and his hypothesis that the shire system was temporarily superseded by a system of administration centred on the boroughs has not proved acceptable. Professor Chadwick's hypotheses were not, however, built on air, but in order to account for some puzzling feature in the evidence, and in more than one instance where scholarship has rejected his explanation the puzzle still remains unsolved. Far from being content with unsubstantiated conjecture, he devised the whole method and arrangement of *Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions* as a protest against the writing of Anglo-Saxon history from pre-conceived ideas—of the popular nature of government &c.—with a disregard or a perversion of the evidence. This is why he works back from later and better-evidenced periods to the remoter past. Here and there the effect is somewhat disconcerting, but he was often wont to say to his pupils: 'We must begin with what is known.'

If, however, in this he was reacting from a manner of writing history of which Kemble had been the most brilliant exponent, he was in other respects very much in the line of descent from this great scholar, as appears more clearly from his book, *The Origin of the English Nation*. For he shared Kemble's versatility, and like him he believed in ignoring

¹ Review of *Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions*, *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xx (April 1905), 348.

no field of study that might yield even a fragment of evidence. In the stress he laid on archaeological evidence and on the sifting of later traditions he has had many successors, and the approach seems so natural to us now that it is well to note that the book was hailed by R. W. Chambers as remarkable for this very reason, and as 'a valuable example of the method which is now likely to lead us to the best results in the study of Old English philology and history'.¹ It was not to be expected that this book, like its predecessor, should be of primary importance for establishing fact; its main concern is with problems that can never receive a definitive answer. The evidence for answering them is fragmentary, contradictory and often capable of several interpretations. No two persons will agree entirely on the comparative importance of the various types of material. Professor Chadwick too confidently believed that they could be combined to give a definite answer, and in some places the reader's verdict is: 'Unproven.' But he is in a position to reach this verdict because the evidence has been fairly put before him. It would be a rash person who should attempt to consider matters such as the continental homeland of the English, the use of the names Saxon and Angle, the date of the invasion, without looking at the evidence assembled here.

In many branches progress has been made since *The Origin of the English Nation* was published; Professor Chadwick was fully aware that conclusions drawn from archaeological data must, in the unsatisfactory state of these studies, be considered tentative. The work of the English Place-Name Society has produced new material; and moreover he wrote before the appearance of Chambers' monumental edition of *Widsith*. It is remarkable how often Professor Chadwick's tentative conclusions have been shown to be in the right direction, and fruitful results have been forthcoming from approaches he suggested. To take only a few examples: he saw clearly the 'Jutish problem' and indicated that a study of Kentish land-tenure was necessary for its solution; he realized that further research into the vocabulary of Old English was the linguistic approach most likely to bear on the distinction between Angles and Saxons; by his interpretation of the element *ge* in place-names he glimpsed the importance of the ancient *regiones*, and by use of charter material he was able to add to what was then known of the kingdoms of the Heptarchy, thus beginning work on material used with such striking effect by Sir Frank Stenton.

It is difficult to assess just how far subsequent scholars' work in the many fields covered by these books derives direction and inspiration from them; but, it would certainly be a mistake to relegate either work to the category of influential books that have been superseded. The steady advance and logical unfolding of a complicated argument afford the reader a keen aesthetic pleasure. Both books are full of penetrating criticism on individual sources: the student of the Anglo-Saxon

¹ Review of *The Origin of the English Nation*, *Mod. Lang. Rev.* iv (1908-9), 262.

Chronicle cannot afford to ignore chapter 2 of *The Origin*; anyone interested in genealogies must read chapter 9. In either book it is possible to find tucked away in a foot-note a conclusion that one has reached only after painful toil. And as new evidence comes to light, even the more speculative portions should be re-read; it may be they will help us to place the new factor in its true place.

Chadwick was appointed in 1910 to a University Lectureship in Scandinavian, a position which he held for two years. But on the death of Skeat, to whom he was the obvious successor, he was elected to the Elrington and Bosworth Professorship of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Cambridge and held the chair from 1912 until he reached the retiring age twenty-nine years later.

The year which witnessed his election to this chair also saw the publication of *The Heroic Age*. This book won for him a wider circle of readers: for the main theme, a comparison of early Teutonic poetry and tradition with the Homeric poems, renders it of importance to classical, as well as Anglo-Saxon and northern studies. Moreover, the approach to Greek Heroic poetry was one hitherto unexplored. The book falls into three parts and the chapters are interspersed with a number of essays dealing with Slavonic and Celtic Heroic poetry and traditions and their background—themes which were later to be studied in greater detail in *The Growth of Literature*. In defining his use of the term 'Heroic', Chadwick writes: 'I am not clear that the essential conditions requisite for a Heroic Age need involve more than may be conveniently summed up in the phrase "Mars and The Muses".'¹ Although a state of war is not a necessary condition even for the formation of a Heroic story, the societies in which such stories and poems arose were essentially martial and the protagonists were drawn from the aristocracy and with few exceptions famed for their courage.

The opening chapters (I to VIII) deal with the early poetry and traditions of the Teutonic peoples and relate to the age of the Teutonic Migrations, a period for which a considerable amount of external information is available. The distribution of the stories, the inter-relationship of the various versions, the antiquity of the poems, and the conditions under which they arose are treated in detail, together with the different elements of which they were composed, history, myth, and fiction; and the relative importance of those elements is discussed. In the next six chapters Greek Heroic poetry is treated on generally

¹ *The Heroic Age*, p. 440.

similar lines, although for the period here involved little external information exists. In the final part a number of characteristics common to Heroic poetry and story are discussed, resemblances which he ascribes to resemblances 'in the ages to which they relate and to which they ultimately owe their origin. The comparative study of Heroic poetry therefore involves the comparative study of "Heroic Ages"; and the problems which it presents are essentially problems of anthropology.'¹

He shows that the characteristics exhibited by Heroic societies are in no sense primitive: both virtues and defects are not those of infancy but adolescence—of a youth, not fully mature, who has outgrown the ideas and the control of his unsophisticated parents and who has acquired a knowledge which places him in a position of superiority to his surroundings. The external influence of a superior civilization—for instance, that of Rome upon the Teutonic peoples and the Welsh—often played a part in this process.

The chief characteristic both of the Teutonic and Greek Heroic Ages is an emancipation, a revolt—social, political, and religious—from the bonds of tribal law. In the social and political spheres this is seen in the weakening of the ties of kindred and the growth of the bond of personal allegiance, in the rise of irresponsible kingship resting, not on a national basis, but purely on military prestige. While in religion chthonic and tribal cults were subordinated to 'the worship of a number of universally recognized and highly anthropomorphic deities, together with the belief in a common and distant land of souls'²—changes which he ascribes to a weakening in the force of religion. These observations are almost all applicable to the Gaulish Heroic Age and he finds similar analogies in the Heroic Ages of the Cumbrian Welsh and the Christian Serbians, though, at most, only to a very slight extent in that of the Mohammedan Serbians.

This masterly book marks an epoch in the study of comparative literature, for in the anthropological approach to his subject Chadwick broke new ground. His former pupil, Dr. C. E. Wright, quoted by Dr. Telfer, Master of Selwyn, in his obituary of Chadwick in the *Cambridge Review*, writes of it as follows:

The Heroic Age was a synthesis of the results of his research in the two broad divisions of his work, the classical and the Anglo-Saxon (and Scandinavian); exhibiting a masterly handling of all the material then available. The line of his future studies was clearly foreshadowed in the emphasis he laid on the value of tradition, and in the Notes (as

¹ Loc. cit., p. viiii.

² Loc. cit., p. 442.

he modestly called them, though each was a masterly essay) on the Heroic poetry of the Slavonic and Celtic peoples. The long time-gap between this and *The Growth of Literature* is irrelevant. The latter was, one might say, inevitable and it was as carefully and consciously prepared for as Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*.¹

Chadwick's election to the Professorship marks the beginning of a new phase in his academic career. Hitherto, his time had been divided between teaching and research; for the greater part of the next ten years it was almost entirely devoted to teaching, to university business and to the development of a School of studies. During this time he published nothing, apart from a short paper entitled 'Some German River-names', a philological study which has bearings on the early home of the Celtic peoples. It was his contribution to *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, 1913, to whose inspiring personality Chadwick owed not a little in the earlier part of his career.

Chadwick accepted his new and heavy burden without regret. The silence of these years was a loss to scholarship rather than to him personally: he believed that his teaching and direction of research-students was of greater value than his written work.

Though fostered in the schools of Classical and linguistic studies, Chadwick's interests embraced a wider field. He held that the scope of his School should cover not only the study of language and literature but of history and civilization; by civilization he meant institutions, religion, and archaeology.

The student may specialize in whatever direction he wishes, provided that he knows the languages, but he must at least have an opportunity of getting a comprehensive picture of the period he is studying and of conditions which are of course very different from those of modern civilization. We believe that it is only by such training that we may render services to learning approximating to those of German and other continental scholars who have hitherto been responsible for the greater part of the advance made in these subjects.²

The achievement of these aims was not attained without opposition. The history of his School's development falls into three stages.

Section B of the old Medieval and Modern Languages Tripos

¹ *Cambridge Review*, 1 Feb. 1947, p. 248. In view of what Mrs. Chadwick has told me, I should hesitate to describe *The Heroic Age* as a conscious preparation for *The Growth of Literature*, the idea of which took shape much later (see below, p. 320 f).

² From a letter of Chadwick to the Vice-Chancellor, dated 2 Oct. 1926, printed in the *Cambridge University Reporter*, 1926-7, pp. 1069 ff.

came into being in 1894 and during the first year of its existence Sir Israel Gollancz and G. C. Macaulay taught for it; in 1895 they were joined by Chadwick who from 1899 onwards was solely responsible for the teaching. Skeat was then Elrington and Bosworth Professor, but his interests lay mainly in Middle English and he gave no teaching in Anglo-Saxon save for a paper in Section A (English) of the same Tripos. Section B was almost entirely limited to linguistic study and attracted but few students, though one of them was no less a person than Sir Allen Mawer. In 1907 regulations were passed of a tentative nature which widened the scope of the Section by the inclusion of a paper on Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic, and Viking Age history, tradition and mythology. But it was not until twelve years later, when the regulations drawn up by Chadwick and passed in 1917, came into force, that the scope of Section B was broadened and it became more or less the same section that it is to-day. Apart from the study of specified passages from Anglo-Saxon and Norse works the syllabus now included papers on the history, traditions, religion, literature, and archaeology—in short the general civilization—of the Anglo-Saxon, the continental Teutonic, the northern, and the Celtic peoples, and a paper on Early Britain. Philology became optional and, in its place, most of the students availed themselves of one or other of the alternative subjects. At first the teaching offered for Celtic studies was of a somewhat tentative nature. The death in 1920 of that eminent Celtic scholar, E. C. Quiggin, was a blow not only to Chadwick personally but to Celtic studies in Cambridge. Chadwick, who married in 1922, was at first aided by his wife who, for some years, taught the Irish language, while he himself undertook the teaching of Welsh and early Irish and Welsh history. It was not until the appointment of his old pupil, Kenneth Jackson (now Professor of Celtic at Edinburgh) that the staff was augmented by a lecturer in Celtic subjects.

But Chadwick's reforms were not limited to the broadening of his own Section: with the collaboration of his friends, Professor Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch and Doctor H. F. Stewart, he simultaneously set about remodelling Section A (English studies) and indeed transforming the whole of the old Medieval and Modern Languages Tripos into the new Modern and Medieval Languages Tripos in which English became a more or less independent course consisting of the two sections mentioned above.

All through 1916 and 1917, he was busy drafting new regulations and, although they have suffered change since then, it is safe to affirm that

both these Triposes (*Modern and Medieval Languages and English*) are his creation; and the students of the modern humanities are as deeply indebted to him as students of antiquity, though for different causes and in different degree. He kept studiously in the background, but even the remarks which opened the discussion in the Senate House were founded upon notes supplied by him.¹

The reformers met with considerable opposition from several quarters, among them from the English Association. In a letter to Stewart Quiller-Couch wrote:

Trouble is that everybody thinks he knows enough English to tender advice upon it. If this goes on, one of these days I'll buy a Slavonic dictionary and a match-lock for Chadwick, and we'll raise trouble in the Balkans.²

But in spite of opposition, this conjunction of three so remarkable and yet such different personalities proved too strong and their reforms were carried and came into force.

