Co-engineering Safety-Security Using Statistical Model Checking

Abstract

In this journal-first paper, we present an overview of our novel formalism of Attack-Fault-Maintenance Trees (AFMTs). Detailed version of work is available in [3]. AFMTs enable practitioners to quantify the disruption scenarios by answering several safety-security metrics. Alongside, it provides an informed decision on optimal maintenance policies by suggesting preventive component repairs and inspection frequencies. We answer the aforementioned metrics through “what-if” and “scenario analysis”. The models are supported by a graphical friendly tool of PASST. The tool’s front-end is a drawing canvas that provides the different syntactic elements used to design a well-formed AFMT model. The back-end of the tool is based on the statistical-model checking techniques. From the practitioner perspective, once the AFMT is designed and input parameters on component failure, detection rates, inspection rates are provided, the entire analysis can be then done as push-button technology using model-checking techniques