The teaching for his new and much extended Section B rested almost entirely with Chadwick during the first years of its existence, and with it the supervising of an ever-increasing number of research-students. Apart from the aid already referred to which was given by his wife, his former pupils, Sir Cyril Fox, F.B.A., and F. L. Attenborough (Principal of University College, Leicester), gave some short courses between 1919 and 1926. But it was not until after the Royal Commission on the Universities, when the Faculty system came into being, that Chadwick acquired a permanent staff: two lecturers were appointed in 1926, one his old friend, Dame Bertha Phillpotts, D.B.E., who had recently resigned from being Mistress of Girton. The premature death of that rare and enchanting being in 1932 was felt keenly by her colleagues and robbed England of one of its outstanding Norse scholars. Further lecturers were appointed later and towards the close of his tenure of the chair Chadwick had four colleagues working with him in his department.

The addition of a purely literary second part to the English Tripos could only mean a decline in the number of Chadwick's pupils. For this, and for other reasons, in 1927 he moved with his Department into the Faculty of Archaeology and Anthropology, where it remains to-day.

Chadwick's lectures were informal. They were usually given

¹ From a letter of H. F. Stewart in the *Cambridge Review*, 2 Feb. 1947.

² F. Brittain, *Arthur Quiller-Couch*, p. 89. In one of the public discussions Quiller-Couch said that he and Stewart were the babes in the wood, but Chadwick was the wicked uncle.

in his college rooms, which looked out on the broad sweep of lawn at the back of King's and over the river. Gowns were not worn; he sat at the head of his dining table, his students, men and women, around him. Even in the earlier days of his career, when the position of women in the University was not officially recognized, he treated them with the same consideration as his men students, always convinced of the important part they could and did play in learning. Whether men or women, his students met with the kindliness and old-world courtesy which ever marked his bearing to his fellow humans and, more than that, they were treated as fellow scholars. For all his gentleness, his influence upon his pupils was a strong one. It was exerted unconsciously and sprang from his vitality and keen enjoyment in teaching. The breadth of approach, the instant grasp of essentials, the exhaustive handling of evidence which characterize his written work were equally manifest in Chadwick, the teacher. Yet his teaching had a rare quality, almost wholly lacking in his writings, a lightness of touch that made work appear amusing, an engrossing and delightful game. I doubt if he was really aware of this himself, yet it was a gift which played no little part in his hold upon the young.

But even more enriching than his lectures were his supervisions. When the present writer was an undergraduate, Chadwick would give long solitary sessions to his students. Once a week, at nine in the evening, one would repair to the small room lined with books to find 'Chadders' (as his students spoke of him) sitting in a rocking-chair, roasting his stockinged legs before a small gas fire. A vast jorum of tea was borne in, capped with a cosy of eider ducks' feathers, sent to him by an admirer in Iceland. A newcomer would be asked, 'How many cups do you take? Because the pot holds eight and I take seven.' And then, for close on three hours, he would impart the riches of his learning upon any problem which had been troubling one, mingling his observations with highly diverting anecdotes and occasionally falling off into a short but profound sleep. Few who had the privilege of these long evening sessions spent alone with him can fail to look back on them as the most formative experience in their education.

If one may venture to criticize so great a teacher, he erred at times by overestimating the capacity of a research student in suggesting subjects for him which were beyond his capability. Chadwick's modesty was perhaps responsible for this: he treated young post-graduates working under him as his intellectual peers.

Too often he has been described as 'a shy recluse'. Shy he certainly was; and the many claims on his time in themselves precluded his mixing in general society. Yet no one who knew him well could deny that he was essentially sociable: he delighted in the society of his chosen friends and of the young. It is true that if he had just cause to be disappointed in someone, he would dismiss him from his thoughts. Moreover, he was apt to regard criticism as hostility—but this only applied to criticism of his ideas on the development of his 'School', which did meet with opposition from the more conservative of his colleagues. Yet thanks to his tenacity, his persuasiveness and a sense of strategy not unworthy of the man whose names he bore, he overcame that opposition and, in his later years, he was able to look back on a band of men and women, former students of his, who had attained distinction in a wide field of subjects. At the time of his death some thirty of his pupils held university posts, not to speak of museum officials and librarians; while on his book-shelves he could number more than forty books written by those who had studied under him. As Miss Dorothy Whitelock has observed,

It was a remarkable achievement to add so enormously to knowledge by his own researches and to form so large a 'school' of workers, if that term can be applied to a body of archaeologists, anthropologists, Celticists as well as the Saxonists one would expect, linked together only by their reverence for a master to whose training they owe so much. It should be put on record that by his own writings and teaching he rescued English studies from a narrow pre-occupation with vowels and consonants.¹

The final stage of Chadwick's academic career was a period in which, while continuing a still heavy programme of teaching, he turned his attention once again to written work. In a sense, this phase may be said to have begun with the return to Cambridge in 1919 of his former student, Miss Norah Kershaw, whom he married in 1922. It seemed to her more than a pity that his time was devoted solely to teaching, university business, and to directing the research of others, and she told him so. At first he was unwilling to begin writing again, for he felt that the work he was engaged in was of greater consequence. But she persisted in urging him to do so and eventually he agreed to write a book if she would collaborate with him.

It was their original intention to continue the line of research explored in *The Heroic Age* into the later Post-heroic period, and

¹ *The Savilian*, Easter Term, 1947, p. 6.

to undertake a comparative study of the literature, archaeology, and general civilization of the Viking Age with that of Greece in the time of Hesiod, Solon, Archilochus; in 1919 they began collecting literary, historical, and archaeological material to this end.

It was about this time that his collaborator chanced upon a passage in Layard's *Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia* in which he vividly describes the effect of poetry upon Mehemet Taki Khan and his followers—'men who knew no pity and who were ready to take human life upon the smallest provocation'.¹

It tells of a scene in the Khan's camp: the minstrel seated by his chief, chanting in a loud voice from the *Shah Nameh* and how his listeners would shout and yell, draw their swords, and challenge imaginary foes, or weep as they listened to the moving tale of the Khorsam and his mistress. 'Such was probably the effect', wrote Layard, 'of the Homeric ballads when recited or sung of old in the camps of the Greeks, or when they marched to combat.' It was this passage which fired Mrs. Chadwick; and to it the great design embodied in *The Growth of Literature* owes its birth. Their original scheme was vastly extended: archaeology was abandoned and a comparison of advanced oral traditions—'oral literature' was their term for it—was embarked upon.

Though in a sense, as Dr. C. E. Wright has observed (see above, p. 315 f.), it was the logical, perhaps the inevitable, outcome of *The Heroic Age*, *The Growth of Literature* was a work far wider in range than the earlier book, for it embraces not only Teutonic and Greek Heroic poetry (the main themes of *The Heroic Age*) but the oral literature of many other peoples, ancient and modern: Heroic and Non-heroic poetry and saga, poetry and saga in relation to deities, antiquarian learning, gnomic, descriptive, and mantic poetry, poetry relating to unspecified individuals. Chapters are also devoted to Literature and Writing, Texts, Recitation, Composition, the Author, and Inspiration. Moreover, a number of essays and notes are included.

Volume I, which appeared in 1932, is concerned with the ancient oral literatures of Europe. Chadwick himself was responsible for its form, although nearly all the Irish material was collected by his wife who also contributed to other sections of the book. In Volume II (1936), Part I (on Russian oral literature) is her work; while he wrote the sections on Yugo-Slav oral poetry, early Indian and early Hebrew literature. Volume III

¹ Layard, *op. cit.*, vol. I (1887), p. 488.

(1940) was mainly the work of Mrs. Chadwick who wrote the first three sections (oral literature of the Tartars, Polynesia, and some African peoples). The concluding section, a masterly summary of the whole of this vast material, is the work of Chadwick himself.

This book is concerned with a stage of human development when 'a man's memory was his library'. Its aim is 'to trace if possible the operation of any general principles in the growth of literature' and the method adopted is 'a comparative study of the literary *genres* found in various countries and languages and in different periods of history'.¹

This necessarily brief account of Chadwick's life and work is no place to embark upon a detailed criticism of so extensive a work and an arbitrary selection of certain points for comment would throw any estimate of the book out of focus. There are details with which one may disagree and views here and there which perhaps a more exhaustive reading of the works of modern scholars might have modified. But it would be ungenerous, not to say foolish, to cavil at this. As the authors themselves admit, had they not concentrated on the primary sources, the book would never have been completed. Rather one should marvel at the courage of a man of his years venturing on so huge an enterprise with but a single collaborator, and at their accomplishment of the task within fifteen years, despite the great inroads which teaching made upon his time—for during the period in which they were at work upon the book, Chadwick was giving something in the neighbourhood of 120 to 150 lectures a year. Yet in spite of this, his writing in this book is more lucid and easier to assimilate than in any of his earlier works.

The approach to their formidable comparative study might be described as an anthropological one. It seems paradoxical that in a man who devoted so much of his life to the study of literature, the aesthetic sense should be lacking or at all events repressed. Yet, although the authors are more concerned with the classification of literature than with its aesthetic value, the book is of absorbing interest. Even those whose interests lie in the aesthetic sphere could hardly fail to admire his sure grasp of the essentials of a problem, the clarity of his argument and, in the final summary, the breadth of his vision.

Certain types of literature are formulated, described in detail, and their distribution and interaction studied. From this, main

¹ The quotations are from the preface to the first volume of *The Growth of Literature*.

drifts in the general history of oral literature are observed: among them the encroachment on and the final supersession of the Heroic by Non-heroic elements, the relative parts played by the minstrel and the seer, the historical and purely speculative elements, the differences between 'maritime' and 'continental' literatures. Among the most stimulating chapters are those dealing with the author and with inspiration. Not the least of the services rendered to learning by this great book lies in its estimation of the relative value of different types of tradition when used as historical evidence—those which have their roots in history and those which are merely the fruit of philosophical or antiquarian speculation. Chadwick's almost pentecostal knowledge of tongues stood him in good stead: nearly all the languages of the many literatures studied in this book were known to one or other of its authors. If the term epoch-making may be applied to so large a synthesis, and one which broke so much new ground, *The Growth of Literature* may well be so described, and it should take its place in English scholarship along with such works as Frazer's *Golden Bough*.

After their marriage in 1922, the Chadwicks set up house in an old paper-mill on the outskirts of Cambridge, close to the Norman 'Leper Chapel' which they took under their care. They had a roomy garden defended by a high wall, and one entered the front door after crossing a bridge over the old mill-stream. Mrs. Chadwick shared his love of animals and the house was peopled with dogs and cats named after various personages in *Beowulf* and in Norse mythology. There was an aviary in the garden, near which in summer they would sit and write; while along the mill-stream ducks and geese could be seen drifting. Mrs. Chadwick had a collection of harps, and on these favoured guests were sometimes regaled by 'The March of the Men of Harlech', played with one finger by the Professor.

One evening, when they were living at the paper-mills, the present writer had occasion to visit him upon business. On being asked how he was, Chadwick replied: 'I have been having a terrible stiff time. One of my in-laws has died. It's like that, do you see.' Still unsuspecting of his preternatural gravity, I murmured my sympathy. 'It has involved me in a lot of legal correspondence,' he continued. 'Only this morning I received a letter from the lawyers which explains why I have not been feeling as well as I should be. It appears that I am a good deal older than I thought—you'd better not mention this or they will have me out of my chair. It appears I am just over a hundred.'

Then, with a blink and a perceptible quickening of *tempo*: 'My father and mother were married in 1857 and, according to this letter, I was not only present at the wedding but must have been twenty-one at the time, since I witnessed the marriage settlement.' As in his treatment of evidence, so in his humour, the approach was original, while in the unfolding nothing of significance was left unexplored.

Soon after their marriage, Chadwick, who had hitherto viewed motoring with an almost superstitious apprehension, was induced by his wife to have a car. Mrs. Chadwick drove, and in it they would not only take students to see archaeological sites in the vicinity, but would make long tours together, visiting many early monuments in this country, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. One of these trips led to their buying a house at Vowchurch in the Golden Valley on the borders of Herefordshire and Wales in which they spent a considerable part of their vacations. It was here that he began a work on *Early Wales and the Saxon Penetration of the West*. The book was laid aside in 1940: his sense of the past was too keen, his love of this country so strong, that he found it more than he could bear to write of an earlier invasion from the same quarter and by people of the same race as that which then threatened to engulf his native land. Only a few chapters were drafted, but the project had entailed a close field-survey of the Border and his tracing on foot many of the parish boundaries. As Dr. C. E. Wright observes:

One feature of his genius, which all those who travelled with him over the country-side noted particularly, was his amazing eye for natural features and for their importance in determining the course of history—earthworks, barrows, camps, trackways and Roman roads were not just isolated objects of antiquarian interest, but essential elements in a great pattern.¹

This gift is nowhere more apparent in his published writings than in his last book, *Early Scotland*.

When the war came in 1939, the Chadwicks, not without regret, moved from the paper-mills to Adams Road, which became his home for the rest of his life. Pleasant though it was, the new house never bore the imprint of his personality as clearly as did the old mill which they had quitted.

The Second World War deprived the University of many of its younger lecturers. The greater part of the teaching for his own department (*Anglo-Saxon and Kindred Studies*) fell once more

¹ *Cambridge Review*, 1946-7, p. 248, quoted in Dr. Telfer's obituary.

upon Chadwick. In 1941, on attaining the age limit, he retired from the chair, but at the request of the university authorities, continued teaching as head of the Department. This did not prevent him from continuing his own writing and research. His contribution, 'Who was he?' in the issue of *Antiquity* (xiv, 1940, 76-87) devoted to the find at Sutton Hoo, throws light on the early kings of East Anglia. To his mind Redwald was the most likely person for whom the great monument might have been made—a view somewhat at variance with the numismatic evidence which suggests a slightly later date.

A short book, *The Study of Anglo-Saxon*, appeared in 1941. Its main purpose was to indicate the scope which that study has to offer. Here, as in the Preface to volume I of *The Growth of Literature*, he argued that the interest and value of this subject is greatly increased by combining it with kindred studies (see above, p. 317). In the last chapter, after tracing the growth of Anglo-Saxon studies, he turned to the future and pleaded that they should not be treated merely as an adjunct to English or be limited solely to language and literature; they should be given, like Classics, full scope for their various interests and an independent position among the courses in Honours. Moreover, he believed that the principles which he advocated for his own subject should be extended to the study of foreign peoples, an idea which he had developed at greater length in *The Nationalities of Europe*.

Both in *The Study of Anglo-Saxon* and in an article 'Why compulsory Philology?', which appeared in *The Universities Quarterly* for 1946 (pp. 58-63), he states the case against the teaching of philology as a compulsory subject. The latter was written at the request of the National Union of Students which had passed a resolution against the teaching of compulsory philology for students of languages at the universities. Even those who disagree with Chadwick's view can hardly fail to be struck with the manner in which he, a man of seventy-five years, was still able to enter into the students' point of view. He held that philology appealed to a very small number and, while believing that students who were interested in the subject should have an opportunity of studying it, he regarded it as best suited for post-graduate work. This has led some to believe that he had grown to dislike philology. Nothing could be further from the truth: his last two books bear witness to his constant use of it as a favourite and delicate instrument.

The Nationalities of Europe appeared in 1945. This book, in a

sense, may be regarded as his war work. His purpose in writing it was

to call attention to the need for more knowledge, not only of national movements—their characteristics and causes and the ideologies associated with them—but also, and more especially, for more knowledge of the nationalities themselves. I believe that the mistakes made by British policy in the past have been due in the main to ignorance of foreign peoples, including non-British peoples within the Empire.¹

As a means of overcoming this ignorance, he suggests that a government-sponsored Institute of Imperial and Foreign Studies should be established to provide courses on the languages, history, records, and antiquities of the different countries—subjects which are essential to the true understanding of the culture of any nation. A scheme for this is outlined at the end of the book. The book itself is a general survey. He traces the different nationalities from their beginnings down to and including the Second World War. Much attention is given to the German philosophy of domination, to its origin, development, and disastrous consequences. The book reflects a mellow, progressive, yet realistic outlook. In the chapters on the formation of the linguistic map of Europe and the prehistoric foundations of claims to domination, Chadwick is in his own element; here his handling of the linguistic evidence is brilliant: for example, his arguments for locating the early home of the Celts in the north-west German-Netherlandic area, a region farther to the north than is admitted by many scholars. His interpretation of the archaeological evidence in the light of linguistic study, though at times unorthodox, is none the less arresting. While the book can hardly fail to elicit the interest of the general reader, for those entering upon a diplomatic career or the foreign branch of the civil service it should prove indispensable.

There remains but to mention his posthumous book, *Early Scotland: The Picts, the Scots and the Welsh of Southern Scotland*, published in 1949 by the Cambridge University Press. Here once again, as his wife writes in her admirable introduction,

his chief contribution lies in synthesis. Linguistic problems, both philological and textual, were his special field But the writer of the present book was also keenly interested in the prehistory of Europe as a whole, and more especially in the archaeology of the British Isles. He realized that the historian and philologist must work in close co-operation with the field-worker, and he has not hesitated to make use of recent archaeological work where it could be seen to be relevant to the historical

¹ *The Nationalities of Europe*, p. vii.

records. It may perhaps be added . . . that his studies were always closely bound up with his personal life. To work on the history of Scotland gave him keen personal pleasure. Descended from an old Highland family, he turned to Scotland whenever opportunity offered as to the home of his ancestors, and the work of his later years, both on Scotland and Wales, was inspired by an almost romantic love of the Celtic West.¹

The book opens with two somewhat formidable chapters on 'The Kingdom of the Picts' and 'The Value of the Sources'. Not the least important contribution arising from them is his thesis that the *Chronicles of the Picts and Scots* were derived from two original chronicles based upon two independent oral traditions: in one the Gaelic element is deeply embedded; in the other the forms are in a language virtually identical with Welsh, a language which he calls 'Welsh-Pictish'. The significance of this emerges in the following chapters; while not denying the existence of pre-Celtic, even pre-Indo-European linguistic elements, of which we know nothing, Chadwick holds that both Gaelic and 'Welsh-Pictish' were spoken by the Picts. He holds no brief for the current view that the Gaelic language was introduced into Scotland at a relatively late date by the Dalriadic Scots from Ireland, rather he regards it as having first reached Scotland in the Late Bronze Age through a movement from the north-west German-Netherlandic area which he believes to have affected the whole of the British Isles.² In this he is in agreement with Mahr and Crawford, though not with the majority of archaeologists. 'Welsh-Pictish', he believes, reached Scotland later, with the La Tène invasion from overseas (Childe's Abernethy Complex). The new-comers were responsible, among other innovations, for the introduction of forts of the *muris gallicis* type; their primary areas of settlement were in the east-coast regions, whence they spread over a considerable part of Scotland. Although believing that the Gaelic element reasserted itself in certain areas, Chadwick claims that 'Welsh-Pictish' was spoken in Scotland for a thousand years and it has left numerous traces of itself in place-names over a large area of that country.

The distribution of the vitrified forts³ on the one hand and of

¹ Loc. cit., p. xxvi.

² Cf. too *The Nationalities of Europe*, p. 150.

³ The vitrified forts are in reality *muri gallici* which have undergone the action of fire. Chadwick regards both as 'Welsh-Pictish' monuments and believes that the firing of the former was due to hostile action, since the *muri gallici* which have not undergone the action of fire only occur in the primary area of his 'Welsh-Pictish' settlement, i.e. in the East.

the brochs on the other lead him to believe them to be the monuments of two contemporary and hostile cultures.¹ But, as he himself admits, this view awaits the confirmation of further excavation. In the chapter on the Irish Picts the broch-builders are equated with the Fomorians of early Irish tradition who appear to have been Cruithni (here the 'Gaelic-Picts' of Scotland) or their dependants on the west coast and western isles of Scotland. Chapters follow on the Dalriadic Kingdom and the Kingdoms of the northern Britons, the latter being perhaps the most interesting part of this arresting book. Chapter VII was never finished, and as Mrs. Chadwick observes, perhaps the greatest loss was the section projected for it upon the earliest history of Christianity in Scotland, on which he held original and valuable views.

Three features in this book are striking: his interpretation of the evidence as seen against the background of physical geography, his estimate of the varying values of different types of tradition as historical evidence and his deductions based upon linguistic study, both philological and textual. But more striking still is the fact that, despite his advancing years, in this, his last book, his intellectual powers show no trace of crystallization; his imagination remained fresh and his brilliance in the handling of evidence undimmed.

Chadwick was a man who neither sought nor expected honours; recognition came to him. He received the following Honorary Degrees: D.Litt., Durham (1914); LL.D., St. Andrews (1919); D.Litt., Oxford (1943). He was elected Fellow of the British Academy in 1925 and Honorary Member of Sweden's *Kungliga Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet*, Lund, in 1928; while in 1941 he became an Honorary Fellow of his own college, Clare.

On the election in 1945 of his old pupil and friend Bruce Dickins to the Elrington and Bosworth Professorship, he relinquished his teaching, satisfied that the electors had chosen a scholar of distinction to succeed him.

In the February of 1946 he fell ill and for a few days his life was in danger. But he recovered and soon resumed writing. During the summer and autumn of that year he was well enough to work in his garden. Up to the evening on which his last illness set in, he was wonderfully alert both mentally and physically, and when the blow fell, it fell suddenly. An operation became imperative and he was hurried to a nursing-home.

¹ For a recent but different view on the brochs see Sir Lindsay Scott, *Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society*, 1947, 1 ff.

Although at first he showed signs of making a recovery, complications set in. All through his last illness he was urging his doctor to let him go home, as he was anxious to finish his book on *Early Scotland*. But the strain proved too great and on the morning of 2 January 1947, the day on which they had decided to move him, he died in his sleep. He did not live to see the publication of the *Festschrift* which his former students had written in his honour, but he knew that it was in course of preparation under the editorship of Sir Cyril Fox and Professor Bruce Dickins.

It is fitting that many distinguished scholars, men and women, should thus testify to his genius as a teacher, for it was this sphere of his work which he himself set most store by. Some may believe that his services to learning might have been greater still had he limited his research purely to Anglo-Saxon studies—a view, perhaps, more narrow than just. His life's work was a harmonious, if unusual, development: from Classics he passed through a phase of philological research to the study of early history, literature, religion, archaeology, and tradition. Not the least of his many achievements was to reveal how 'the darkness of the Dark Ages' could be illumined by tradition when scientifically used and in his formulation and fearless application of a technique which, outside the range of purely classical scholarship, he did so much to extend and perfect. His views on archaeological matters may at times have been unorthodox, but they were always alive and provocative, while not infrequently they revealed deep insight. As a philologist his contribution lay in the realm of 'practical' rather than 'asterisk' philology. His power of synthesis, based as it was upon learning deep and wide, stood out like a beacon in this age of ever-increasing specialization.

His friends will always remember the stocky figure in shaggy green tweeds, the old Norfolk jacket, belt unbuttoned, out at elbows; the heavy boots yet delicate almost tripping gait; his inseparable companion a battered, wheezy pipe, swathed in adhesive tape. Nor will they forget the gentle voice, the comfortable north-country manner of speech, the fine cliff-like brow and the large brown eyes, kindly, yet to the end so piercingly bright.

The richness and rare variety of endowments, not only of the scholar but of the man—his faculty of at once penetrating to the core of things, his quiet yet inflexible tenacity, his gentleness, shyness, delicate courtesy, the humour, dry, ironic, yet not

unmingled with a sense of mischief and self-deprecating buffoonery—all these qualities combined to make him an utterly unique being and will keep his memory green to all who were fortunate enough to know him. For those who were not his written work and, it is to be hoped, the School which he laboured so unsparingly to found will remain his monument.

J. M. DE NAVARRO


BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLISHED WORKS

BY H. M. CHADWICK

- 1894 'The Origin of the Latin Perfect Formation in -ui', in Bezzenberger, *Beiträge zur Kunde der indo-germanischen Sprachen*, xx, pp. 270 ff.
- 1899 'Ablaut Problems in the Indo-Germanic Verb', *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, xi, pp. 145 ff.
 'Studies in Old English', *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, iv, pp. 85 ff.
The Cult of Othin, Cambridge University Press.
- 1900 'The Oak and the Thunder-God', *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, xxx (New Series III), pp. 22 ff.
 'The ancient Teutonic Priesthood', *Folk-Lore*, xi, pp. 268 ff.
- 1901 'Early Inscriptions in the North of England', *Trans. Yorks. Dialect Soc.* I, pp. 79 ff.
- 1902 Review of K. D. Bülbring, *Altenglisches Elementarbuch I.* (1902), *The Modern Language Quarterly*, v, pp. 22 ff.
- 1904 *Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions*, Cambridge University Press.
- 1907 *The Origin of the English Nation*, Cambridge University Press. Reprinted 1924.
 'Early National Poetry', vol. i, chap. iii of *The Cambridge History of English Literature*.
- 1908 'Ancestor Worship and the Cult of the Dead: Teutonic', James Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, I, p. 466 f.
- 1910 'Calendar: Teutonic', James Hastings's *Encyclopaedia*, III, pp. 138 ff.
- 1912 *The Heroic Age*, Cambridge University Press. Reprinted 1926.
- 1913 'Some German River-names', *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 315 ff.
- 1932-40 With Mrs. N. K. Chadwick, *The Growth of Literature*, vols. i, ii, and iii, Cambridge University Press.
- 1940 'Who was He?', *Antiquity*, xiv, pp. 76 ff.
- 1941 *The Study of Anglo-Saxon*, W. Heffer and Son.
- 1945 *The Nationalities of Europe*, Cambridge University Press.
- 1946 'Why compulsory Philology?', *The Universities Quarterly*, i, pp. 58 ff.
- 1949 *Early Scotland: the Picts, the Scots and the Welsh of Southern Scotland*, Cambridge University Press.

The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Mrs. N. K. Chadwick for much help in the preparation of this Memorial. He also wishes to thank Miss Dorothy Chadwick for certain information about the family history.

J. M. DE N.



HAROLD ARTHUR PRICHARD

Photograph by Lafayette

HAROLD ARTHUR PRICHARD

1871-1947

HAROLD ARTHUR PRICHARD was born on 30 October 1871. He was the son of W. S. Prichard, who was a solicitor, a partner in the firm of Collisson & Prichard, of Bedford Row, London. He was educated at Clifton and New College, Oxford. He came up to New College with a mathematical scholarship in 1890, and had the rare distinction of taking first classes both in Mathematical Moderations and in Literae Humaniores. It was originally intended that he should follow in the footsteps of his father and grandfather, and in 1894, after taking his degree, he was articled to a firm of solicitors in the City of London. But a few months later he was offered, and accepted, a fellowship at Hertford College, which he held for three years. In 1898 he was elected to a fellowship at Trinity. In the following year he married Miss Mabel H. Ross, who was later an Alderman of the City of Oxford. They had three children, two sons and a daughter. For some years the Prichards lived at 43 Broad Street, a house which was eventually pulled down to make room for the New Bodleian Library. In 1911 they moved to 6 Linton Road. Many generations of Oxford men were familiar with that house, and remember with gratitude the kind hospitality they received there. In 1923, after twenty-four years' devoted service to his college, Prichard's health broke down, and in 1924 he was obliged to retire from his fellowship. Four years later he was elected White's Professor of Moral Philosophy; the chair carried with it a fellowship at Corpus Christi. He held the chair until 1937, when he retired on reaching the age of sixty-five. He was subsequently elected to an honorary fellowship at Corpus. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1932, and received the degree of LL.D. from Aberdeen University in 1934. He died at the end of December 1947 after a short illness, at the age of seventy-six.

Prichard's name, an abbreviated form of ap Richard, shows that he was of Welsh descent, though I do not know whether he was aware of it himself; and the physical type to which he belonged, short, wiry, fair-skinned and sandy-haired, is not uncommon in the valleys of South Wales. There have not been many Welsh philosophers. But his fellow countrymen may claim him, if they please, as the worthy successor of the philosophical theologian Pelagius and the moralist Richard Price.

He was athletic in his youth; as an undergraduate he played tennis for the University. His physical vigour continued into his old age. In the late war, in his early seventies, he was an air-raid warden, and appeared to enjoy his duties. Like many academic persons, he was a lifelong and enthusiastic golfer. It has been said that his golf was like his philosophy: his shots were sometimes short, but they were always straight.

Prichard was a philosopher by nature and not merely by profession. The ruling passion of his life was the desire to discover the truth about ultimate questions. This gave him a certain admirable simplicity and integrity which impressed all who knew him. It is popularly supposed that a moralist should practise what he preaches. It would be misleading to say that Prichard practised what he preached, because he never preached at all, and disliked every form of 'uplift'. But he certainly illustrated in his life the moral excellences which he analysed in his writings. His conscientiousness was almost proverbial in Oxford. In philosophy, and in practical matters, too, he always stuck to his principles, whatever opposition there might be. However heated he might sometimes become in philosophical controversies (and he always apologized for it afterwards) in daily life he was the kindest and most considerate of men. Many disagreed with him, but everybody liked him.

The Oxford tutorial system is perhaps one of the best methods of higher education yet devised. But however beneficial to the pupil, it makes great demands on the teacher. Probably no Oxford tutor was ever more devoted than Prichard. The traditional 'one hour a week' was often extended to two or three. The pupil's essay was discussed line by line, and almost word by word. By the end of the hour it often happened that only the first page or two had been read; and no matter how full Prichard's time-table might be, he would contrive to find another hour later in the week to continue the discussion, and sometimes another after that. It is not surprising that his health eventually broke down, and in 1924 he had to retire from his fellowship at Trinity.

In general, his teaching methods followed the Socratic tradition of the School of Literae Humaniores, but he added some peculiar features of his own. The most original was his use of silence. The pupil would make some statement and pause, expecting a comment. Prichard would say nothing. He would just sit there, looking very puzzled, puffing at his pipe and

relighting it when it went out. This continued sometimes for several minutes. Perhaps the statement had sounded rather good at first, but its defects became more and more painfully apparent as the seconds passed. At last Prichard would say 'Do you mind repeating that?' By this time it was perfectly obvious that it was not worth repeating, and indeed was so confused that it should never have been uttered at all. He sometimes used the same method in philosophical discussions with his colleagues.

He enjoyed philosophical argument, and was almost always to be seen at the meetings of an informal discussion group known as 'The Philosophers' Tea' which occurred every Thursday afternoon during term. The host for the afternoon provided the tea and read a short paper to introduce the discussion. The tea, in those happy days, was always forthcoming. Sometimes the paper was not; the host had been too busy to write it. But Prichard often saved the situation by producing one from his pocket, or by propounding what he called 'a new heresy' on the spot. Sometimes a paper was read which seemed to him so radically mistaken that he did not know where to begin criticizing it, and he would sit through three-quarters of the meeting without saying a word. I remember hearing a senior colleague of his expounding the rather curious view that the notion of cause plays no part whatever in historical inquiries. Prichard bore it for a long time in silence. At last he could bear it no longer, and exploded into speech. 'Did Brutus *kill* Caesar?' he said, and relapsed into silence. But more often than not he was the life and soul of the discussion; and somehow or other it would generally resolve itself into an argumentative duel between Prichard and Joseph. They were close friends, and each had the greatest respect for the other, both as a man and as a thinker. But in philosophy, particularly in moral philosophy, they always differed. And their ways of expressing themselves differed as much as their philosophical principles. Joseph talked 'like a book'—like one of his own books—in long and astonishingly complicated sentences, full of dependent clauses. (How he kept his head through them one never knew, but they always came out right in the end.) Prichard replied in short staccato sentences, often in ejaculations, and sometimes in old-fashioned slang: 'Isn't it the other way on?' 'Personally, I should go bald-headed for the view that. . . .' But, different as they were, somehow one always thought of them together. In the twenties and thirties, when people outside Oxford talked of 'The Oxford

Philosophers', with approval or not, Joseph and Prichard were the two names which came inseparably to mind. They were indeed *the* Oxford philosophers of their generation.

Prichard sometimes conducted his philosophical discussions by letter. From time to time he would send two or three pages of somewhat crabbed handwriting to a colleague, stating some problem which was worrying him. For example, can duties be hypothetical? What does one mean by saying 'I promise to do *A* if you promise to do *B*?' Prichard would state all the obvious answers himself, with ingenious arguments showing that none of them would do, and the recipient was asked to produce a better one. When he had done his best, there would be a rejoinder twice as long; and when he had replied to that, there would be another. The interchange of replies and counter-replies might go on for several weeks. Prichard's correspondent would be sure to learn a good deal from this process, but he would also find it something of a strain. It was not only that the problems themselves were subtle and perplexing. In suggesting solutions for them, it was essential to use Prichard's own peculiar philosophical language. This language was not easy to learn, and it was very easily forgotten again when one had learned it. The difficulty was not that it contained a lot of unfamiliar technical terms. Prichard disliked technical terms, and seldom or never invented any new ones. To all outward appearance the Prichardian philosophical language was just ordinary, everyday English. But it was a technical language all the same, because the words had to be used according to rules far more rigid than those of ordinary discourse; and an awkward one, just because the ordinary technical terms—even such familiar ones as 'cognition' and 'introspection'—had to be avoided, and must be replaced by elaborate circumlocutions. Nor would he admit that two philosophers who used very different terminologies might after all be saying the same thing. He thought that there was just one right way of formulating any philosophical proposition.

I think that this was the source of the low opinion he had of much contemporary philosophy. In his Inaugural Lecture 'Duty and Interest', delivered in 1928, he complains that 'the most obvious feature of current books on philosophy is language so loose that it is usually difficult, and often impossible, to make out what their authors are trying to maintain'. This was an odd judgement to make in the palmy days of the Cambridge Analytical School. It is rendered still odder by the tribute

which he pays in the same passage to T. H. Green, on the ground that 'the more you study any particular sentence, the more you are convinced that every word of it has been weighed, and that, whether or not it is true, it expresses exactly what he meant to say'; though certainly this would be a very just comment on Prichard's own writings.

Whatever the reason may have been, Prichard certainly thought that most contemporary philosophical movements were moving in the wrong direction; and he did his utmost to resist them, in the last ditch if necessary. He could see little good in the logic of Russell and Whitehead, and still less in the 'Logical Empiricism' which eventually developed out of it. The gradual influx of the Cam into the Isis, which began in the 1920's and in the end became a flood, appeared to him disastrous. Contemporary developments in physics shocked him, too. He thought that both the Theory and the Quantum Theory contained fundamental philosophical errors.

It is not surprising, therefore, that his philosophical reading was deep rather than wide. He thought that few philosophical books deserved 'close reading', a favourite phrase of his. With many, he got stuck after the first page or two. But there were a few which he read again and again with the most minute attention. Among them were the ethical writings of Hume.

He himself did not write easily. He was as conscientious in his writing as in his conduct; and his standards were very high, as the remark about Green shows. He would sometimes say that a single short paragraph had taken him a whole morning's work. As often as not, he would tear it up again later and start afresh. His style of writing reflects his style of thinking. There are no 'frills' in it, no metaphors, no witticisms or epigrams. A classical tutor in Oxford, who had been a pupil of Prichard's, was once reproached by a colleague for encouraging undergraduates to waste their time writing poetry. He replied indignantly that he had never encouraged them to write anything but 'the plainest and most Prichardian prose'. Certainly there was nothing of the poet in Prichard, as there has been in some eminent philosophers. He did write plain prose, and it is plain in both senses of the word: it is devoid of adornments, and it is unambiguous. It is not always easy; 'close reading' is sometimes needed. But the reader is assisted from time to time by quaint and homely illustrations. For example, suppose you find a man lying by the roadside. You think, but do not know, that he has fainted; he may merely be asleep. Would you be

doing your duty if you shouted loudly in his ear with the intention of reviving him?

In his general conception of what philosophy is, as well as in many of his specific philosophical views, Prichard was a disciple of Cook Wilson, one of the most influential Oxford teachers of this century, for whom he always had the warmest affection and respect. It has been said of Cook Wilson that 'he distrusted mere cleverness'. It was true of Prichard, too. This was because they both believed that philosophical questions are in a way questions of fact; not of empirical fact, but of what one might call intelligible fact. If you had not bothered to inspect the facts, what was the good of talking, however clever you might be? According to this view, there are certain objective necessary connexions and disconnexions between universals. They are to be known by reflection; and a philosopher's principal business is to fix his attention on them, and record what he finds. They could not, of course, be known *in vacuo*. Connexions between universals, like the universals themselves, exist only *in rebus*. They are to be known by reflecting upon instances, real or imaginary. To philosophize without instances would be merely a waste of time. (Perhaps that was one way in which the 'merely clever' went wrong.) But still what we know through or in the instances is known by direct inspection. It is not a matter for argument, but for immediate or non-inferential apprehension. One of Prichard's favourite phrases was 'as we see when we reflect'. On the other hand, great and often painful effort might be needed to divert one's attention from irrelevances, and to discard deep-rooted preconceptions. How painful it might be is shown by another favourite phrase, 'as we have to allow in the end'. Before the end was reached, much agony of soul might have to be endured. In the concluding paragraph of *Duty and Ignorance of Fact* Prichard formulates this conception of philosophical method as follows: 'There is no way of discovering whether some general doctrine is true except by discovering the general fact to which the doctrine relates; and there is no way of apprehending some general fact except by apprehending particular instances of it.' This method, as he saw, is precisely the 'Dogmatic Method' which Kant rejected. Prichard thought it none the worse for that. As Joseph once put it: "'Dogmatic" is an ugly word; but what better reason can one have for making a statement than that one sees it to be true?'

The two branches of philosophy to which Prichard gave most attention were moral philosophy and the theory of knowledge. In moral philosophy he was one of the leaders of the school of thought which is sometimes called 'Oxford Intuitionism'. Indeed, he might fairly be called its founder. In his article 'Does Moral Philosophy rest on a mistake?', published in *Mind* as long ago as 1912, all the main doctrines of that school are clearly and forcibly stated. His published ethical writings are not very numerous (so far as I know they amount to four articles in all), but they have had a great influence on students of moral philosophy all over the English-speaking world. The comprehensive book on the subject, to which he devoted the last ten years of his life, would have had a greater influence still. Unfortunately his conscientiousness was so exacting, and his standards of accuracy so high, that the book was never finished. But the legend that he spent every evening tearing up the pages he had written during the day seems happily to be false. I believe that nine chapters were completed, and that they are to be published in the near future.

The central and most striking contention of Prichard's moral philosophy is that the notion of obligation is ultimate and unanalysable. Any attempt (Naturalistic or otherwise) to *define* obligation would only result in substituting something else in its place. He held that we become conscious of this notion by reflecting on particular situations which are instances of it. We know directly and immediately that in circumstances of such and such a kind, such and such an action ought to be done. And what we then know, he maintained, is self-evident. It is not a matter of proof or argument. Argument may indeed be necessary to establish what the circumstances are; to convince us, for example, that this man is in need and that we have the means of helping him. But when or if those questions of fact have been settled, we must simply *see* directly that such and such an action would be the right one in the circumstances, and that we are morally obliged to do it. And there, no argument is possible. We must simply exercise the capacity for direct moral apprehension which all of us possess. In particular, it would be useless to appeal—as so many moralists have—to the good consequences of the proposed action. Such a doctrine, to use a phrase of Prichard's own, 'will not stand the test of instances'. For example, it cannot explain why we have an obligation to keep promises or to make recompense for past wrongdoing. We have these obligations because of what *has*

been, not because of what will be in the future. Moreover, there is no one type of action which is always our duty. Duties differ with differences in the situation; and the situation includes the fact that the agent has done certain actions in the past. If I have made a promise, it is my duty to keep it. If I encounter someone who is in need, it is my duty to help him. And neither of these duties can be deduced from any wider or more fundamental one. The ordinary moral rules, 'Always tell the truth', &c., are generalizations of what we see to be our duty in such and such specific sorts of situation. The process of generalizing can be carried a certain way, but after that it can be carried no farther.

The 'mistake' on which almost all traditional moral philosophy was founded arose, in Prichard's view, from failing to notice the immediate and intuitive character of our apprehension of duties. It was supposed that the ordinarily admitted duties were in need of some kind of 'justification'. *Why* ought I to do these things, many of which are manifestly to my own disadvantage? Many moralists accordingly tried to prove that they were to my advantage after all—in the very long run, and when all the facts of human nature had been considered. Prichard maintained that, even if they succeeded in proving this (and it is doubtful whether they did), the conclusion would be irrelevant to the issue. For they would not have shown why I *ought*, am morally obliged, to do the actions in question. They would only have shown why it is to my advantage to do them. From premisses concerning advantage, even 'ultimate' and 'long-run' advantage, no conclusions concerning obligation can follow. And it only seems that they can, because the hypothetical 'ought' ('if you want to catch the train, you ought to take a taxi') is confused with the categorical 'ought' of duty. Other moralists had tried to solve the problem in another way, superficially more plausible but equally erroneous. They tried to explain 'ought' in terms of 'good'. The obligatoriness of an action, they said, is derived either from the good which it produces or from the intrinsic goodness of the action itself. But here again, Prichard pointed out, a conclusion containing the word 'ought' cannot follow from premisses which do not contain it. The argument would only be cogent if one inserted an additional premiss: that what is good *ought* to exist. And this premiss, Prichard thought, is either false, or perhaps even nonsensical.

Nevertheless, Prichard was aware that it is natural to offer

one or other of these answers to the question 'Why ought I to do my duty?' However mistaken they are, we shall continue to be attracted by them, until we see that there is something wrong with the question itself. In point of fact, he maintains, it is an absurd question. For in asking it, I am admitting that I *know* I have duties. And it is senseless to ask for a proof of something one already knows. If one merely believed it, one could properly ask for a 'justification' of one's belief. But that is not the situation in which we find ourselves. We do already know, in particular situations, that we have duties and what those duties are. And to ask for a 'justification' of knowledge is nonsensical. 'But *do* I really know that these actions are duties?' According to Prichard, this is like asking 'Do I really know that $7+5 = 12$?' You did know it when you last did the sum. If you no longer know it, you must simply do the sum again. So likewise with the ethical doubt. Put yourself in one of the ethically relevant situations; for example, put yourself in the presence of a man who needs help, or imagine yourself to be in his presence, and allow your capacity for direct moral apprehension to do its work.

Two further features of Prichard's ethical theory must be mentioned. The first is that the rightness or wrongness of an action has nothing to do with the motive from which it is done. My duty is just to do a certain action. If I pay my debt from a bad motive—say, from fear of punishment, or because I wish to annoy somebody else—I have still done what is right. The right action was to pay my creditor, and I have done it. When critics objected that an action taken in abstraction from its motive is no longer an action at all, the answer was that they had confused motive with intention. An action considered apart from its intention *would* no longer be an action at all. But what one intentionally brings about can still be distinguished from the motive—the desire or feeling—which moves one to bring it about. We have also to distinguish between rightness or wrongness, which does not depend on motive, and goodness or badness, which does. And we have then to distinguish further between two varieties of goodness: conscientiousness on the one hand, and 'virtue' on the other. If a man does an action because he believes it to be right and desires to do what is right, he has the first sort of goodness. If he does it from some intrinsically good desire or disposition, such as pity or courage, he has the second sort. Many actions are, of course, done from a combination of both sorts of motive, and so they have both

sorts of goodness at once; nevertheless, the two sorts are different. The ancient Greek moralists, Prichard thought, had much to say about virtue, but little or nothing about conscientiousness. Modern moralists, on the contrary, have much to say about conscientiousness, but little about virtue. He added the interesting observation that great imaginative writers, such as Shakespeare, resemble the ancient moralists in this respect, and that is why their writings often seem so remote from what we read in modern text-books of moral philosophy. I cannot help wishing that Prichard had said more about virtue himself.

Prichard's moral philosophy has the enormous merit of keeping close to the facts of the ordinary moral consciousness. If the task of the moralist is to analyse, or clarify, the moral experiences of the ordinary decent man (and that is certainly one of his most important tasks), this 'intuitionist' theory comes much closer to success than the Rational Egoism and the Utilitarianism—Agathistic or Hedonistic—which it criticizes. But it has its difficulties, too. What happens when two obligations conflict, for example the obligation to tell the truth and the obligation to keep a secret with which one has been entrusted? To this Prichard answers that different obligations have different degrees of stringency. Our duty is to carry out the more stringent one, though, as he characteristically added, 'we still feel uncomfortable' when we have done so. Again, if we know directly and immediately what our duties are, how is it that different men so often differ about what ought to be done in a particular case? Sometimes, of course, it is merely a difference about matters of fact. The conscientious inquisitor thinks that burning heretics is the only way to save souls, and others do not think so. But sometimes men agree about the facts, and still differ about what ought to be done. In this case, Prichard holds, we simply have to say that the capacity for direct moral apprehension may be developed in different degrees in different people, like the capacity for apprehending mathematical truths. I do not know whether he thought it possible that the capacity for moral apprehension might be entirely undeveloped in some individuals, so that they would be, as it were, morally blind.

Other difficulties came into view later. I shall mention two which worried him greatly. Perhaps the one which worried him most was the problem of 'duty and ignorance of fact'. This was the subject of his Hertz Lecture in 1932, perhaps the best of all his published ethical writings. As we have seen, he

thought that the duty we have at a given moment depends on the situation in which we are. But what is meant by 'the situation'? Does it mean the circumstances in which we *in fact* are ('the Objective View')? Or does it mean that we *believe* them, perhaps erroneously, to be ('the Subjective View')? If the Objective View is right, it follows that we never know what our duty is or whether we have done it. We are always more or less ignorant of our circumstances. Indeed, according to Prichard's theory of knowledge, as we shall see, we never know any of them in a strict sense of the word 'know'. We only at best have more or less probable opinions. These consequences are so paradoxical that we are driven to the Subjective View. The word 'subjective' must not be misunderstood. Prichard was far from maintaining the absurd theory that because you believe a certain action to be your duty, it therefore *is* your duty. No proposition, about duty or anything else, can be made true merely by the fact that someone believes it. What he is saying is that our duty depends, not on our beliefs about our duty, but on our beliefs about the circumstances. For instance, if I believe that this man has fainted it is my duty to try to revive him, even though in fact he is not in a faint at all, but merely asleep, or dead. Now we *can* know what our duty is, because we can know what our beliefs are. To discover what they are, we have merely to reflect upon our present state of mind.

But that is not the whole story. There is an assumption which is common to both views alike, namely, that our duty is to do some *action*. Obvious as it seems, even platitudinous, Prichard came to think that this assumption is false. To do an action is to originate some change in the physical world, and strictly speaking this is not in our power. The occurrence or non-occurrence of this change always depends in part on circumstances which are not in our control (on the state of our own nervous system, to begin with). Our duty therefore is to *set ourselves* to bring about such a change and not actually to bring it about. That, and that alone, is always in our power. Moralists have failed to see this, Prichard thought, because we are prone to suppose there is an attribute called 'ought-to-be-doneness' which characterizes actions, just as rightness characterizes them. Indeed, the two expressions 'right' and 'ought to be done' are often used as if they were synonyms. But the truth is that there is no such attribute as 'ought-to-be-doneness' at all. And if there were, Prichard argued, there would be no subject whose attribute it could be. For at the time when we say that an

action ought to be done, the action does not yet exist, and therefore can have no attributes. The right way to put it is to say that *we* have the attribute of being obliged. And since this is an attribute of *us*, it is not after all so very surprising that it should depend upon certain beliefs of ours, and not on the objective facts of the situation.

Another problem which puzzled Prichard greatly, especially in his later years, was the nature of promising. The duty of keeping a promise has been a favourite illustration with all the writers of the Oxford Intuitionist School. It has provided them with a strong argument against Utilitarianism and other forms of teleological ethics, since it is obvious that in this case our duty arises from something which has happened in the past, and not from the good consequences which our actions may be expected to have in the future. But what exactly is a promise? There is the difficulty that it may be tacit or, as we say, 'implied'. But let us suppose that it is explicitly formulated in words. Someone utters the sentence 'I promise to do so and so'. What kind of a sentence is it, and what does it mean? (Or rather, perhaps, in what way does it mean?) It looks like a statement. And 'I promised', in the past tense, certainly is a statement; so is 'he promises'. But 'I promise' cannot really be a statement, giving the information that a promise is now being made by the speaker. For the uttering of these words is itself the act of promising. Similarly, as Prichard used to point out, 'I request you to do so and so' is not a statement, though 'I requested . . .' and 'he requests . . .' are: and the same applies to 'I order . . .', 'I command . ..'. It seems, then, that 'I promise . . .' is just a formula, a kind of incantation as it were, which *alters* the situation in a certain way, instead of informing us what the situation is. It is not true or false; it is a linguistic device by which the speaker *imposes an obligation* on himself (and also, of course, arouses expectations in others).

Now Prichard, if I understand him rightly, found two difficulties in this. First, it puzzled him that we can impose obligations on ourselves at all. One would expect that our obligations would be entirely independent of our own will and pleasure, and would arise either from the objective situation in which we are, or at any rate from our beliefs about that situation. But here, it seems, the obligation does arise precisely from our own will and pleasure, namely, from our choosing to utter certain words. The second difficulty is this. If we ask how the words 'I promise' have come to have this morally binding character,

we have to admit that their binding force is derived from a linguistic convention accepted both by the speaker and the hearer. But what is the acceptance of a convention? Is it not itself the making of a promise, or something essentially similar? It is as if one had said, 'I promise that whenever I say "I promise . . ." I shall be morally bound to do the action whose description follows those words.' And this looks like a vicious infinite regress. How Prichard solved these difficulties about promising, I do not know. I mention them partly for their intrinsic interest, and partly to illustrate the course his reflections were taking in the last ten years of his life, when he was at work on his unfinished book.

Something must now be said about Prichard's theory of knowledge. In this he was greatly influenced by Cook Wilson (much more, I think, than in his moral philosophy). But he developed Cook Wilson's principles in a highly original way of his own; and the eventual results, though very strange to contemporary ears, deserve to be better known than they are. Outside his own university, and even to some extent within it, Prichard came to be thought of mainly as a moralist. This was because nearly all his published work after 1918 was concerned with moral philosophy. It came to be forgotten that he had been one of the founders of the epistemological school known as 'Realism'. His book *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (1909), once so shocking and exciting, is now read by few; and his excellent paper 'A criticism of the Psychologists' treatment of knowledge' (*Mind*, 1907) seems to be quite unknown to the present generation of philosophical students and philosophical teachers. But epistemological problems continued to occupy him right up to the end of his life, and his theory of knowledge, especially in its later developments, is as interesting as his moral philosophy; indeed, his moral philosophy cannot be completely understood apart from his theory of knowledge. It is a great pity that he published almost nothing on the subject after 1910. But he certainly wrote a number of short papers about it, some of which were read to philosophical gatherings in Oxford (not to speak of numerous letters to his colleagues). It is to be hoped that some of these have been preserved and will one day be printed.

It used to be said that *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* was a very good book about Prichard's theory of knowledge, but not such a good one about Kant's. There is truth in both comments: in the second, because one cannot do full justice to the writings of

a great philosopher if one is in fundamental disagreement with him on almost every major point; in the first, because the central thesis of Prichard's theory of knowledge is very clearly stated in the book, even though he came to be dissatisfied later with some of the ways in which he had applied it. That thesis, which he had learned from Cook Wilson, concerns the nature of knowledge itself. Knowledge, Prichard holds, is something *sui generis*. It can neither be defined in terms of anything else, as Kant, he thought, had tried to define it in terms of 'synthesis'; nor can it be explained genetically, as the psychologists, he thought, have tried to explain it by tracing its development out of some previous state—sensation or feeling—in which it is not yet present. Knowing is an activity of consciousness, certainly. But it is not any kind of doing, or making, or constructing. It is the discovery of what is. And what is known is independent of the knowing; to deny this (as all the Idealists, in one way or another, did deny it) was simply to contradict the nature of knowledge. Moreover, Prichard thought that all knowledge was direct: To speak of 'knowing indirectly' would be absurd. The indirectness was only in the manner of coming to know, not in the knowing itself. To put it metaphorically, knowledge is the direct confrontation of mind and reality.

Now this conception of knowledge compels us to draw a very sharp distinction between knowledge on the one hand, and belief or opinion on the other. To speak of 'false knowledge' or even of 'fallible knowledge' would be self-contradictory, and falseness and fallibility must be provided for somehow. Moreover, within what is traditionally called belief we must distinguish between rational opinion based on evidence, and non-rational taking for granted, what Prichard called 'thinking without question', and Cook Wilson 'being under an impression that'. (Of course a rational opinion may still be false, and what we think without question may still happen to be true.) These distinctions are characteristic of all Cook-Wilsonian philosophers, and must always be borne in mind if we are to understand their writings.

It follows also that much of what we commonly call knowledge in ordinary life, including a large part of natural science, has to be classed as probable opinion, since it is neither direct or infallible. Perception is a crucial instance. In *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* Prichard held that perception is, or at any rate contains, a direct knowledge of the material world. He got over the obvious difficulties of this view by drawing a distinction

between 'appears' and 'is'. If one may use terminology he disliked, he thought that the perceptual situation is an irreducibly three-term one, in which a certain material object *M* appears to a percipient *P* to have a certain characteristic *C*. Nevertheless, he thought, we are knowing that the material object does exist, and that it does have *some* determinate form of the determinable characteristic of which *C* is a determinate. Thus when railway lines appear convergent, we know that the railway lines exist, and that they are *either* convergent *or* divergent *or* parallel. Moreover, in favourable cases we can know the determinate characteristic which the object really does have. It then appears to be what it actually is. Thus from points of view directly above them the railway lines appear parallel, though from other points of view they appear convergent. But Prichard already admitted that no such distinction between 'appears' and 'is' can be drawn in the case of secondary qualities (even though the plain man does try to draw it). Colour, sound, smell, and other such qualities, he says, are dependent on us: not, of course, dependent on us in so far as we are *knowers*—for anything which is known is independent of the knowing of it—but dependent on us in so far as we are *sentient* beings.

This theory did not satisfy Prichard for very long. The objection 'how can a thing appear what it is not?', which he had already stated and tried to answer in the book, eventually seemed to him unanswerable. But dissatisfaction with this Appearing Theory did not lead him, as it led Russell and Moore, to accept a sense-datum theory in its place. On the contrary, the very use of the term 'sense-datum' seemed to him to involve a fundamental error, the error of supposing that sensation is a form of knowledge.¹ As to the nature of sensation (or 'perceiving' as he insisted on calling it) he held that Berkeley was right, that the *esse* of sensibles involves *percipi*. Thus to ask, as some philosophers have, whether colours exist unseen or sounds unheard is absurd. The fact that most of those who have asked the question answer 'No' does not make matters any better. The question itself, so Prichard thought, is nonsensical and cannot be asked at all. For, strictly speaking, there *are* no colours or sounds; there is only someone-seeing-a-colour, someone-hearing-a-sound, &c. The colour, of course, is not *the same*

¹ This was the theme of his inaugural address to the joint session of the Mind Association and Aristotelean Society, held in Oxford in 1938. ('The Sense-datum Fallacy:' Aristotelean Society *Proceedings*, Supplementary Volume xvii.)

as the seeing. So far, he would have admitted that Professor G. E. Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism' is right; but the colour, he held, is nevertheless dependent on the seeing (i.e. on the visual sensing) and cannot be conceived to exist apart from it. It follows that sensation cannot be a form of knowing: for in that case it would be at least conceivable that colours, &c., might exist unsensed, even though in fact they might be dependent on physiological or psychological processes which accompany the sensing.

Prichard offered no argument in favour of this 'internal accusative' theory of sensation. He maintained that it was self-evident. (I must confess that I do not find it so, though I do not deny that it may be true.) But he also thought that in our everyday perceptual consciousness we systematically ignored this self-evident truth. As he quaintly said, the ordinary man when he sees a colour 'straight off mistakes it for a body'. What a strange mistake to make! One of Prichard's colleagues, when he first heard this theory propounded, suggested as a parallel: 'I got into a noise, but I thought it was a train.' It is difficult to think that anyone could mistake a brown colour for a tea-tray. What he might do, I suppose, is to mistake it for the upper surface of a tea-tray; and this, I believe, is what Prichard meant. In any case, he certainly thought that in our ordinary perceptual consciousness we were in a state of permanent illusion. He ought to have admitted, I think, that within this Great Illusion there were minor illusions (as when we are deceived by a mirror image) and, moreover, that the ordinary percipient knows how to detect them and correct them, even though the Great Illusion itself can only be detected and corrected by philosophical reflection. At any rate, some account ought to be given of what we *ordinarily* call the distinction between illusory and veridical perception. If one may put words into his mouth which he would have abhorred, he ought surely to have distinguished, within the Great Illusion, between the 'phenomenally true' and the 'phenomenally false'; and he ought to have examined the criteria by which we decide whether a given perceptual experience falls under the one head or the other. But the further analysis of the ordinary perceptual consciousness (for that is what it would amount to) did not appear to interest him greatly. It was sufficient for him that this form of consciousness was radically erroneous.

He did, however, draw one interesting and curious consequence from this theory. It followed, he said, that the idea of

'bodiness' (material substance) must be an *innate* or unacquired idea. We could not make the mistake of confusing sensation-contents with bodies unless we had the idea of 'bodiness' already. We could not have acquired it from a knowledge of its instances, because we never had known any instances of it. And yet we certainly possess it, because we constantly find ourselves misapplying it to something which is *not* an instance of it.

'What had become of Prichard's "Realism"?' the reader may ask, as his colleagues also did. It was still there, however. Though its details had altered, its main principles had not, and they enabled him to build up again with one hand what he had so ruthlessly knocked down with the other. Despite the illusory character of the ordinary perceptual consciousness, he maintained that there are still some things which we *know* when perceptual experiences occur. Sensation itself is not knowing. But we do know (or can, if we attend) that we are having sensations, and what sensations they are. Again, to take a colour for a body is an error, but even in making this mistake we are knowing a region of physical space; not just a region of sensible space, as some philosophers might suppose, for according to Prichard there is only one space, Space with a capital S, and to speak of 'many spaces' is absurd, unless you mean many regions within the one space. We know also, or can if we reflect, that every event has a cause. This proposition, too, Prichard thought to be self-evident. Finally, he held, we knew that causes are always substances. A cause, as he once strikingly said, is a *substance acting*; causation is activity, not necessitation (still less mere regularity of sequence), and only substances can act.

Given these pieces of knowledge, the material world, which we seemed to have lost, may be restored to us. We can infer its existence by a causal argument, though we can no longer claim to perceive it. The argument, Prichard admitted, would not be demonstrative. So we could not *know*, in a strict sense, that there is a material world or what its constitution is, but we could attain to a highly probable opinion. Indeed, he once said, *sub rosa*, that the existence of a material world is 'almost certain'. He also remarked once, in an equally unofficial moment, that 'the truth, when it is found, will not be very unlike the philosophy of Locke'. I think he meant the truth about perception and the external world.

What exactly this causal argument was, I do not know, but it must have been an elaborate one. When challenged at philosophical meetings to produce it, he would ask to be

excused, on the ground that he would need at least half an hour to state it. But presumably some sketch of it, at any rate, exists among his papers. Meanwhile, the only clue I can offer is a remark he once made about Berkeley's argument for the existence of God. It was to the effect that Berkeley's God could only produce our sensations by acting as if He were a system of bodies in space.

Prichard's theory of self-consciousness was much less fully worked out than his theory of perception, perhaps because the subject seemed to him less difficult. He thought that in self-consciousness (he disliked the word 'introspection') we had a direct knowledge of our own mental state and activities, and a direct knowledge of the self whose states and activities they are. He also held that every self is a substance, and an immaterial substance. I think he saw nothing particularly puzzling in psycho-physical interaction. Both Parallelism and Epiphenomenalism seemed to him absurd; and he thought it equally absurd to try to explain memory by means of physiological traces. When asked about the difficulty which some have found in reconciling the principle of the Conservation of Energy with the possibility of psycho-physical interaction, he replied that if there were any incompatibility between them it was the Conservation Principle, and not the fact of psycho-physical interaction, which must be denied. His conviction that every self is a substance led him to accept a curious theory of immortality and pre-existence. His ground for this was that a substance could neither be produced nor destroyed. Indeed, he thought that strictly speaking any substance is a non-temporal entity; what was temporal was only its state and activities, not the substance itself. A self then, being a substance, could not have come into existence at the time when it began to interact with the collection of material substances known as its body, any more than it could cease to exist when that interaction ceased. It did not, however, follow that it was *conscious* of anything before bodily life began. That might or might not have been so. All we could be certain of was that it did exist, and did have the *capacités* which are constitutive of a psychical substance, for instance the capacities of knowing and feeling. It might be that before bodily life began these capacities were wholly unactualized.

Finally, a word must be said about Prichard's theory of thinking. He did not distinguish, as many philosophers now do, between logic on the one hand and the epistemology of

thinking on the other. If the distinction be made, I think we shall have to say that in logic he was not particularly original. He accepted, in the main, the logical views of Cook Wilson, though he was never satisfied with Cook Wilson's theory of hypothetical statements. But his theory of thinking, though it was also Cook Wilsonian in its principles, was original in its details; and not less interesting because it was so unfashionable. Thinking, he held, is essentially awareness of objective universals and of the relations between them. The capacity for apprehending universals is an ultimate and inexplicable capacity of the human mind, and it is actualized by reflecting upon the particulars which are their instances. (Our knowledge of the universal 'bodiness', mentioned above, would appear to be an exception to this rule.) All forms of Conceptualism, and *a fortiori* all forms of Nominalism, seemed to him to be fundamentally erroneous. The word 'concept', which he disliked, could only mean 'an objective universal which some mind apprehends'. One of the few points on which he agreed with Kant was in maintaining that there are truths which are at once necessary and synthetic. But Kant's answer to the question 'how are *a priori* synthetic judgements possible?' seemed to Prichard utterly mistaken. The right answer, he thought, was simply that we are directly aware of certain necessary and synthetic connexions between objective universals.

But though he was uncompromisingly 'realistic' about universals, Prichard would have nothing to do with 'realistic' theories about other objects of thought. It has been supposed by some that when we hold a belief there must be a special kind of intelligible entity, a subsistent proposition, which is the object of our belief (likewise when we doubt, or assume, or wonder). Prichard maintained, on the contrary, that there are no 'objects of belief' at all; and, for the same reason, that there are no 'objects of desire'. When confronted with the criticism that, if so, two people could not believe the same thing, he admitted that strictly speaking they could not. Nevertheless, the same universals could be present to the minds of both; and that, he thought, gave the critic all he had a right to ask. Prichard likewise rejected all 'realistic' theories of possibility and probability, on the ground that everything which exists is also necessary; therefore, when we say that it is possible that *A* is *B*, or probable to a certain degree that it is, we are only expressing our own mental attitude—an attitude of uncertainty, or of opinion, as the case may be. But unfortunately Prichard never

worked out this part of his philosophy in detail, and I do not know how he would have solved the difficulties to which any subjectivistic theory of probability seems to be exposed. (How is it, for example, that a probability-estimate can be mistaken?)

It will be seen that Prichard's theory of knowledge is not at all congruous with the prevailing climate of philosophical opinion. Even in his own university, the traditional home of lost causes, it appeared strange and even reactionary to many of his younger contemporaries. Nevertheless, I believe that his epistemological views are both interesting and important, not less so than his moral philosophy. Their paradoxical appearance is largely due to the old-fashioned terminology in which they were formulated. Whether we agree with them or not, we have much to learn from them.

H. H. PRICE



C. W. PREVITÉ-ORTON

C. W. PREVITÉ-ORTON

1877-1947

CHARLES WILLIAM PREVITÉ-ORTON was born at Arnesby, Leicestershire, on 16 January 1877, the younger son of the Rev. William Previté-Orton, vicar of Arnesby. He had Italian blood in his veins. His paternal grandfather, a native of Sicily, had taken service with one of Nelson's captains during the Napoleonic wars, and subsequently came to England, whence, in common with a number of his countrymen, he sought a career in British India. There he secured a competence and, before leaving the country, married a Miss Enderwick in Calcutta Cathedral in 1835 and settled in London the following year. Seven years later, shortly after he had bought a villa at Naples, and only a fortnight before he was to leave England for good, he died suddenly. His widow remained in England, and among her sons' schoolfellows were two of the name of Orton, whose sister, Eliza, William Previte married in 1870, taking the additional name of Orton by deed-poll. His son retained little trace of the Italian ancestry save the name, for neither in appearance nor temperament nor tastes was there any clear indication of Sicilian descent, and though he read Italian with ease, and was familiar with the classical poets and prose writers, he did not speak it with idiomatic perfection. He was, however, always deeply pained by ignorant or narrow criticism of Italy and the Italians, and in middle life he took the trouble to visit Sicily and trace the home of his forebears at Sampieri on the slopes of Etna.

While his father's brother made something of a fortune as shipbroker and underwriter, his father, who had been an undergraduate of St. John's College, Cambridge, took orders and spent his life on country parishes. It was, indeed, because he feared that a foreign name would be a disadvantage in rural districts that he added that of his wife, and the accent on the final letter of his own name was an arbitrary addition to indicate the pronunciation. There was something of irony, therefore, in the choice of 'Previté' as the name by which his son was known to all his friends. Dr. Previté-Orton's elder brother followed his father to St. John's, and after a university career of some distinction followed the academical profession, becoming in time professor of chemistry at Bangor and a Fellow of the Royal Society. He died shortly after the First World War.

The younger son, Charles, who had inherited from the Ortons a natural shyness and diffidence, began his education at Franklin's Preparatory School, Stoneygate, Leicester. This was the beginning and the end of his schooling, for at fourteen it became clear that he had inherited from his Italian great-grandmother a disease which attacked his left eye. In the then practice of ophthalmic therapy the removal of the diseased eye was considered necessary to prevent the infection spreading to the sound one. The operation was a shock to the sensitive and handsome boy, and left him with an ever-present anxiety, which more than once proved well founded, that any excessive strain on the remaining eye might induce temporary, if not permanent, loss of sight. He never returned to school, and for some years did little reading for himself; his education was continued by the loving care of his parents, who read to him in turn for several hours each day. A further trial came in his late boyhood, for it was thought that one of his lungs was affected by tuberculosis. As a safeguard and cure he spent the winter months for some years on the south coast, and it was during one of these visits that he came to know well two small cousins in their home. One of them, a little girl of six, who was in time to become his wife, he delighted with the fairy tales he could tell by the hour; with her elder brother he played at tin soldiers and read Scott and Henty. Throughout his life he was at perfect ease with children and they with him; he delighted in telling stories and they in listening. In this, his own daughter followed her mother, and, in very recent years, so did his two small grandsons.

Not till his twenty-eighth year was completed was his health considered to be fully re-established; then, in 1905, he entered his father's old college. At that time an undergraduate over twenty-three was a wonder, and this helped to accentuate Previt -Orton's shyness. Nevertheless, he was from the first happy in Cambridge, and his academical career was one of unbroken success; he took a first class in both parts of the historical tripos (1907, 1908) and followed this by winning the Gladstone memorial prize and the Members' essay prize (with an essay on English Political Satire) in 1910. Finally, he was elected into a fellowship at St. John's in 1911. He was, in the opinion of one who knew him well at this time, already formed in mind, but his early years at Cambridge were passed among a generation keenly aware of the demands and ideals of Acton, and of the German methods of exact scholarship made familiar by Adolphus Ward. History was regarded primarily as a science:

the ascertaining and presentation of the greatest possible number of accurate facts. It was in this spirit that the *Cambridge Modern History* had been conceived; during Previt -Orton's first years at Cambridge the early volumes were on the stocks, and his career coincided almost exactly with what may be called the era of the Cambridge Histories.

For the purposes of his fellowship dissertation he made an elaborate study of which the results were published in an augmented form in 1912 as *The Early History of the House of Savoy*. It was his first considerable historical publication—though the earliest item in his bibliography is, somewhat unexpectedly, a book of verse—and he was already thirty-five; it is not therefore surprising that it should have been a work of maturity and poise, exhibiting all those qualities of ‘patient and inexorable learning’ that made him, in the opinion of Sir Maurice Powicke, ‘the master of a rigid scientific method’. It is a difficult book to read, not through any fault of style or confusion of thought, but because, as the writer himself said, he had ‘gone plainly on . . . endeavouring to be complete and omit nothing’. If the reader would at times be willing to omit a great deal, he cannot fail to appreciate and salute the easy mastery of technique, the absolute accuracy, and the perfect self-control of the young historian. Shortly after the book's appearance Previt -Orton, now firmly established in his career, married his cousin, Ellery Swelfield Orton, and settled at 55 Bateman Street, a house lately vacated by J. H. Clapham, which was to be his home for the remaining thirty-four years of his life.

While at work on his dissertation Previt -Orton had contrived to find time to devote to an interest represented by his prize essay, and between 1912 and 1914 contributed to the *Cambridge History of English Literature* chapters on political satire and political literature from the Restoration to the age of the Reform Bill. These pages, written in an easy and attractive style, and showing a wide acquaintance with many little-known by-paths of literature, seem at first sight an example of a phenomenon not uncommon in scholars—the ability in a specialist to retain a mastery of a subject far removed from that which he has made peculiarly his own. Regarded more closely, however, a connexion may be found on a deeper level between the essays on English political satire and his larger works. Marsilius of Padua and Titus Livius de Frulovisiis are, in other ages, fellows in their different ways of Samuel Butler and Junius. Purely literary interests, however, were no more to have a place, though

he never ceased to read great poetry; henceforward his concern was with the cities and communes of Lombardy between the age of Otto the Great and that of Lewis of Bavaria.

Meanwhile college and university work filled much of his time. After many years of supervision he became director of studies in history in his college, a large one with a distinguished tradition in the History School, while for twenty-one years he was librarian, and found a peculiarly congenial field of work in that office. A friend and colleague¹ writes of him:

To his college, both in its buildings and in its men, he was devoted. The Library owes a great deal to his skilful buying and choice of books; he loved displaying its treasures to visitors, and his readiness to help brought him into touch with a large number of Fellows and undergraduates. In supervision, to a keen pupil he could be an inspiration, and many owed to him their first glimpse of the fascination of medieval studies. He dined in Hall regularly twice a week, and took with almost equal regularity the alternative sweet of apple pie. He obviously enjoyed the give-and-take of conversation, and would strike in when he felt he had something to contribute, but not before. He carried his immense learning lightly, though nothing was more enjoyable than to see (and hear) him embark—having first polished his glasses with a silk handkerchief—upon a topic that interested him; then a flood of information, accurate, well-phrased and satisfying, would pour forth. So unassuming, so quiet, but when occasion demanded so definite; if amused by a joke or passing quip he would fling back his head in enjoyment and laugh with an almost childlike and infectious glee.

He lectured by preference on the history of Italy in the central medieval centuries, and more than once took charge of a special period for the second part of the tripos. Here he had scope for his genius, but with a more general subject and larger audiences he was not seen to advantage; the teller of fairy-tales, who could hold a nursery spellbound, made too few concessions to the imagination and emotions—perhaps because of a diffidence that hindered the free play of all his powers—and he failed to kindle an enthusiasm in the majority of those who heard him.

Physically unfit as he was for active service of any kind in the First World War, he nevertheless trained and drilled throughout those years with the corps of resident M.A.s; the war, however, did not interrupt his life of scholarship as it did that of many of his contemporaries and juniors, and in 1916 he published his *Outlines of Medieval History*, for which a second edition was called in 1924. He was thus clearly fitted to fill the vacancy

¹ The Rev. M. P. Charlesworth.

on the editorial board of the *Cambridge Medieval History* left by the death of Professor Gwatkin, and he was asked to join Professor Whitney and his own colleague and sometime tutor, J. R. Tanner. Previt -Orton remained to be joint-editor of six volumes (iii-viii), contributing introductions to vols. vi and vii and an epilogue to vol. viii, as well as three chapters on Italy in the course of the work. These chapters remain the clearest and most judicial short account in English of the periods concerned, and the introductions, and above all the epilogue, are fine examples of reflective writing of a kind found all too rarely in his books. In 1921 he was joined by Z. N. Brooke, and the final three volumes were edited by these two alone. This last partnership of fifteen years, which accompanied a close association in the teaching of medieval history, was a notable one in the annals of the School of History at Cambridge. Though Brooke was Previt -Orton's junior by seven years, he had been his senior by several years in residence at St. John's; they were therefore in a sense on an exact equality. Differing widely in temperament, but both reserved and sensitive, they would not perhaps otherwise have reached intimacy, for Previt -Orton was a man of few close friends, but as scholars and medievalists they were of one family, and with 'Previt ' no one could quarrel.

Before many years had passed his wide erudition and great editorial gifts received recognition outside Cambridge, and in 1925 he was invited to become joint-editor of the *English Historical Review*. When, after a year's association (Jan.-Oct. 1926) with G. N. Clark, the latter relinquished his post, Previt -Orton was sole editor for over eleven years (Jan. 1927-Jan. 1938). The sum total of editorial work involved in the two offices which he thus held concurrently was very great; the *Medieval History* alone was reasonably felt as something of a burden by Brooke, and Previt -Orton was never one to spare himself. He was methodical; he had no external commitments apart from his work and his home; he enjoyed his work, and the contacts and exchanges with historians all over Britain which it involved; but the amount of teaching, editing, and original research accomplished between 1920 and 1938 was truly remarkable, especially when his delicate physique and fragile eyesight are taken into the reckoning. As editor of the *English Historical Review* he continued the tradition established by R. L. Poole by which the editor not only eliminated errors but also criticized the articles submitted to him in a constructive manner and improved them in every possible way. Those who contributed articles on medieval subjects during

those years had a sense of confidence when their manuscript emerged from the careful process of checking, correcting, and amplifying; as for some of the chapters in the *Medieval History*, especially those by foreign scholars, the debt they owe to Previt -Orton for their accuracy and lucidity could be fully estimated only if the original manuscript were available for comparison with the printed page. Exact and tireless, but never harsh, in criticism, he had also the qualities of a great editor in the planning and allotment of chapters and articles. The later volumes of the *Medieval History* are particularly remarkable in this respect; whatever may be the value of co-operative history, they are admirable specimens of the *genre*.

With all these claims upon him, Previt -Orton yet found time for private study. Two or three scattered articles had indicated that he was working upon Marsilius of Padua, and a critical edition of the *Defensor Pacis* appeared in 1928. After centuries of neglect Marsilius has in recent years found editors and commentators in plenty: Previt -Orton's edition was followed in 1937 by that of R. Scholz in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*. Each has excellences of its own, and some will feel that if Scholz is at times more aware of the wider implications of Marsilius' thought, Previt -Orton is superior on textual and linguistic points. These same years saw further papers (1927, 1929) and a lecture for the British Academy on Marsilius. The last shows the writer in his most informative and penetrating vein, and we cannot but regret that more demands of the kind were not made upon him. At the same time, it may be thought that his approach to the interpretation of Marsilius showed his limitations as a critic of medieval currents of opinion. The studies of M. de Lagarde and others may at times err from excessive warmth of tone and sentiment, but we can with difficulty avoid feeling that, lacking as he did a sense of the actuality of medieval problems, Previt -Orton failed to relate Marsilius' thought sufficiently to the other movements and parties of his age, and failed also to assess the justice of his implicit claim to be a faithful expounder of the mind of Aristotle.

Another article, contributed to the *English Historical Review* as early as 1915, had indicated an interest in Titus Livius de Frulovisiis, the Ferrarese humanist and Venetian schoolmaster and satirist who spent some years in England in the reign of Henry VI. The presence of an autograph manuscript in the library of St. John's was the occasion of this particular study, and a critical edition of the hitherto unpublished works of Titus

Livius appeared in 1932; they are of interest for the historian of Italian humanism, but have no direct bearing upon medieval history.

Previté-Orton proceeded Litt.D. in 1928, with the edition of Marsilius behind him, and in the following year was elected a Fellow of the British Academy. Eight years later a chair in medieval history was founded in the university; of those engaged in teaching at Cambridge at the time the two joint editors of the *Medieval History* were clearly seen as unwilling rivals, and the choice of the electors fell on the older man. He felt the relief from college teaching and direction, but his existing commitments were enough to prevent his new office from marking an epoch in his career as a scholar. His *History of Europe, 1198-1378*, a volume in the series of Methuen's advanced text-books, which stood next to another by Brooke, appeared in the year of his election. In the sequel, his activity was seriously curtailed within less than a year. On more than one occasion overwork had resulted in a minor haemorrhage in his eye; in the Christmas vacation of 1937-8 he went out to Rome to see to the comfort of his daughter who had only just recovered from an illness during her Oxford career; the anxiety and a sudden exposure to brilliant sunshine brought on a serious haemorrhage, and he became completely blind. After long weeks the trouble abated and he could see once more, but he was advised that a contraction of work was necessary, and he resigned the editorship of the *English Historical Review*; labour on the *Cambridge Medieval History* had ceased, save for formalities, with the passing of the final volume for press in 1937. Within a little more than a year came the war, with an inevitable dislocation of academical work, and in September 1942 he reached the retiring age in his chair. Though he had done his fair share, and more, of routine teaching in the past he undertook, in the abnormal conditions at the end of the war, a certain amount of supervision for his college; it was a characteristic act of unselfishness and modesty. He was also engaged during his last years, at the request of the Syndics of the University Press, in condensing the *Cambridge Medieval History* into a single volume, and the manuscript had gone to the printers before his death. The feat of writing two text-books on medieval periods, as well as concentrating a great co-operative history, is an unusual one for a scholar of his distinction to have achieved; other historians, perhaps, will regard it with marvel rather than envy.

Though colleagues and scholars of other universities of the

most diverse interests and temperaments had for Previt -Orton a respect and admiration which verged more nearly than he knew upon affection, his intimate friends were very few. At his own college the present Master (Mr. E. A. Benians), the President (the Rev. M. P. Charlesworth), and Professor J. M. Creed may be mentioned; outside its walls, perhaps Professor Harold Temperley stood nearest; he lost the last two named within a few years of his own death, and felt the loss deeply. He delighted in his home life and was devoted to his only daughter, who inherited many of his interests, and in the last years his two grandchildren gave him much joy. As a boy, during his enforced abstention from reading, he had taken to observing birds. At Cambridge his garden ran down to the territory of the Botanical Garden, the entrance to which was only a hundred yards away, and he found endless delight in watching the finches, tits, and warblers, in identifying their song or call, and in noting each year the date of arrival of the migrants. Of interests of a deeper kind the friend already quoted writes:

His religious convictions, though never obtruded, were deep, sincere and strong. He regularly attended divine service at St. Andrew's Parish Church, and often in the College Chapel; in war-time he sometimes came to evening chapel and would read the lessons. He was asked to assist a small committee which was engaged in drawing up a supplement to the College hymnbook; here his scholarship, his prodigious memory, his sound taste and his piety were alike invaluable. On one occasion the committee had been searching for the earliest version of a hymn by Dean Stanley; it could not be found either in his works or in his *Life*. But Previt  was certain he had seen it somewhere, or heard his father speak about it; was it not first published in *Macmillan's Magazine*? Indeed it was, and at the next meeting he produced the volume in triumph.

Though well aware that his reserve of physical strength was not great, he never became an invalid and continued his normal activities to the end. The severe winter of 1947, however, taxed him more than he knew. Before its rigours abated came the death of Dr. G. G. Coulton, for long a colleague at St. John's, and the last time his friends saw Previt -Orton was at the memorial service in the college chapel. The following day, 11 March, he died at home, of heart failure, suddenly and unexpectedly, while engaged with a pupil.

Previt -Orton, to many both at Cambridge and elsewhere, seemed an embodiment of some of the most typical features of the historical scholarship of his age and of his university. If his

general accounts of medieval history appear dry and factual, and his editions and articles appeal for the most part to specialists alone, a few of his occasional lectures and papers, and above all his editorial contributions to the *Cambridge Medieval History*, show him to have had many of the gifts of a great historian—lucidity of thought and style, a wide outlook, and a sensitive appreciation of men and their arts in the past. Only fire was wanting. When his first book appeared a reviewer in the *English Historical Review* remarked that a clearer and more accurate account could not be desired; there was but one defect, that of dullness; and when he had, with all the medieval centuries to cover, a more lofty theme, no less a critic than James Tait, who himself condescended little to human weakness, could write that ‘a little more of the glow of [a specified paragraph] on Gothic architecture would have stimulated the interest of most readers’.

This dryness of treatment was largely deliberate, but not wholly so. Previt -Orton remained, perhaps more than any other contemporary medievalist, an impersonal writer because he was intellectually and emotionally detached. Though no recluse and far from eccentric or inhuman, he yet lived what may be called an intellectually monastic life. History was to him a science, a technique, and medieval history was the department of the historical Cavendish in which he spent his days; it was not, as it had been to some of the greatest medievalists of the past—a Stubbs, a Maitland, a Delisle, a Pirenne—a living force which, by reason of its political or legal or economic or religious or artistic implications, lay behind some of the most eager activities and deepest convictions of their own lives; it was not even a discipline or a subject for which he led a crusade or a reform. This circumstance was a source of strength: not a paragraph that he wrote was vitiated by enthusiasm or prejudice or rhetoric; almost alone among his contemporaries he would seem to have satisfied the demand of impartiality as formulated by Acton in his celebrated prospectus. Yet at the same time this detachment had its limiting force: his books, though a help to innumerable students, have done comparatively little to stimulate enthusiasm for further research, and few of his readers would be able to say that their understanding of the currents of life and thought in medieval Europe had been notably altered or deepened by what he wrote. It is for this reason that it is hard in his case to feel the regret which is commonly experienced when a scholar or historian of the first rank becomes enmeshed in editorial duties. Previt -Orton was in his element as an editor

of learned work, and his achievement in selection, criticism, and improvement was perhaps a greater contribution to historical learning than would have been two or three additional publications of his own. Yet possibly his greatest service, above both his editorial labours and his own research, lay in the quality rather than in the content of his work. Scholarship reflects character, and he was candid, without vanity, sincere; his scholarship, pure, flawless, sharply cut and lucid as a diamond, has been to others an example and a challenge.

M. D. KNOWLES

FOR much of the personal information in this memoir I am indebted to Mrs. Previté-Orton, to the Master of St. John's College, Cambridge (Mr. E. A. Benians), and to the Rev. M. P. Charlesworth.

A full bibliography of the writings of Dr. Previté-Orton, compiled by Mr. Philip Grierson, appeared in the *Cambridge Historical Journal*, vol. ix, No. 1 (1947), 118-19. The second of the articles there listed, and noted as appearing in the *English Historical Review* of 1907, actually appeared in 1910, pp. 520-2.

CENTRAL LIBRARY
BIRLA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & SCIENCE
PILANI (Rajasthan)

062
B862
v. 33

Call No.

Acc. No.

DATE OF RETURN

36445

--	--	--	--

